Asia Policy Events, Monday February 2, 2026

THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF MYANMAR’S ELECTIONS. 2/2, 9:00-11:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Morgan Michaels, Research Fellow for Southeast Asian Security and Defence, IISS; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Chulalongkorn UniversitySteve Ross, Senior Fellow, Stimson; Min Zin, Executive Director, ISP-Myanmar; Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow, Stimson; Moe Thuzar, Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Myanmar Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS); Moderator: Yun Sun, Senior Fellow, Myanmar Project; Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson. 

THAILAND’S 2026 GENERAL ELECTION AND REFERENDUM: WHAT TO EXPECT. 2/2, 10:00-11:30am (SGT), 2/1, 9:00-10:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISWAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Speakers: Mathis Lohatepanont, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan; Thanisara Ruangdej (GG), CEO and Co-founder, WeVis.

WHAT FUTURE AFTER THE WAR? OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE’S SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND PROSPERITY. 2/2, 9:00am-Noon (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Anatolii Amelin, Executive Director, Ukrainian Institute of the Future; Max Bergmann, Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Hans Braunfisch, Founder, Pravo Ventures; Serhii Haidaichuk, Founder, CEO Club Ukraine; John E. Herbst, Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Mykola Murskyj, Program Director, Razom for Ukraine; Senator Rob Portman, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Practice of Public Policy, AEI; Dalibor Rohac, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kori Schake, Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI; Ambassador Olga Stefanishyna, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States; Angela Stent, Senior Fellow, AEI.

FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF US DEMOCRACY. 2/2, 10:00-11:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics. Speakers: Marie Gottschalk, Edmund J. Kahn Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; G. Elliott Morris, data journalist and author of the Strength in Numbers Substack; Elora Mukherjee, Jerome L. Greene Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Ilan Wurman, Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Moderator: Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Herbert H. Lehman Professor of Government and Director of IGP American Democracy Initiative, Columbia SIPA. 

BOOK TALK: RETRENCH, DEFEND, COMPETE: A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA. 2/2, Noon-1:00pm (EST). Sponsor: Quincy Institute (QI). Speakers: author Charles Glaser, Senior Fellow, MIT Security Studies Program; Michael J. Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Michael D. Swaine, Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Program, QI. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4cbcAbg

JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY. 2/2, Noon-1:15pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. Speaker: Ryo Sakai, 35th Chief of Staff of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and International Fellow at the Naval Postgraduate School. For inquiries, please contact Mr. Kenji Nagayoshi, knagayoshi@spfusa.org.

IN CONVERSATION WITH TOM STEYER. 2/2, 6:30-8:00pm (BST), 1:30-3:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: London School of Economics (LSE). Speakers: Tom Steyer, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Chair, Galvanize, Founder, NextGen America, Investor, Climate Advocate; President and Vice Chancellor, Larry Kramer, London School of Economics, Former President, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Former Dean, Stanford Law School; Susana Mourato, Professor of Environmental Economics, Vice President and Pro-Vice Chancellor (Research), Department of Geography and Environment; Jonathan Pershing, Dean of the Global School of Sustainability, Professor in Practice, The Global School of Sustainability at LSE; Lord Stern, IG Patel Chair of Economics and Government, Chairman, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Department of Economics, The Global School of Sustainability, London School of Economics (LSE). 

TARIFFS, TECH & TRUST: NAVIGATING THE NEXT PHASE OF U.S.–JAPAN TRADE TIES. 2/2, 5:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Washington, DC. Speakers: Emma Chanlett-Avery, Deputy Director & Director for Political-Security Affairs, ASPI; William Chou, PhD, Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Yuka Hayashi, Vice President, Japan Practice, The Asia Group; Moderator: Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, ASPI. LIVESTREAMING HERE.

Will Scandal Upend Japan's Lower House Elections?

PM Takaichi Prepares for the Lower House Elections

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 26, 2026

Japan’s House of Representatives was dissolved on January 23. All the members of the House are up for election. The House is empty now. A general election to fill its 465 seats was officially announced on January 27, and voters will go to the polls on February 8. While the election itself requires voters to choose between Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and another person to be the leader of Japan, the election presents deeper choices between the right and the center and between pressure groups and populism. (The parties on the left are not a realistic option.) The voters will consider the Prime Minister’s economic and security policies, as well as her political ethics. 
 
It will be a highly unusual election. This is the first time a prime minister has dissolved the Diet at the beginning of its annual ordinary session since 1966 when former prime minister Eisaku Sato dissolved the House to bolster popular support for his administration. The 2026 general election also will have the shortest timeframe; election day is only 16 days after the dissolution. The previous record was 17 days when former prime minister Fumio Kishida dissolved the Diet in 2021.
 
Just before the election campaign begins, polls conducted by news organizations showed that the Takaichi Cabinet’s approval rating had fallen. The decline appears to reflect public doubts about holding a snap election before the Diet has passed the FY2026 budget bill. In the poll by Mainichi Shimbun, 41 percent disapproved of the snap election, while only 27 percent approved.
 
A Vote for the Right or the Center
Takaichi is asking the voters to validate the coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). The LDP’s previous coalition partner, Komeito, had been working as a brake on the LDP’s rightward drift, but the JIP identifies itself as an “accel” or accelerant of the move to the right. The JIP is now quickening the pass by calling on the LDP to promote such conservative policies as eliminating Paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the Constitution of Japan, which prohibits maintaining armed forces and other “war potential”.
 
Takaichi has long been known as a hawkish figure among the LDP members; for example, she has advocated prime ministerial visits to the Shinto Yasukuni Shrine for Japan’s war dead. On several matters, the LDP-JIP government is taking positions further to the right than previous administrations led by Shigeru Ishiba or Fumio Kishida. Takaichi hopes voters will endorse her conservative agenda, similar to Shinzo Abe’s, including a review of the three principles for transferring defense equipment and of the three non-nuclear principles.
 
The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito offer another choice for voters by establishing a new party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), in the Lower House. One of the two co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda, has explained that the new party will integrate centrist parties so that they can effectively challenge Takaichi’s right-wing administration.
 
