Monday Asia Events November 4, 2024

IN CONVERSATION WITH SHASHANK JOSHI, EDITOR OF THE ECONOMIST. 11/4, 12:30-1:30pm (AEDT), 11/3 8:30-9:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Lowy Institute. Speaker: Shashan Joshi, Defence Editor, The Economist.

NAVIGATING GPS VULNERABILITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 11/4, 10:00-11:30am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Nathan Simington, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission; Dana Goward, President, Resilient Navigation Foundation and Member, National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board (PNTAB), National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Todd Humphreys, Ashley H. Priddy Centennial Professor in Engineering, University of Texas at Austin; Zac Kassas, Professor and TRC Endowed Chair in Intelligent Transportation Systems, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Ohio State University; Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, Senior Director, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

AMERICA’S COLD WARRIOR: PAUL NITZE AND NATIONAL SECURITY FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN. 11/4, 4:00-5:30pm (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: History and Public Policy Program, Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center. Speakers: James Graham Wilson, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State; Thomas Schwartz, Distinguished Professor of History and Professor of Political Science and European Studies, Vanderbilt University; Victoria Phillips, Global Fellow, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4fp8fzY

BOOK LAUNCH: PROSTITUTES, HOSTESSES, AND ACTRESSES AT THE EDGE OF JAPANESE EMPIRE: FRAGMENTING HISTORY. 11/4, 7:00-8:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Department of History Michigan State University. Speaker: Nobuko Yamasaki, Author, Professor, Associate Professor of Japanese, Lehigh University.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3YHLgKT

LDP-Komeito Coalition Loses Its Majority

Now what?

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 27, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The long-standing ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito shattered in Japan’s October 27 House of Representatives elections. They lost their simple majority. To continue its hold on the country’s leadership and policies, the traditional coalition needs to add at least 18 outside lawmakers in the House – yet it is not obvious where the 18 will come from. Meanwhile, the opposition parties are too fragmented to build a new coalition to counter a modified LDP and Komeito bloc. All this throws into question the direction of politics in Japan.
 
The House has 465 seats, and the majority is 233. The LDP lost 56 seats in the election, down from 247 to 191. Komeito lost six seats, going from 32 to 24. The two parties now have a total of 215 seats, 18 seats short of a majority.
 
Three opposition parties made significant gains at the LDP-Komeito coalition’s expense. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) gained 148 seats, up 50 from its 98 seats before the election. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) quadrupled its seats from 7 to 28, and Reiwa Shinsengumi tripled its seats from 3 to 9. Two opposition parties lost seats, however. The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) saw a reduction of six seats, from 44 to 38. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) lost two seats, from 10 to 8.
 
The biggest reason for the LDP’s losses was its reluctance to make meaningful political reforms. Despite public concern about the slush fund scandal, the LDP has not departed from the obsolete management of its political fund. Although the fund is discredited in Japan, the LDP nevertheless used it to distribute 20 million yen to their candidates, even including independent candidates who had been excluded from the LDP slate.
 
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba failed to exercise his leadership to reform the party. In fact, he actively avoided reform. He decided to call the early snap election in part to avoid pre-election policy discussions in the Diet. Indeed, the snap election was contrary to his earlier position on timing. In addition, Ishiba embraced bad actors: he included 34 candidates in the LDP slate who had accepted secret funds from factions within the LDP. The election at least included a measure of justice: over half of the 34 lost their seats. These lost seats were the margin by which the LDP lost its majority. 
 
These were not the only significant losses. In the wake of the scandal, prominent and otherwise unassailable candidates lost, including Minister of Justice Hideki Makihara and Minister of Agriculture Yasuhiro Ozato, Traditional LDP heavyweights and prominent conservative nationalists, such as Hakubun Shimomura, Akira Amari, and Seishiro Eto, also were unseated. The former Abe faction within the LDP, the basis of conservative nationalism in the party, saw several members, including Tamayo Marukawa in Tokyo, go down in defeat. The chief representative of Komeito, Keiichi Ishii, also lost.
 
Article 54 of the Constitution requires that a Diet session must be convoked within 30 days after an election. The Cabinet will resign en masse. Then, each Chamber holds an election to nominate a new prime minister. If the Lower and Upper Houses nominate different people, the vote in the Lower House trumps that in the Upper House. The Diet is now scheduled to meet on November 11.
 
Ishiba will be reelected prime minister if he is a member of a majority coalition. But the LDP-Komeito coalition no longer has that majority. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes, the election will go to a run-off, which does not require majority. In the case of a run-off between Ishiba and CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda, Ishiba seems certain to win, because the opposition parties are not united to vote for Noda.
 
Once a coalition loses its majority, no bill submitted by the cabinet (i.e., annual budget bill) is sure to pass the Diet. The prime minister will always be exposed to the risk of a forced resignation if the opposition parties pass a no-confidence resolution. So, Prime Minister Ishiba must pull enough seats together to secure the majority. It is likely that some independent lawmakers who were dropped from the LDP slate will return to the LDP, but they would not be enough.
 
Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Ishiba floated to his aides the idea of cooperation with the DPP. The DPP has just enough members to take a coalition with the LDP and Komeito over the top. Although DPP leader Yuichiro Tamaki once said that his party would not enter into a coalition with the LDP and Komeito, the DPP will cooperate with any party willing to implement DPP policies.
 
