Saturday, September 26, 2026

Takaichi Administration Shuffle

Takaichi Makes Minor Changes to Her Team

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 21, 2026


On September 16 and 17, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reshuffled the board members of her party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and her cabinet. As expected, she did not make major changes, nor did she replace core members. Her focus was to strengthen her political base ahead of her bid for reelection in next fall’s LDP presidential election. However, some opposition to her reelection has emerged, which may cause her concern.

The prime minister, or the president of the leading party, often has good reason to reshuffle his or her staff. When the leader finds that the administration is slowing down, particularly in the wake of a major political scandal, a reshuffling may be a measure to regain public support. When the leading party has lawmakers who expect to be ministers, the prime minister may ease that frustration by reshuffling the cabinet to appoint them to unoccupied positions.

Takaichi had no major reason to change her staff now because she has maintained a relatively high approval rating. But the LDP established a rule in 2022 that board members (except the president) may serve only one-year terms. They may be reappointed twice for a total of three consecutive terms. Changes to the LDP board always linked to reshuffling of cabinet ministers. Takaichi appointed LDP board members in October 2025. That is why she needed to make some changes in her team.

The lineup of the Takaichi administration has three categories: close allies, supporters to rely on and potential rivals. Minister of Finance Satsuki Katayama and Minister on Economic Security Kimi Onoda are Takaichi’s close allies because they were two of the 20 nominators for Takaichi in the 2025 LDP presidential election. Takaichi decided to keep them in the same positions, unaffected by the reshuffle.

LDP vice-president Taro Aso is Takaichi’s most important supporter and guardian. Because Aso’s grip on the LDP is essential, Takaichi reappointed Aso as vice president and named Aso’s brother-in-law, Shun-ichi Suzuki, LDP Secretary General. The Chairman of the LDP Policy Research Council, Takayuki Kobayashi, also stayed because Aso expects Kobayashi to be a future leader. Kobayashi has been a rival of Takaichi – he ran for the LDP presidency last fall -- but Takaichi supposedly accepted Aso’s recommendation to reappoint Kobayashi to the council chairman’s slot.

Former members of the Abe faction might also be labeled as supporters of Takaichi since they share conservative political principles. Several lawmakers in the former Abe faction were punished when the kickback fund scandal emerged in 2024 and were then purged from positions as ministers or members of the LDP board. Takaichi has now brought them back into the fold.  

Three former Abe faction leaders -- Koichi Hagiuda (deputy SG), Yasutoshi Nishimura (election chief), and Hirokazu Matsuno (organization chief) – retained the positions that Takaichi had given them after she took office. Additionally, she appointed two other lawmakers involved in the scandal, Yoshihiro Seki (education), and Kazuo Yana (agriculture), to the cabinet for the first time after the scandal. Takaichi seems now to have pardoned many leaders of the now-defunct Abe faction.

Two key cabinet members, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Toshimitsu Motegi, and the Minister of Defense, Shinjiro Koizumi, both ran in the LDP presidential election last fall and would be recognized as Takaichi’s rivals. It may sound strange for Takaichi to keep them in her cabinet. But it is not easy for a cabinet minister to run for the party presidency to replace the incumbent prime minister because every minister needs to approve the prime minister’s policies. To take different policy positions, the minister needs to reject signing on cabinet decision, which is likely to cause a dismissal. Thus, Takaichi’s reappointment of Motegi and Kozumi keeps them on the sidelines.

This rationale did not apply across the board. The Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, Yoshimasa Hayashi, was another candidate in last fall’s presidential election, and thus a potential rival of Takaichi. Takaichi replaced Hayashi. Her decision indicates that she recognizes him as a serious obstruction to her reelection.

As the minister in charge of local governments, Hayashi was able to visit cities and towns all around Japan for a year to build good relationships. His travels might have laid the local groundwork for local support in the next LDP presidential election. Hayashi had been a leader in Kochikai, an LDP faction that has been dissolved, which represented LDP liberalism in contrast to more hawkish groups in the party.

