Continued Diet Showdowns

The Struggle over Pension Reform

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 19, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

On May 16, the Ishiba Cabinet submitted a pension reform bill to the Diet. After a long deliberation, the Ishiba government dropped a provision to use a reserve fund for salaried workers to offset any future decline in pension benefits. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was afraid that including this provision would hurt them in the coming July Upper House elections.
 
The opposition parties are frustrated with the pension bill. It is likely that it will be the last major piece of legislation considered during the remainder of the current ordinary session of the Diet that ends June 22.
 
Japan has a universal pension system which covers mostly all the residents in Japan, irrespective of their nationality. Everyone between the ages of 20 and 59 must pay premiums into the National Pension System (NPS) and receive benefits at the age of 65. Salaried workers, who make up 70 percent of the workforce, must pay additional premiums for “employee’s pension insurance” (EPI), if they make more than 106 million yen annually. The premiums for both NPS and EPI are automatically deducted from their monthly salaries.
 
Business owners, including farmers and fishermen, receive NPS-only benefits. In 2023, the average NPS benefit was 57 thousand yen per month. Retired salaried workers, both employees of private companies and public workers, receive both NPS and EPI benefits in proportion to their past payments. In 2023, the average total benefit was 147 thousand yen per month.
 
Because Japanese demographics show that the population is aging rapidly, the government introduced the “Macro-economic Slide Formula,” which automatically adjusts pension benefits based on changes in the revenue of the NPS and EPI. With fewer people of working age, the pension revenues have fallen. The financial review for the pension system in 2024, conducted once every five years, found that the ratio of the average pension benefit against the average income of workers currently paying into the NPS and EPI would drop from 61.2 percent in 2024 to 56.9 percent in 2039, even if Japan’s economy achieves a high growth rate with 1.2 percent of real GDP growth and 2.0 percent of real wage hike. That is why pension reform is necessary in the current session of the Diet.
 
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) proposed to raise benefits under the NPS program because people who had paid a smaller premium in the past would receive a smaller benefit. The ministry looked at the EPI reserve fund, which has been growing, as a resource to support the added benefits.   
 
The LDP opposed that idea. Salaried workers who look to the EPI for most of their benefits and not the NPS would object to the MHLW proposal because it would erode the EPI fund. The first action they could take would, of course, be to vote against the LDP in the next election.
 
The LDP has had a traumatic experience with the pension system before. The first Abe administration collapsed following a pension mismanagement scandal, which resulted in a significant defeat for the LDP in the 2007 Upper House elections.
 
Accepting this reality and his party’s opposition, Ishiba submitted the pension bill without any measure for raising the NPS benefit. Instead, the bill would remove “the wall of 106 million yen.” In the current pension system, only a salaried worker with an annual income of 106 million yen or more must pay an EPI pension premium. The new bill would require all workers to pay the premium, regardless of the amount of their income. Even though low-income salaried workers would now be required to pay a premium, their benefits will not be reduced.
 
Also missing from the pension bill is any attempt to address another demographic issue: the “employment ice age.” There is a generation of workers who graduated from college in the 1990s and 2000s after the burst of the bubble economy and who had fewer job prospects. Since they did not pay premiums during their sometimes-lengthy periods of unemployment, it is likely that they will receive fewer pension benefits than the people who were able to keep working. A rule in the pension system significantly reduces benefits for those who have made premium payments for less than 25 years.
 
The opposition parties are critical of the bill’s failure to provide any relief for these participants in the NPS. These parties regard help to the employment ice agers as the core of pension reform. “This is red bean roll bread without red bean paste,” is how the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, described the bill. In American terms, “hamburger helper without the hamburger.” The CDPJ plans to submit its own pension reform bill.
 
The LDP is in a quandary. If they help the employment ice agers by tapping into the EPI reserve fund, they will face anger from the salaried workers. If they do not help, the pension system will not work well for low benefit recipients. And if they fail to pass any bill, Ishiba’s government will be criticized as irresponsible. The future is murky: since the LDP is a minority government in the Lower House. It is unclear whether Ishiba’s bill will pass the Diet by the end of the session on June 22.

Monday Asia Policy Events May 19, 2025

CHINA’S YOUTH: THE AGE OF ANXIETY. 5/19, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society New York. Speakers: Yi-Ling Liu, Journalist in Residence, Tarbell Center; Biao Xiang, Director, Max Planck Institute in Social Anthropology, Germany; Li Zhang, Professor, University of California Davis. 

AN ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S VISIT TO THE GULF AND THE FUTURE OF U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS. 5/19, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. Speakers: Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Senior Advisor, Soufan Group, Former Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Congressional Research Services; Dr. Joseph Kéchichian, Senior Research Fellow, Office of the Chairman, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, CEO, Kéchichian & Associates, LLC; Christopher Johnson, Managing Attorney, Al-Sharif Law, Former Chairman, Middle East Council of Chambers of Commerce; Norman Roule, Former United States National Intelligence Manager for Iran, United Against a Nuclear Iran Senior Advisor. 

ISRAEL AND CIVILIZATION: THE FATE OF THE JEWISH NATION AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST. 5/19, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Josh Hammer, Senior Editor at Large, Newsweek; Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Senior Fellow and Director, Keystone Defense Initiative.

AMBASSADORS' CIRCLE WITH AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. 5/19, 7:00-8:00pm (EDT) 5/20, 8:00-9:15am (JST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Cheol-Hee Park, Ambassador to Japan, ROK. 