There are several ways to effect cooperation with the DPP: the DPP could send a member to join the cabinet as a minister, or it could enter into an agreement over some basic policies but without having a representative minister in the cabinet. The LDP once in the past invited some lawmakers of opposition parties to join them to secure majority.
 
The Ishiba administration’s policy agenda has lost its momentum because the LDP-Komeito coalition needs to focus on building a majority. The government is now supported by only a minority of the Lower House and may have to abandon some policies to invite some lawmakers into a majority coalition.
 
It is likely that security policies of Ishiba, such as revision of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement or establishing Asian NATO, will significantly slow down. However, since CDP leader Noda is relatively aligned with the LDP on security issues, there will be no major conflicts over security issues, including diplomacy to enhance security in East Asia. Debates among the parties will center on political reform – an issue that is fatal for the LDP – and on how the budget may serve as an economic stimulus.
 
Meanwhile, Noda hopes to build a coalition of the opposition parties. Although the total sum of seats of the CDP, DPP, and Ishin is less than a majority of the House, a critical mass of lawmakers in the opposition parties can have an impact on such policies as political reform or the economy.

Monday Asia Events October 28, 2024

ELECTIONS 2024: REP. WALTZ ON LEADERSHIP AND THE FUTURE OF US FOREIGN POLICY. 10/28, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speaker: Congressman Mike Waltz (R-FL-6). PURCHASE BOOK, Hard Truths: Think and Lead Like a Green Beret: https://amzn.to/3YFRISG 

SILVER DEMOCRACY: YOUTH REPRESENTATION IN AN AGING JAPAN. 10/28, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Weatherhead Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. Speaker: Charles McClean. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Yale University. 

INSIGHTS INTO MONITORING, REPORTING AND VERIFICATION COSTS FOR CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL (CDR). 10/28, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal. Speakers: Josh Burke, Senior Visiting Fellow, Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal, Senior Policy Fellow, Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics; Leo Mercer, Policy Analyst, Grantham Research Institute, London School of Economics. 

WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CLUES FROM UKRAINE FROM MODERNIZATION AND FUTURE CONFLICTS. 10/28, 5:00pm-6:00pm (EDT). HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. Speakers: Hon. Gabe Camarillo, Under Secretary of the U.S. Army; Rose Gottemoeller, William J. Perry Lecturer, Freeman Spogli Institute. 

Japan's General Election Policy Debates

What the Politicians Propose in the Campaign for Japan’s General Election

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 21, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The campaign season for Japan’s House of Representatives is in its last week. Most polls conducted by news organizations indicate that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito coalition will maintain its simple majority in the House. The LDP, however, is on the brink of losing its stand-alone majority. Some indicate uncertainty whether the coalition can reach the simple majority.

The leading opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), is estimated to increase its seats to some extent, and the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) is expected to lose seats. Other opposition parties would not win enough seats to have a significant impact on national politics.

As the race enters the home stretch, the parties are actively promoting their policies to voters throughout Japan. All the parties have focused on three issues: political reform, diplomacy and security, and the economy.
 
Political Reform
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, the LDP president, continues to apologize to voters about the party’s slush fund scandal. “I am going to reform the LDP into a party abiding by the rules,” emphasizes Ishiba in his campaign speeches.

The LDP includes in its campaign platform “consideration of abolishing the policy activities fund,” a fund whose proceeds are distributed from the party to its members without disclosing how a member spent the proceeds. The platform is limited to “consideration,” however, and does not explicitly call for abolition of the fund.  Elsewhere, the LDP leaders speaks of “freedom of political activities.”

The opposition parties –as well as Komeito – propose complete abolition of the policy activities fund. Most parties record the policy activities fund in their political fund reports, and the LDP has the largest amount. The opposition parties urge greater transparency on the use of policy activity funds and criticize the LDP for maintaining the status quo.

The opposition parties also support a prohibition on contributions to political parties from companies and other organizations, such as labor unions. The 1994 political reforms suggested ending contributions from companies and other organizations to individual politicians but did not affect donations to parties. The LDP and Komeito do not back this change.
 
Diplomacy and Security
Ishiba has not insisted LDP platform adopt his own security policy agenda. While this platform includes a sentence that “We seek Japan-U.S. State of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as it should be,” it does not mention an Asian version of NATO. Other Asian countries, as well as the United States, are skeptical that Ishiba would not attempt to form a NATO-like organization.

Rather than push his earlier agenda, Ishiba accepts the security policies of his predecessor, Fumio Kishida. The LDP campaign policy package includes firm commitments to the Three Security Documents in December 2022 -- National Security Strategy of Japan, National Defense Strategy and Defense Buildup Program – and to a 43 trillion-yen defense budget over the five years between FY 2023 and FY 2027.

The CDP says that it will doublecheck Kishida’s defense budget hike and promises that it will never increase taxes for the defense budget. The CDP approves of the Japan-U.S. alliance in its current form and emphasizes the importance of Japan’s traditional “exclusively defense-oriented policy.”

While Ishin does not differ significantly from the LDP on diplomatic and security policy, the Japan Communist Party (JCP) opposes the entire LDP security plank. The JCP demands repeal of the 2015 security legislation, which reinterpreted Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, fundamental revisions to the Japan-U.S. SOFA, and an immediate stop to construction of a new U.S. air base in Henoko, Okinawa.
 
The Economy
Notwithstanding political reform and security policy, the economy is the top issue for voters in Japan, just as it is for voters in the U.S. In a poll by NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) in mid-October, 34 percent of the respondents thought that the economy and measures on price hikes were the most important issue, leaving other issues behind.

