Ishiba Announces He Is Stepping Down
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 8, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Acknowledging his responsibility for the serious defeat in the Upper House elections in July, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced his resignation on September 7. Although he sought a way to stay in office after the election, backed by public opinion that he did not have to leave, the anti-Ishiba movement in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) overwhelmed Ishiba’s continuity plan. The LDP presidential election, which is likely to name the next prime minister, will be held on October 4.
Ishiba announced his resignation at an abrupt press conference on Sunday evening. “I’ve been saying that I would not insist on my position, I would make a decision at a proper time, and I am responsible for the result of the election. Now is the proper time to open my position to a successor, because we could conclude tariff negotiations with the United States,” Ishiba said.
With the defeat in the Upper House elections on July 20, the leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito fell into minority positions in both Chambers of the Diet. Ishiba sought advice on how to continue the government from three former prime ministers, Taro Aso, Yoshihide Suga and Fumio Kishida, three days after the election. Although Ishiba denied that the meetings covered his possible resignation, it was reported that the three former premiers did not unequivocally support Ishiba staying in office.
Achievements in tariff negotiations with the U.S. and the expansion of rice production gave the Ishiba Cabinet a bump in its approval rating in August. In the polls, people considered the LDP’s defeat to be more a function of the LDP slush fund scandal than of Ishiba’s mishandling of the election campaign. Nevertheless, anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP called for Ishiba’s resignation and an early presidential election to replace him.
The LDP decided to conduct a count on September 8 of how many lawmakers and local branches would demand an early election. Ishiba made up his mind to step down a day before this showdown. “If we proceed to the process for an early presidential election, it will cause a division of our party. That was not what I want,” Ishiba explained about his decision. The LDP cancelled the count.
A day before the announcement, Ishiba had met with Suga and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Shinjiro Koizumi. After 30 minutes, Suga left, and Koizumi had a one-on-one meeting with Ishiba for 90 minutes. It was reported that Suga and Koizumi urged Ishiba to resign to avoid a division of the party. Now isolated, Ishiba decided to resign.
The argument of Suga and Koizumi that Ishiba would avoid disruption of the LDP by resigning did not in fact make good sense because the LDP has already been divided. Anti-Ishiba groups, notably the former Abe faction, have been frustrated with Ishiba’s leadership from the beginning. There has been a rivalry between Ishiba and former prime minister Shinzo Abe ever since Ishiba had rejected Abe’s offer to be his minister in charge of security legislation in 2014. This position oversaw the radical reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan.
Ishiba’s and Abe’s antagonism stemmed from a political war in the 1970s between Kakuei Tanaka, Ishiba’s political mentor, and Takeo Fukuda, a founder of the Seiwa Policy Group which was the official name of the former Abe faction. Looking back further, the LDP originally was the result of a merger in 1955 of the conservative Democratic Party of Japan and the relatively dovish Liberal Party. From the beginning, no leader has been found in the LDP who could reconcile the fundamental difference between those two parties: the historical revisionists pushing for an immediate constitutional amendment and the moderates advocating domestic decentralization.
As prime minister, Ishiba was unusually adept at handling competing policies. Although he could not deliver an official statement on August 15 to recognize the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Ishiba included, in his address at the memorial ceremony, the word “remorse” in reference to Japan’s invasion of neighboring countries. Abe, in contrast, refrained from expressing “remorse” in his annual addresses.
On another issue, however, campaign contributions from companies and organizations, Ishiba was unable to abolish them after protests from anti-Ishiba powers in the LDP. Ishiba regretted that he could not deliver the kind of political reform sought by the public.
After Ishiba’s resignation, the LDP decided to hold a presidential election on October 4 to elect a successor. The election will be held in “full spec version,” in which lawmakers and general party members have equivalent votes. In the full-spec version, each of 295 Diet members of LDP has one vote, and hundreds of thousands of votes by general LDP members are proportionally divided into 295 votes.
There is a speculation that the two leading contenders are Koizumi and former Minister for Economic Security Sanae Takaichi. Both have yet to announce their candidacies. Former LDP Secretary General Toshimitsu Motegi, who has allied himself with Aso’s faction. A young conservative, Takayuki Kobayashi, is another possible entrant in the race. Electioneering begins on September 22.
One significant difference between the October 4 election and previous LDP presidential elections is that the winner will not necessarily be elected prime minister in the Diet. The LDP and its junior coalition partner Komeito do not have a majority vote in either Chamber. That is, the opposition parties can elect their own prime minister if they can agree to back a single candidate.
But the opposition parties are too fragmented to do so. One possible consensus candidate is the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan Yoshihiko Noda. Yet some opposition lawmakers may vote for an LDP candidate rather than for an opposition candidate from another party. For there to be smooth negotiations with the opposition parties to name a prime minister or to pass a budget bill, the next LDP president will be required to have an ability to talk convincingly and work closely with the opposition parties.
Friday, September 12, 2025
Sunday, September 7, 2025
Asia Policy Events, Monday, September 8, 2025
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AMERICA'S PROPULSION ADVANTAGE AND WHY IT'S IMPORTANT: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE. 9/8, 10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. Speakers: Steve Russell, Vice President & General Manager, Edison Works at GE Aerospace; Lt Gen David A. Deptula USAF (Ret.), Dean, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
THE ENDURING LEGACIES OF WORLD WAR II IN EAST ASIA: REFLECTIONS 80 YEARS LATER. 9/8, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Korea Institute - Harvard University, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations - Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Asia Center, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies. Speakers: Thomas Berger, Professor of International Relations, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University; Mark Caprio, Professor Emeritus, Rikkyo University, Tokyo; Kim Koo Visiting Professor of Korean Studies, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University; Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government and Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.