WHAT WE CHOSE NOT TO SEE: PULITZER PRIZE WINNER MATTHIEU AIKINS ON WAR, POWER, AND TRUTH. 5/19, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speaker: Matthieu Aikins, Reporter, New York Times, Pulitzer Prize Winner. 

HOW THE WEST CAN OVERCOME THE TOTALITARIAN AXIS. 5/19, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speaker: Sir Iain Duncan Smith MP, former leader of the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party and founder and cochair of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. 

MAINTAINING AMERICA'S AI EDGE. 5/19, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security. Speakers: Michael Kuiken, Commissioner for the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission; Randall Schriver, Commissioner for the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

BOOK TALK: EDWARD LUCE ON THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. 5/19, 5:30-6:30pm (CET) 6:30-7:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: author Edward Luce, US National Editor and Columnist, Financial Times; Ian Brzezinski, Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4jHp4bO

BOOK TALK: OUR FIRST GLIMPSE OF JAPAN: PROMINENT AMERICAN VISITORS TO JAPAN IN THE 1870. 5/21, 12:15-1:45am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY, Brown bag lunch. Sponsor: ICAS, Temple University Japan and Harvard Club of Japan. Speaker: author Samuel Kidder, Managing Director, FES Inc. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Sovj8c 

Japan is not the UK of the East

The Impact of Tariffs on Japan’s Economy

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 12, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

As U.S. President Donald Trump enters bilateral tariff negotiations with several countries, his tariffs have already begun to negatively affect Japan’s economy. Some business sectors had already realized profit and growth losses from the slowdown of Japan’s economy. The Shigeru Ishiba administration believes that, as a close ally of the United States, it can negotiate some exceptions to the punishing tariffs. This is far from certain.
 
The Bank of Japan has revised its estimate of the growth of Japan’s economy in FY2025. “Japan’s economic growth is likely to moderate, as trade and other policies in each jurisdiction [other countries] lead to a slowdown in overseas economies and to a decline in domestic corporate profits and other factors,” says the bank’s Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices in April. The outlook identifies Japan’s evolving trade situation and developments in import prices as risks to economic activity.
 
Toyota Motor Corporation published its FY2025 consolidated financial results on May 8. According to its estimation, net income from April 2025 to March 2026 will decline by 3.1 trillion yen ($21 billion), or 34.9 percent. Toyota has already taken into account declines of 180 billion yen in April and May 2025 that have resulted from Trump’s tariff policy, as well as an annual 745 billion yen reduction caused by the fluctuation of foreign exchange rates.
 
Nippon Steel estimates its net income between April 2025 and March 2026 will be 200 billion yen, a 42.9 percent decline from the previous fiscal year. “The U.S. administration’s tariff policy is becoming increasingly uncertain day by day and is beginning to have a major impact on the global economy. As a result, the trend toward favoring domestic production is accelerating, and it is expected to have a significant impact on the domestic and overseas steel industry, including an indirect impact,” according to Nippon Steel’s consolidated financial results for FY2024.
 
The Trump administration imposed a 25 percent tariff on foreign steel and aluminum in March. In April, it imposed another 25 percent tariff on imported cars. The Shigeru Ishiba administration quickly sought to negotiate reductions in these tariffs. Japan’s top negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, announced that the talks were focused on the expansion of bilateral trade, non-tariff barriers, and economic security.
 
While Japan has been spending time trying to set the agenda, the United Kingdom reached a deal with the U.S. to reduce tariffs on UK products. The tariff on 100,000 UK cars will be reduced from 27.5 percent to 10 percent, and steel and aluminum imports will be tariff-free. On Monday, May 12, the U.S. agreed with China to cut the 145 percent tariff on Chinese goods to 30 percent for 90 days.
 
The Trump administration clearly is seeking deals with countries, regardless of whether they are allies or foes. Japan was stunned by the indifference of Trump administration to their alliance and shared values of democracy and free markets, as seen in the U.S. intent to exclude the new tariffs on automobiles, steel, and aluminum from negotiations with Japan.
 
Trump’s tariffs caused the Japanese yen to appreciate against the U.S. dollar. The appreciation will itself raise the cost of Japan’s goods sold in the U.S., although the precise change in the exchange rate has varied. The yen rose from 155 yen per dollar at the time of Trump’s inauguration in January to a high of 140 yen in April. As of the close of business Monday, May 12, in the U.S., the rate was approximately 148 yen to the dollar.
 
Despite pressure from the Trump Administration to ease monetary policy, the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Board made no change to the current federal funds rate of 4¼ to 4½ percent at its May meeting, which concluded on May 7.  As long as U.S. monetary policy does not reduce the interest gap between the U.S. and Japan, there should be little impact on the yen. 
 
However, the announcement of even a 90-day deal between the U.S. and China devalued the yen. At the close of the market on Friday, the Japanese yen was at approximately 145 yen to the dollar. At the U.S. close on Monday, it was approximately 148 yen to the dollar. 
 
A cheap yen hikes the price of imported goods in Japan. According to the Monthly Labour Survey in March by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the real wage of workers in Japan has dropped for three consecutive months. Workers’ wages have still not caught up with price inflation.
 
To minimize the negative impact of Trump’s tariffs in the coming Upper House election, the Ishiba administration plans to deliver an economic stimulus package. However, the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party are reluctant to include a consumption tax cut or a cash distribution in the party’s campaign platform.
 
If Japan falls behind other countries in finishing bilateral tariff deals, the Ishiba administration will be unable to reverse the downward trend in its approval rating. The latest poll of NHK showed a 33 percent approval rating, down 2 percentage points from the previous month. The Trump administration's tough line toward Japan is having a negative effect on Japanese politics.