Although the CDPJ on its own has been taking positions on the left and has in the past sought to cooperate with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) in elections, the new CRA is staking out positions on the center-right to attract moderate and conservative lawmakers. As former CDPJ lawmakers have left the party before joining the CRA, CDPJ’s leftist tradition was not succeeded to the CRA. Because the JCP, Reiwa Shinsengumi, and the Social Democratic Party are unable to build a coalition on the left, the voters will have to choose between the right with the LDP-JIP coalition and the center with the CRA.
 
Populism or Solid Supporters
Recent elections in Japan are testimony to the advance of populism. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Sanseito embody this movement. They can attract young voters with eccentric policy proposals and video messages through social networking services.
 
Following its successful campaign in the Upper House election last summer, the DPP has been repeating its slogan: “We will increase your take-home pay.” The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, reached a deal with Takaichi last month to raise the threshold for the imposition of income tax to an annual income of 1.78 million yen. Tamaki is asking for even more in the campaign.
 
Sanseito focuses on xenophobic policies. Some conservatives worry about the increasing number of foreigners seen in the streets, trains and popular tourist destinations. Sanseito promises to deport low-skilled workers to their home countries and to regulate more stringently foreign investment in Japanese real estate. The party targets independent voters who lean conservative.
 
By contrast, the CRA is trying to distance itself from populism. The alliance is basing its campaign on support from established organizations. Candidates from the CDPJ have solid support from labor unions in the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). Komeito lawmakers are backed by Soka Gakkai, which has about 20,000 votes in each single-seat district. Although the CRA is not popular with young and independent voters, the party nevertheless has a good chance to win single-seat districts around Japan.
 
The LDP has historically relied on several large organizations, including major corporations, local chambers of commerce, agricultural organizations, and associations of medical services to bring out the vote. But its leader, Takaichi, is now pursuing a populist agenda, including an increase in take-home pay and stricter regulation of the foreign presence in Japan. Takaichi’s strategy indicates that even the ruling party cannot depend entirely on its traditional supporters and must turn to the constituency of independent voters.
 
Campaign Policies
It is notable that Takaichi announced that she would consider a consumption tax cut. Although she had opposed it on the view that it would not have an immediate impact on the economy, she introduced a tax cut bill after pressure from opposition parties. Her policy change made the bond market skeptical of her economic and financial policies, resulting in a sudden increase in interest rate on long-term government bonds. The consumption tax cut has now become a critical issue in the election.
 
Consistent with the view of the LDP’s coalition partner, Takaichi is suggesting a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food. How the government will make up for the moratorium’s reduction in tax revenue is a discussion for later – after the election. The CRA has proposed a permanent consumption tax cut for food backed by a governmental fund. The DPP would cut the tax rate from ten percent to five percent.  The JCP, Sanseito, and Reiwa Shinsengumi have all called for a permanent abolition of the tax.
 
The CRA has prioritized every walk of life in the domestic economy, and not a nationalistic agenda such as a constitutional amendment, to present a clear contrast with the leading coalition. The LDP and the JIP also are emphasizing their efforts to combat inflation. To reduce contributions by the current working generation, the JIP is stressing the need for social security reform.
 
The Scandal Factor
The campaigns of three of the parties will likely suffer from negative public reaction to scandals or misdoings. First, the LDP has decided to give formal party backing to the lawmakers who were involved in the kickback fund scandal of some of the former factions in the party. Takaichi insists that those members who were re-elected in 2024 election have cleared the voters’ scrutiny. The LDP still rejects stricter regulation of political contributions, which the opposition parties highlight as evidence of the LDP’s unwillingness to engage in true political reform. 
 
Second, the Weekly Bunshun magazine reported in mid-January that the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU), formerly the Unification Church, has been working behind the scenes to establish Takaichi’s presidency of the LDP – and her prime ministership. Bunshun found that Takaichi’s name appeared 32 times in the FFWPU’s special reports to the “True Mother (Han Hak Ja)” between 2018 and 2022. The report also identified her as the best choice to be Japan’s prime minister. The opposition parties may demand that Takaichi explain her relationship with the FFWPU.
 
Third, the JIP allowed its local leaders to avoid paying their own health insurance premiums, an evasion scheme premised on the theory of an exception for board members of any incorporated association. The party has expelled these leaders, but the fallout will hurt the JIP’s effort to keep to its target of 38 seats in the Lower House. As seen in 2024 election, some scandals of the leading parties may slow down their campaigns.

Trump’s Choice for Japan

Why Donald Trump Wants Takaichi to Win

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published January 26, 2026 on Toyo Keizai Online.

Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae wants the coming election to be a referendum on her personal leadership. In that contest, she has already won one vote – from U.S. President Donald Trump.

Is a clear victory for Takaichi the best outcome for the U.S? “Absolutely,” Kenneth Weinstein, an advisor to Trump, declared without hesitation.

Weinstein is the Japan Chair at the conservative Hudson Institute think tank and was the nominee to be Ambassador to Japan during the first Trump administration. In an interview with Toyo Keizai Online, he explained why a Takaichi triumph fits the Trump administration agenda.

“She is clearly focused on defense, national security, upgrading Japan’s security posture, upgrading Japan’s security capabilities, someone willing to work closely with the United States, and our allies, and willing to deepen the ties in the Indo Pacific that we in the United States have been less effective in doing,” Weinstein explained.

Clearly, Takaichi is seen as a loyal follower of Trump, one unlikely to challenge the U.S. as Europe and Canada are now doing in response to the military operations in Venezuela and the threat to seize Greenland.

“I don’t think the Takaichi administration is going to say a word about Greenland,” the distinguished American Japan scholar Gerald Curtis told Toyo Keizai. “Of all the allies, Japan is the one with which Trump has the least problems.”

American preference for Japan to be governed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is hardly unusual. But Takaichi is viewed as a significant improvement over the previous government of Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru who sought to create some distance from the U.S.

Instead, the Trump administration expects a victorious Takaichi government to rapidly increase defense spending and take on the responsibility for regional security in the Asia Pacific.