TRUMP VS. HISTORY. 9/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: New Republic. Speakers: David Blight, Sterling Professor, American History, Yale University; James Grossman, Executive Director, American Historical Association; Leslie M. Harris, Professor of History and Black Studies, Northwestern University; Amna Khalid, Professor of History, Carleton College.
RIGHT-WING HISTORICAL MYTHS: A CHALLENGE FOR SOCIETY, ACADEMIA AND POLITICS. 9/8, 7:00-9:00pm (AEST), 1:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Speakers: Frank Bösch, Historian and Director, Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam; Constanze Itzel, Director, House of European History, Brussels; Katja Meier, Member, Saxon State Parliament; Former Saxon State Minister of Justice and for Democracy, Europe and Equality, Alliance 90/The Greens; Volker Weiß, Historian and Journalist; Moderator: Christine Watty, Editorial Director and Presenter, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, Berlin.
BOOK TALK: NEW BOOKS ON JAPAN: EXHIBITIONIST JAPAN: THE SPECTACLE OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT. 9/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author Angus Lockyer, Lecturer, Rhode Island School of Design; Jordan Sand, Professor of History, Georgetown University; Moderator: Joseph Seeley, Associate Professor of History, University of Virginia. PURCHASE BOOK
THE ENDURING LEGACIES OF WORLD WAR II IN EAST ASIA: REFLECTIONS 80 YEARS LATER. 9/8, Noon-1:15pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Korea Institute - Harvard University, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations - Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Asia Center, Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies. Speakers: Thomas Berger, Professor of International Relations, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University; Mark Caprio, Professor Emeritus, Rikkyo University, Tokyo; Kim Koo Visiting Professor of Korean Studies, Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University; Rana Mitter, ST Lee Chair in US-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government and Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.
TRUMP VS. HISTORY. 9/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: New Republic. Speakers: David Blight, Sterling Professor, American History, Yale University; James Grossman, Executive Director, American Historical Association; Leslie M. Harris, Professor of History and Black Studies, Northwestern University; Amna Khalid, Professor of History, Carleton College.
RIGHT-WING HISTORICAL MYTHS: A CHALLENGE FOR SOCIETY, ACADEMIA AND POLITICS. 9/8, 7:00-9:00pm (AEST), 1:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Speakers: Frank Bösch, Historian and Director, Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History Potsdam; Constanze Itzel, Director, House of European History, Brussels; Katja Meier, Member, Saxon State Parliament; Former Saxon State Minister of Justice and for Democracy, Europe and Equality, Alliance 90/The Greens; Volker Weiß, Historian and Journalist; Moderator: Christine Watty, Editorial Director and Presenter, Deutschlandfunk Kultur, Berlin.
BOOK TALK: NEW BOOKS ON JAPAN: EXHIBITIONIST JAPAN: THE SPECTACLE OF MODERN DEVELOPMENT. 9/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author Angus Lockyer, Lecturer, Rhode Island School of Design; Jordan Sand, Professor of History, Georgetown University; Moderator: Joseph Seeley, Associate Professor of History, University of Virginia. PURCHASE BOOK
Saturday, September 6, 2025
Ishiba Isolated
Going it alone, with the public
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 3, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
In a Joint Plenary Meeting (JPM) on September 2, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wrapped up its assessment of their disastrous July 20 Upper House elections. The party attributed the defeat to the slush fund scandal, and it did not explicitly refer to the responsibility of the party president and prime minister Shigeru Ishiba.
Ishiba announced his willingness to continue as the prime minister in the meeting and apologized for the loss of seats in the election. However, four LDP leaders, including Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama, offered their resignations to Ishiba. Ishiba now appears to be isolated from the LDP leadership.
The political struggle in the LDP over replacing Ishiba has continued even after the mid-August commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Asia-Pacific’s War’s end. Anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP have been trying to gather votes for an early presidential election, and LDP leaders have been trying to block that effort.
Following up on a decision of the JPM last month, on August 8, the LDP plans to hear from its lawmakers and local branches on whether the party should hold a presidential election before the end of Ishiba’s term, which expires in September 2027. The LDP constitution provides that an early election will take place when a majority of LDP lawmakers, which currently is 295, plus a majority of 47 local branches request one. Now, the majority consists of 172 votes or more.
The LDP Presidential Election Committee has decided that the requests for an early election will not be anonymous. The decision will make it difficult for party members to gather enough votes to request such an election -- that is, to demand Ishiba’s resignation – because they are afraid of retribution from Ishiba if the vote falls short.
In midst of this party struggle, another JPM was held on September 2. A special committee reviewing the Upper House election submitted a report to the JPM. It concluded that the LDP’s defeat was caused primarily by the secret fund scandal. The report also observed that voters had not accepted the LDP’s measures on price inflation and that a gaffe by an LDP member damaged the image of the party. The report did not place responsibility on Ishiba. The report concluded that the party needs to “restart from dissolution,” a phrase which has often been used in crises of the party in the past.
In the JPM on September 2, Ishiba announced that he would stay on as the LDP president and prime minister. “I could not meet the people’s demand for change,” said Ishiba, recognizing his role in the defeat in the Upper House election. He emphasized his willingness to advance his agenda, including tariff negotiations with the United States, agricultural policy, slowing price inflation, and disaster prevention. Recognizing his responsibility for the lost seats and not clinging to his position as prime minister, Ishiba said that he would make “a decision” on his presidency in a proper time.
His senior staff members took another way – four of them revealed their intention to resign. Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama announced in the JPM that he would step down to take responsibility for the electoral defeat. Three other leaders, Itsunori Onodera, the chief of the policy council, Shunichi Suzuki, the chair of the general council, and Seiji Kihara, the chair of the election committee also submitted letters of resignation. “You too?” Ishiba reportedly murmured when he received them. He now must decide whether to accept them.