South Korea and Trump Tariffs

South Korea Needs to Take the Long Road to Free Trade
First Published May 12, 2025, KEIA Blog
By  Daniel Sneider, Stanford and APP Member

The Donald Trump administration is pursuing a flurry of activities designed to convey the impression that a wave of trade deals is underway. The announcement of an agreement framework with the United Kingdom was followed by talks between Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent and Chinese counterparts.

The United States and China agreed to a ninety-day pause in their tariff war, setting rates of 30 percent by the United States and 10 percent by China while negotiations take place. Talks of de-escalating the high-stakes trade war are clearly aimed at dampening the severe reactions of financial and stock markets.

South Korean officials have seized upon this activity as a sign that bilateral talks can yield positive results, particularly the removal of the 25 percent tariffs imposed on autos, steel, and electronics.

Han Duck-soo, the former prime minister who stepped down to pursue an independent bid for president, expressed hope that he could negotiate a “win-win” deal with President Trump.

“There is always some room for cooperation and good communication among policymakers of the United States and Korea. So I feel rather good about expecting some acceptable final results from that,” Han said at a meeting with foreign correspondents in Seoul on May 7. “We will do our best making win-win solutions.”

But there are grounds for deep skepticism about the prospects for success in these and other talks.

Economist and former New York Times columnist Paul Krugman dismissed reports of the U.S.-UK deal and other deals as “smoke and mirrors, an attempt to persuade the gullible that Trump’s tariffs are actually working.” Krugman argues that these talks are “a response to a problem that didn’t exist” and that trade deficits do not reflect unfair foreign trade practices or high tariffs but rather the huge flows of capital into the United States, which reflects the perception of the United States as an attractive place to invest.

Japan’s experience of two rounds of negotiations with Bessent and other senior U.S. officials is instructive. Japanese negotiators emerged from the talks mystified as to what the Trump administration actually wanted. The U.S. side refused to discuss the biggest tariff rate—the 25 percent tax placed on autos, auto parts, steel, and aluminum—and insisted that these were global tariffs not subject to exemptions.

The Japanese government is in no rush to reach an agreement, though it does not want to be seen as backing away from talks. Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces considerable criticism from the opposition for engaging in “tribute diplomacy.” With elections for Japan’s upper house of the National Diet coming in July, the ruling party does not want to concede to what are seen as unreasonable demands from the United States.

“It’s not better just because it’s faster,” Ishiba told reporters following the bilateral talks. “For us, while properly asserting our national interests, it’s not good to reach an early conclusion by sacrificing such interests.”

South Korea faces many of the same circumstances. The first round of talks in Washington was similarly inconclusive, and the key issues for Korea—tariffs on auto, auto parts, steel and aluminum—are also beyond discussion for now. This is unlikely to change even after a new presidential administration is voted into office on June 3.

Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, commenting after the U.S.-UK announcement, acknowledged this reality. “You’ve got to spend an enormous amount of time with Japan, South Korea,” he told reporters. “These are not going to be fast deals.”

Like Japan, Korea’s strategy has been to seek concessions to induce the removal of the tariffs. Offers to cooperate on shipbuilding and energy production have been put on the table. But trade policy experts doubt those gestures will ultimately succeed.

“Many will still try to use this pause period to finalize something in exchange for a moderation to their initial tariff ‘sentence,’” says Michael Beeman, former assistant U.S. trade representative for Japan, Korea and APEC in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). “There will be value in negotiating since, as I’ve been saying, the threats are a tactic in part — but not in whole. Because at the end of the day, he still wants a new, higher rate on the world,” Beeman, author of Walking Out: America’s New Trade Policy in the Asia-Pacific and Beyond, told this writer.

The Japanese prime minister explicitly rejected a new, higher rate as a possible outcome. “We are seeking a complete elimination,” he said on Sunday. “It is not a matter of being satisfied with a certain percentage.”

When engaging the Trump administration, Korea and Japan need to “be patient” and take a longer view, Stanford University Professor Gi-Wook Shin told a recent seminar at Stanford’s Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Short-term efforts to appease the Trump administration are unavoidable, but they should be paired with efforts to bolster free trade outside. U.S. discussions of reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) offer one pathway, though admittedly a complex and drawn-out process. More likely are discussions to expand and strengthen existing regional trade regimes in the Indo-Pacific, including through partnerships with the European Union.

According to the Financial Times, plans to forge a strategic partnership between the European Union and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) have been revived in response to the trade wars unleashed by the Trump administration. The CPTPP already brings together twelve nations, including Canada, Japan, Mexico, Vietnam, Australia, and the United Kingdom, and covers rules for investment, digital trade, and other goods trade. According to the report, support for linking the two arrangements has come from New Zealand, Canada, Singapore, and, quietly, Japan. The proposal could be discussed at the upcoming meeting of trade ministers at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) later this month in South Korea.

“Any efforts to strengthen and widen the CPTPP as a rules-based international trade system are useful,” says a former senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official who led the effort to embrace CPTPP without U.S. participation during the first Trump administration. But the former official adds that he doubts the Ishiba government “has the guts” to do something similar.

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a looser regional trade grouping with fifteen Asia-Pacific member countries—including China—could also gain a larger role. China has presented itself as a guardian of free trade against the Trump administration’s protectionism, reaching out to the European Union, South Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia as part of a charm offensive. Discussions of a free trade agreement between China, South Korea, and Japan were held recently, partly in response to Trump’s tariffs.

