Monday Asia Policy Events June 23, 2025

THE US-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP IN THE NEW ERA. 6/23, 2:00-3:30pm (JST), 1:00am (EDT). HYBRID. Sponsor: Nikkei Global Events, The Asia Group. Speakers: Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who oversaw Asia policy during the Biden presidency; former Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger, involved in Asia diplomacy in the first Trump administration; and former National Security Advisor Takeo Akiba, who long guided Japan's diplomacy.

THE NEXT DECADE: SHAPING THE FUTURE OF US-ROK NUCLEAR COOPERATION. 6/23-24 (KST), HYBRID. Sponsors: Atlantic Council; Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. Speakers Include: Matt Bowen, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, University of Columbia School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA); Scott Campbell, President, Howard Baker Forum; Sungyeol Choi, Associate Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Seoul National University; Bumjin Chung, Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University.

ENERGY SECURITY AND THE ISRAEL-IRAN WAR. 6/23, 9:00-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Clayton Seigle, Senior Fellow and James R. Schlesinger Chair in Energy and Geopolitics, Energy Security and Climate Change Program; Adi Imsirovic, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program; Raad Alkadiri, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program.

US ATTACKS IRAN: ISRAEL IRAN CONFLICT UPDATE. 6/23, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: General Joseph L. Votel, US Army, Retired, Distinguished Military Fellow, Middle East Institute; Daniel Benaim, Associate Fellow, Middle East Institute; Colby Connelly, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute.

SPACE FORCE INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY: A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH AIR MARSHAL PAUL GODFREY. 6/23, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Air Marshal Paul Godfrey, Assistant Chief of Space Operations for Future Concepts and Partnerships, United States Space Force; Sarah Mineiro, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Aerospace Security Project, CSIS.

DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY REFORM IN EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC. 6/23, 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: WTO. Speakers: Aaditya Mattoo, Chief Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank; Alessandro Barattieri, Senior Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank.

OPERATION MIDNIGHT HAMMER: U.S. STRIKES AGAINST IRAN'S NUCLEAR SITES. 6/23, 3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish, Senior Vice President for Israeli Affairs, Julian & Jenny Josephson; Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Amikam Norkin, JINSA Distinguished Fellow; John Hannah, Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow, JINSA.

CENTRAL ASIAN FIGHTERS AND GLOBAL JIHAD. 6/23, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL .Sponsor: Center for the National Interest. Speakers: Dr. Gavin Helf, Adjunct Professor, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown University; Dr. Asfandyar Mir, Senior Fellow for South Asia, Stimson Center; Dr. Noah Tucker, Senior Research Consultant, Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs. 

USING LABOUR MIGRATION TO SUPPORT EUROPE’S GREEN TRANSITION. 6/23, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Center for Global Development; Fragmen. Speakers: Gemma Hyslop, Director, Fragomen; Nina Vafaee, Global Mobility Immigration Manager, RWE. 

THE HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE AGENDA: A CONVERSATION WITH REPRESENTATIVE FRENCH HILL (R-AR). 6/23, 2:00–3:00 pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speaker: Rep. French Hill, Chair, House Financial Services Committee. Moderator; Nellie Liang, Senior Fellow, Brookings; fmr. U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Domestic Finance. 

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS ON GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAINS. 6/23, 10:00–11:30 am (SGT), 10:00–11:30 pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Speaker: Professor Archanun Kohpaiboon, Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University. 

BOOK TALK: THE SENKAKU ISLANDS CONFRONTATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE. 6/23, Noon-1:30pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS), Temple University, Japan Campus. Speaker: author Dr. Paul Midford, Professor, Political Science, Meiji Gakuin University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/43ZcfD0

Japan's Science Council Politicized

Transformation of Japan’s National Academy through Governmental Oversight

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 16, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

On June 11, Japan’s Diet enacted a law to convert the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) from an independent consultative body to a special public corporation with stronger governmental oversight. The new law enables the Japanese government to participate in the selection of the council’s new members.

The Council historically has represented Japan’s scientific community. The new law takes effect in October 2026. The changes to the Council’s membership are controversial: some scholars are adamantly opposed, dubbing the law the “SCJ Control Act.”

The SCJ was established in 1949 as a special organization of the government of Japan to provide a scientific perspective on government actions. “Based on a belief that science constructs the basis of cultural state, SCJ is hereby established with consensus of scientists, upholding mission of peaceful reconstruction of our country, contributing welfare of human society, and supporting academic progress connected with world academy,” as the current SCJ Act states.

The Japan Academy (Nippon Gakushi-in) is another government-authorized academic organization. The Meiji government established Gakushi-in in 1879 to reward scientists who had made outstanding scientific breakthroughs. While the members of Gakushi-in have life-time membership, SCJ is limited to 210 members, who are frequently replaced.