The LDP has entered the official process to consider whether to hold an early presidential election. LDP lawmakers and local branches who favor an early election must submit those requests by September 8. If the party receives 172 or more such requests, an early presidential election will be held. A heavyweight in the LDP, Taro Aso, announced that he would demand such an election.
According to Yomiuri Shimbun’s survey of the lawmakers and local branches, 128 will vote for an early election. Only 33 have formally taken the position that an election is unnecessary. The remaining 181 lawmakers or branches have not yet decided or are unwilling to communicate their decisions.
Polls show that Ishiba retains a material measure of popular support. In a poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun in late August, 50 percent of respondents thought Ishiba did not have to resign, while 42 percent thought he should. When asked about the reason for the loss in the Upper House election, 81 percent placed responsibility on the LDP lawmakers who were involved in the political funds scandal. Fifty percent of all respondents thought Ishiba’s responsibility was great, but this percentage is much lower than the percentage that attributes the loss to the scandal.
Even more favorable to Ishiba is a gradual increase in his approval rating. In a poll taken by the Mainichi Shimbun, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet was 33 percent, a four percentage point increase from July. According to the poll, Ishiba is the most suitable person as prime minister with the support of 21 percent of the respondents, followed by Sanae Takaichi with 14 percent and Shinjiro Koizumi with nine percent.
As anti-Ishiba movements spread in the LDP, the difference between anti-Ishiba powers in the party and public opinion widens. If the LDP replaces the president, there is no assurance that the party will be able to regain the power to lead an administration based on a minority government. The LDP lawmakers and local branches face a choice to oust Ishiba to attract public attention or rebuild the party under his leadership.
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
Sept 3, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
In a Joint Plenary Meeting (JPM) on September 2, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) wrapped up its assessment of their disastrous July 20 Upper House elections. The party attributed the defeat to the slush fund scandal, and it did not explicitly refer to the responsibility of the party president and prime minister Shigeru Ishiba.
Ishiba announced his willingness to continue as the prime minister in the meeting and apologized for the loss of seats in the election. However, four LDP leaders, including Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama, offered their resignations to Ishiba. Ishiba now appears to be isolated from the LDP leadership.
The political struggle in the LDP over replacing Ishiba has continued even after the mid-August commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the Asia-Pacific’s War’s end. Anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP have been trying to gather votes for an early presidential election, and LDP leaders have been trying to block that effort.
Following up on a decision of the JPM last month, on August 8, the LDP plans to hear from its lawmakers and local branches on whether the party should hold a presidential election before the end of Ishiba’s term, which expires in September 2027. The LDP constitution provides that an early election will take place when a majority of LDP lawmakers, which currently is 295, plus a majority of 47 local branches request one. Now, the majority consists of 172 votes or more.
The LDP Presidential Election Committee has decided that the requests for an early election will not be anonymous. The decision will make it difficult for party members to gather enough votes to request such an election -- that is, to demand Ishiba’s resignation – because they are afraid of retribution from Ishiba if the vote falls short.
In midst of this party struggle, another JPM was held on September 2. A special committee reviewing the Upper House election submitted a report to the JPM. It concluded that the LDP’s defeat was caused primarily by the secret fund scandal. The report also observed that voters had not accepted the LDP’s measures on price inflation and that a gaffe by an LDP member damaged the image of the party. The report did not place responsibility on Ishiba. The report concluded that the party needs to “restart from dissolution,” a phrase which has often been used in crises of the party in the past.
In the JPM on September 2, Ishiba announced that he would stay on as the LDP president and prime minister. “I could not meet the people’s demand for change,” said Ishiba, recognizing his role in the defeat in the Upper House election. He emphasized his willingness to advance his agenda, including tariff negotiations with the United States, agricultural policy, slowing price inflation, and disaster prevention. Recognizing his responsibility for the lost seats and not clinging to his position as prime minister, Ishiba said that he would make “a decision” on his presidency in a proper time.
His senior staff members took another way – four of them revealed their intention to resign. Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama announced in the JPM that he would step down to take responsibility for the electoral defeat. Three other leaders, Itsunori Onodera, the chief of the policy council, Shunichi Suzuki, the chair of the general council, and Seiji Kihara, the chair of the election committee also submitted letters of resignation. “You too?” Ishiba reportedly murmured when he received them. He now must decide whether to accept them.
The LDP has entered the official process to consider whether to hold an early presidential election. LDP lawmakers and local branches who favor an early election must submit those requests by September 8. If the party receives 172 or more such requests, an early presidential election will be held. A heavyweight in the LDP, Taro Aso, announced that he would demand such an election.
According to Yomiuri Shimbun’s survey of the lawmakers and local branches, 128 will vote for an early election. Only 33 have formally taken the position that an election is unnecessary. The remaining 181 lawmakers or branches have not yet decided or are unwilling to communicate their decisions.
Polls show that Ishiba retains a material measure of popular support. In a poll taken by Yomiuri Shimbun in late August, 50 percent of respondents thought Ishiba did not have to resign, while 42 percent thought he should. When asked about the reason for the loss in the Upper House election, 81 percent placed responsibility on the LDP lawmakers who were involved in the political funds scandal. Fifty percent of all respondents thought Ishiba’s responsibility was great, but this percentage is much lower than the percentage that attributes the loss to the scandal.
Even more favorable to Ishiba is a gradual increase in his approval rating. In a poll taken by the Mainichi Shimbun, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet was 33 percent, a four percentage point increase from July. According to the poll, Ishiba is the most suitable person as prime minister with the support of 21 percent of the respondents, followed by Sanae Takaichi with 14 percent and Shinjiro Koizumi with nine percent.