Chinese officials have also expressed an interest in joining the CPTPP. But there is considerable opposition to admitting China out of fear it would dilute the organization’s established standards, including clear restrictions on favoring state-owned enterprises.

“If you put China into the CPTPP, you basically blow it up,” Dr. Elizabeth Economy, a widely respected expert on China at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, told the Stanford seminar. “I don’t think the Japanese have any interest in bringing China into the CPTPP.”

South Korea’s participation in CPTPP faces much less opposition and could offer a means to balance the pressure from the Trump administration. The pathway to membership, however, will need to involve the strengthening of Korea-Japan relations.

But the Korean government may be reluctant to take that step, suggests Shin. “I don’t think Korea would be interested in joining a multilateral entity that didn’t include the U.S.,” he said.

Such calculations in both Seoul and Tokyo could shift, however, if attempts to bargain with Washington falter and the global economy slips into a recession. In any case, it makes sense for South Korea to look beyond bargaining with Trump and join the construction of a free trade zone in the world economy.

Monday Asia Policy Events, May 12, 2025

CONVERSATION WITH FORMER USTRS. 5/12, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Michael Froman, Former USTR (2013-2017); Ronald Kirk, Former USTR (2009-2013); Susan Schwab, Former USTR (2006-2009); Robert Portman, Former USTR (2005-2006); Charlene Barshefsky, Former USTR (1997-2001); Mickey Kantor, Former USTR (1993-1996); Carla A. Hills, Former USTR (1989-1993); William Alan Reinsch, Senior Advisor and Scholl Chair Emeritus. 

PUSHING BACK AND MOVING FORWARD: A CONVERSATION WITH SEN. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN. 5/12, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Center for American Progress. Speaker: Chris Van Hollen, Senator, Democratic Party, Maryland.  

SHIFTING TRADE DYNAMICS: TRUMP’S TRADE POLICY & ITS IMPACT. 5/12, 12:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society. Speaker: Michael Beeman, Former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea, and APEC. Membership.

THE INDIA-PAKISTAN CONFLICT. 5/12, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Columbia University Institute of Global Politics. Speakers: Shamila Chaudhary, fmr. National Security Council Director, Pakistan and Afghanistan; Jon Finer, fmr. Assistant to the President, Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, IGP Carnegie Distinguished Fellow, Columbia SIPA; Rajan Menon, Emeritus Anne and Bernard Spitzer Chair in Political Science, City College of New York, Adjunct Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA; Mike Pompeo, 70th Secretary of State; IGP Carnegie Distinguished Fellow, Columbia SIPA; Rumela Sen, Lecturer and Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia SIPA, South Asia Institute Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia University.

STRATEGIC TRENDS 2025: A TRANS-ATLANTIC LOOK AHEAD. 5/12, 2:30–3:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS Intelligence, National Security, and Technology Program; CSIS Defense and Security Program. Speakers: Emily Harding, Vice President, CSIS Defense and Security Department; Daniel Möckli, Head of Think Tank, Center for Security Studies (ETH Zürich); Gorana Grgić, Senior Researcher, Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team, CSS; Névine Schepers, Team Head and Senior Researcher, Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team, CSS; Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Deputy for Research and Teaching, CSS. 

TRUMP AND THE COURTS: WILL OUR GUARDRAILS HOLD? 5/12, 3:00–3:45pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Speakers: Mariano-Florentino (Tino) Cuéllar, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Jack Goldsmith, Learned Hand Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program. 

REVOKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF JEWS IN VICHY FRANCE. 5/12, 7:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: US Holocaust Memorial Museum. Speaker: Dr. Claire Zalc, Research Director, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS, France), Professor, École des Hautes études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, France). 

BOOK TALK: THE TIME OF LAUGHTER: COMEDY AND THE MEDIA CULTURES OF JAPAN. 5/12, 9:00pm (EDT) 5/13, 10:00am (JST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: author Dr. David Humphrey, Associate Professor, Japanese, Global Studies, Michigan State University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3RAF4jt

The Fragile Alliance

A Fundamental Gap Opens in Tariff Negotiations


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 5, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

As tariff talks between the United States and Japan are getting into details, a fundamental difference over preconditions has emerged that put the talks in danger. While the U.S. says that cars, steel, and aluminum tariffs are nonnegotiable, Japan insists on negotiating tariffs on every product from Japan. This disagreement places unusual pressure on both governments due to internal political calendars.

Following the first meeting on April 16, Japan’s top negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, held a second meeting with his counterparts, U.S. Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, in Washington, DC on May 1.

After the meeting, Akazawa announced that both sides had discussed expanding trade between the two countries, reducing non-tariff barriers, and cooperating on economic security. Japan asked the U.S. to reconsider its tariff policy on all products.

According to some news reports, Japan explained in the meeting how it would increase imports of corn and soybeans from the U.S. and ease regulations that generally prevent the importation of foreign-made cars. Bessent said that he hoped to reach a consensus with Japan across a range of key bilateral issues soon.

However, even before Akazawa returned to Japan, Japanese news media reported that the U.S. would exclude cars, steel, and aluminum from the negotiations. The Trump administration had already activated 25 percent tariffs on steel and aluminum in March and imposed a 25 percent duty on automobiles in early April.

The “reciprocal” tariffs that Trump announced in April are different from the 25 percent tariffs. The administration set a 10 percent baseline tariff on all imports into the U.S. and separate tariffs for each country. The baseline tariff took effect on April 5, but Trump set 90-day moratorium on the additional tariffs; the moratorium will expire on July 9. The tariffs on cars, steel, and aluminum are in a third category.