Excluding Hayashi from her team is part of Takaichi’s reelection strategy: the exclusion will isolate Hayashi in the LDP, which is otherwise united under her leadership. However, this reshuffling revealed one of her weaknesses. That would be Diet affairs.

Takaichi replaced the LDP Chairman on Diet Affairs, Hiroshi Kajiyama, with Hideki Murai because of her differences with Kajiyama over this year’s budget process. During the discussions over the fiscal year 2026 budget bill in the last session of the Diet, Kajiyama’s handling of Diet procedure frustrated Takaichi since she was forced to answer questions from opposition parties. Murai, the new Chairman, has argued that the prime minister need only appear a few times before the Diet.

Takaichi’s preferences were more telling in the Upper House. The LDP Upper House Secretary General, Jun-ichi Ishii, stepped down against his will. Having strong connections with the opposition parties, Ishii managed negotiations with opposition parties in the last session of the Diet. The LDP was unable to collect a majority vote in the Upper House and failed to pass a budget bill by the end of March. Ishii has expressed his concern with Takaichi’s unrealistically short scheduling for passing bills regardless of opposition parties’ protest. Takaichi did not like to be advised by Ishii.

Moreover, Ishii had established a new group in the Upper House LDP in April, which became the anti-Takaichi group in the party. If this movement in the Upper House LDP attracts lawmakers who have distanced themselves from Takaichi, like Hayashi for example, it will be a formidable challenge to Takaichi in next year’s LDP presidential election. The LDP election is next year. This would be a nightmare for Takaichi, who has not built an unshakable political base within the LDP.

UN General Debate Asian and Significant Speeches

Backgrounders on the race to become the 10th Secretary General of the United Nations General Assembly

81st UN General Assembly Debate Asian and Other Significant Speeches [subject to change]
Full Videos and Transcripts

9/22-Tuesday
His Excellency Donald TRUMP, President of the United States of America
Son Excellence Emmanuel MACRON, President of the French Republic
His Excellency Khurelsukh UKHNAA, President of Mongolia
His Excellency LEE Jae Myung, President of the Republic of Korea
His Excellency David Ranibok Adeang President of the Republic of Naoero [Nauru]
His Excellency To LAM, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Viet Nam and President of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam 
His Excellency Tshering TOBGAY, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Bhutan
His Excellency Andy BURNHAM, Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Her Excellency TAKAICHI Sanae, Prime Minister of Japan

9/23 – Wednesday
His Excellency Masoud PEZESHKIAN, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
His Excellency José RAMOS-HORTA, President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
 His Excellency Volodymyr ZELENSKYY, President of Ukraine
President

9/24-Thursday
His Excellency Mahmoud ABBAS, President of the State of Palestine
His Excellency Benjamin NETANYAHU, Prime Minister of the State of Israel
His Excellency Anutin CHARNVIRAKUL, Prime Minister and Minister of Interior of the Kingdom of Thailand
His Excellency Ratu Naiqama Tawakecolati Lalabalavu, President of Fiji
His Excellency Tarique RAHMAN, Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh
His Excellency Balndra SHAH, Prime Minister of Nepal
His Excellency Anthony ALBANESE, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia

9/25-Friday
His Excellency Muhammad SHEHBAZ SHARIF, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
His Taneti MAAMAU, President of Kiribati
Her Excellency Hilda HEINE, President of the Marshall Islands
His Excellency Mathew Cooper WALE, Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands
His Excellency James MARARAPE, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea
His Excellency Feleti TEO, Prime Minister of Tuvalu
Her Excellency Mulipola Anarosa Ale MOLINOO, Deputy Prime Minister of Samoa

9/26-Saturday
His Excellency HAN Zheng, Vice President of the People's Republic of China
His Excellency Aren Palik, Vice President OF Micronesia (Federated States of)
His Excellency Thongsavanh PHOMVIHANE, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic
His Excellency PRAK Sokhonn, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Kingdom of Cambodia
His Excellency Sergey LAVROV, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Her Excellency Maria Theresa P. LAZARO, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines
His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdul Mateen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brunei Darussalam 
His Excellency Vivian BALAKRISHNAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Singapore
His Excellency MOHAMAD Hasan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia
His Excellency SUGIONO, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia
His Excellency Subrahmanyam JAISHANKAR, Minister of External Affairs of India
The Honorable Anita ANAND, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada [Prime Minister Mark Carney attends but will not speak]