Ishiba has promised to submit a supplementary budget for economic stimulus to the Diet right after the election. The supplement would be more than that of last fall’s, which amounted to 13 trillion yen. The supplement will include allowances to low-income families, support for local jobs such as agriculture and fishing, and subsidies for the chip industries. Komeito urges that subsidies for gasoline, electricity and gas be extended beyond its current expiration date.

The LDP also proposes support for higher education, and Komeito sets a goal of making college tuition free in 2030s.

The CDP focuses on the middle class and proposes to raise workers’ wages, including increase in the minimum wage to the level of 1,500 yen. Noda proposes a refundable credit to the consumption tax that would replace the current system of dual tax rates for daily necessities and other expenditures.

Other opposition parties argue for lowering the consumption tax rate. Ishin proposes a reduction from ten to eight percent, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) wants a greater reduction to five percent as does the JCP as a precursor to ending the consumption tax.
 
Other Policy Matters
The LDP hopes to resume the use of as many nuclear power plant reactors as possible if they meet new safety standards. The CDP would approve no new nuclear power plants. The JCP wants adopt a goal of zero nuclear power as quickly as possible.

The LDP stresses its efforts to eliminate the inconvenience of sharing the same surname between spouses but does not propose legislation on separate surnames. Most LDP members are opposed to this change. Komeito, the CDP, and some other opposition parties would immediately introduce legislation to authorize separate surnames.

On the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the LDP refuses to participate in it, while the CDP proposes that Japan join meetings about the treaty as an observer, and JCP would have the government  ratify the treaty.

The LDP, Komeito, Ishin, and DPP propose amending Japan’s Constitution, while the CDP stresses the need for further discussion. The JCP strongly opposes any change.

Monday Asia Events October 21, 2024

SECURING ENERGY BY RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER - POWER VERSUS RULE. 10/21, 9:00am-1:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Reischauer Center, SAIS, Johns Hopkins; Japan Economic Foundation. Speakers: Yukari Niwa Yamashita, Managing Director, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan; Hirotaka Ishii, Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security; Christopher Elsner, Associate Director in Energy-Wide Perspectives for S&P Global Commodity; Dr.Jennifer F. Sklarew, George Mason University, the Department of Environmental Science and Policy; Kenta Hirami; Associate Professor, University of Nagasaki; Kiyoshi Tanigawa, Executive Director, Keidanren USA; Ambassador David Shear. fmr. Ambassador to Vietnam, Senior Advisor, Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University (SAIS); Ambassador Kenneth Juster, fmr. Ambassador to India, Distinguished Fellow, CFR. 

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE. 10/21, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), LIVESTREAM. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Dr. Park Jin, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea from 2022 to 2024; Victor Cha, president of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Mark Lippert, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS. 

RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS FROM THE UDHR TO DIGNITATIS HUMANAE. 10/21, 1:00-5:00pm, 10/22, 9:00am-1:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Georgetown University. Speakers: M. Cathleen Kaveny, Darald and Juliet Libby Professor, Boston College; José Casanova, scholars, senior fellow, Berkley Center; Meghan J. Clark, associate professor, moral theology, St. John’s University, New York; Mary Doak, associate professor of theology and religious studies, University of San Diego; Linda Hogan, professor of ecumenics, School of Religion, Trinity College Dublin; Rev. David Hollenbach, S.J., Pedro Arrupe Distinguished Research Professor, Walsh School of Foreign Service; senior fellow, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs; affiliated professor, Department of Theology and Religious Studies, Georgetown University; Dr. Pantelis Kalaitzidis, director, Volos Academy for Theological Studies (Volos, Greece), member, Executive Committee, European Academy of Religion (Bologna, Italy); David Little, research fellow, Georgetown University’s Berkley Center; Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love, tenured professor of international relations, Catholic University of America, expert, international security and peacebuilding. 

GEOPOLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE: KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS. 10/21, 9:00am-4:35pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Peterson Institute (PIIE), Bank of International Settlements (BIS), WTO. Speakers Include: Richard Baldwin, IMD Business School, PIIE; Linda S. Goldberg, Federal Reserve Bank, New York; Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stanford Graduate School of Business; Mary E. Lovely, PIIE; Susan M. Lund, International Finance Corporation; Ralph Ossa, WTO; Adam S. Posen, PIIE; Hyun Song Shin, BIS; Yeo Han-koo, PIIE. 

BARRIERS AND BREAKTHROUGHS: BUILDING AND FUTURE U.S. MANUFACTURING WORKFORCE. 10/21, 9:00-10:00am (EDT). IN-PERSON. Sponsor: Semafor. Speakers include: Neera Tanden, Domestic Policy Advisor to President Biden, White House; Christian Meisner, Chief Human Resources Officer, GE Aerospace. 

ASIAN-AMERICANS EYE THE U.S. ELECTIONS: A VIEW FROM CAPITOL HILL WITH CONGRESSMAN DON BEYER. 10/21, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: US-Philippines Society, Vietnam Society, United States-Indonesia Society. Speaker: Congressman Don Beyer (D-VA). 