The rate of reciprocal tariffs on Japanese imports, the sum of the 10 percent baseline tariff and an additional 14 percent tariff, is 24 percent. The U.S. team told Akazawa that they would negotiate only the additional 14 percent tariff. In addition, the U.S. would not negotiate the 10 percent baseline with any country.

As soon as he returned to Japan, Akazawa reported to Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba about the results of the meeting. Akazawa announced Japan’s position that tariffs on all goods should be negotiated. “We cannot reach an agreement without those items (cars, steel, and aluminum),” said Akazawa to the reporters. He added that he did not have parameters for an agreement with the U.S.

Notwithstanding the differences between the two governments, officials on both sides have continued to negotiate after Akazawa’s second visit. A third meeting at the ministerial level is anticipated in mid-May. Both sides understand the importance of reaching a deal before the 90-day moratorium expires.

The schedule is closely aligned with the domestic politics of each side. Ishiba does not want the negotiations to have a negative impact on elections to the Upper House in July. The leaders in Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are worried about protests by farmers against any compromise on imports of agricultural products from the U.S. LDP leaders are aware of the importance of protecting the national interest in the tariff negotiations.

Opposition leaders are putting pressure on Ishiba not to make easy concessions. “It is important to keep a motivation for an early agreement, but Japan should not open its hand too early to be taken advantage of by the U.S.,” said the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda.

Concerns are growing about a slowdown in the Japanese economy. In a monetary policy meeting on the same day as the Akazawa-Bessent meeting, the Bank of Japan reduced its projection of Japan’s economic growth in FY2025 by more than 50 percent from the original 1.1 percent in January to 0.5 percent. Japan has no time to waste on tariff negotiations.

Trump has indicated that a deal with Japan is a priority that will set a level for negotiations with other countries. Along with progress in negotiations with Japan, Secretary of State Marco Rubio said that tariff talks with China would start soon. As approval ratings for President Trump are declining, Trump may believe that a negotiated deal with Japan will be a signal achievement in the MAGA agenda.

There is an expectation in Japan that the two sides may be able to make more progress when Trump and Ishiba are together at the G7 Summit in Canada on May 15 to 17. Ishiba spoke by telephone with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, who had just been elected prime minister, to discuss the impact of Trump’s tariffs on the world economy and the multilateral trade framework. Although Ishiba’s G7 schedule does not yet include a side meeting with Trump, an agreement, even if it is only partial, between the leaders in June is the best hope for both Japan and the U.S.

Monday Asia Policy Events, May 5, 2025

FORK IN THE ROAD: THE STARK CHOICES ON US IRAN POLICY.  5/5, 11:00am-12:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CATO. Speakers: Danny Citrinowicz, Research Fellow, Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University; Gregory Brew, Senior Analyst, Iran and Energy, Eurasia Group; Negar Mortazavi; Senior Fellow, Center for International Policy; Jon Hoffman, Research Fellow, Cato. 

KOREAN WAVE AND GLOBAL KOREA. 5/5, 1:00-2:30pm, VIRTUAL. Speaker: Areum Jeong, Assistant Professor of Korean Studies, Arizona State University; Moderator: Jungwon Kim, King Sejong Associate Professor of Korean Studies, EALAC, Columbia University.

STRENGTHENING ARTICLE IV: NUCLEAR FACILITY RESILIENCE IN TIMES OF CRISIS. 5/5, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Nuclear Threat Initiative. Speakers: Dr. Rabia Akhtar, Research Fellow, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School; Darya Dolzikova, Senior Research Fellow, Royal United Services Institute; Ambassador Matteo Fachinotti, Resident Representative to the IAEA, Permanent Representative to the CTBTO PrepCom, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the OSCE, the United Nations, and other International Organizations in Vienna; Klemen Polak, Minister Plenipotentiary, Security Policy Department, Slovenian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs; Nickolas Roth; Senior Director, Nuclear Materials Security. 

INSPIRING A SPACE FORCE WARRIOR ETHOS. 5/5, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Air & Space Forces Association. Speaker: John F. Bentivegna, Chief Master Sergeant of the Space Force.

RISKS AND REWARDS: WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE GLOBAL ECONOMY. 5/5, 5:30-6:30pm (CDT) 6:30-7:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Joyce Chang, Chair of Global Research, J.P. Morgan; Phil Levy Lead Trade Economist, World Bank; Diane Swonk, Chief Economist, KPMG US.

 
CHARTING AUSTRALIA'S PATH: 2025 ELECTION RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS. 5/5, 6:00-7:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Charles Edel, Senior Adviser and Australia Chair; Laura Tingle, Political Editor, ABC News; Chris Uhlmann, Political Contributor, Sky News, Columnist, The Australian; Stephen Dziedzic, Foreign Affairs (Asia Pacific) Reporter, ABC News. 

JAPAN'S TARIFF NEGOTIATOR

Ryosei AKAZAWA [赤澤 亮正]

 We are not considering sacrificing Japan's agriculture, 

forestry and fisheries industries for the sake of automobiles. 

Ryosei AKAZAWA (赤澤 亮正), 64
MINISTER IN CHARGE OF ECONOMIC REVITALIZATION
7 terms in House of Representatives (Tottori 2). LDP

Also under current government his portfolios are:
Minister in charge of New Capitalism
Minister in charge of Wage Increase
Minister in charge of Startups
Minister in charge of Social Security Reform
Minister in charge of Infectious Disease Crisis Management
Minister in charge of the Preparation of Establishing the Disaster Management Agency
Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy
 
He is in charge of establishing a Disaster Prevention Agency, which is a pet project of Prime Minister Ishiba.
 