9/28-Monday
His Excellency Vijitha HERATH, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Employment and Tourism of Sri Lanka
His Excellency KIM Son Gyong, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Korea
Her Excellency Victoria Louise Hallum, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New Zealand
Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun, Permanent Presentative to the United Nations, Ambassador of Myanmar 
His Excellency Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vanuatu

Sunday, September 20, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday September 21, 2026

Today is Yom Kippur, the day of atonement for the Jewish people. Many places in the US are closed. Congress is not in session. The House left last week and will not return until after the mid-terms. The Senate is expected to go on recess on October 2.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HORMUZ ENERGY CRISIS ON SOUTH ASIA. 9/21, 8:30-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Anish De, Global Head for Energy Natural Resources & Chemicals (ENRC), KPMG International; Vibhuti Garg, Director, South Asia, IEEFA; Amit Jain, Senior Energy Specialist, World Bank; Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program CSIS.

ENERGY OPPORTUNITY FORUM 2026: BUILDING ABUNDANT ENERGY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH. 9/21, 8:45-10:45am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Energy Opportunity Lab, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs. Speakers Include: Rania Al-Mashat, Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, United Nations; Ashish Khanna, Director General, International Solar Alliance; Luisa Palacios, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy.

NEW STRATEGIC PRIORITIES: HOW CHINA IS RESPONDING TO RUSSIA–NORTH KOREA MILITARY COOPERATION. 9/21, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute. Speakers: Sungmin Cho, Nonresident Fellow on Chinese Politics, Foreign Policy, and National Security, Asia Society Policy Institute; Emma Chanlett-Avery, Deputy Director, Asia Society Policy Institute; Moderator: Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow on Foreign Policy and National Security, Asia Society Policy Institute.

THE GERMAN STATE ELECTIONS AND THE RISE Of AfD. 9/21, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy. Speakers: Reinhard Krumm, head of the US & Canada office of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) in Washington DC; Thomas Fasbender, German journalist; and Molly O’Neal, non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute.

HER POWER 2026: SUSTAINING ACTION FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS. 9/21, 3:30-6:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Policy. Speakers: H.E. Dr. Rania Al-Mashat, Under-Secretary-General and Executive Secretary, United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia; Hon. Dr. Velislava Petrova-Chamova, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Bulgaria; Roberta Metsola, President, European Parliament; Hon. Lori Urso (D-RI), Senator; Abigail Erikson, Chief, UN Trust Fund to End Violence Against Women and Girls; and more.

BOOK TALK: INSIDE CHINA'S SECRET PRISONS: AN UNDERCOVER EXPOSÉ AND ITS LASTING LEGACY. 9/21, 4:30-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; China and the World Program, Columbia University. Speaker: author, Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director, Center on U.S.-China Relations, Asia Society; Moderator: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University. PURCHASE BOOK 

Wednesday, September 16, 2026

Japan’s Opposition Cannot Hold Together

Centrist Reform Alliance head Junya Ogawa 
Japan’s Main Opposition Party Fragments


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 7, 2026


Japan’s largest opposition party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), determined to dissolve and separate itself into two groups: the former Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and the former Komeito. Although the party had hoped to be an alternative to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Diet, the CRA failed to find common ground between ex-CDPJ and ex-Komeito members on crucial policies, or to invite some members in other parties including the LDP. Fragmentation of the opposition will encourage Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to continue exercising arbitrary power to promote her conservative agenda.
 
Lower House members of the CDPJ and Komeito formed the CRA last January. It was an attempt to counter the LDP in Takaichi’s snap election in February by consolidating the votes of supporters of the CDPJ and Komeito. But the strategy failed because the voters regarded the merger as a maneuver not for confronting Takaichi’s policies but merely for the two parties’ survival. The CRA emerged from the February election with only 49 seats – a 70 percent loss from its pre-election seats of 167.
 