“We also need someone who understands the immense burdens that the Japanese people are going to have to bear in terms of their own national security,” Weinstein said. “And she is as good as it gets.”

The China question between Trump and Takaichi

For China hawks, like Weinstein, a strong Takaichi government is useful in bolstering those who are worried about an American retreat from Asia and a grand bargain with China’s Xi Jinping when the President goes to China in April.

“We need a strong leader and strong partner to keep us focused, on China, on the Taiwan challenge, on the Scarborough Shoal challenge,” the Hudson Japan chair who formally was the CEO of the think tank, told us.

Weinstein and other Japan hands are carefully critical of Trump’s failure to come to the open support of Takaichi after her comments on Taiwan and the massive pressure campaign mounted by China against her government.

But he and others dismiss fears that Trump is heading toward some kind of G-2 grand pact with China. They point to the attack on Venezuela and the pressure on Iran as moves that effectively strike at China which is dependent on those countries for oil.

They see the approval of arms sales to Taiwan and the recent trade agreement with Taiwan as further evidence that Trump is not planning on abandoning Taiwan in the pursuit of a deal with Xi.

Trump is seeking a bargain with Xi but not a grand alliance, Weinstein contends. His hesitation in backing Takaichi against China was tactical. “The president doesn’t want to have an open confrontation with China on the eve of his summit,” he said.

“Trump wants to strike a big deal with China,” Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific security chair at Hudson, told this writer. “But this is not some game-changing G2 moment.” He compared it to the talks between Xi and former President Joe Biden in seeking strategic stability, one that avoids the difficult issue of Taiwan.

Takaichi’s “big mistake” was to undermine Trump’s desire to make this deal with Xi, observed Curtis, an emeritus professor at Columbia University. “I wasn’t surprised that he was upset with Takaichi and called her and told her to get out of this mess.”

If Takaichi manages a decisive victory in the February election – and there is no consensus on this among American Japan hands – she will then head to Washington for a meeting ahead of Trump’s April trip to Beijing.

But that meeting may be even more challenging for a stronger Takaichi than if she still leads a weak coalition government.

Curtis predicts that Takaichi will not focus on China in Washington. “She knows that is not a winning issue for her in dealing with Trump,” he told Toyo Keizai. “Trump is interested in money and he wants to have his 550 billion bucks. It is his money and she better get it to him.”

Trump of course is unpredictable but within the Trump administration bureaucracy, to the extent it plays a role in forming policy, the focus is on strengthening security ties. That is particularly true for those who want to push a harder line toward China and want Japan to vastly increase its defense spending.

“Both State and Defense are very interested in making effective cooperative deals with Japan and they think Prime Minister Takaichi is clearly the best person for that now,” said Cronin, a prominent security expert.

“From the Pentagon’s perspective, you are either helping deterrence against a China contingency or you are not,” he explained. “You have to look tough if you want to keep the peace. She has bought into that security paradigm.”

How the Americans see the election prospects

Among the Trump advisors, there is praise for Takaichi’s decision to call a snap election and, at this early stage, an expectation of a clear, even dramatic victory.

“It seems like an incredibly smart move politically,” Weinstein told TOE. “If the polling numbers stay where they are for her, she should have a resounding victory that will really change the shape of the Diet moving forward. It looks like a strong return of the LDP after the weaknesses shown in the Upper House elections not too many months ago.”

Even some non-Trump analysts share this assessment of the decision to go down this somewhat uncertain road.

“No election is free of risk but for Takaichi the risk of losing seats in an election held now would not be as nearly as great as the risk she would be facing by waiting too long,” argued Curtis, probably the most well respected observer of Japanese politics in the U.S. “Better to strike now with her public support at more than 70 percent, the political opposition in disarray, and public opinion polls and the LDP’s own election district by district analysis indicating the strong possibility that the LDP would win the 235 seats needed for a majority and perhaps garner as many as 260 seats.”

Both men attribute the prospects for victory to Takaichi’s personal appeal, not to the popularity of the LDP or her policy proposals for taxes or other domestic issues, even including her embrace of Trump-like anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Takaichi “is running a presidential style race,” said Weinstein. “I don’t see her running as the LDP,” he added. Others have compared her not to Abe Shinzo, her mentor, but to Koizumi Junichiro who won election a quarter century ago by running in some ways against the LDP as well as the opposition.

Takaichi’s popularity, in their view, seems to be due primarily to the uniqueness of her being the country’s first female prime minister, her image as a decisive and confident leader, and her ability to benefit from a rightwing shift among the Japanese public and among younger people in particular. Her ability to manage ties with Trump, and with South Korea’s Lee Jae Myung, as well as stand up to China has worked to bolster this image of a strong leader.

This assessment is not universally shared among American Japan experts who are also intrigued by the formation of a new centrist alliance of the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Komei party, whose loyal voters provided a key margin of victory for decades in their now broken alliance with the LDP.

Cronin, who is also based on the pro-Trump Hudson Institute, is more skeptical about a clear Takaichi victory next month.

“I think the assumption a couple of weeks ago was that she could ride her huge popularity and enlarge her majority in the Diet,” he told TOE. “But the politics now look challenging for her. She is facing a united opposition, she lacks a unified coalition, and she is facing a twin set of pressures from China and from the US, in terms of economics. She can still win a majority, but I wouldn’t bet on it.”

Whether Trump is even thinking much about this situation, given the focus on Greenland and his domestic battles, is doubtful. Nor is there much thought about the possibility that a rightwing nationalist government in Japan may head off in a very independent direction. But for now, the fact that Takaichi is Trump’s choice for Japan is undeniable.

Asia Policy Events, Monday January 26, 2026

A snow storm in Washington has shut the town down. The Federal government, schools, and most businesses are closed.

THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN NEPAL. 1/26, 9:00-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Dinesh Prasad Bhatt, Chief Executive of the National Disaster Risk Reduction & Management Authority (NDRRMA), Government of Nepal; Reena Bajracharya, Anticipatory Action Clinic Technical Coordinator, NDRRMA/Danish Red Cross; Jeevika Khadka, Project Coordinator for Early Warning Systems for Cascading Disasters in Nepal, Stimson.