AIRPOWER OPTIONS FOR JAPAN. 10/21, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Program on US-Japan Relations at Harvard University. Speaker: Eric Heginbotham, Principal Research Scientist, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 

NAVIGATING NEW GLOBAL DYNAMICS: CHALLENGES AND POLICIES. 10/21, 2:30-4:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Economy and Development program at Brookings, jointly with the Korea Development Institute (KDI). Speakers: Richard E. Baldwin, Professor of International Economics, IMD Business School, Lausanne, Editor-in-Chief, VoxEU; Eswar Prasad, Senior Fellow, Global Economy and Development, Brookings; Laura Tyson, Distinguished Professor, University of California, Berkeley, fmr. Chair, Council of Economic Advisers, Director, National Economic Council., Daehee Jeong, Senior Fellow and Senior Director, Department of Macroeconomic and Financial Policies - Korea Development Institute. 
PURCHASE BOOK,  New Global Dynamics: Managing Economic Change in a Transforming World: https://amzn.to/4dLizRs

ON XI JINPING WITH AMBASSADOR KEVIN RUDD. 10/21, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT). HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: author Amb. Kevin Rudd, Australian Ambassador to the United States, former Australian Prime Minister; John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS; Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair, China Studies.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/47PQRll

PUTIN'S RED LINES: DOES HE MEAN WHAT WE THINK WE HEARD? 10/21, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES), The Russia Program at GW. Speakers: TBA. 

REMARKS BY MINISTER MOHAMMED AL-JADAAN OF SAUDI ARABIA. 10/21, 5:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). 

HOW “SUPERSTAR FIRMS” SHAPED SOUTH KOREA’S ECONOMIC MIRACLE. 10/21, 5:00pm (PDT), 8:00pm (EDT). VIRTUAL. Sponsors:  Seoul National University and the Korea-Pacific Program at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. Speakers: Jaedo Choi, Economist, Federal Reserve Board; Seula Kim, Assistant Professor, Pennsylvania State University (Discussant); Munseob Lee, Assistant Professor, Director of the Korea Pacific Program, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy (Moderator). 

BOOK TALK: THREAT MULTIPLIER: CLIMATE, MILITARY LEADERSHIP, AND THE FIGHT FOR GLOBAL SECURITY. 10/21, 5:00-7:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Women's Foreign Policy Group. Speakers: author Sherri Goodman, leader, senior executive, lawyer, director, national security, climate change, energy, science, oceans, environment; Meaghan Parker, Executive Director, Council for the Advancement of Science Writing. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/487cEoG

CLIMATE CHANGE AT THE CROSSROADS: NATIONAL SECURITY AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES. 10/21, 5:00-6:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University. Speaker: Richard R. Verma, Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources. 

WILL U.S. LEADERSHIP IN ASIA AND THE WORLD LAST? 10/21, 6:30-7:30pm (EDT). IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute. Speakers: Amb. Wendy R. Sherman, Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State; Stephen Biegun, Senior Vice President, Global Public Policy, Boeing Company; Daniel Russel, Vice President, International Security and Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute.  Fee.

Japan’s House of Representatives Dissolved

Now What?

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 15, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s new Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba dissolved the House of Representatives (Lower House) on October 9. All the seats were immediately open for election. The general election campaign begins on October 15, and voting takes place on October 27.
 
With the negative impact of the slush fund scandal, it is predicted that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will lose seats. However, the opposition parties have not established an effective framework for cooperation that would outmaneuver the LDP’s leading coalition. The LDP defines its victory in this election as securing a simple majority of 233 seats with its coalition partner, Komeito.
 
Prime Minister Ishiba has long questioned the power of a prime minister to unilaterally dissolve the Lower House. He wrote in his blog in June about importance of learning from the wisdom of predecessors in the House, quoting the words of former Speaker of House of Representatives, Shigeru Hori, that criticized the arbitrary dissolution in 1978.
 
Nevertheless, Ishiba dissolved the House only eight days after he was elected as prime minister. He explained that he thought a new prime minister should be judged by voters as soon as possible. The opposition parties criticized Ishiba for his shortcut, which ignored the custom of pre-election policy discussions in the Diet.
 
The biggest issue in the election is political reform, stemming from the slush fund scandal that led Ishiba’s predecessor, Fumio Kishida, to step down. The LDP decided to exclude members who had received heavy penalties in the scandal from its slate of candidates in the coming general election. Cutting candidates from the slate necessarily will make it harder for the LDP to retain power.
 
Back in April, the LDP found that 85 of its members had failed to report kickback funds from their factions. Of these, 55 planned to run in next general election. Six of the 55 then dropped out. On October 9, the LDP removed 12 of the remaining 49 from the slate. The 12 members had received major penalties in the scandal.
 
The party included in its slate 34 members with minor penalties in the slush fund scandal. The official endorsement of a party is a great advantage in a race for a Lower House seat. A candidate with an official endorsement from his or her party can receive financial support from the party, broadcast his/her opinions through the public TV and radio program, and distribute more flyers than an independent candidate can.
 
The 34 members have, however, lost one benefit: they may not receive “double nominations.” A double nomination means that an LDP member who loses in a single-seat constituency may still run as one of several proportional representatives. LDP members not implicated in the scandal may still receive double nominations. Several members felt that the exclusion from double nominations was too heavy a sanction. To sooth those ruffled feathers, Ishiba excluded himself and other four major positions in LDP board – Secretary General and Chairs of the General Council, Policy Research Council and Election Strategy Committee – from double nominations.
 
The 12 members removed from the LDP slate and the 34 members ineligible for a double nomination are all candidates in single-seat constituencies. Three other members involved in the scandal are candidates for proportional representatives, and they declined to be included in the LDP slate. One of the three is running in a single-seat constituency as an independent candidate, and another will seek election to the House of Councillors next year.
 