One unusual decision of a prime minister in 2020 prompted proposals to reform the SCJ. Then Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga rejected six scientists as new members of the SCJ. The SCJ Act provides that the prime minister appoints the members of the SCJ based on recommendations from the council. Former prime ministers had previously approved all members recommended by the council as a matter of course. The six scientists rejected in 2020 were known to be critical of some government policies, and they are not the members of the SCJ up until now.

In March 2025, the government of Japan submitted the bill for the new law to replace current SCJ Act. Reflecting the view of the leading parties, mainly conservative ones, that a government organization contribute to the government, the bill stripped from the SCJ its status as a special organization in the Cabinet Office, which makes independent decisions and receives sufficient financial support.

The new law includes provisions to establish new sections in the council. They include a Member Candidate Selection Committee, a Selection Advisory Committee, and a Management Advisory Committee. The law requires the SCJ to abide by various conditions in selection of new members. In addition, the law sets up an SCJ Evaluation Committee in the Cabinet Office. This committee will evaluate SCJ’s annual self-assessment report on its activities, as well as reviewing the mid-term plans of the council.

The SCJ argued that the law should maintain the SCJ as a national academy in its statement in April. The statement proposed five elements necessary for the SCJ to be a true national academy: status as an academic representative of the state, public qualification, a stable financial base in the form of funding in the government’s budget, independence from government regulation of its activities, and autonomy and independence in selecting members.

Six former presidents of the SCJ issued a statement in May that the SCJ Act would not include those five elements and urged that the bill be abandoned.. They recommended maintenance of a cooptation system in the selection of new members, arguing that the new law would erode the SCJ’s academic independence with the government’s intervention in the management of the council.

The government never explained, even in the Diet discussion, why former prime minister Suga rejected the six scientists as new members in 2020. It merely repeated that the new law would guarantee higher independence and autonomy. Although the leading coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito, did not have a majority in the Lower House, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) joined them in passing the bill in the Lower House on May 13 and the Upper House on June 11.

At a press conference after the bill passed the Diet, one of the six former presidents who opposed the bill, Juichi Yamagiwa, the former President of Kyoto University, labeled the new law the “SCJ Disorganization Law.” “The reason for Suga’s rejection has not made clear and the law entails stricter control on academism,” said Yamagiwa.

The Suga administration was a loyal successor to the Shinzo Abe administration. Abe worked aggressively for constitutional amendment, but in the face of criticism by liberal scholars, his efforts failed. It is likely that the conservative lawmakers and the loyalist bureaucrats close to Abe were frustrated with the academic community in Japan.

Knowing that Suga’s rejection of the six scientists was an arbitrary decision against liberal scholars, they might have thought that they could control the SCJ by reviving the law. They did not choose a course of correcting Suga’s decision. Today’s Japanese government, not unlike the Trump administration in the U.S., appears not to appreciate scholarly advice from experienced scientists on national policies.

Monday Asia Policy Events, June 16, 2025

ASSESSING IRANIAN, U.S., AND GULF REACTIONS AND OPTIONS FOLLOWING ISRAEL’S UNPRECEDENTED ATTACK ON IRAN. 6/16, 9:00-10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow, AGSI; Kristin Smith Diwan, Senior Resident Scholar, AGSI; Robin Mills, Non-Resident Fellow, AGSI. 

A CLOSER LOOK: RECENT SHIFTS IN THE U.S. SANCTIONS LANDSCAPE. 6/16, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Washington Foreign Law Society. Speakers: David Tannenbaum, Director, Blackstone Compliance Services; Manny Levitt, Associate, Holland & Knight; Moderator: Andrew McAllister, Partner, Holland & Knight. 

KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS: WHAT TO EXPECT? 6/16, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Christopher B. Johnstone, Partner & Chair of the Defense & National Security Practice, The Asia Group; Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program, Stimson Center; Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Mark Lippert, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS. 

A REDRAWN MIDDLE EAST? 6/16, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speakers: Vali Nasr, Professor, Johns Hopkins University; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy. 

THE VIEW FROM INDONESIA. 6/16, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speaker: Dino Patti Djalal, Former vice minister for foreign affairs, Indonesia. 

BOOK TALK: THE GREAT TRADE HACK: HOW TRUMP’S TRADE WAR FAILS AND THE WORLD MOVES ON. 6/16, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speaker: author Richard Baldwin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, PIIE, Professor, International Economics, IMD Business School, Founder, Editor-in-Chief, VoxEU.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4mHk5JT

BOOK TALK: CHILD WELFARE AND PROBLEMS OF WELL-BEING IN JAPAN. 6/16, 6:30pm (JST) 5:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at Temple University, Japan Campus; Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: Kathryn Goldfarb, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Boulder.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3ZmKT8s

INAUGURAL LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN LECTURE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL WILLIAM BARR. 6/16, 4:00-5:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute. Speaker: William Barr, former US Attorney General; Moderator: Adam J. White, Laurence H. Silberman Chair, Constitutional Governance, American Enterprise Institute. 

RUSSIA'S INFORMATION CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE – INTENT, EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS. 6/16, 9:30-11:00am (BST), 4:30–6:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Speaker: Julia Voo, Senior Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict, IISS. 