Past Positions: State Minister in charge of Financial Services Agency (2nd Kishida Cabinet (2nd Reshuffled))
Parliamentary Secretary for Land, Infrastructure and Transport (2nd Abe Cabinet)
 
University of Tokyo (1984)
Upon graduation joined the Ministry of Transportation (today’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism)
Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, MBA (1991)

Returned to Ministry after Cornell. Among his early assignments was to oversee the Sasakawa organization-funded Nippon Foundation. (The Sasakawa organization manages motorboat racing (gambling) in Japan, is closely involved in the shipbuilding and harbor management industries in Japan, and funds many philanthropic groups. Its founder, Ryōichi Sasakawa [笹川 良], a Class-A war criminal, was involved in all manner of illicit activities during and after the war.)

Retired from government in 2005.
 
One of “Koizumi’s Children/Assassins” who won election to the Lower House for the first time in the 2005 “postal reform election”
One of the 20 nominators for Ishiba in 2024 LDP presidential election
Although he was a lawmaker supported by Junichiro Koizumi, he became an ally of Ishiba and was elected from the same prefecture, Tottori
Often referred to as an “Ishiba Mania.” His continued support of Ishiba alienated him from mainstream politicians like Abe, Suga, and Kishida

Served as secretary general of Ishiba's campaign in the 2024 LDP presidential election

While at the Ministry of Transportation, Akazawa managed the government’s disaster responses of the crash of Japan Air Lines Flight 123 (1985) and of the Hanshin-Awaji Great Earthquake (1995). This work made him an expert on and advocate for disaster management policies. He is now in charge of establishes a Disaster Prevention Agency.
 
It is reported that he learned American-style negotiation skills while at Cornell University’s business school. At the Ministry of Transport in 1994, he was Assistant Director, International Aviation Division, Supervision Department, Civil Aviation Bureau in charge of Japan-U.S. aviation negotiations.
 
In the 2005 election, then Prime Minister Koizumi dropped some lawmakers against his postal reform from the LDP slate and fielded “snipers” to their districts as official LDP candidates. Akazawa was one of those new lawmakers who defeated the anti-Koizumi candidates. As a lawmaker from a rural community, Akazawa shared decentralization policies with Ishiba for years and became a close ally in Ishiba faction, named Suigetsu-kai.
 
Akazawa is considered the cabinet minister most trusted by Prime Minister Ishiba. Although Akazawa has limited experience with trade negotiations, it is reasonable to assume for Ishiba to pick the Minister in charge of Economic Revitalization, because Toshimitsu Motegi, dubbed as “tough negotiator” by Trump, held the same position in the negotiations over Japan-U.S. Trade Agreement in 2019. Akazawa’s success in tariff negotiations depends on how well the Ministries for Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) support him.

Family
Akazawa's birth name was Mori. His father was a university professor who encouraged him to pursue public service. When he started the University of Tokyo, he was adopted by his maternal grandparents. His maternal grandfather, Masamichi Akazawa [赤沢正道], was a politician and chairman of the construction company Akazawa Gumi [赤沢組] likely founded in 1915 by his great grandfather, Kohei Akazawa, a samurai from the Tokushima Domain who became an engineer and construction worker.

Akazawa’s wife: Chiaki Akazawa, born in Hokkaido. They met while he was working for Hokkaido Prefectural Government between 1996 and 1998, dispatched from the Ministry of Transport. Akazawa son; Ryota Akazawa, 24 years old. He was known as the leader of the cheering squad in Yonago Higashi High School in Tottori. Both Chiaki and Ryota were involved in the 2024 election campaign 

On his personal website, he prominently features his grandfather Masamichi Akazawa, former Minister of Home Affairs (today’s Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications) in the third Ikeda cabinet (1964) and the first reshuffled cabinet of the second Sato cabinet (1967). Akazawa says he wants to emulate his grandfather's principled way of life.

Conservative Nationalist Parliamentary League: Yasukuni, Association for Protecting National Interests in TPP Negotiations. Unification Church ties.

 
Social Media
Official Page: https://www.ryosei-akazawa.com/
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/akazawa.ryosei/
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/akazawa_ryosei/
Twitter: https://x.com/ryosei_akazawa
 
Book
Preparation Acts for Terrorism: How to Confront the Imminent Threat – 38 Key Debates in the National Diet [テロ等準備罪：目の前にある危機にいかに立ち向かうか 国会38の論点] by Ryosei Akazawa, Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal Policy, Liberal Democratic Party, Member of House of Representative, Good Books, Tokyo. November 15, 2017, 280 pages.
Book description:
     The passage of the 2017 legislation on the Punishment of the Preparation of Acts of Terrorism and Other Organized Crimes faced backlash from opposition parties and the media, primarily from the perspectives of privacy and human rights protection. According to the author, “the crux of this legislation is to strike an optimal balance between countering the threats of terrorism and organized crime and protecting privacy and human rights.” This book outlines Japan’s vulnerability to terrorism and organized crime prior to the legislation, and argues that, despite media criticism, the law remains restrained in key areas of enforcement compared to international standards.

The facts presented in this report were collected entirely from open sources.
We endeavor to keep the information we provide you up to date and correct.
However, as with any research, we make no representations or warranties of any kind, express or implied, about its completeness, accuracy, reliability, or suitability.
Your comments, suggestions, and corrections are welcome.