As anti-Ishiba movements spread in the LDP, the difference between anti-Ishiba powers in the party and public opinion widens. If the LDP replaces the president, there is no assurance that the party will be able to regain the power to lead an administration based on a minority government. The LDP lawmakers and local branches face a choice to oust Ishiba to attract public attention or rebuild the party under his leadership.
Wednesday, September 3, 2025
The Decline of the U.S.-Japan Alliance?
An Asia Policy Point Seminar
THE DECLINE OF THE
US-JAPAN ALLIANCE?
September 10, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT)
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Washington, DC
IN PERSON ONLY
Space Limited
Speaker
Ms. Sayo Saruta
President
New Diplomacy Initiative (ND) Japan
Under Trump, the fundamental guarantee of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty –"that the U.S. will defend Japan in an emergency”—has become unstable.
REGISTER
asiapolicyhq@jiaponline.org
Monday, September 1, 2025
September 1, 1945 - Hong Kong
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| Keiji MAKIMURA, 29 August 1945 |
South China Morning Post, September 1, 1945
Henry Ching, Post editor for 33 years until 1958, wrote this editorial on September 1, 1945, when the paper reappeared for the first time after the Japanese occupation.
How long dead? Three years, eight months and six days. Forty-four months lost from our lives - a thousand and more dreary days and nights of waiting and hoping, starving, praying and enduring. Not really dead, only buried alive, conscious of great tumult far off, wherein we could have been participating - wish-dreaming with all the phantasmagoria of delirium. Now for us, the forgotten folk, life begins again. We return to the world like Phra the Phoenician. Some are not with us, will not awaken again. Requiescat! And we who, by the grace of God, survive, emerge from entombment leaner, prematurely aged and spiritually very tired, to justify our existence anew, to try to overtake the march of time, to fill the great gap in our knowledge of our fellow men and of humanity's affairs. History has moved far on, left us stumbling an age behind.
How much elated? The bewilderment of that tragic Christmas Day when our world came to an end returns to us. Can this be it? Can this peace be deliverance? Aye, this is Peace - this is The Day, in faith whereto throughout those interminable months we refused to die. So mild a day, so tame an ending! In the comfortable countries they have already given their thanks and abandoned themselves in celebration. We too had thought to rejoice mightily, in overnight relief: thought also to be avenged for hardship and tyranny, for persecution and slappings - prepared to take again the risks of bombardment, of looting, of starvation, even of vindictive massacre, if only to prevent the vulture horde from escaping with their surfeit. Frustrated to the end; tantalized by uncertainties, rumours and delays, to us the truce brought little more than a fuller realization of our weariness.
How much chastened? The gaping ruins, the walking skeletons, the accumulation of filth, the degradation to be seen on all sides - these are the superficies of a devastation of pride. We have been guilty of failure; we have rediscovered poverty. We have sampled want. We know just how unfitted we are to wrest a livelihood from a primitive economy, without the aid of privilege; we know how it feels to be beggars and helpless. We comprehend how the submerged other half lived and what it is that makes criminals. We appreciate the value of friends, and we have learned why some of us had none. Few can now recall the old recriminations, and many would prefer that they would be forgotten. They are part, however, of the sins of the past and of the warnings for the future. Tolstoi in his 'Peace and War' says that wars are not brought about by politicians, nor even by policy. He agrees that war is the explosion of accumulated conditions, and that those conditions are created by selfishness, by wrong thinking. None of us must cry 'Peccavi.'
How much regenerated? With the end of a difficult war a more difficult task begins - to construct the new world order, to secure the general acceptance of the truth that war will only cease when the causes of war have been destroyed. Are we equal to it? Hong Kong the proud, the beautiful, out-raged, dragged in the mire, to be a foul trollop - Hong Kong is but one of many victims. Her rehabilitation is a task peculiarly ours. It will need much patient effort, for so many of our local institutions have been destroyed, and so many habits have been changed. Success will be great or small in proportion to the sanity that has been left to us, and in ratio to our consciousness of our obligations.
As we return to our own, our rugged familiar Catskills greet us wanly, yet encouragingly. They too have suffered; and because we have bled with them we should know at last what these green hills mean to us. We owe them more faithfully our love and our loyalty, so that this our Hong Kong may flourish again, more beautiful, more prosperous, more progressive - and purer of soul.
Sunday, August 24, 2025
Monday Asia Policy Events, August 25, 2025
WHAT'S NEXT AFTER JACKSON HOLE? 8/25, 4:00pm (CDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: econVue. Speakers: Michael Lewis, Founder, Free Market Inc.; Kathleen Graham, an expert in human capital; Mark Roeder, author and thought leader on the impact of technology on human behaviour; Michele Wucker, author and analyst in world economy and crisis anticipation.
STATESMEN'S FORUM: HIS EXCELLENCY LEE JAE MYUNG, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. 8/25, 6:15-6:55pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: His Excellency Lee Jae Myung, President of the Republic of Korea; Dr. John J. Hamre, President and CEO, and Langone Chair in American Leadership, CSIS; Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS.
RIDING UNRULY WAVES: THE PHILIPPINES’ MILITARY MODERNISATION EFFORT. 8/25, 9:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Crisis Group. Speakers: Lindsey W. Ford, Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation America, former Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for South Asia at the National Security Council from 2024-2025; Rommel Jude Ong, Rear Admiral, Philippine Navy (Ret.), Professor of Praxis, Ateneo School of Government; Georgi Engelbrecht, Crisis Group Senior Analyst, Philippines.
Thursday, August 14, 2025
Trump-Lee Summit
Security Agenda for Trump-Lee Summit May Renew Abandonment Concerns
First Published August 13, 2025 in The Peninsula Blog of the Korean Economic Institute.
By Daniel C. Sneider, non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University and APP member.
The upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is shaping up to be a crucial moment in the more than seventy-year-long alliance.