Despite Ishiba’s cutting back the slate, there is a trick that may help the LDP. Even after the election, it is not unusual for a party to include victorious candidates as additional members of its slate. Ishiba did not rule out the possibility of adding independent winners to the LDP slate. If the LDP does so, it likely would include some independent winners who originally were excluded from the slate due to the scandal.
 
The opposition parties do not consider the decisions of the LDP to pare down the slate and bar double nominations as meaningful penalties for the members involved in the scandal. “Most of them would be on the slate. It cannot be understood by the people,” said the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) Yoshihiko Noda to Nikkei Shimbun. The head of the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai), Nobuyuki Baba, said that the LDP members should testify before the Political Ethics Council in the Diet. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) demanded the resignations of those LDP lawmakers.
 
According to the counting of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), LDP fielded 342 candidates (266 for single-seat constituencies and 76 for proportional representatives excluding the double nomination). Komeito has 50 (11 and 39). LDP did not field any candidate in a district where Komeito has its own.
 
The number of candidates of the opposition parties are as follows; CDP: 237 (207 and 30), Ishin: 164 (163 and 1), JCP: 236 (213 and 23), Democratic Party for the People: 42 (41 and 1), Reiwa Shinsengumi: 35 (19 and 16), Social Democratic Party: 17 (10 and 7), and Sanseito: 95 (85 and 10).
 
Most of the JCP’s candidates will compete with CDP or Ishin candidates. It is likely that the votes against LDP will be divided among some opposition parties, but the parties are not working together to defeat LDP candidates. Although Noda hoped to lead negotiations to establish a cooperative framework among the opposition parties, time has run out with the LDP strategy of an early call of a snap election.
 
LDP held 256 seats in the House of Representatives before the general election was proclaimed, and Komeito held 32. The coalition of these two parties thus controlled 288 seats – 55 seats above the simple majority of 233. If this coalition loses 56 seats or more in the election, they will lose the majority. In this event, the coalition will have to add unaffiliated, independent voters or find additional coalition partners. So far, no opposition party has shown any interest in joining the coalition with the LDP and Komeito.
 
The possibility of LDP and Komeito losing the administration is widely estimated as low because the approval rating for the LDP rose after Ishiba replaced Kishida and because the opposition parties have not formed a united front against the leading coalition. This possibility is not zero, however: LDP candidates who had been involved in the slush fund scandal will face very difficult campaigns, even if they are included in the LDP slate. No one can deny a possibility of political turmoil following the election.
 
Explaining the Election System for the House of Representatives
Dissolution of the House of Representatives is made under the name of the Emperor. Article 7 of the Constitution of Japan states that dissolution is one of the acts in matters of state by the Emperor. However, the Emperor does not have political power, and the acts in matters of state are exercised with the advice and approval of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is led by the Prime Minister. So, the provision has been interpreted as vesting Prime Minister with the power to dissolve the House of Representatives at any time.
 
When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of the House of Representatives within 40 days from the date of dissolution under Article 54 of the Constitution. The general election in 2024 will be held 18 days after the dissolution.
 
The House of Representatives has 465 seats. 289 seats are from single-seat constituencies in all over Japan. The remaining 176 seats are from eleven blocks with several representatives that are allocated to parties on pro rata based on the number of votes.
 
Each voter has two votes in election; one is for writing a name of a candidate in a single-seat constituency, and the other is for writing the name of a party (and not an individual candidate) for proportional representatives.
 
In each single-seat constituency the system is first-past-the-post: whoever receives the most votes wins the seat. The winning proportional representatives are selected from the slate of each party, according to the number of seats allocated to them. Each party makes a list of candidates in order of priority. If a party wins 10 seats in a block of proportional representatives, the candidates from number 1 to 10 on the list will take the seats.
 
What makes this system complicated is that one candidate can be nominated for both kinds of seats. A candidate with a double nomination can take a seat as a proportional representative, even if he/she loses the single-seat constituency.
 
Moreover, a party can nominate multiple candidates in the same position on the list of proportional representatives. It is usual that, say, ten or twenty candidates who also are candidates in single-seat constituencies are nominated in the number one position. As between the candidates in this position, the candidate with the smallest margin of defeat in the single-seat constituency takes priority. If candidate A lost by 5 percentage points to his or her opponent, and candidate B lost by 10 percent, A is superior to B when seats are allocated to proportional representatives.

Monday October 14, 2024 Asia Events

COMMON SECURITY IN THE INDO PACIFIC REGION. 10/14, 8:00pm (PST), 8:00am (EDT) HYBRID. Sponsor: Campaign for Peace, Disarmament & Common Security. Speakers: Francis Daehoon Lee of Peace MOMO is former research professor of peace studies at SungKongHoe University and visiting professor for peace studies at Ritsumeikan University and the International University of Japan; Speakers: Reiner Braun has been actively involved in the German and international peace movements since 1982; Anuradha Chenoy is Adjunct Professor, Jindal Global University and Associate Fellow of the Trans-national Institute (The Netherlands); Enkhsakhan Jargalsaikhan is chair of Blue Banner, a Mongolian NGO dedicated to promoting the goals of nuclear non-proliferation.  

THE CONSERVATIVE WEAPONIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AGAINST TECH. 10/24, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Information Technology & Innovation Foundation. Speakers: Jennifer Huddleston; Technology Policy Research Fellow, Cato Institute; Josh Withrow, Resident Fellow, Technology and Innovation; R Street. 