The Republic of Korea’s New Leader and Japan

Will Cooperation Continue? Maybe

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 9, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

A major question in Japan is whether Japan can get along with South Korea’s new progressive leader, LEE Jae-myung, who once called Japan an “enemy country.” At present the Japanese government has no explicit differences with Korea’s Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP has so far avoided discussing Japan, especially on the history issues that have long divided the two countries. The current optimism about relations between the two countries reflects changes in each country’s domestic politics and national security policies. The history issues have not been resolved, however.

It is broadly recognized in Japan that the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea improved under the leadership of YOON Suk Yeol, Lee’s predecessor. Yoon was, however, impeached after his abrupt declaration of martial law last December. Yoon’s decision to compensate Koreans for wartime forced labor without seeking contributions from Japanese corporations silenced conservatives in Japan who had advocated for a hard line against Korean progressives. The greatest concern in Japan now is that Korea may go back to the time before Yoon – and reopen old wounds.

Lee refrained from negative remarks about Japan in his presidential campaign. Right after his victory, he even suggested that he would maintain the bilateral relationship forged by Yoon. “Policy coherence is especially important in managing relations between nations,” Lee said on the day he was sworn into office.

The Trump Administration’s tariff policy necessitates that South Korea make common cause with Japan. Moreover, to deal with North Korea, which is expanding its missile and nuclear capability and enhancing its ties to Russia, Lee will pursue “pragmatic diplomacy:” adjusting Korea’s foreign policies to account for the latest developments in international affairs. Japan and the U.S. are likely to be at the heart of Lee’s approach.

The Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, congratulated Lee on his victory. “This is the year of 60th anniversary from diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea, and I want to vitalize exchanges including non-governmental relationship. Enhancing cooperation between Japan and South Korea, or with the U.S., has a significance, as Japan shares such common issues as low birth rate, demographic concentration to the capital, and an alliance with America,” Ishiba said. He hopes for early meeting with Lee in the nature of “shuttle diplomacy.”

Ishiba and Lee had a telephone talk on June 9, in which Ishiba said he hoped to promote bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea based on the common ground the both countries had built. Both leaders emphasized the importance of cooperation in their bilateral relations, or their trilateral one including the United States, given the severe strategic environment.

Ishiba’s observations about common – and troubling – demographic conditions warrant serious attention. With respect to low birth rates, according to the Vital Statistics of Japan, the fertility rate (the number of babies that a woman delivers in her lifetime) was 1.15 in 2024, a year in which Japan hit a record low with fewer than 700,000 births. The situation is even more dire in the South Korea, which has the lowest fertility rate in the world: 0.75 in 2024. As to population trends, the capitals of Japan and the ROK are expanding at the expense of rural areas. Tokyo recorded the greatest population increase in 2024, while most of the other prefectures lost residents. In South Korea, half of the population lives in Seoul.

Beyond demographics, Japan and South Korea have common national security interests, which bring the United States into the picture. To protect its security environment, which is affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and to protect against China’s advances, Japan has been reinforcing its multilateral arrangements for security cooperation with like-minded countries in the region.

The security frameworks of both Japan and South Korea are based on alliances with the U.S. In his policy speech to the Diet last January, Ishiba extolled the leadership of Japan and the U.S. in building multi-layered regional security networks, including the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia, Japan-U.S.-South Korea and Japan-U.S.-Philippines. For South Korea’s part, Lee said that he would “pursue pragmatic diplomacy with neighboring countries and boost trilateral Seoul-Washington-Tokyo cooperation.”

Bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea fell to their lowest point since World War II under the respective leaderships of Shinzo Abe in Japan and Moon Jae-in South Korea. That fall stemmed in large part from Abe’s revisionist view on history issues. Specifically, on the mobilization of “comfort women,” Abe in 2007 denied that Japanese officials had engaged in “coercion in narrow definition,” while emphasizing that brokers (that is, parties outside the government) had conducted “coercion in broad definition.”

Although Moon’s predecessor, Park Geun-hye, agreed with the Abe administration on a “final and irreversible” settlement of the comfort woman claims in December 2015, Moon was skeptical about the validity of the agreement. In fact, the relevant document was unique, unsigned, and unratified and existed only as two different “announcements” at a “joint press occasion.” In the absence of a conventional agreement, South Korean courts have continued to order Japan to compensate Korea’s former comfort women.

Yoon and Fumio Kishida ended the personal rivalry between the leadership of the two countries. However, domestic developments may cause Lee to take a hard line on the comfort woman issue. Even the dispute over wartime forced labor can reappear, if potential frustration against Japan grows among the people in South Korea. In 2018 and 2023, South Korea's Supreme Court dismissed the argument of Japanese corporations that compensation over the wartime forced labor was all settled.

Both countries also continue to dispute control over Takeshima Island (Dokdo in Korean). Meaningful cooperation with South Korea on national security matters will require the Ishiba administration to settle decades-long disputes over compensation of World War II comfort women and the conflicting territorial claims.