The two leaders inked a vague agreement on trade and investment late last month, which appears to have opened the door to good relations, and President Lee has eagerly sought this meeting to strengthen his legitimacy and demonstrate his diplomatic skills.
But the summit also has the potential to imperil the alliance. While some economic issues remain—not least the U.S. tariffs on automobiles and semiconductors—the meeting is more likely to focus on a range of contentious security issues, including U.S. demands for greater South Korean contributions to defense costs and pressures for South Korea to commit to join military contingencies in Taiwan and subordinate its policies to an aggressive U.S. stance toward China.
All of these issues are now joined under two broad policy umbrellas the Trump administration calls “alliance modernization” and “strategic flexibility.”
Both concepts embody the idea of shifting the alliance away from its sole focus on deterring North Korea toward a broader regional approach that prioritizes confrontation with China, including the use of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in a Taiwan contingency. China is the number one strategic threat to the United States, and allies and partners must “do more,” according to an interim strategic guidance document the U.S. Department of Defense issued in July.
“Strategic flexibility” means that in the event of a clash with China, U.S. military forces based in South Korea will be withdrawn and deployed elsewhere. It demands that South Korea take on the preponderant burden of defense against potential North Korean aggression.
USFK Commander Xavier Brunson recently stated that the “USFK must be able to move to other locations and perform other missions at any time” and that South Korea must “play a great role in responding to North Korea, and USFK demonstrate flexibility to perform other missions.”
General Brunson acknowledged South Korea’s desire to connect any moves in this direction with the completion of a plan to reform the current system of operational control (OPCON), which places South Korea’s military under U.S. command during wartime. OPCON transfer to South Korea has been a long-standing goal for South Korea, particularly under progressive administrations. If the United States shifts its focus, then “the transition of wartime operational control in which South Korea leads the defense of the Korean Peninsula, must also be expedited,” argued the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun.
But Brunson pushed back against accelerating this process, telling reporters that “taking shortcuts to expedite the transfer of wartime operational control could jeopardize the readiness of the Korean Peninsula’s military.”
This has not stopped the Trump administration from preparing to push for South Korea’s acquiescence to their demands. An early draft of a U.S.-South Korea agreement sets a goal for the upcoming talks to compel South Korea to “issue a political statement supporting flexibility for USFK force posture to better deter China while continuing to deter [North Korea],” according to the Washington Post. This is to be paired with pressures to boost South Korea’s defense spending to 3.8 percent of GDP—up from 2.6 percent last year—and to vastly increase its support for the cost of basing U.S. forces.
Defense planners linked to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have pushed more specific plans to drastically cut the number of U.S. troops based in South Korea from the current level of 28,500 to 10,000. This would be done by effectively removing all ground troops from South Korea, leaving only air units that can easily be deployed elsewhere.
The United States has maintained the right to deploy its forces anywhere, and reductions in troop levels are hardly unprecedented. But in return, the United States accepted the South Korean stance that “it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”
More profoundly, the United States’ plans undermine the basic pledge to defend South Korea in a war—a commitment that underlies the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. The presence of U.S. ground forces is the famously labeled “tripwire” to guarantee the U.S. commitment.
“The continued presence of US troops at existing levels on the Korean Peninsula is more important than documents discussing ‘strategic flexibility’ or ‘modernized alliance,’” Senior Fellow at the Mansfield Foundation Bruce Klingner told this writer. “Maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea is a tangible manifestation of American commitment to the defense of its treaty partner. As such, they continue to be an integral part of Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command. In a conflict with North Korea, the American public and Congress would not allow a U.S. president to abandon them, particularly after casualties.”
The Trump administration faces resistance not only from South Korea but also from Congress, where support for the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula and opposition to downsizing the current troop levels remain strong, even among Republicans. The National Defense Authorization Act, which was passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, prohibits a reduction in the U.S. military posture or a change in wartime OPCON until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that “such action is in the national interest.” It also directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Indo-Pacific Command, and USFK to carry out an independent assessment of any such changes.
The North Korea Connection
The push to refocus the U.S. regional presence away from North Korea and toward China could potentially be linked to another sensitive issue shaping the upcoming Trump-Lee summit—relations with North Korea.
Rumors and hints of a resumption of talks between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have surfaced again in recent weeks. The Lee administration is supportive of such dialogue, as such moves are consistent with its desire to ease tensions with North Korea and revive serious engagement. But such talks are likely to only take place if Trump is heading seriously toward the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and acceptance of Kim’s demand that North Korea be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.
“At some point, the ROK is going to pay a price for U.S.-DPRK dialogue if the U.S. under Trump decides to accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state,” former senior Department of State official and Korea expert Evans Revere told KEI.
“The deeply progressive government in Seoul cannot possibly give the U.S. what it wants — agreement that the ROK will support the U.S. militarily in a China- or Taiwan-related contingency and agreement to allow the U.S. to use Korea-based forces against China,” argues Revere, who is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “And the U.S. does not wish to give the ROK what it wants — an open-ended commitment that Korea-based U.S. forces will be solely dedicated to the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression.”
Summit Disasters of the Past
The possibility that the upcoming summit could lead to a serious clash is well understood in Seoul, based on past experience and the much-publicized Oval Office encounters between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other world leaders. In the case of South Korea, the 1993 meeting between presidents Bill Clinton and Kim Young-sam and the 2001 summit between presidents George W. Bush and Kim Dae-jung are representative examples of what could happen if things go wrong.
“In both cases, the meeting went badly because of North Korea,” recalls former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard, who was a key participant in both summits. “In my mind they went badly because the Koreans failed to prepare carefully and understand where our president was.”
There are lessons for Lee Jae Myung, Hubbard told this writer in an interview. North Korea is not the problem now, as both Trump and Lee want to engage with North Korea. “The issue this time will be security relations, host nation support, and I don’t think anyone really knows where Trump is going to come down on troop levels in Korea. Lee Jae Myung is a progressive who wants to reach out to China but I think he is afraid Trump is going to make demands on troop reductions that will undercut him in Korea.”