MYANMAR’S HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND CHALLENGES IN 2024. 10/14, 3:00-4:30pm (SGT), HYBRID. Sponsor: ISEAS Myanmar Studies Programme. Speakers: Dr Su Mon Thazin Aung, Visiting Fellow with the Myanmar Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institut; Dr Surachanee Sriyai is a Visiting Fellow with the Media, Technology and Society Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 

A CONVERSATION WITH NK NEWS CEO CHAD O’CARROLL. 10/14, 5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: School of Global Policy and Strategy, US San Diego. Speakers: Chad O'Carroll, founder and CEO, NK News; Stephan Haggard, Director Emeritus, Korea-Pacific Program, School of Global Policy and Strategy, US San Diego. 

THE RISING SUN OF INNOVATION. 10/14, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Dr Peter Gruss, one of the most experienced and "hands-on" doers and thinkers in the world of global science and innovation. 

Japan's New Prime Minister

Ishiba’s challenge is to unite both the LDP and Japan

by Ben Ascione, Waseda University and APP member 
First published in the EastAsiaForum, October 6, 2024

On 1 October 2024, Shigeru Ishiba was sworn in as Japan’s new prime minister. To win the top job, he overcame a crowded field with a record nine candidates in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership election. He brings extensive political experience with 38 years as a lawmaker and past roles as defence, agriculture and regional revitalisation minister.

Ishiba’s win was perhaps unexpected given his long-standing position as an outsider within the LDP. Known for his wonkish style, he often favours idealist policy solutions. Ishiba was also critical of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, earning him the ire of many of his fellow LDP lawmakers, especially among the nationalist conservatives in the Abe and Aso factions. This outspoken stance even led some Abe allies to label Ishiba a ‘traitor’.

Ishiba criticised Abe’s economic policy, Abenomics, for failing to help rural areas and small businesses, as well as his handling of various political scandals, calling for greater transparency and accountability. Ishiba also criticised Abe’s leadership style, suggesting it was excessively top-down and insufficiently inclusive of diverse public opinion.

Where Abe emphasised outcomes, Ishiba emphasises the importance of democratic processes and engaging the public in what he calls the ‘politics of understanding and empathy’ (nattoku to kyokan no seiji). Even when Abe and Ishiba agreed on policy direction, such as revising the Article 9 peace clause of the constitution or restarting nuclear power plants, Ishiba criticised Abe for being hasty and failing to build sufficient public consensus.

Despite, or perhaps because of, his position as a voice of dissent within the LDP, Ishiba successfully cultivated significant support among the more than 1 million LDP rank-and-file members. But his lack of popularity among fellow lawmakers meant that he was seemingly blocked from a pathway to the prime ministership and sidelined as a major political force.

The situation changed when a political slush fund scandal emerged in December 2023, where LDP factions were found to have underreported fundraising income to create off-the-books funds to evade spending regulations. The scandal plunged the LDP into crisis as its public support eroded. In response, former prime minister Fumio Kishida dissolved his faction as part of his efforts to recover public trust, which pressured other LDP factions — bar the Aso faction — to follow suit.

This meant that when Kishida announced his resignation, after battling for months as a ‘dead man walking’, the LDP leadership election would be contested under a new political landscape. The public were looking for a change in leadership to reform the LDP and the role that money plays in politics. And LDP lawmakers, with an eye on the upcoming upper and lower house elections that must be held by July and October 2025 respectively, would have a free hand to cast their votes rather than taking their cues from factional bosses.

The nine candidates were whittled down to two — Ishiba and Abe-protege Sanae Takaichi — who faced off in a second-round runoff vote. This time, Ishiba succeeded where he had failed before, securing enough support from lawmakers to defeat Takaichi. With the LDP still reeling from the slush fund scandal, many lawmakers perhaps felt their electoral chances would fare better with Ishiba rather than Takaichi at the helm, even if they don’t necessarily like Ishiba.

But Ishiba’s path to the prime ministership and his approach to politics present him with a number of challenges going forward.

Ishiba inherits a fractured party. Lawmakers split fairly evenly between Ishiba and Takaichi in the second-round runoff, with Ishiba winning by a slim margin of 189 votes to 173. This shows that Takaichi, who positioned herself as Abe’s successor, still commands sizeable support within the party for her brand of ‘national greatness’ conservatism. Takaichi reportedly rejected an offer from Ishiba to become chair of the LDP General Council. Takaichi and her supporters are clearly waiting in the wings for Ishiba to stumble, ready for another shot at the crown.

Ishiba also lacks a natural base within the party. This means electoral results and public support will play an outsized role in laying the foundations for him to govern. Ishiba announced a snap election a day before even being sworn into office, set to be held on 27 October, aiming to take advantage of his honeymoon period with the public. Lacking the natural charisma of former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, who also heavily relied on public support, Ishiba is backing himself to frankly explain the difficulties Japan faces to the public — be it demographic decline, the need for structural economic reform or bolstering Japan’s defence posture — and garner their support for ideal rather than piecemeal solutions.

Another challenge is that some of Ishiba’s ideal solutions will require more than strong public backing. Ishiba has touted the idea of renegotiating the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States, which governs the legal status of US military bases and personnel stationed in Japan, to establish a more equal alliance and to give Japan a say over how the United States uses its nuclear weapons in Asia.