Monday Asia Policy Events, June 9, 2025

WILL LEE JAE-MYUNG REORIENT SOUTH KOREA’S FOREIGN POLICY? 6/9, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: Rep. Kim Joon-hyung, Member, National Assembly, Republic of Korea; Frank Aum, Senior Expert, Northeast Asia, U.S. Institute of Peace; Darcie Draudt-Véjares, Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; James Park, Research Associate, Quincy Institute; Moderator: Jake Werner, Director of East Asia Program, Quincy Institute. 

REPORT LAUNCH: RUSSIA’S USE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF STATECRAFT IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 6/9, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Dr. Alexander Korolev, Senior Lecturer, Politics, International Relations, School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney; Dr. Michael Rouland, Senior Strategic Advisor, Director, Research, Russia Strategic Initiative, US European Command; Colonel (ret.) Robert E. Hamilton, Ph.D., Head, Research, Eurasia Program, FPRI. 

FUTURE OF WAR. 6/9, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy (FP Live). Speakers: Mara Karlin, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities, Professor of Practice, Johns Hopkins SAIS, Visiting Fellow, Brookings Institution. Moderator: Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy. 

ISRAEL, CHINA, AND THE INDO-PACIFIC IN THE POST-OCTOBER 7TH MIDDLE EAST WITH, DIRECTOR OF SIGNAL GROUP. 6/9, Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Council for a Secure America. Speaker: Carice Witte, Founder and Executive Director, SIGNAL Group. 

WHY THE US NEEDS TO WIN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY RACE AGAINST THE CCP. 6/9, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Dr. Jason Kelly, CEO, Ginkgo Bioworks; Mike Gallagher, Distinguished Fellow, Hudson Institute. 

SECURING EUROPE: WHAT SHOULD THE US PRIORITISE TO SUPPORT ITS CRITICAL SECTORS? 6/9, 2:00-5:30pm (CET), ), 8:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Science Business Network; Indra. Speakers: Robert de Groot, Vice-President, European Investment Bank; David Luengo Riesco, Head, Brussels Office, Indra; Manuel Aleixo, Cabinet Expert, Cabinet of Commissioner Zaharieva, European Commission; Martin Übelhör, Deputy Head of Unit, Innovation and Security Research, DG HOME, European Commission; Ethan Corbin, Director, Defence and Security Committee, NATO Parliamentary Assembly; Kate Robson-Brown, Vice-President for Research, Innovation and Impact, University College Dublin; Sergii Nazarenko, Head, Office for Identification and Countering Threats to Critical Infrastructure Objects, NPC Ukrenergo; Nikolas Ott, Director, Cybersecurity and Defence Policy, Microsoft; Francesco Topputo, Full Professor of Space Systems, Politecnico di Milano; Verena Fennemann, Head, EU Office Brussels, Fraunhofer; Stijn Vermoote, Head of User Outreach and Engagement, ECMWF; Marco Brancati, Senior Vice President of Technology, Innovation & Systems Architecture - Space Division, Leonardo.

ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND GLOBAL (DIS)ORDER. 6/9, 6:30-8:00pm (BST), 1:30-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Speakers: Robert Falkner, Professor of International Relations, LSE; Katerina Dalacoura, Associate Professor in International Relations, LSE. 

Ms - Named

Discussion over Separate Surnames Begins

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 2, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Discussion over bills that would allow married couples to use separate surnames has begun in the Committee on Judicial Affairs of Japan’s House of Representatives. Three opposition parties have proposed their own respective bills, none of which has attracted majority support in the House because the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) opposes them. Despite domestic and international requirements for separate surnames, the Diet has failed to give married couples this flexibility.

Amid growing demands and international movements for gender equality, the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice released a draft in 1996 of a revised Civil Code to permit separate surnames. “When a married couple use each of their surnames before marriage, they need to decide at their marriage which name their children would use,” according to the draft. The couple themselves would be able to continue to use their unmarried names.

The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued concluding observations in 2024, in which it recommended that Japan “amend legislation regarding the choice of surnames of married couples in order to enable women to retain their maiden surnames after marriage.” The convention had issued the same recommendation in 2003, 2009 and 2016.

The Japan Business Federation (Keidanren), one of the most influential supporters of the LDP, requested in 2024 that the government of Japan create a selective separate surnames system for women. Women in Japan may and do use their maiden names for business abroad, but legal inconveniences arise in foreign countries since their maiden names have no legal basis and are not described in their passports.

Nevertheless, conservative lawmakers in the LDP have blocked the amendment of the Civil Code, which currently requires a married couple to use one of their surnames, reflecting a concern that separate surnames would destroy the traditional shape of the family. They have not explained, however, how separate surnames will cause a family to collapse. Although some LDP lawmakers understand the necessity of separate surnames, the majority in the party has yet to do so.