Trump’s belief that there is no rationale to keep U.S. forces in South Korea is long-standing and unchanged. It is not hard to imagine a moment in the upcoming summit when Trump will once again raise this issue.
“I never took the strategic flexibility dispute seriously,” says Ambassador Hubbard, “but the danger is we push them too hard on Taiwan, on the relations with China, and at the same time raise questions about our strategic commitment.”
That could put the United States on a slippery slope toward abandoning its ally—something no South Korean leader would want to happen.
PREVIEW OF THE TRUMP-LEE SUMMIT. 8/18, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Korea Chair, CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Sydney Seiler, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS; William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair Emeritus, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business, CSIS; Timothy Martin, Korea Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal. https://www.csis.org/events/impossible-state-live-podcast-preview-trump-lee-summit
TRILATERALISM THROUGH TRANSITION: PROSPECTS OF STRENGTHENING U.S.-SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP. 8/18, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Eun A Jo, Assistant Professor of Government, William and Mary; Shihoko Goto, Senior Fellow, Mansfield Foundation. https://keia.org/event/trilateralism-through-transition-prospects-of-strengthening-u-s-south-korea-japan-partnership/
First Published August 13, 2025 in The Peninsula Blog of the Korean Economic Institute.
By Daniel C. Sneider, non-resident Distinguished Fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University and APP member.
The upcoming summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is shaping up to be a crucial moment in the more than seventy-year-long alliance.
The two leaders inked a vague agreement on trade and investment late last month, which appears to have opened the door to good relations, and President Lee has eagerly sought this meeting to strengthen his legitimacy and demonstrate his diplomatic skills.
But the summit also has the potential to imperil the alliance. While some economic issues remain—not least the U.S. tariffs on automobiles and semiconductors—the meeting is more likely to focus on a range of contentious security issues, including U.S. demands for greater South Korean contributions to defense costs and pressures for South Korea to commit to join military contingencies in Taiwan and subordinate its policies to an aggressive U.S. stance toward China.
All of these issues are now joined under two broad policy umbrellas the Trump administration calls “alliance modernization” and “strategic flexibility.”
Both concepts embody the idea of shifting the alliance away from its sole focus on deterring North Korea toward a broader regional approach that prioritizes confrontation with China, including the use of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) in a Taiwan contingency. China is the number one strategic threat to the United States, and allies and partners must “do more,” according to an interim strategic guidance document the U.S. Department of Defense issued in July.
“Strategic flexibility” means that in the event of a clash with China, U.S. military forces based in South Korea will be withdrawn and deployed elsewhere. It demands that South Korea take on the preponderant burden of defense against potential North Korean aggression.
USFK Commander Xavier Brunson recently stated that the “USFK must be able to move to other locations and perform other missions at any time” and that South Korea must “play a great role in responding to North Korea, and USFK demonstrate flexibility to perform other missions.”
General Brunson acknowledged South Korea’s desire to connect any moves in this direction with the completion of a plan to reform the current system of operational control (OPCON), which places South Korea’s military under U.S. command during wartime. OPCON transfer to South Korea has been a long-standing goal for South Korea, particularly under progressive administrations. If the United States shifts its focus, then “the transition of wartime operational control in which South Korea leads the defense of the Korean Peninsula, must also be expedited,” argued the progressive Kyunghyang Shinmun.
But Brunson pushed back against accelerating this process, telling reporters that “taking shortcuts to expedite the transfer of wartime operational control could jeopardize the readiness of the Korean Peninsula’s military.”
This has not stopped the Trump administration from preparing to push for South Korea’s acquiescence to their demands. An early draft of a U.S.-South Korea agreement sets a goal for the upcoming talks to compel South Korea to “issue a political statement supporting flexibility for USFK force posture to better deter China while continuing to deter [North Korea],” according to the Washington Post. This is to be paired with pressures to boost South Korea’s defense spending to 3.8 percent of GDP—up from 2.6 percent last year—and to vastly increase its support for the cost of basing U.S. forces.
Defense planners linked to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have pushed more specific plans to drastically cut the number of U.S. troops based in South Korea from the current level of 28,500 to 10,000. This would be done by effectively removing all ground troops from South Korea, leaving only air units that can easily be deployed elsewhere.
The United States has maintained the right to deploy its forces anywhere, and reductions in troop levels are hardly unprecedented. But in return, the United States accepted the South Korean stance that “it shall not be involved in a regional conflict in Northeast Asia against the will of the Korean people.”
More profoundly, the United States’ plans undermine the basic pledge to defend South Korea in a war—a commitment that underlies the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. The presence of U.S. ground forces is the famously labeled “tripwire” to guarantee the U.S. commitment.
“The continued presence of US troops at existing levels on the Korean Peninsula is more important than documents discussing ‘strategic flexibility’ or ‘modernized alliance,’” Senior Fellow at the Mansfield Foundation Bruce Klingner told this writer. “Maintaining U.S. troops in South Korea is a tangible manifestation of American commitment to the defense of its treaty partner. As such, they continue to be an integral part of Combined Forces Command and United Nations Command. In a conflict with North Korea, the American public and Congress would not allow a U.S. president to abandon them, particularly after casualties.”
The Trump administration faces resistance not only from South Korea but also from Congress, where support for the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula and opposition to downsizing the current troop levels remain strong, even among Republicans. The National Defense Authorization Act, which was passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee on July 9, prohibits a reduction in the U.S. military posture or a change in wartime OPCON until the secretary of defense certifies to Congress that “such action is in the national interest.” It also directs the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Indo-Pacific Command, and USFK to carry out an independent assessment of any such changes.