Although the CRA leaders expected the Upper House lawmakers in the CDPJ and Komeito to join immediately after the Lower House election, the Upper House members of the CDPJ hesitated. Members of Komeito, which had left the leading coalition with the LDP in the fall of 2025, were willing to join, but the CDPJ was reluctant because of basic policy differences. The CDPJ has taken liberal stances on security legislation that would include a right of collective self-defense right, construction of nuclear power plants, and building new military base in Okinawa. Komeito has stayed its conservative course on these issues. Neither party expressed much interest in compromise.
 
The CRA set a deadline for the merger at the end of August, to prepare a unified party able to compete in local elections in April 2027. But the local organizations of the CDPJ resisted an integrated campaign with Komeito since it had been an enemy for decades. The leaders of the CRA, CDPJ and Komeito officially agreed to abandon the merger in early September and to separate the party between its ex-CDPJ and ex-Komeito members.
 
The method of separation is unique and complicated. The former Komeito lawmakers will leave the CRA and return to Komeito. The former CDPJ members will join with the current CDPJ members in the Upper House to establish a new party. However, a single former CDPJ lawmaker will remain in the CRA to maintain its party status.
 
The CRA depended heavily on public funding to support its political activities. The party expects to receive 2.34 billion yen in 2026 and in fact has already accepted half the amount, 1.17 billion yen. If the CRA disappears, the rest of 1.17 billion yen will not be delivered. Hence one lawmaker in the CRA, which will be enough to maintain its eligibility to receive the remaining funds later this year. The leader of CRA, Jun-ya Ogawa, explained that the funding will be used to retire CRA’s debts for the election campaign in February.
 
The new party organized by the former CDPJ and CRA members will succeed to the funds assigned to the CRA shell. Komeito will not receive any of the funds. It is remarkable that the government will pay the funds to a single-member party that will not take any effective political activity. The CRA has in the past accused the LDP of mismanagement of its political funds, but the CRA is now vulnerable to criticism of its control of its own funds.
 
Regardless of former party memberships, it is expected that the lawmakers who leave the CRA will form a parliamentary group in the Lower House. However, those lawmakers still differ on some important policies. Whether and for how long the new parliamentary group can take integrated actions in the Diet remains to be seen.
 
The LDP, which does not have a simple majority in the Upper House, expects Komeito to cooperate on such issues as the consumption tax cut. Takaichi pushed her conservative agenda, including a national statutory prohibition on national flag vandalism, in the last session of the Diet. Takaichi and the LDP are likely to approach Komeito for support on defense budget increase or constitutional amendment. In the meantime, the opposition parties are further fragmented from the far right to the far left.
 
Historically, the CRA has had a much smaller presence in the Diet than other earlier opposition parties. In 1960s, during the Cold War era, the largest opposition party, the Japan Socialist Party, occupied 30 percent of the seats in the Lower House. The New Frontier Party, established after of its members left the LDP, won 31 percent of votes in Lower House election in 1996. The Democratic Party of Japan won 26 percent of seats in the election in 2000. By contrast, the CRA had only 10 percent of Lower House seats, and now these seats will be divided. Trouble in the opposition parties thus enhances the power of LDP – without the LDP having to do anything.

The CRA's break up is welcomed by the Takaichi's administration. The unraveling of the opposition, as witnessed in the combined CRA dissolution and the LDP win in the Okinawa gubernatorial election, will solidify Takaichi's rule. If the CRA had found a way to remain unified, it could have presented a meaningful alternative to the LDP and Takaichi's military build-up.

The CRA had received over 10 million votes among the proportional districts in the February election. Although this was only half of those for the LDP, they did represent 18 percent of the overall vote--no small voice in the Diet. The CRA did not consider the power of that political will in their rush to put an end to their union.

Sunday, September 13, 2026

Asian Art Events in September

PURCHASE BOOK
Jeju Biennale, SOUTH KOREA, 8/25-11/15, 2026.