With the decline of LDP power in the Diet after the October 2024 Lower House election, the opposition parties have tried to sustain momentum for amendment of the Civil Code. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) submitted a bill in April, which included the suggestions of the Legislative Council in 1996. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) proposed their own bill that would require a couple, as soon as they married, to register the surname that would be used for their children but that would allow the wife to use her unmarried surname.

The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) takes more conservative stance. Ishin’s bill would not allow separate surnames but would have a couple create a “common name” in family registration. The LDP decided against submitting their own bill in the current session of the Diet after long internal discussion.

Some conservative lawmakers, including Ms. Sanae Takaichi, argue that using a common name can be an alternative to separate surnames. Komeito favors a system for separate surnames, but thinks it is too early to resolve the issue.

It is not unusual for a Diet member to use their maiden name for their activities. For example, “real” name of Rui Matsukawa (LDP) is Rui Arai. While she discusses policies in the Diet as Rui Matsukawa, she needs to be Rui Arai in family registration or in foreign travel as a Diet member. Giving maiden name a legal status may be a good first step for lawmakers to make their political activities easier.

With no prospect that any one of the three bills from CDPJ, DPP, and Ishin could pass, the Chairwoman of the Committee on Judicial Affairs, Chinami Nishimura (CDPJ), has begun discussions in the committee on the surname issue. Of the 35 seats in the committee, the opposition parties hold 19. Two of the 19 oppose separate surnames. With these two members in dissent, the opposition parties cannot muster a majority to pass a bill.

If the Diet does not pass a bill by the end of the current session, the committee may discard some or all the bills or hold them over the next session. Chairwoman Nishimura reportedly aims to hold votes on the bills to draw a clear contrast between the ayes and the nays. The opposition continues to hold out remote hope that it can persuade enough LDP lawmakers to vote against the policy of their party.

In a May poll by Kyodo News, 71 percent of respondents supported a legal process for selective separate surnames, dwarfing the 27 percent who oppose the idea. Even if no bill passes the Diet, it will be good enough for the opposition: they can show, before the Upper House election in July, that the LDP was unable to deliver legislation favored by the majority of Japan’s citizens.

Monday Asia Policy Events June 2, 2025

 

6/2-6 - Asia Clean Energy Forum 2025: Empowering the Future - Clean Energy Innovations, Regional Cooperation and Integration, and Financing Solutions, Asia Development Bank, Manila.

FROM PEACEFUL UNIFICATION TO TWO KOREAS: PARADIGM SHIFTS IN INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS.6/2, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT),  VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speaker: Christopher Green, Assistant Professor, Korean Studies, Leiden University.

TOWARD IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXTENDED DETERRENCE IN THE JAPAN-U.S. ALLIANCE. 6/2, 9:30-10:30am (JST) 6/1 8:30-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Sasakawa. Speakers: Admiral Tomohisa Takei, fmr. Chief of Staff, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa; General Koji Yamazaki, fmr. Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa; General Sadamasa Oue, fmr. Commander, Air Material Command, Japan Air Self-Defense Force / Senior Fellow, Sasakawa. 

Women are the forgotten victims of war

 — it’s time that changed

Our chief foreign correspondent has reported for decades on frontline sexual violence. What does the first leading museum to tackle the subject reveal —
and hide?

Christina Lamb, Chief Foreign Correspondent
Sunday May 18 2025, The Sunday Times

Pass the massive naval guns in front of the Imperial War Museum (IWM) and enter its spectacular atrium and you will be confronted by a Soviet tank and German V2 rocket while a Harrier jump jet and a Spitfire from the Battle of Britain dangle from the ceiling — the ultimate boys with toys fantasy.

No surprise perhaps for a country that has fought more wars (about 120 in the last 300 years) than almost any other. But something is happening — upstairs a colourful North Korean propaganda poster advertises a new exhibition, Unsilenced: Sexual Violence in Conflict.

Yes, it’s tucked away behind the lifts on the third floor and comes with a trigger warning, but it’s the first time any big western museum has tackled this subject, the dark side of what happens to (mostly) women in war.

Representations of rape in war have been in many of our leading galleries and museums for years, but are not described as such. As a foreign correspondent who has been reporting on this for years — often feeling like I’m whistling in the wind as it keeps on happening — I find it incredible to finally see it the focus of an exhibition.

“We wanted to do it because it’s a side of war we don’t talk about or see represented enough,” says the curator Helen Upcraft. The exhibition has been seven years in the making, partly because of delays caused by Covid, but that has made it more timely. In the meantime we’ve had Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the October 7 attacks in Israel and subsequent escalation of conflict with Palestine — all of which have produced widespread allegations of sexual violence, not to mention horrific reports from the Sudanese civil war with even 12-month-old babies being raped.

Giving the museum’s annual lecture last month, Denis Mukwege, a Congolese gynaecologist and the founder of Panzi Hospital, which has treated 87,000 rape victims, asked: “Where is the outrage? People should be out on the streets.”