The North Korea Connection
The push to refocus the U.S. regional presence away from North Korea and toward China could potentially be linked to another sensitive issue shaping the upcoming Trump-Lee summit—relations with North Korea.
Rumors and hints of a resumption of talks between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un have surfaced again in recent weeks. The Lee administration is supportive of such dialogue, as such moves are consistent with its desire to ease tensions with North Korea and revive serious engagement. But such talks are likely to only take place if Trump is heading seriously toward the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea and acceptance of Kim’s demand that North Korea be recognized as a nuclear-weapon state.
“At some point, the ROK is going to pay a price for U.S.-DPRK dialogue if the U.S. under Trump decides to accept North Korea as a de facto nuclear state,” former senior Department of State official and Korea expert Evans Revere told KEI.
“The deeply progressive government in Seoul cannot possibly give the U.S. what it wants — agreement that the ROK will support the U.S. militarily in a China- or Taiwan-related contingency and agreement to allow the U.S. to use Korea-based forces against China,” argues Revere, who is now a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. “And the U.S. does not wish to give the ROK what it wants — an open-ended commitment that Korea-based U.S. forces will be solely dedicated to the defense of the ROK against DPRK aggression.”
Summit Disasters of the Past
The possibility that the upcoming summit could lead to a serious clash is well understood in Seoul, based on past experience and the much-publicized Oval Office encounters between Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and other world leaders. In the case of South Korea, the 1993 meeting between presidents Bill Clinton and Kim Young-sam and the 2001 summit between presidents George W. Bush and Kim Dae-jung are representative examples of what could happen if things go wrong.
“In both cases, the meeting went badly because of North Korea,” recalls former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard, who was a key participant in both summits. “In my mind they went badly because the Koreans failed to prepare carefully and understand where our president was.”
There are lessons for Lee Jae Myung, Hubbard told this writer in an interview. North Korea is not the problem now, as both Trump and Lee want to engage with North Korea. “The issue this time will be security relations, host nation support, and I don’t think anyone really knows where Trump is going to come down on troop levels in Korea. Lee Jae Myung is a progressive who wants to reach out to China but I think he is afraid Trump is going to make demands on troop reductions that will undercut him in Korea.”
Trump’s belief that there is no rationale to keep U.S. forces in South Korea is long-standing and unchanged. It is not hard to imagine a moment in the upcoming summit when Trump will once again raise this issue.
“I never took the strategic flexibility dispute seriously,” says Ambassador Hubbard, “but the danger is we push them too hard on Taiwan, on the relations with China, and at the same time raise questions about our strategic commitment.”
That could put the United States on a slippery slope toward abandoning its ally—something no South Korean leader would want to happen.
###
TRILATERALISM THROUGH TRANSITION: PROSPECTS OF STRENGTHENING U.S.-SOUTH KOREA-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP. 8/18, 11:00am-12:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute. Speakers: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Eun A Jo, Assistant Professor of Government, William and Mary; Shihoko Goto, Senior Fellow, Mansfield Foundation. https://keia.org/event/trilateralism-through-transition-prospects-of-strengthening-u-s-south-korea-japan-partnership/
Lessons of War
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By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
August 11, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
This month the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki commemorated the 80th anniversary of the atomic bombings in 1945. While the sufferers of the atomic bombs, or hibakusha, aspire to eternal peace without the devastation of nuclear weapons, the gap between their hopes and the reality of world politics has widened. Hibakusha face a challenging task in handing their movement over to next generation, as the sufferers in Hiroshima and Nagasaki pass away.
In Hiroshima, in the Declaration of Peace at the Peace Memorial Ceremony on August 6, the Mayor, Kazumi Matsui, introduced a story of an unnamed man who was injured by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima. “Building a peaceful world without nuclear weapons will demand our never-give-up spirit. We have to talk and keep talking to people who hold opposing views,” Matsui said, quoting words of the hibakusha.
That unnamed man is thought to be Sunao Tsuboi who shook hands and had a short conversation with then U.S. President Barack Obama on his visit to Hiroshima in May 2016. “Never give up” is the phrase Tsuboi likes to use in his conversations. He once told me that he came to pursue peace and to hate war. Instead of continuing the resentment he held against America after the end of the war, he realized that retaliation would produce nothing. This principle is commonly held by the hibakusha.
Mayor Matsui also warned against a growing perception that “nuclear weapons are essential for national defense,” a view that he and many other believe heightens the risk of the use of these weapons.
In Nagasaki, Mayor, Shiro Suzu urged in his Nagasaki Peace Declaration on August 9 for the world to take the path to a peaceful future through dialogue with different people. Suzuki pressed world leaders to end disputes that are based on a principle of “force is met with force.”
One event at which the world community seemed to meet the hopes of the hibakusha was the award of the 2024 Nobel Peace Prize to the Japan Confederation of A- and H-Bomb Sufferers Organization, or Nihon Hidankyo. The Norwegian Nobel Committee recognized that “Nihon Hidankyo has carried out extensive educational work on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Hence the motto ‘No more Hibakusha.’”
However, the reality of world politics has recently visited more disappointments on the hibakusha. Recognizing that it can use its nuclear weapons stockpile to blackmail Ukraine, Russia has continued its war. Commenters have noticed that the invasion by a country with nuclear weapons of another that abandoned nuclear weapons undermines the international non-proliferation regime. Ukraine gave up its status of the world’s third largest nuclear power with the Budapest Memorandum in 1994.
A growing concern among the hibakusha is the fact that the nuclear powers are increasing their involvement in international conflicts. Despite efforts to find a peace deal in the Gaza Strip, Israel – widely thought to have nuclear weapons capability – has continued to destroy cities in the region to eliminate a terrorist organization, Hamas. India and Pakistan, both of which are recognized as nuclear powers, exchanged military strikes in May over a terrorist attack in Kashmir.