STRAIGHT TALK WITH RAHM EMANUEL: A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH MICHAEL MCFAUL. 1/26, 4:00-5:30pm (PST), 7:00-8:30pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Stanford University, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Speakers: Rahm Emanuel, former Ambassador to Japan, Chicago Mayor, White House Chief of Staff, Congressman; Moderator: Michael A. McFaul, Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science.

Japan's Prime Minister Announces a Snap Election

https://craj.jp/

With a New Competitor

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 19, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced on January 19 that she would dissolve the House of Representatives (Lower House) on January 23 and hold a general election of the House on February 8. In anticipation of Takaichi’s election decision, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito established a new party named Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) [中道改革連合] to cooperate in the coming election.
 
The Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the coalition partner of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), decided to hold gubernatorial and mayoral elections in Osaka on February 8 as well to promote the Osaka Capital Initiative, JIP’s unique policy. Although the prime minister and the major parties claim that the elections will promote the well-being of Japanese citizens, the politicians are takin these actions for their own survival.
 
Asking Public Endorsement for the Administration
In her press conference on the 19^th, Takaichi explained that she would ask voters for their fundamental support of her administration that was established only last October and of her decision to form a coalition with JIP. “This is a decision for the people to make on which direction Japan will go,” Takaichi said. The political vacuum created by a snap election, however, will delay the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill and measures to protect against price inflation. Takaichi dismisses this concern by claiming that they were included in the supplemental budget delivered last December.
 
Takaichi’s goal in the Lower House election is to achieve a simple majority -- 233 seats out of 465 -- for the LDP-JIP coalition. She indicated that she would resign if the coalition did not hit that target. But the leading coalition already has this majority. The premiership is always at stake in a Lower House election.
 
Takaichi thus will dissolve the Lower House for the limited purpose of maintaining the status quo. This fact raises the question of why she wants a snap election. Moreover, the election will not change the composition of the Upper House where the leading coalition is short of a majority.
 
Takaichi must believe that the election will boost her coalition’s voting power in the Lower House, aligning the composition of the Lower House with her popularity in the opinion polls. Takaichi has repeated slogans from her 2025 platform such as “responsible and proactive public finances” and “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.”
 
These policies require the approval of both chambers of the Diet. Takaichi has attempted to accelerate these policies by taking advantage of her high approval ratings in national polls. Also at issue in the election is her proposal of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food – a key populist issue. Consumers are deeply worried about the future of price inflation as reflected in a survey by the Bank of Japan, in which over 80 percent anticipate higher prices a year from now.
 
Another purpose of the snap election is to increase supporters around Takaichi. The LDP reportedly favors restoring “double nominations” of those lawmakers who had been involved in the kickback fund scandal of the now-former Abe factions in the LDP.  The double nomination is a system that enables a candidate who lost in a single-seat district to nevertheless win a seat through a proportional district. The option was denied to most members of the now-former Abe faction in 2024 election. Takaichi surely hopes to fortify her position by making it easier for former allies of Abe to gain seats.
 
Takaichi also wants to solidify her right-wing position by obtaining the endorsement of the coalition she assembled last year. She refused to admit that it was a mistake for her to have let Komeito leave the leading coalition last October. If the election goes her way, Takaichi will have popular approval for a new coalition, and she will be able to promote such conservative policies described in the agreement with JIP as amending the self-defense provisions in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, limiting imperial succession to a patrilinear line, and endorsing the official use of nicknames instead of introducing separate surnames of married couples.
 
All this agenda can be achieved without a snap election, if Takaichi can get support from some opposition parties. There is speculation that she decided for an election because she: 1) had failed to persuade the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) to join the leading coalition, 2) China’s pressure on Japan would seriously impact Japan’s economy, and 3) was caught in her own scandal exposing her relationship with the former Unification Church.
 
Takaichi heavily relies on her popularity to remove those negative elements sticking around her administration. She needs a reassurance for her administration. Her message to the voters of the snap election must be “Do you love me, or someone else?” But it causes an accusation among parties that her decision for a snap election is abuse of power given to the prime minister.
 
Integration of Opposition Parties
Takaichi’s decision on a snap election had two unexpected side effects. Their impact on the coming election is hard to assess. The first was the combination of the CDPJ and Komeito in the Lower House, establishing the CRA. They published their policy platform on January 19, which included sustainable economic policy, formulation of a new social security model, building an inclusive society, realistic diplomacy and security policies and continuing reform of political funds and elections. Note that the combination is only in the Lower House; the CDPJ and Komeito remain as independent parties in the Upper House.
 
The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, and the Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, are co-leaders of the CRA. Both parties expect their Lower House members to leave their parties and join the CRA. CDPJ currently holds 148 seats in the Lower House and Komeito has 24. If all their members join the CRA, it creates a substantial group of 172 lawmakers in the House, which, while still a minority, can contend in a meaningful way with the LDP-JIP coalition, which holds 233 seats.
 
Noda revealed that he has been approaching Komeito ever since Komeito left the leading coalition with the LDP last October. Even though it was the biggest opposition party, the CDPJ unable to lead the opposition parties against the ruling LDP over the years. For its part, Komeito needed another partner to survive the next election, having rejected the support of the LDP. Both parties have some common policy concerns on their agendas, such as the regulation of corporate political donations and the introduction of selective separate surnames.
 
Noda and Saito stressed that their intention is to form a group of centrists. Komeito left the leading coalition to protest the ascendancy of right-wing leadership in the LDP led by Takaichi. The LDP went further rightward by launching its coalition with the JIP.  On the left, the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi pursue such eccentric policy positions as the total abolishment of the consumption tax.
 
The CDPJ and Komeito plan to position themselves between the right and left to offer an alternative to the LDP-led government. Noda and Saito plan to approach the DPP and moderate lawmakers in the LDP to join them.
 