Bending toward Trump

Ishiba Hopes to Make a Model for Dealing with Trump

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun. You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 28, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

The Japanese government under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is accelerating its efforts to deal with U.S. President Donald Trump’s shifting tariff policies. The negotiating team for a new trade deal with the U.S. is considering increasing imports of some agricultural products from the U.S. as a bargaining chip. The ultimate objective is to protect Japan’s citizens from the harm of Trump’s unpredictability. Ishiba, focused on this summer’s Upper House elections, hopes to demonstrate that he is a good model in the world for negotiating with the Trump administration.
 
In the team’s first meeting at the White House in mid-April, Japan’s top negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, expressed Japan’s “extreme regret” about Trump’s tariffs. Both sides agreed to try to conclude talks as soon as possible.
 
Trump, who unexpectedly jumped into the bilateral meeting, left the Japanese confused. It was reported that he said that no American cars are being driven in Japan owing to excessive safety standards there. “Most victims in traffic accidents in Japan are pedestrians. Drivers [are the primary victims] in the U.S. That is why regulations on safety are different between Japan and the U.S. We need to understand that background,” said Ishiba in a Diet discussion.
 
After the meeting, Trump repeated an allegation from his first term that Japan’s safety standards include a “bowling ball test.” That is, the Japanese test the durability of foreign cars by dropping bowling balls on them – a test any automobile would be likely to fail. However, there is no such test. The Japanese people now have an image of its supposed trade partner making unrealistic arguments based on fake information.
 
As soon as he returned to Japan, Akazawa reported to Ishiba his impression of the Trump administration’s trade issues. Although Akazawa was careful not to show Japan’s hands, his team believes that Trump’s top priority in trading with Japan is the elimination of non-tariff barriers. “It can be making a model in the world for us to promote negotiation maintaining a good relationship.,” said Ishiba in a Diet discussion.
 
The Ishiba administration has started to consider easing regulations on imported cars from the U.S. Japan currently requires U.S. cars to obtain a safety certification in Japan, even if they have passed U.S. safety tests. The Japanese government is trying to determine whether it is possible to have common test specifications in Japan and the U.S. The Japan team is also looking for examples of Japanese carmakers increasing production in the U.S.
 
In the meeting with Akazawa’s team, the U.S. team showed a particular interest in agricultural exports to Japan, quoting a report on trade barriers by the U.S. Trade Representative. The Ishiba administration is now looking for ways to allow more U.S. farm products into the country. The Secretary General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Hiroshi Moriyama, estimated that Japanese demand for soybeans and corn would support more imports from America. There is an argument to increase rice import from the U.S., but the Japanese government can expect stiff opposition to increased rice imports from lawmakers who represent farmers.
 
Trump had expressed his frustration with Japan over currency valuation and security, but these matters have low priority. The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Scott Bessent, ruled out setting currency targets in negotiations with Japan. The Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, met with Bessent in Washington, DC, and reported that they did not talk about a currency valuation target. It is worth noting that over the past two months the U.S. dollar has lost over 10 percent of its value against the Japanese yen, which may explain the U.S. willingness to forgo discussion of the issue.   
 
Regarding security, Asahi Shimbun reported that Trump told the Norwegian Prime Minister that military issues (including the level of national expenditures) would not be the subject of any trade deals.
 
In preparing for an accelerated deal that would place Japan at or near the top of nations willing to do business with the Trump administration, Ishiba must deliver domestic relief to mitigate the economic costs to the Japanese people. The urgent policy package developed by the officials assigned to deal with U.S. tariff policy includes provisions for enhancement of consultation for business sectors, financial support for entrepreneurs, sustainable employment and training, stimulation of consumption, including a subsidy of 10 yen per litter for gasoline, and structural reform of industries.
 
Ishiba ruled out cash distributions as part of a stimulus package. Instead, the parties are discussing a consumption tax cut. Komeito, the LDP’s coalition partner, wants to cut the consumption tax on food. Rank-and-file LDP lawmakers in the Upper House have asked for a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food, but LDP leaders oppose it.
 
The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, who, as prime minister in 2012, is responsible for raising the consumption tax rate from 5 percent to 10 percent, has said that the CDP will support a one-year moratorium on the consumption tax for foods. This is one of the planks in the CDP’s platform for the coming Upper House election. Other opposition parties also have called for cutting or abolishing the consumption tax.
 
In resolving the U.S. tariff problem, Ishiba must weigh two domestic considerations.  First, of course, Ishiba must make tough decisions to defend the Japanese economy. Second, Trump’s tariffs distract the public’s attention away from political scandals and the weakness of the LDP’s minority government. Recent polls show at most only a slight rise in the Ishiba Cabinet’s approval ratings. In the end, Ishiba must present himself to Japanese voters as a leader who can deal wisely with the erratic Trump administration.

Monday Asia Policy Events, April 28, 2025

CHINA IN THE MIDDLE EAST AFTER ASSAD. 4/28, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Jesse Marks, Senior Advocate, Middle East, Refugees International; Yun Sun, Senior Fellow, Co-Director, East Asia Program, Director, China Program, Stimson Center; Tingyi Wang, Research Fellow, Member, Research Committee, Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy; Aaron Glasserman, Non-Resident Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI, Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for the Study of Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania. 