Busan Biennale, SOUTH KOREA, 8/29-11/1, 2026.

Gwangju Biennial, SOUTH KOREA, 9/5-11/15, 2026.

BOOK TALK: KINKAKUJI AND KITAYAMA: SPACE, PLACE, MONUMENTS AND MEMORY IN JAPAN 1222-1994. 9/10, 7:00-8:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author, Thomas Conlan, Professor of East Asian Studies and History, Princeton University; Mimi Yiengpruksawan, Professor of Art History, Yale University; Moderator: Nick Kapur, Associate Professor of History, Rutgers University-Camden. PURCHASE BOOK

Autumn Asia Week New York, UNITED STATES. 9/10-18, 2026.

Geraldine Javier’s “State of the Nations” Exhibition at Silverlens Gallery, UNITED STATES. 9/10-10/24, 2026

CURATOR'S TALK: STROLLING TOGETHER IN THE WORLD OF CHINESE ART. 9/15, 6:30-8:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: China Institute of America. Speakers: Annette Juliano, Research Associate, Institute for the Study of the Ancient World, New York University; Alfreda Murck, Visiting Professor, Department of Art History and Archaeology, Columbia University; David Sensabaugh, Head, Department of Asian Art, Yale University. 

BOOK TALK: IN THE SHADOW OF EMPIRE: ART IN OCCUPIED JAPAN. 9/23, 3:30-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Department of History of Art, University of Pennsylvania, UNITED STATES. Speaker: Alicia Volk, author, Professor, Japanese Art, Art History and Archaeology, University of Maryland. PURCHASE BOOK

Art Formosa (Taipei), TAIWAN. 9/25-28, 2026.

Ha Chong-Hyun: Retrospective, Asian Art Museum of San Francisco, UNITED STATES. 9/25, 2026-1/25, 2027.

Asia Policy Events, Monday September 14, 2026

US Congress returns. House only in session this week and will be in recess until after the mid-terms. US Federal Reserve Monetary Policy Committee meets on Tuesday and Wednesday.

9/13-14 - European Arctic Summit hosted by the Finnish Foreign Ministry, Rovaniemi, Finland.
9/14 - First ever parliamentary elections for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Philippines.
9/14 - 2026 Women In Defense National Conference: AI Driven. Human Powered. Where Innovation Meets the Mission and the People Who Drive It, Arlington, VA.
9/14-15 - USA India Business Summit (UIBS).
9/14-15 - International Stability Operations Association (ISOA) Pacific Deterrence and Readiness Conference, Honolulu, HI.
9/14-18 - 70th IAEA General Conference, Vienna.

PACIFIC DETERRENCE AND READINESS CONFERENCE 2026. 9/14-15, IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). Speakers: COL Matthew Amsdell, Commander, 402d Army Field Support Brigade; Peter Belk, Former (Acting) Assistant Secretary of War and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of War, U.S. Department of War; Joseph Brooks, SES, Executive Director, Regional Sustainment Framework, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Product Support (ODASW(PS)); LTG Mike Howard, USA (Ret), Chief Executive Officer, International Stability Operations Association; and more. FEE

RETHINKING MAO AND THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: INSIGHTS FROM A NEW CHRONOLOGY OF JIANG QING. 9/14, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University. Speaker: Bao Pu, Founder, New Century Press, Hong Kong; Moderator: Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University.

MAKING ORDERS IN CONTESTATION: CIVIL WAR AND ONLINE SCAMS IN MYANMAR'S BORDERLANDS. 9/14, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: New York Southeast Asia Network (NYSEAN). Speaker: Kota Watanabe, Visiting Scholar, NYU Wagner Graduate School of Public Service.

DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD. 9/14, 4:00-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. Speakers: Akihiko Tanaka, President, Japan International Cooperation Agency; Christina Fink, Professor of International Development, George Washington University; Moderator: Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Visiting Scholar, Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University.