Distinguishing themselves from the rise of populism in Japanese politics as seen in advance of Sanseito, the CDPJ and Komeito have several firm supporters. These include the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) for CDPJ and the Buddhist organization, Soka Gakkai, for Komeito. Backed by these groups, Komeito will support former CDPJ candidates in single-seat constituencies in the coming election. Komeito will focus on proportional districts and not field any candidates in single-seat districts. This decision could be a major threat to LDP candidates whose principal advantage in past elections has been the support of Komeito.
 
For all that, the new party could prove a disappointment. In the most recent poll by Asahi Shimbun, only 20 percent expected CRA to be a serious contender against the Takaichi administration; 69 percent thought that it would not be.
 
Local Election for Osaka to Become a Second Capital
The second by-product of Takaichi’s decision was the JIP’s unilateral decision to hold local elections in Osaka on the same day as the Lower House elections. The JIP’s leader, Hirofumi Yoshimura, resigned as Governor of Osaka and announced that he would run in the gubernatorial election – a race that was brought about by his resignation. He is doing so with the intent of gaining the voters’ endorsement of JIP’s “Osaka Capital Initiative.” The JIP’s vice-leader and the mayor of Osaka city, Hideyuki Yokoyama, took the same course.
 
The “Osaka Capital Initiative” aims to integrate the governments of the Osaka prefecture and Osaka city to create a special autonomous government in Osaka. The initiative is modeled on the government of metropolitan Tokyo. JIP sought voter approval of the initiative through referenda in 2015 and 2020, but voters rejected it twice. Yoshimura once said that he would not seek a third chance as a politician after the loss in the 2020 referendum.
 
Yoshimura’s frequent and sudden policy changes are within his discretion as JIP leader. When he decided that JIP would form a coalition with the LDP, Yoshimura shifted his legislative priority from the regulation of political donations to the reduction of seats in the Diet. His stepping down is recognized as a request for public endorsement of this policy change.
 
The voters in Osaka city will vote for three elections for the Lower House, governor of Osaka and mayor of Osaka on February 8. Yoshimura and Yokoyama expect high voter turnout for the triple elections. Some observers including JIP members ask why the two leaders feel the need to step down and run again in the by-election if it is simply for the purpose of gaining voter support for their unilateral policy change. Other major parties, including the LDP, will not field any candidates in the two elections.
 
Takaichi’s sudden decision to call a snap election for her survival induced unusual responses by other parties. Neither the election nor the responses will appeal to citizens who are frustrated with how the national government has managed economic and security policies. Rather, these events are for the politicians and parties themselves. A Lower House election costs 80 billion yen.
 
Abrupt moves in the new year reflect the situation in today’s politics in Japan, which is filled with populism, jingoism, and political maneuvering. The politicians’ actions distance the government and the parties from the Japanese who, the majority who suffer from the unstable economy.

South Korea's Continued Political Polarization

Lee Jae-myung’s foreign policy successes
in the shadow of political polarisation

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published January 18, 2026 on the East Asia Forum.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung came into power in an early unscheduled election in June 2025, under perhaps some of the most trying circumstances to face a South Korean leader in the past decade.

The election followed a failed attempt to declare martial law by then-president Yoon Suk-yeol, followed by his impeachment, deepening a political divide that spilled out into the streets of the capital and beyond. The new leader was immediately faced with a trade war from the United States, South Korea’s security ally led by President Donald Trump, that threatened to upend the economy. At the same time, Lee had to shape a policy to balance relations with China and Japan alongside a belligerent and well-armed North Korea, closely tied to Russia and its war in Ukraine.

Yet Lee has exceeded the expectations of many observers of South Korea’s turbulent politics. The leader of the progressive Democratic Party has proven himself to be not only a consummate pragmatist, as some predicted, but even more surprisingly a deft diplomat as well.

In January 2026, Lee managed a highly successful summit in Beijing, followed shortly by a surprisingly warm and positive trip to Japan hosted by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. All along, he avoided getting drawn into the sharpening confrontation between Japan and China.

In the year ahead these diplomatic gains may be overshadowed by the continuing — even sharpening — lines of political polarisation domestically. There is a double divide in South Korean politics. On one level, it exists between the ruling progressives and the conservative opposition People Power Party. Both camps themselves are also split between ideological extremism and more centrist elements.

The South Korean right is increasingly at odds with itself, pitting the hardline followers of former president Yoon, who have adopted the rhetoric and imagery of Trump’s Make America Great Again movement, against the conservatives who crucially broke with Yoon’s martial law bid. On the left, the Lee administration is dominated for now by advocates of pragmatism, not only in the realm of foreign policy but also in fostering the support of chaebols. There are though, more ideological leftists within its ranks and in the membership of the party’s National Assembly bloc.

Those divides are tested by Lee’s increasingly aggressive pursuit to prosecute the leaders and supporters of Yoon’s insurrection, not only through the courts but also via his attempts to regulate conspiracy-driven social media. In the name of defending democracy, the administration has also targeted the Unification Church and other right-wing evangelical movements.

Former US ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens noted that Lee’s actions on these fronts, alongside the perception of his party as being ‘dangerously soft on North Korea’, have led him to be ‘viewed with deep distrust by many [South] Koreans’.

This deepening polarisation will begin to impact not only domestic stability but also the conduct of foreign policy. This is already evident in the difficult job of balancing relations with China, favoured by many on the left but denounced on the right, with increasing unease among progressives over American unilateralism and isolationism.

Lee made significant concessions on trade and investment issues in talks with the Trump administration to preserve the security alliance, though he can claim to have won a better bargain than Japan on both fronts. South Korean negotiators pushed the timetable for the long-sought transfer of wartime operational control of armed forces and made a deal to construct nuclear-powered submarines that could lead to a revision of restrictions on nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing. But even within the Lee administration, there is unhappiness over a shift in the focus of US military presence towards contingencies for confrontation with China.

‘Traditional leftist orientations on major domestic and foreign policy issues are colliding with very different geopolitical and geo-economic drivers that Lee has to accommodate’, argues Chung Min Lee. The South Korean right also faces significant challenges, remaining ‘shell shocked and in near-total disarray’ with no ‘viable party leadership and agenda’.