As Upcraft says, sexual violence does not happen in a vacuum, and the exhibition offers a sobering look at underlying factors — from gender stereotypes to the objectification of women exemplified by “nose art” such as a naked reclining blonde on an RAF jet in the Gulf War proclaiming “Hello Kuwait”.

Rape in war is of course nothing new. The exhibition’s first example is the German invasion of Belgium in 1914 and testimony from Belgian civilians, collected in the so-called Bryce report by the British Parliamentary Committee on German Outrages.

The next is of state-sanctioned sexual violence and sexual slavery — tens of thousands of young women and girls snatched across southeast Asia in the Second World War to be so-called “comfort women”, repeatedly raped by Japanese soldiers. A collaboration with the Museum of War and Women’s Human Rights in South Korea has provided items such as a soldier’s comfort station pass and the brave testimony of Kim Bok-dong, in 1991 the first to tell her story publicly. Photos and placards from the Wednesday demos outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul remind us that the women are still waiting for an apology from the Japanese government.

Then we see how rape can be used as a tool of genocide, hearing from two Yazidi women among thousands abducted by Islamic State fighters who swept through their villages in northern Iraq in 2014 and took them as sex slaves. More than a decade later, thousands are still in miserable conditions in displacement camps and many are still missing.

How to illustrate such an exhibition is, as Upcraft says, “a real challenge — people want to see 3D objects in glass cases”. Instead they have testimonies, documents, photos and talking heads (I am one of them).

It might have been an opportunity to exhibit the Scottish artist Peter Howson’s Croatian and Muslim, a confrontational painting of a woman with her legs spread apart by one man as another pushes her head into a lavatory. This was painted for the IWM, for whom Howson was the official war artist in the Bosnian War, but their male-dominated Acquisitions Committee refused to buy it, arguing, somewhat strangely, that he could not have witnessed the scene. David Bowie ended up buying it.

Instead they have opted for one of Albert Adams’ 2004 paintings of abuse of male Iraqi prisoners in Abu Ghraib as a reminder that this doesn’t only happen to women (although overwhelmingly it does). Upcraft says they looked at exhibiting the Howson, but at 2.13m x 1.52m it was “too big and we wouldn’t be able to put anything else in the room as people would have to step back”. Although the Adams is not small at 1.5m x 1.5m.

Surely an exhibition on such a shocking subject needs to shock people? “It’s difficult graphic content and we don’t want to overwhelm people,” she says. “It’s a balance. If we went down the road of shock and horror people would turn off and what we want is for them to engage.

“We know it’s just a fraction of all the sexual violence happening round the world,” she adds. “What I hope is it’s a start on treating this complex subject and being better at incorporating it within our collections.”

And this is me quibbling because Unsilenced is truly groundbreaking and, one hopes, will be a wake-up call. The Justice and Reconciliation room, which importantly looks at who gets to have their day in court and who gets believed, reminds us that neither Tokyo nor the Nuremberg Tribunals prosecuted anyone for sexual violence despite horrendous evidence. Accountability continues to be the exception, not the rule.

Such is the exhibition’s power, there is a quiet room at the end. I hope people will reflect on what kind of society we live in where it’s the victim who bears the life sentence, not the perpetrator.

The updated edition of Christina Lamb's
Our Bodies, Their Battlefield: What War Does to Women by is out now in paperback

Imperial War Museums to open UK’s first major exhibition on sexual violence in conflict.
By Mark Westall, FAD Magazine, 8 March 2025

Continued Diet Showdowns

The Struggle over Pension Reform

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 19, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

On May 16, the Ishiba Cabinet submitted a pension reform bill to the Diet. After a long deliberation, the Ishiba government dropped a provision to use a reserve fund for salaried workers to offset any future decline in pension benefits. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was afraid that including this provision would hurt them in the coming July Upper House elections.
 
The opposition parties are frustrated with the pension bill. It is likely that it will be the last major piece of legislation considered during the remainder of the current ordinary session of the Diet that ends June 22.
 
Japan has a universal pension system which covers mostly all the residents in Japan, irrespective of their nationality. Everyone between the ages of 20 and 59 must pay premiums into the National Pension System (NPS) and receive benefits at the age of 65. Salaried workers, who make up 70 percent of the workforce, must pay additional premiums for “employee’s pension insurance” (EPI), if they make more than 106 million yen annually. The premiums for both NPS and EPI are automatically deducted from their monthly salaries.
 
Business owners, including farmers and fishermen, receive NPS-only benefits. In 2023, the average NPS benefit was 57 thousand yen per month. Retired salaried workers, both employees of private companies and public workers, receive both NPS and EPI benefits in proportion to their past payments. In 2023, the average total benefit was 147 thousand yen per month.
 