Ishiba has also proposed the establishment of an ‘Asian NATO’ between the United States and its allies in the region, presumably with a collective defence clause. These are ideas whose time has probably not yet come. If not handled delicately, such initiatives risk upsetting Washington, and maintaining good US–Japan relations is imperative for any Japanese prime minister to maintain support at home.

Ultimately, the longevity of the Ishiba government will depend on his ability to garner and leverage public support to rebuff pressure from Takaichi and members of the former Abe faction. This will determine whether Ishiba’s leadership heralds a more democratic era for Japan’s entrenched ruling party or ushers in a period of LDP factionalism, a revolving-door prime ministership and political volatility.

Monday Asia Events October 7, 2024

NEVER AGAIN IS NOT ENOUGH: REMEMBERING THE TRAGEDY OF OCTOBER 7. 10/7, 9:30-11:30am (EDT). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers Include: Rob Greenway, Director, Allison Center for National Security, Heritage Foundation; EJ Kimball, Director of Christian Engagement, Combat Antisemitism Movement; Mort Klein, National President, Zionist Organization of America. 

EXECUTIVE ROUNDTABLE ON TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION IN EAST ASIA AND THE ROLE OF PATENTS. 10/7, 11:00am-1:00pm (PDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society San Francisco. Speakers: Mark Cohen, Senior Tech Fellow, Asia Society Northern California; Kathi Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office. 

U.S. - CHINA-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION. 10/7, Noon-1:45pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Foundation. Speakers: Dr. David M. Lampton, Senior Research Fellow at SAIS Foreign Policy Institute; Dr. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, Professor of International Relations and Head of the Center of Asian Studies, at the National University of Malaysia; Dr. Da Wei, Director, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University; John Brandon, Senior Director of International Relations Programs for The Asia Foundation ; Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.  [By invitation...]

OCTOBER 7, ONE YEAR LATER: THE HAMAS ATTACK, THE FUTURE OF GAZA, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES. 10/7, 4:30-5:30pm (EDT). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers Include: Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; David A. Deptula, Dean, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies; Eyal Hulata, Senior International Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

LDP Chooses Ishiba for its Next Leader

The Occam's Choice Candidate

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
Special to Asia Policy Point, September 30, 2024

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected its former Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba as its 28th President on September 27. Ishiba immediately started forming his administration, inviting supporters in the election to join his team. After he is elected as the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan in tomorrow’s extraordinary session of the Diet, Ishiba says he will dissolve the House of Representatives (Lower House) and call a general election on October 27.
 
The presidential election was, as expected, a close race between Ishiba, Minister of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi and former Minister of the Environment Shinjiro Koizumi. Takaichi bested the other two with 181 votes in the first round, compared to 154 for. Ishiba and 136 for Koizumi. As the two leading vote-getters, Takaichi and Ishiba proceeded to a run-off, because no candidate among nine obtained majority votes.
 
Surprising enough for members of the LDP, Ishiba overtook Takaichi in the run-off by a narrow 21-vote margin, 215 to 194. Ishiba added 143 lawmaker votes, from forty-six in the first round to 189 in the run-off, while Takaichi received another 101, from 72 to 173. While each of 368 lawmakers had one vote, 6 were supposed to have abstained or their votes were invalid in the run-off. Ishiba’s greater increase in lawmaker votes indicates that lawmakers who supported the losers in the first round clearly preferred Ishiba. Of the 47 rank-and-file votes available, Ishiba received 26 and Takaichi 21.
 
Notwithstanding public criticism, obscure faction politics, as shown in the LDP’s slush fund scandal, it was the backstage moves of the factions that determined the result of the election, especially at the run-off stage.
 
LDP Vice-president Taro Aso, the leader of the eponymous Aso faction with 54 members, decided to support Takaichi a day before the voting and instructed his faction members to follow him. Takaichi’s surge among lawmakers’ votes in the first round, despite recent polls that had shown she had as little support in the Diet as Ishiba, was the result of the Aso faction’s support.
 
On the other side, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was concerned about Takaichi’s boost among the lawmakers. As a prime minister firmly committed to diplomacy, Kishida opposed the hawkish stance of Takaichi. For example, earlier she had promised to visit the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister. Kishida advised the 47 members of his former faction never to vote for Takaichi. Although the Kishida faction had been dissolved, former members collectively voted against Takaichi and supported Ishiba in the run-off.
 
As part of his rivalry with Aso as a would-be kingmaker, former prime minister Yoshihide Suga supported Ishiba in the run-off and persuaded young colleagues to follow him. In the first round, Suga supported Koizumi, for whom Suga is guardian.  The support of lawmakers who voted for Koizumi in the first round (95 votes) was supposed to go to Ishiba in the run-off. Although the former Abe faction (92 members) and the Motegi faction (47 members) expected to vote for Takaichi in the run-off, they seemed unable to act collectively.
 
Ishiba started building up his administration the day after the election. He appointed as Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama, the Chairman of General Council in the Kishida Administration. Ishiba expects Moriyama, as the former leader of his own small faction, to balance the different interests in the LDP.
 
Moriyama in turn persuaded Aso to join Ishiba’s team as LDP Supreme Advisor. Ishiba invited Suga to come aboard as the LDP Vice-president as a way of, thanking him for his efforts to shift lawmakers’ votes to Ishiba in the run-off. Two hopeful kingmakers, Aso and Suga, now stand together at two of the highest positions, though nominal, in the party.
 