The looming question that may push these divisions to the forefront, not least within the Lee administration itself, is how to respond to North Korea’s growing confidence in its power. Progressive advocates of engagement, led by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-seok, are pushing for more attempts to woo Pyongyang, even towards de facto acceptance of its nuclear status.

But this outreach is frustrated by North Korea’s dismissal of their legitimacy. The administration seeks to use improved ties to China to open dialogue with the North Korean regime but Pyongyang seems to prefer relying on its new alliance with Russia and waiting to see what Trump may offer them. Even if Trump’s Beijing visit in April 2026 were able to help foster inter-Korean relations, there is no guarantee that North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un will have a dialogue with Seoul.

Policy choices that were deferred will come to the fore in 2026 and bring the double divide of South Korean politics into play. Lee ‘will be walking on a tightrope’ — evidence so far suggests he may be up to the task, but time will tell.

Asia Policy Events, Monday January 19, 2026

Monday, January 19th is a National Holiday and day of service in the United States. It is a celebration of civil rights leader Martin Luther King's birthday.

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Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 12, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reportedly is considering dissolution of the Lower House at the beginning of the ordinary session of the Diet, now scheduled to convene on January 23. A snap election would follow in early or mid-February. Her motivation is to restore the power of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) before her cabinet’s approval rating falls. If she does so, she will face criticism for bringing about a period of political vacancy and leaving behind the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill.
 
“I asked my ministers to execute policies included in the supplementary budget as early as possible. It is important to let the people realize the benefit of measures taken by my Cabinet to curb price inflation. I am focused on those immediate issues,” Takaichi said  in her new year’s press conference on January 5. This answer to a question from press was widely interpreted as a firm refusal to call an early snap election.
 
Four days later, late on the night of January 9, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Takaichi was thinking of an early snap election. According to Yomiuri, the Lower House election would be on February 8 or 15, if the House were dissolved on the first day of ordinary session, January 23. Mainichi Shimbun published a similar account early in the morning of January 10, and other media outlets followed on January 11.
 
It is well established that the prime minister has the power to dissolve the Lower House.  This authority derives from the cabinet’s duty to advise and approve the Emperor’s actions in matters of state. These actions include dissolving the Lower House. Once the Lower House is dissolved, Japan’s Constitution requires that a general election take place within 40 days. The period from dissolution to election has diminished in recent snap elections. The last Lower House election was in October 2024. Some argue that calling a snap election in a short period may be an abuse of power.
 
The rationale for an early snap election is Takaichi’s relatively high popularity. She has maintained a 60 to 70 percent approval rating in the polls since she took office last October. Some lawmakers in the LDP expect that the party will secure a large enough victory to give the LDP a simple majority in the Lower House. They also expect that the high approval rating will decline as discussions in the ordinary Diet session continue.
 
Even with a majority in the Lower House, Takaichi’s government, including the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority in the Upper House. If the LDP wins a majority in a Lower House snap election, Takaichi will still need to ask opposition parties for support to pass bills in the Upper House. It is possible that an endorsement by the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) of the FY2026 budget bill, which is to be discussed in the coming ordinary session, has encouraged Takaichi to contemplate an early election.
 
To have an early and successful snap election, Takaichi must counter criticisms of her decision. She argues that a majority will ensure action to support her priorities. The highest one on her list is support for people suffering from price inflation, for which she has adopted the slogan of “responsible and proactive public finances.” Although she delivered a certain amount of economic stimulus in the supplemental budget last year, anti-inflation measures are only at a halfway point.
 
If the snap election occurs, no discussion of the FY2026 budget bill can take place until new Lower House members are elected, the Lower House elects a prime minister (presumably Takaichi) again, and the newly elected prime minister delivers a policy speech to the Diet. The budget bill is unlikely to pass the Diet before the end of March.  Without a finished budget bill, the government will have to develop a provisional budget for FY2026 beginning in April.
 
A snap election creates political vacancy, though she said wants to deal with price inflation. There is no reason or cause for dissolution,” the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, said. Noda also indicated that the regular convocation of the ordinary session could invite some discussions that Takaichi does not want to face. There is speculation that Takaichi is afraid of questioning in the Diet about her relationship with the former Unification Church. Weekly Bunshun has reported that the Church had hoped that she would become the LDP president.
 
The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, has expressed his concern that an early election would delay implementation of the economic policies embedded in the FY2026 budget bill. “A dissolution will leave the economy behind,” he said. Although he had agreed with Takaichi last December to support passage of the FY2026 budget bill by the end of March, Tamaki said that he would now reconsider that agreement. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, was terser: when questioned about an early election in light of the urgent issues in economy and foreign affairs, he said, “Why now?”
 
The LDP and the JIP have not reached any agreement on electoral cooperation in the single-seat districts of the Lower House. If JIP suffers a significant defeat in the snap election, particularly in those districts, JIP may reconsider the merits of its coalition with the LDP. The DPP may also rethink its approach to the Takaichi administration if the party loses seats in the Lower House election and finds the coalition to be unbeneficial. A victory by the LDP thus could undermine its coalition framework.
 
Takaichi’s policies have not achieved outstanding results. The Japanese yen has continued to depreciate and fell to 158 yen to the dollar after news broke of a possible snap election. The fall was interpreted as reflecting a concern that Takaichi’s “proactive” fiscal policy would further destabilize the government’s delicate financial balance. The political vacancy resulting from a snap election will delay delivery of an economic stimulus package.
 
On the international front, ever since Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency, China has been boosting its pressure on Japan. China most recently announced that it would impose greater restrictions on exports of dual-use goods to Japan. Although China ruled out regulation of private trade, The Wall Street Journal has reported that China has begun choking supply of rare-earths. Takaichi has not taken either effective countermeasures or other steps to mend the relationship with China.
 