Because Japanese demographics show that the population is aging rapidly, the government introduced the “Macro-economic Slide Formula,” which automatically adjusts pension benefits based on changes in the revenue of the NPS and EPI. With fewer people of working age, the pension revenues have fallen. The financial review for the pension system in 2024, conducted once every five years, found that the ratio of the average pension benefit against the average income of workers currently paying into the NPS and EPI would drop from 61.2 percent in 2024 to 56.9 percent in 2039, even if Japan’s economy achieves a high growth rate with 1.2 percent of real GDP growth and 2.0 percent of real wage hike. That is why pension reform is necessary in the current session of the Diet.
 
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) proposed to raise benefits under the NPS program because people who had paid a smaller premium in the past would receive a smaller benefit. The ministry looked at the EPI reserve fund, which has been growing, as a resource to support the added benefits.   
 
The LDP opposed that idea. Salaried workers who look to the EPI for most of their benefits and not the NPS would object to the MHLW proposal because it would erode the EPI fund. The first action they could take would, of course, be to vote against the LDP in the next election.
 
The LDP has had a traumatic experience with the pension system before. The first Abe administration collapsed following a pension mismanagement scandal, which resulted in a significant defeat for the LDP in the 2007 Upper House elections.
 
Accepting this reality and his party’s opposition, Ishiba submitted the pension bill without any measure for raising the NPS benefit. Instead, the bill would remove “the wall of 106 million yen.” In the current pension system, only a salaried worker with an annual income of 106 million yen or more must pay an EPI pension premium. The new bill would require all workers to pay the premium, regardless of the amount of their income. Even though low-income salaried workers would now be required to pay a premium, their benefits will not be reduced.
 
Also missing from the pension bill is any attempt to address another demographic issue: the “employment ice age.” There is a generation of workers who graduated from college in the 1990s and 2000s after the burst of the bubble economy and who had fewer job prospects. Since they did not pay premiums during their sometimes-lengthy periods of unemployment, it is likely that they will receive fewer pension benefits than the people who were able to keep working. A rule in the pension system significantly reduces benefits for those who have made premium payments for less than 25 years.
 
The opposition parties are critical of the bill’s failure to provide any relief for these participants in the NPS. These parties regard help to the employment ice agers as the core of pension reform. “This is red bean roll bread without red bean paste,” is how the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, described the bill. In American terms, “hamburger helper without the hamburger.” The CDPJ plans to submit its own pension reform bill.
 
The LDP is in a quandary. If they help the employment ice agers by tapping into the EPI reserve fund, they will face anger from the salaried workers. If they do not help, the pension system will not work well for low benefit recipients. And if they fail to pass any bill, Ishiba’s government will be criticized as irresponsible. The future is murky: since the LDP is a minority government in the Lower House. It is unclear whether Ishiba’s bill will pass the Diet by the end of the session on June 22.

Monday Asia Policy Events May 19, 2025

CHINA’S YOUTH: THE AGE OF ANXIETY. 5/19, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society New York. Speakers: Yi-Ling Liu, Journalist in Residence, Tarbell Center; Biao Xiang, Director, Max Planck Institute in Social Anthropology, Germany; Li Zhang, Professor, University of California Davis. 

AN ASSESSMENT OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S VISIT TO THE GULF AND THE FUTURE OF U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS. 5/19, 10:00-11:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations. Speakers: Dr. Kenneth Katzman, Senior Advisor, Soufan Group, Former Specialist in Middle East Affairs, Congressional Research Services; Dr. Joseph Kéchichian, Senior Research Fellow, Office of the Chairman, King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, CEO, Kéchichian & Associates, LLC; Christopher Johnson, Managing Attorney, Al-Sharif Law, Former Chairman, Middle East Council of Chambers of Commerce; Norman Roule, Former United States National Intelligence Manager for Iran, United Against a Nuclear Iran Senior Advisor. 

ISRAEL AND CIVILIZATION: THE FATE OF THE JEWISH NATION AND THE DESTINY OF THE WEST. 5/19, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Josh Hammer, Senior Editor at Large, Newsweek; Rebeccah L. Heinrichs, Senior Fellow and Director, Keystone Defense Initiative.

AMBASSADORS' CIRCLE WITH AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. 5/19, 7:00-8:00pm (EDT) 5/20, 8:00-9:15am (JST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Cheol-Hee Park, Ambassador to Japan, ROK. 

WHAT WE CHOSE NOT TO SEE: PULITZER PRIZE WINNER MATTHIEU AIKINS ON WAR, POWER, AND TRUTH. 5/19, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speaker: Matthieu Aikins, Reporter, New York Times, Pulitzer Prize Winner. 

HOW THE WEST CAN OVERCOME THE TOTALITARIAN AXIS. 5/19, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speaker: Sir Iain Duncan Smith MP, former leader of the United Kingdom’s Conservative Party and founder and cochair of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China. 

MAINTAINING AMERICA'S AI EDGE. 5/19, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security. Speakers: Michael Kuiken, Commissioner for the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission; Randall Schriver, Commissioner for the United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission. 