OUTLOOK FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS: PERSPECTIVES FROM JAPANESE LEGISLATORS. 4/28, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Itsunori Onodera, LDP Member, House of Representatives, fmr. Minister of Defense; Shinjiro Koizumi, LDP Member, House of Representatives, fmr. Minister of the Environment. 

MULTIPOLARITY, CIVILIZATIONS AND UNIVERSALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.  4/28, 2:00-3:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: New York University School of Law. Speaker: Malcolm Jorgensen, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law. 

DOMESTIC POLITICS, THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE, AND TOKYO’S GLOBAL ROLE: BIPARTISAN VIEWS FROM THE DIET. 4/28, 2:30-3:45pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Itsunori Onodera, LDP Member, House of Representatives; Shinijiro Koizumi, LDP Member, House of Representatives; Kimi Onoda, LDP Member, House of Representatives; Koichiro Gemba, CDP Member, House of Representatives. 

CUTTING DEEP ABROAD AND AT HOME: SLASHING FOREIGN ASSISTANCE CAUSES WORLDWIDE HARM. 4/28, 1:00-2:00pm (PDT), 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for American Progress. Speakers: Jeremy Konyndyk, President, Refugees International; Jordan Schermerhorn, Researcher, former USAID Program Analyst; Chloe Schwenke, Teaching Professor, Georgetown University's McCourt School of Public Policy. 

FROM TAIWAN SUBJECTS TO OVERSEAS TAIWANESE TO TAIWAN PROVINCIALS: BEING TAIWANESE IN EARLY POST-WAR JAPAN. 4/28, 4:30-6:00am (EDT), 5:30-7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Sophia University, Japan. Speaker: Evan Dawley, Associate Professor, History, Goucher College.

Ishiba Confronts Trumps Tariffs

Ishiba Builds His Team on Tariffs


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 14, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

After the FY2025 budget was approved on March 31, Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba turned to dealing with the Trump Administration tariffs. While Ishiba has been organizing his negotiating team, the opposition parties have separately been calling for policies to support businesses and households. Their policy demands are designed to garner public support for the coming Upper House elections.

Ryosei Akazawa, the Economic Revitalization Minister, was named the top negotiator. He arrives in Washington April 16 for three days of meetings with U.S. officials who include Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Akazawa’s mission is to have the Trump administration rethink its tariff policy. He will emphasize Japan’s role as the top foreign investor in the U.S.

Ishiba also launched a task force on U.S. tariff policy, co-headed by Akazawa and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, in the general headquarters on tariffs in the Ishiba Cabinet. “Under the leadership of Akazawa and Hayashi, we will construct an all-Japan organization in which the officers work on negotiation with the U.S. and measures for domestic industries beyond the border of ministries,” said Ishiba at the announcement of the task force.

Ishiba is concerned not only about trade and domestic industries but also about foreign exchange. Trump has been complaining about the devaluation of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar. As a founder of a hedge fund, Bessent is an expert in foreign exchange. It is likely that the exchange rate will be one of the talking points in the negotiations between Japan and the U.S. later this week. The Minister of Finance, Katsunobu Kato, will lead the currency negotiations. Kato plans to visit Washington for the annual spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank later in April. Although his schedule has not fixed, Kato hopes to have a meeting with Bessent during his visit.

National security is another topic. Trump reiterated that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is unfair because the U.S. pays hundreds of billions of dollars to defend Japan, but Japan does not pay anything. The Ishiba administration will explain that the Japanese government has provided extensive host nation support for the U.S. Forces in Japan. In anticipation of this discussion, Ishiba has included National Security Advisor, Masataka Okano, in the taskforce. Trump seems unaware of Japan’s constitution that prohibits engaging in non-defense war fighting.

Rice will also be a priority topic in the negotiations. “We feel like we could have more and better agricultural market access,” said Greer in pre-negotiation remarks. Because rice is the staple food in Japan, the government strictly controls the rice trade inside the country. The U.S. argues that Japan’s rice trade is not transparent and hard for foreign countries to access. Although the Japanese government is reluctant to open its rice market, the recent price hikes of rice in Japan may increase demand for foreign rice.

It is inevitable that Trump’s tariffs will have a negative impact on the Japanese economy. Beyond the “reciprocal” tariffs, the 25 percent tariffs on cars and other specific products are certain to reduce exports from Japan to the U.S. “The greatest concern is about financing of small and mid-size entrepreneurs,” said the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda. All political parties in Japan share a common interest in supporting business sectors.

Meanwhile, the parties are fighting over how to help households: should there be a cash handout or a tax cut? On the one hand, cash handouts could be delivered soon after the Diet passes the supplemental budget, while tax cuts would be part of the perennial debate over tax reform. A decision on tax cuts could not be made until the end of this year. On the other hand, a tax cut is more helpful for the families than a cash handout since the cut would last for several years. A cash handout is a one-time event, which has limited and temporary effects.

The parties have different views. The Liberal Democratic Party is leaning toward a cash handout in the hope of immediate effects shortly before the elections. Its coalition partner, Komeito, is urging both a handout and a tax cut. The Democratic Party for the People is promoting reduction of the consumption tax rate from 10 percent to 5 percent. Reiwa Shinsengumi wants to abolish the consumption tax entirely. Noda is reluctant to cut the consumption tax, even though some members of his party support a tax cut.

All parties are motivated to deliver an economic stimulus plan in time for the Upper House election expected to be held in July. To do so, the Diet must pass a supplemental budget by the end of the current Diet session on June 22. Passing a budget bill is hard work for a minority government. Ishiba nevertheless plans to deliver an economic policy package, which may require a supplemental budget.