Takaichi has stressed that her upcoming March visit to the United States is one of her diplomatic achievements. But President Donald Trump is focusing elsewhere, such as pursuing his America First agenda in Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Iran. The Japan-China relationship is out of his sight. Trump also wants to have a successful, grand summit with China’s Xi Jinping in April. A snap election will give voters in Japan a chance to evaluate Takaichi’s diplomatic work. 

Asia Policy Events, Monday January 12, 2026

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Takaichi’s 2026

Foreign Affairs, Coalition Building, and a Snap Election Headline Takaichi’s 2026

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 5, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi entered the new year learning of the United States’ raid on Venezuela. Takaichi issued an anodyne comment, hoping for sustainable democracy in that country. Trump’s action may be a sign for Takaichi that 2026 will be diplomatically busy, even while her political focus should be on reinforcing the leading coalition and calling for a snap election.
 
It was in the evening of January 3, Tokyo time, when news broke of the U.S. attack on Caracas and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Having no opportunity to speak to the press on the day, Takaichi posted on X that the government of Japan was insisting on the importance of restoring democracy in Venezuela. The Japanese government “will promote diplomatic efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela and to stabilize the situation there, in close cooperation with neighboring countries and taking the utmost measures to secure the safety of Japanese citizens,” Takaichi said.
 
Although Takaichi had a telephone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump only the day before, she gave the reporters no hint about whether they had talked about Venezuela. “Having reconfirmed the close relationship between Japan and the U.S., we agreed on coordinating for my visit to the U.S. this spring,” Takaichi said in a press briefing after the call.
 
For Takaichi, who naively complicated bilateral relations with China by the observation that Japan could use force if the Taiwan contingency occurs, it would be the U.S. that she can rely on to reestablish diplomatic normality with China, without any apology or regret about her comment. As Trump agreed with Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Beijing in April, it is a diplomatic requirement for her to meet with Trump before his meeting with Xi.
 
Japan has opposed a unilateral change in the international status quo by force since criticizing China’s conduct toward Taiwan and its aggression in the South China Sea. No argument is heard in Japan that the U.S. raid on Venezuela was not a unilateral change of the status quo by force. “I am concerned that it would send a dangerous message that this American military operation could be regarded as a unilateral change in the status quo,” former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera said.
 
Professor Kazuhiro Maeshima of Sophia University indicated that Japan will need to balance its security against critical comments about U.S. action in Venezuela. “In case China invades Taiwan, it will not be easy to say ‘stop changing the status quo,’ ” after the U.S. action in Venezuela, Maeshima said. Indeed, North Korea launched ballistic missiles into the Japan Sea after the U.S. sent military forces into Venezuela. An event in South America can thus affect security in Northeast Asia.
 
Takaichi’s domestic agenda is no less crucial than the increasing complications in foreign affairs. Takaichi’s priority in 2026 is to stabilize her administration. In the first half of this year, Takaichi must survive the ordinary session of the Diet, which will convene on January 23. She has obtained support for the FY2026 main budget bill, which must pass the Diet by the end of March, from the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). On other legislation, though, the leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), must find votes from other opposition party members.
 
The LDP and JIP tabled action on a bill that would reduce the number of seats in the House of Representatives in the ordinary session. The two parties did, however, agree to proceed in the ordinary session with a bill that would impose greater restrictions on real estate investments and sales by foreigners and that would establish the Japanese version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). To find a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, the LDP-JIP coalition must garner votes from the opposition parties.
 
The DPP is willing to support the LDP more broadly than in previous sessions, after the LDP agreed at the end of last year to the DPP’s policy to raise the threshold for imposing income tax to 1.78 million yen of annual income. But, the DPP has not decided to participate in the leading coalition. The DPP is worried that the LDP may field candidates against DPP candidates in single-seat districts of the Lower House in the next election. Further, by not joining the coalition, the DPP may exercise discretion in deciding whether to support bills sponsored by the LDP.
 
Because the LDP currently has no margin for error in passing bills in the House of Representatives, it is important to watch whether Takaichi will call a snap election of the House. The prime minister of Japan is regarded as having the power to dissolve the Lower House at any time of her choosing. Every prime minister hopes to call a snap election to reinforce the political basis of his or her administration.
 
To do so, Takaichi must resolve at least three practical issues. First, there are two conflicting factors. On the one hand, she will need the approval of the LDP’s coalition partner. The LDP and JIP so far have no agreement to cooperate in elections. JIP has overwhelming strength in single-seat districts in Osaka. If the parties do not agree to cooperate, they will compete in those districts. On the other hand, a decision against running candidates in districts with JIP lawmakers will frustrate the LDP’s local organizations. Takaichi will have to weigh the risks whether to cooperate or to compete.
 
Second, Takaichi must find a cause to run on. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe dissolved the Lower House in 2014, asking voters to approve his decision to postpone a consumption tax hike. Fumio Kishida in 2021 and Shigeru Ishiba in 2024 sought approval of their new premierships. To hold a snap election, Takaichi must clarify what she will ask voters in the election.
 
Third and most important, is whether a snap election will reinforce or erode Takaichi’s currently high approval rating. Public opinion for prime ministers tends to go down as time passes after inauguration. If Takaichi calls a snap election, she will want her administration to keep its fresh image.
 
Perhaps the earliest possible time to dissolve the Lower House is in April, right after it passes the FY2026 budget bill. The voters will evaluate Takaichi’s budget achievement and the success (or lack thereof) in her visit to the U.S. now planned for March. Another chance to dissolve the Lower House is at the end of the ordinary session in June after the Diet has passed conservative bills such as legalizing the use of maiden names for wives, rather than allowing for separate surnames.
 
If Takaichi feels she cannot call an election during the ordinary session of the Diet, she may still do so at the extraordinary session in the fall at which she will submit a supplementary budget bill. Notwithstanding her high approval rating in the polls, it is unclear if Takaichi can win a snap election. The state of the economy and international affairs cannot be foretold but will certainly affect the election and the Takaichi administration’s longevity.