Wednesday, September 9, 2026

Japanese Budget Disquiet

Takaichi’s Unlimited Budget Request Causes Concern


By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
September 7, 2026

 
Japan’s Finance Ministry (MOF) closed budget requests from the ministries for FY 2027 at the end of August. Because Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi removed the limits on requests for investments in projects that could contribute to economic growth, the total number of requests significantly exceeded last year’s. These expanded budget requests, suggesting that Japan wants to provide more economic stimulus, have made the markets uneasy, as seen in the steep rise of long-term bond yields. The United States has warned Japan to adjust its fiscal policy to stop, if not reverse, these increases.
 
The MOF wraps up budget requests for the coming fiscal year at the end of August every year. The ministry examines these requests and formulates an annual budget bill by December. The Diet discusses the bill in its ordinary session normally convoked in January. The leading parties hope to pass the budget bill by the end of March; the budget would then govern projects in April or thereafter.
 
If the government needs to spend more on unexpected events, for example, recovery from a natural disaster or support for urgent economic stimulus, the government will formulate a supplemental budget in the fall. Takaichi wants to abolish the supplemental budget process to make the level of governmental spending more predictable for businesses. It is likely that her approach reflects the views of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), for which economic growth is everything.
 
Historically, an annual budget has been formulated based on MOF’s estimation of the government’s tax and other revenues over the next year. Embracing a well-known principle of “calculate income, regulate outgo,” the MOF allots portions of the expected revenue to every ministry. This allotment process effectively caps the budget request of each ministry. It is the reason the annual budget request is called a “ceiling.” Through the allotment process and the examination of budget requests, MOF controls government spending and has earned the status as “the most powerful ministry.”
 
METI-leaning Takaichi hopes to reform this system. Regardless of the estimate of next year’s revenue, she ordered each ministry to submit a budget request without regard to the ceiling, at least insofar as the ministry’s expenditures above ceiling would contribute to economic growth or crisis management. The Ministry of Defense made the largest ever request at 8.9 trillion yen for projects including the introduction of AI in command and control. METI increased its own requests to support businesses on AI, semiconductors, and robotics.
 
It is not strange that the total amount of budget requests hit a new record. It swelled to 143.06 trillion yen, exceeding the previous year’s total by 20.75 trillion yen. Uncapped requests for investment amounted to 12.17 trillion yen. The MOF explains that this amount is the sum of the annual budget and the supplemental budget in FY2027. However, the amount still exceeds the sum of these two budgets in FY2026, which was 140.61 trillion yen. There is no guarantee that the government will not need a supplemental budget for an unpredictable natural disaster next year.
 
The greatest concern, however, is Japan’s payments on its government bonds. The total estimated expenditures in FY 2027 for the redemption and payment of interest on outstanding government bonds is at a record high 36.63 trillion yen. With the recent trend of policy interest rate increases by the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the payments for government bonds are expected to increase. The assumed yield rate for government bonds is 3.8 percent in FY2027, 0.8 percentage points higher than in FY2026.
 
Concern about Japan’s lack of fiscal discipline was immediately reflected in the long-term bond market. Bond prices fall as yields rise. The ten-year government bond yield hit three percent, the highest level in the last thirty years. It happened on the next day when the MOF closed budget requests. Expectations that the BOJ would hike the policy interest rate that the rise in crude oil prices would increase price inflation also caused bond yields to go up and bond prices to drop.
 
A rise in the long-term bond yield in Japan can be linked to a similar rise in the U.S. longer-term bond rate. U.S. Secretary of Treasury Scott Bessent said on September 1 that he expected Japan to “do the right thing,” effectively pressuring the BOJ to raise the policy interest rate. Referring to the success of former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s reflationary policy in stimulating the Japanese economy, Bessent said that Japan “should actually let that run and stop the reflation” in his press conference after the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank chiefs in Asheville, North Carolina.  That is, Bessent implied, Japan should cease further stimulus and direct its fiscal policy toward lowering inflation.
 