As for other members of the administration, their experience with defense policy seemed to be the main guidepost for Ishiba. In addition to Ishiba himself, the incoming Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, and LDP Chairman of Policy Research Council Itsunori Onodera are all former defense minister.
 
On September 25, the Hudson Institute published an essay by Ishiba on security policy. Speaking in his personal capacity (rather than as Prime Minister), Ishiba proposed revisions to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement “to allow the Self-Defense Forces to be stationed in Guam to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of Japan and U.S.” The appointment of defense experts reflects Ishiba’s desire to strengthen Japan’s defense capability.
 
Unsurprisingly, Ishiba’s political enemies are not part of his administration. Ishiba offered Takaichi the position of chief of the General Council, but Takaichi declined. Ishiba also asked another hawkish presidential candidate, Takayuki Kobayashi, to serve as the LDP’s chief of public affairs, but he rejected the offer. Ishiba may well have offered them these positions as a nominal attempt at party unity but fully expecting that they would refuse, either because they felt the positions beneath them or because they wanted to avoid being co-opted by his administration.   
 
Elsewhere in his administration, Ishiba picked Seiichiro Murakami as the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications. Murakami once called Shinzo Abe “public enemy.” Thus, Murakami’s appointment may stir anger among former allies of Abe in the party. Once the glow surrounding the new administration begins to dim, the struggles within the LDP may resume.
 
Although Ishiba in the past said that a general election of the Diet should occur after the traditional detailed discussion of his policies in the Diet, Ishiba has now shifted his stance to an earlier snap election. He made this decision on the advice of senior LDP leaders, including Moriyama, Kishida, and Aso. He has announced a general election of the House of Representatives on October 27.
 
October will be busy for the new prime minister. After his election in the Diet on Oct. 1, there will be: Ishiba’s policy speech on Oct. 4; discussion of those policies in a Diet plenary session on Oct. 7 and 8; dissolution of the House of Representatives on Oct. 9; Ishiba’s trip to the ASEAN Summit in Laos on Oct. 10 and 11; and proclaim on Oct. 15 a general election of the House of Representatives. The month ends with a snap election on the 27th. 

###

BILL BROOKS OBSERVATIONS
Senior advisor at the Reischauer Center and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS since 2009, after retiring from the U.S. Department of State. For 15 years, he served as the head of the U.S. Embassy in Japan’s media analysis and translation unit.

My recollection of Ishiba is that he is one of the LDP's most seasoned defense policy wonks. But whether his policy vision for the Alliance and regional security is implementable is another matter. His proposed establishment of an Asian-style NATO arrangement has been considered and rejected as unworkable long ago due to the variety of diverse security interests in the region. ASEAN would prefer to remain unaligned, not choosing one side or the other. The US has long expressed no interest in such a security arrangement, and Japan is certainly not capable of putting a NATO-like scheme together. China would react strongly to any security arrangement that seeks to contain it or threaten it. 

Regarding a revision of the SOFA, such a proposal has been kicking around the LDP for decades and going nowhere. I don't think it will gain traction among the majority of the party. The US would continue to reject any revision, arguing that problems with the US forces in Japan can be resolved by administrative actions, such as a memorandum of understanding with Japan. 

The greater question is whether Ishiba will continue the defense policies of Abe and Kishida, including the defense buildup plan and other commitments to the Alliance that have pleased Washington. 

Monday Asia Events September 30, 2024

XINJIANG: SUPPORTING VICTIMS AND ADVANCING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RECOMMENDATIONS. 9/30, 8:00am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Location: 57th Session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, Switzerland. Speakers Include: Priya Gopalan, Vice-Chair on Follow-Up and member for the Asia-Pacific region, UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention; John Fisher, Deputy Director for Global Advocacy, Human Rights Watch. 

THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF THE UNITED WA STATE ARMY. 9/30, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow, Stimson; Doctoral Researcher, Peace Research Institute of Oslo; Pamela Kennedy, Research Analyst, East Asia Program. 

THE POLITICS OF NON-POLITICS IN POST-1960S JAPAN. 9/30, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: Weatherhead Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. Speaker: Nick Kapur, Associate Professor of History, Rutgers University. 

ON DAY ONE": A U.S. ECONOMIC CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR A TAIWAN CRISIS. 9/30, 12:30-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Eyck Freymann, Hoover Fellow, Stanford University, Non-resident Research Fellow, China Maritime Studies Institute, US Naval War College; Jude Blanchette, Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS; Hugo Bromley, Research Associate, Centre for Geopolitics, Cambridge. 

PRICE STABILITY IN AN AGE OF EMERGENCIES: REVISITING THE CASE FOR BUFFER STOCKS. 9/30, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: Maurice Obstfeld, C. Fred Bergsten Senior Fellow, PIIE; Isabella M. Weber, Associate Professor, Economics, University of Massachusetts Amherst. 

OBJECTIONS OF DISRUPTION: OPPRESSION IN THAILAND. 9/30, 3:00-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center, George Washington University. Speaker: Pavin Chachavalpongpun, professor, Kyoto University’s Center for Southeast Asian Studies, chief editor, online journal, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia. 

BOOK TALK: WEAPONS IN SPACE: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. 9/30, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speaker: author Aaron Bateman, Assistant Professor, History, International Affairs, George Washington University. 
PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/47BX3Nu

BOOK TALK: WEAPONS IN SPACE: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE. 9/30, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speaker: author Aaron Bateman, Assistant Professor, History, International Affairs, George Washington University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/47BX3Nu