Balancing History and Strategy: South Korea's Challenge

South Korea Walks a Narrow Bridge between China and Japan

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published January 9, 2026 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is spending the first weeks of the new year attempting a feat of diplomatic engineering that would challenge the most experienced leader. He began the year in Beijing, the first official visit by a South Korean president since 2019. Next week, he is scheduled to join Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in her hometown of Nara.

Both China and Japan are eager to draw South Korea to their side as President Lee walks across a narrowing bridge between them. His task is to foster closer ties while avoiding being drawn into conflict, even perhaps to help ease tensions.

This careful management of the complex triangular relations in the region takes place against a backdrop of growing global uncertainty, manifest in U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive intervention in Venezuela. In the capitals of Northeast Asia—as well as in Europe—the talk is of a world splintering into spheres of influence.

“Trump’s America seeks to position itself not as a global hegemon but as a great power whose sphere of influence is the American continent,” commented Jung E-gil, senior international affairs writer at Hankyoreh. “Looking at the situation surrounding Ukraine, Taiwan, and Venezuela, one wonders if the US, China, and Russia are now carving up separate spheres of influence.”

Xi Woos Lee to Join Hands Against Japan

Lee’s four-day visit to China was a continuation of a Chinese charm offensive toward the new government that began with Xi’s attendance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit late last year. As was the case then, the language and messaging of the summit were mainly focused on friendship and mutual benefit, founded in deepening economic and cultural cooperation. The South Korean leader was accompanied by some 200 corporate leaders, making the focus clear.

But Xi and his colleagues did not conceal their concerted effort to frame the relationship in the historical context of shared battles against the Japanese Empire, which China now contends is being revived under Takaichi. Chinese officials greeted the assumption of power by the conservative nationalist with skepticism, given her unapologetic views of Japan’s wartime past. They moved into outright hostility after Takaichi’s November 7 remarks suggesting Japan could get involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits. Chinese retaliation continues to grow, most recently threatening restrictions on exports of “dual-use” technology.

The official Chinese readout from the visit was explicit in promoting the idea that the two countries should join hands against Japan:

“Both countries, with broad common interests, should stand firmly on the right side of history and make correct strategic choices. Over 80 years ago, China and the ROK made great sacrifices in resisting Japanese militarism and achieved the victory. Today, it is all the more important for the two sides to join hands to defend the victorious outcomes of World War II, and safeguard peace and stability of Northeast Asia.”

Lee was ready to accommodate Xi in one key respect—the reaffirmation of South Korea’s standing policy on Taiwan, telling Xi he “respects” China’s position on “one China.” He made a nod toward their shared history of opposition to Japanese imperialism, symbolized by a visit to Shanghai to mark the anniversary of the birth of Kim Ku, who led the Korean government in exile there.

Otherwise, as foreign policy scholar Moon Chung-in anticipated in an interview with this writer, Lee was “much more prudent on Beijing’s push for collective action against Takaichi’s remarks on history” and tried to balance its strategic cooperative relationship with China, while “retaining its alliance with the US.”

Lee left more empty-handed in his effort to secure Xi’s support in pressing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to return to dialogue and engagement with South Korea. Despite vague words about dialogue, there was no mention of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, much less any reiteration of past statements supporting the “denuclearization” of the peninsula, a formula sought by Seoul.

Can Takaichi Match the Pragmatism of Lee?

The next stop in President Lee’s diplomatic obstacle course is Japan, where he is reportedly heading to what many hope will be a breakthrough meeting with Takaichi, hosted by the currently popular leader in her hometown of Nara, some thirty minutes east of Osaka.

The two leaders had a friendly forty-five-minute meeting on the sidelines of the APEC conference, where Lee went out of his way to defy a widely held view of him as “anti-Japanese.” He embraced a “forward-looking” relationship, building on progress made by the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration and his Japanese counterparts.

This has led to expectations that the two leaders can forge an unexpected partnership, based in part on shared apprehensions about China and an unspoken need to coordinate a response to the Trump administration.

“The deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific makes it even more necessary for these leaders to collaborate,” wrote Japanese scholar Ayumi Teraoka in Foreign Affairs. “In particular, Washington’s renewed unpredictability and waning engagement in multilateral forums require Japan and South Korea to work together to sustain regional public goods and protect their interests.”

This optimism rests on several untested assumptions—that difficult issues of wartime and colonial history that have bedeviled the relationship can be put aside and Takaichi can bury her well-known conservative nationalist views and mirror the pragmatism of Lee. And it also assumes that the two leaders have a shared view of the regional security situation.

The two-day Nara visit could go smoothly if they steer clear of difficult questions. But there are already signs that this may be a challenge, especially for the Japanese prime minister. She did not hesitate to proclaim that the disputed islands of Dokdo (Takeshima for Japan) are being “illegally occupied.” Takaichi regularly and defiantly visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine to Japan’s war dead and has left open the possibility that she would go as prime minister.

Lee is committed to establishing a working relationship with Takaichi. “His shuttle diplomacy with Takaichi in Nara on Jan. 13 will go well as long as she does not provoke him on Dokdo or other history issues,” predicts Yonsei University scholar Moon.

But it may not be enough to momentarily avoid sensitive subjects. Real progress remains to be made on resolving these issues, including compensation for forced labor victims and their families from decades ago—an issue that could lead to seizure of Japanese corporate assets. For Korean progressives, simply focusing on the strategic situation is not sufficient.

“They cannot simply avoid historical and territorial issues,” the progressive daily Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized. “Japan has remained completely indifferent to historical issues. This may be partly due to South Korea’s lack of strong opposition. I hope this summit will mark a turning point in resolving historical issues.”

There is no evidence, however, that Takaichi is interested in doing more than just keeping up the appearance of cooperation. Perhaps more challenging for Lee is that the Japanese leader is clearly locked into a confrontational approach toward China, which has become a key plank of the political coalition she is forming between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and other smaller parties.

Still, President Lee seems poised, for now, to manage the journey from China to Japan. What follows is less clear.

“Seoul’s choreography of summitry with Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing has been masterful,” says former U.S. Ambassador to Korea Kathleen Stephens. “But the real challenges will come when real choices have to be made.”