BOOK TALK: EDWARD LUCE ON THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. 5/19, 5:30-6:30pm (CET) 6:30-7:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: author Edward Luce, US National Editor and Columnist, Financial Times; Ian Brzezinski, Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4jHp4bO

BOOK TALK: OUR FIRST GLIMPSE OF JAPAN: PROMINENT AMERICAN VISITORS TO JAPAN IN THE 1870. 5/21, 12:15-1:45am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY, Brown bag lunch. Sponsor: ICAS, Temple University Japan and Harvard Club of Japan. Speaker: author Samuel Kidder, Managing Director, FES Inc. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Sovj8c 

Japan is not the UK of the East

The Impact of Tariffs on Japan’s Economy

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 12, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

As U.S. President Donald Trump enters bilateral tariff negotiations with several countries, his tariffs have already begun to negatively affect Japan’s economy. Some business sectors had already realized profit and growth losses from the slowdown of Japan’s economy. The Shigeru Ishiba administration believes that, as a close ally of the United States, it can negotiate some exceptions to the punishing tariffs. This is far from certain.
 
The Bank of Japan has revised its estimate of the growth of Japan’s economy in FY2025. “Japan’s economic growth is likely to moderate, as trade and other policies in each jurisdiction [other countries] lead to a slowdown in overseas economies and to a decline in domestic corporate profits and other factors,” says the bank’s Outlook for Economic Activity and Prices in April. The outlook identifies Japan’s evolving trade situation and developments in import prices as risks to economic activity.
 
Toyota Motor Corporation published its FY2025 consolidated financial results on May 8. According to its estimation, net income from April 2025 to March 2026 will decline by 3.1 trillion yen ($21 billion), or 34.9 percent. Toyota has already taken into account declines of 180 billion yen in April and May 2025 that have resulted from Trump’s tariff policy, as well as an annual 745 billion yen reduction caused by the fluctuation of foreign exchange rates.
 
Nippon Steel estimates its net income between April 2025 and March 2026 will be 200 billion yen, a 42.9 percent decline from the previous fiscal year. “The U.S. administration’s tariff policy is becoming increasingly uncertain day by day and is beginning to have a major impact on the global economy. As a result, the trend toward favoring domestic production is accelerating, and it is expected to have a significant impact on the domestic and overseas steel industry, including an indirect impact,” according to Nippon Steel’s consolidated financial results for FY2024.
 
The Trump administration imposed a 25 percent tariff on foreign steel and aluminum in March. In April, it imposed another 25 percent tariff on imported cars. The Shigeru Ishiba administration quickly sought to negotiate reductions in these tariffs. Japan’s top negotiator, Ryosei Akazawa, announced that the talks were focused on the expansion of bilateral trade, non-tariff barriers, and economic security.
 
While Japan has been spending time trying to set the agenda, the United Kingdom reached a deal with the U.S. to reduce tariffs on UK products. The tariff on 100,000 UK cars will be reduced from 27.5 percent to 10 percent, and steel and aluminum imports will be tariff-free. On Monday, May 12, the U.S. agreed with China to cut the 145 percent tariff on Chinese goods to 30 percent for 90 days.
 
The Trump administration clearly is seeking deals with countries, regardless of whether they are allies or foes. Japan was stunned by the indifference of Trump administration to their alliance and shared values of democracy and free markets, as seen in the U.S. intent to exclude the new tariffs on automobiles, steel, and aluminum from negotiations with Japan.
 
Trump’s tariffs caused the Japanese yen to appreciate against the U.S. dollar. The appreciation will itself raise the cost of Japan’s goods sold in the U.S., although the precise change in the exchange rate has varied. The yen rose from 155 yen per dollar at the time of Trump’s inauguration in January to a high of 140 yen in April. As of the close of business Monday, May 12, in the U.S., the rate was approximately 148 yen to the dollar.
 
Despite pressure from the Trump Administration to ease monetary policy, the Federal Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Board made no change to the current federal funds rate of 4¼ to 4½ percent at its May meeting, which concluded on May 7.  As long as U.S. monetary policy does not reduce the interest gap between the U.S. and Japan, there should be little impact on the yen. 
 
However, the announcement of even a 90-day deal between the U.S. and China devalued the yen. At the close of the market on Friday, the Japanese yen was at approximately 145 yen to the dollar. At the U.S. close on Monday, it was approximately 148 yen to the dollar. 
 
A cheap yen hikes the price of imported goods in Japan. According to the Monthly Labour Survey in March by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, the real wage of workers in Japan has dropped for three consecutive months. Workers’ wages have still not caught up with price inflation.
 
To minimize the negative impact of Trump’s tariffs in the coming Upper House election, the Ishiba administration plans to deliver an economic stimulus package. However, the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party are reluctant to include a consumption tax cut or a cash distribution in the party’s campaign platform.
 
If Japan falls behind other countries in finishing bilateral tariff deals, the Ishiba administration will be unable to reverse the downward trend in its approval rating. The latest poll of NHK showed a 33 percent approval rating, down 2 percentage points from the previous month. The Trump administration's tough line toward Japan is having a negative effect on Japanese politics.