A reflation policy typically consists of expansive fiscal policy and monetary easing. The Abe administration used this policy to get rid of deflation. It is obvious that the current problem of Japan’s economy is not deflation, but inflation. Nevertheless, Takaichi has decided that what was good for Abe will be good for her, and she is trying to mobilize the national budget for investments to spur even greater economic growth and to pressure the BOJ not to raise the policy interest rate. Her economic policy, called “Sanaenomics,” looks to be facing opposition from the markets and the U.S.

Tuesday, September 8, 2026

JAPAN UPDATE - View from Australia

                          Japan Update 2026

Australia-Japan Research Centre

Australian National University


Wednesday 9 September 

9 AM - 5 PM (AEST, UTC+10)

Tuesday 8 September

7 PM - 3 AM (EDT)

in-person and live streamed on Vimeo

Please indicate whether you will attend in person or online (via live stream on Vimeo) at the checkout. All attendees will receive a confirmation email with instructions for accessing both the in-person and online events


PROGRAM

Registration & tea and coffee (8:30-9:00am)

Welcome (9:00am)
Shiro Armstrong, Director, Australia-Japan Research Centre, The Australian National University

Introduction
Rebekah Brown, Interim Vice Chancellor of The Australian National University

Opening Keynote
Tim Ayres, Minister for Industry and Innovation and Minister for Science

Vote of Thanks
HE Kazuhiro Suzuki, Japanese Ambassador to Australia

The New Normal in Japan's Economy (9:45-10:45am)
Keynote: Koji Nakamura, Bank of Japan
Chair: Ippei Fujiwara, University of Tokyo and Keio University
Katrina Di Marco, Deputy Secretary, Treasury

Morning Tea (10:45-11:15am)

Foreign Policy and Political Choices (11:15-12:45pm)
Chair: Lauren Richardson, The Australian National University
Yves Tiberghien, University of British Columbia and Taipei School of Economics and Political Science
Naoko Eto, Gakushuin University
Tomohiko Satake, Aoyama Gakuin University
Evelyn Goh, The Australian National University

Lunch (12:45-1:45pm)

The State of Japanese Studies in Australia (1:45-3:00pm)
Keynote: Sawako Shirahase, University of Tokyo
Chair: Simon Avenell, The Australian National University
Nana Oishi, The University of Melbourne
Kent Anderson, The Australian National University
Carolyn Stevens, Monash University

Afternoon tea (3:00-3:30pm)

The Next 50 Years of the Australia–Japan Relationship (3:30-4:50pm)
Keynote: Peter Drysdale, The Australian National University
Chair: Geraldine Doogue, Australian Broadcasting Corporation
Kate Kitagawa, La Trobe University
Shiro Armstrong, The Australian National University
Melissa Conley Tyler, The University of Melbourne

Closing and Thank You (4:50-5:00pm)
Ippei Fujiwara, University of Tokyo and Keio University
Simon Avenell, Director, Japan Institute, The Australian National University

Sunday, September 6, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday September 7, 2026

It is a federal holiday in both the U.S. and Canada on Monday. The U.S. Congress is on a weeklong recess. The U.S. House of Representatives will take the following week for recess as well. 

STATE DEPENDENCE OF MONETARY POLICY DURING GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DISRUPTIONS. 9/7, 5:00-6:30pm (JST), 4:00-5:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Canon Institute for Global Studies (CIGS), Tokyo, Japan. Speaker: Francesco Zanetti, International Research Fellow, CIGS.


Sunday, August 30, 2026

Asia Policy Events, Monday August 31, 2026

Asia Policy Point's weekly Asia Policy Calendar returns from summer recess. Thus, only Monday events will be posted here, on our blog, for the rest of the year. If you want to access the full calendar, please subscribe via this LINK.

TAKEAWAYS FROM THE 2026 INTERNATIONAL AIDS CONFERENCE. 8/31, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Global Health Policy Center, CSIS. Speakers: J. Stephen Morrison, Senior Vice President and Director, Global Health Policy Center, CSIS; Lloyd Mulenga, Professor of Infectious Diseases, University Teaching Hospital, Zambia; Doris Macharia, President, Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation; Jirair Ratevosian, Research Scholar, Duke Global Health Institute; Omar Sued, HIV Treatment and Care Regional Advisor, Pan American Health Organization.

US-NORTH KOREA REMAINS RECOVERY COOPERATION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE. 8/31, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea (NCNK). Speaker: Kelly McKeague, Director, Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency.

Saturday, August 29, 2026

An American Progressive View of Asia

Matt Duus
INTERVIEW: U.S. Progressive Leader Eyes Greater Cooperation with China

First published in JiJi Press, 8/17/2026, reprinted here for educational distribution

Washington, Aug. 17 (Jiji Press)--A United States guided by progressive foreign policy would seek to improve cooperation with countries around the world, including China, said Matt Duss, a prominent progressive thought leader in the United States, in an interview with Jiji Press this month.

   The recent electoral success of left-wing candidates in the United States has led to growing interest in progressivism within the country. Although progressivism is usually associated with domestic reforms intended to reduce inequality and increase social justice, its foreign policy tenets are less widely understood.

   "As a progressive, I take the ethic of solidarity seriously. I think we live in an interconnected world," said Duss, executive vice president at the Center for International Policy, a progressive think tank based in Washington. "Our security and prosperity should not come at the expense of the security and prosperity and safety of communities elsewhere."

   In terms of security, Duss calls for a re-evaluation of the U.S. force posture globally, saying that the presence of U.S. troops creates less stability in some regions such as the Middle East. He sought to reassure, though, that any changes to the terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance would be done in close consultation with the Asian ally.

   "I think we need to pay close attention to the debate within Japan. There's obviously a lot of concern within Japanese society about the continuing U.S. troop presence. I think we should take that seriously with Japan as a partner democracy," he said. "I think one thing that we can promise is that a progressive administration would not act precipitously in making these decisions."

   Duss, who previously served as foreign policy advisor to Senator Bernie Sanders, arguably the leading voice in the American progressive movement of the last 10 years, says that, while he is sympathetic to the concerns of some in Asia over the rise of China, it is incumbent on the world's two largest economies to find ways to coexist to bring stability and safety to the region and the world.

   "But I think it's a mistake to characterize the (U.S.-China) relationship mainly as competition. There is going to be cooperation. I would hope there will be more cooperation than competition, and I think the United States needs to really press forward to identify those areas of cooperation."

   While citing climate change, pandemics, and global development as areas ripe for increased cooperation with China, Duss rejects the orthodoxy of the U.S. foreign policy establishment that China's massive global infrastructure project intended to connect emerging markets and developing nations with Beijing, known as the Belt and Road Initiative, is economic warfare.

   "Many people here in Washington see this as a threat," Duss said. "They see these regions as an arena of competition with China. I don't think it's necessarily right to characterize that all as competition."

   Overall, progressive foreign policy differs most from the trade and economic strategies of the past by focusing on the needs of working families and communities ahead of the "elite establishment."

   "I don't want to pit American workers in some kind of zero-sum competition against workers in China or Japan or anywhere else in the world. I think we need a kind of new global trade order that really puts the needs of workers front and center."

   While Duss foresees a significant shift in trade policy under a progressive administration, he does not stray far from long-standing strategy in terms of Taiwan, perhaps the most strategically sensitive issue in the U.S.-China relationship. Instead of saying how a progressive U.S. administration would react to an invasion of Taiwan, Duss emphasized the need to maintain the current admittedly "unsatisfactory" status quo.

   "I think the best course forward is to lower the temperature to make clear that the United States does not support any kind of military solution by either side, we maintain a 'One China' policy, (and) that this issue should be resolved peacefully," he said, largely echoing existing U.S. policy.

   While there will be points of disagreement between the United States and China, such as Taiwan or the "absolutely atrocious" treatment of its Uighur minority population, Duss asserts that preventing ties from worsening is in everyone's interest.

   "(In) a relationship that is so broad and multifaceted and so consequential for the entire global community, I think the focus needs to be on identifying areas of cooperation and coexistence between the United States and China," he noted.