The hibakusha were astonished that the U.S. conducted air strikes in June on three of Iran’s nuclear sites. Aggravating the situation for the hibakusha was U.S. President Donald Trump’s justification for the attacks on Iran as a means of ending the conflict between Iran and Israel. Trump likened the U.S. attack on Iran to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, characterizing the strikes on Iran as “essentially the same thing.” “Nothing has changed 80 years after the war,” said one of the hibakusha.
The survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki are also frustrated with the diplomacy of the government of Japan on nuclear non-proliferation. In their peace declarations, Matsui and Suzuki strongly recommended that the government join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, issued by the United Nations in 2017. The Japanese government has routinely rejected that request because Japan is under nuclear umbrella of the U.S.
In his speeches at the ceremonies in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Prime Minister Ishiba stressed Japan’s efforts toward “the world without nuclear weapons” not through the 2017 UN treaty, but the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970. Ishiba also quoted the Hiroshima Action Plan, a plan first proposed by his predecessor Fumio Kishida in a speech to NPT Review Conference in 2022. The plan would preclude the use of nuclear weapons and enhance the transparency of a country’s nuclear development.
When we look at the reality of the hibakusha, they are decreasing year after year. Hibakusha who have kept their copies of the Atomic Bomb Survivor’s Handbook, issued by Japanese government, fell below 100,000 in 2024. It means we have fewer and fewer people who can talk about the direct experience of the devastation brought by atomic bombs. How the narratives of Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be passed down to future generations is an important – and unresolved – question.
In his peace declaration, Matsui urged young people to think less about themselves and more about each other. “Clearly, nations, too, must look beyond narrow self-interest to consider the circumstances of other nations,” Matsui said. This tenet is grounded in the preamble to the Constitution of Japan, which states that “no nation is responsible for itself alone.” While Hiroshima’s hope for peace is as fresh as ever, the reality of the world, including that in Japan, looks as if the great tragedy of the atomic bombings has been forgotten.
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BOOK TALK: RAIN OF RUIN BY RICHARD OVERY. 10/7, 6:30-8:30pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Imperial War Museums. Speaker: author Richard Overy, one of Britain’s most distinguished historians. https://www.iwm.org.uk/events/iwm-in-conversation-richard-overy-rain-of-ruin. Fee. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/45hyoOU
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THE SURRENDER OF JAPAN: ORCHESTRATING THE END OF THE WAR. 9/2, 11:00am-Noon, HYBRID. Sponsor: National WWII Museum. Speaker: Colonel Mike Bell, PhD, Executive Director of the Museum’s Jenny Craig Institute for the Study of War and Democracy. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/events-programs/events/137098-surrender-japan-orchestrating-end-war
2025 CONFERENCE TO HONOR 80TH ANNIVERSARY OF END OF WORLD WAR II. 8/30-9/2. IN PERSON ONLY, Hilton Garden Inn, Arlington, VA. Sponsor: American Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Society. Various presentations on the American POW experience with Imperial Japan. https://www.adbcmemorialsociety.org/
FINALE IN THE PACIFIC: THE ROAD TO JAPAN'S SURRENDER. 8/23, 9:00am. IN PERSON ONLY, MacArthur Memorial Visitor Center, 150 Bank Street, Norfolk, VA. Sponsors: MacArthur Memorial, Military Aviation Museum, and Hampton Roads Naval Museum. Speakers: Military historians Richard B. Frank, author of Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, D.M. Giangreco, author of Truman and the Bomb: The Untold Story, and Timothy J. Orr, co-author of Never Call Me a Hero: A Legendary American Dive-Bomber Pilot Remembers of the Battle of Midway. https://www.eventbrite.com/e/finale-in-the-pacific-the-road-to-japans-surrender-tickets-1371578601519?aff=oddtdtcreator
80TH ANNIVERSARY END OF WAR SYMPOSIUM. 8/8-9. Sponsor: National WWII Museum-New Orleans. Speakers: Guenter Bischof; Michael Neiberg; John McManus; Craig Symonds; James Scott; John Curatola; Jonathan House; Richard Frank; Jim Zobel; Noriko Kawamura. https://www.nationalww2museum.org/events-programs/events/135816-80th-anniversary-end-war-symposium VIDEO
THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF WORLD WAR TWO: THE HOTTEST FLASHPOINTS TODAY. 8/1. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Speakers: M.G. Sheftall, Professor, Modern Japanese Cultural History and Communication, Faculty of Informatics, Shizuoka University; Alexis Dudden, Professor, Department of History, University of Connecticut and Visiting Professor of Japanese Studies, National University of Singapore; Koichi Nakano, Professor, Political Science, Sophia University. https://www.fccj.or.jp/news-and-multimedia/press-conference-contested-history-world-war-two-hottest-flashpoints-today-mg VIDEO
Monday, August 11, 2025
Japan's Continued War
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But what is the alternative
Ishiba Fighting to Stay in Power
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
August 4, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Despite pressure from several lawmakers in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is resisting demands that he resign. He is trying to take the initiative in the LDP’s internal discussions on responsibility for the party’s defeat in Upper House election in July. He is also discussing legislation with opposition parties in the Diet. The struggle over LDP leadership is likely to continue into the fall.
The LDP convened an unofficial Joint Plenary Meeting (JPM) on July 28. A JPM is a forum for internal party discussions but has no authority to decide on behalf of the party. At the unofficial JPM, the LDP Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama said that, after the party had reviewed its campaign strategy, he would make clear his responsibility for the setback. His statement was widely reported as an intent to step down as secretary general. His resignation would do almost fatal damage to the Ishiba administration.
Moriyama meanwhile out-maneuvered anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP. He agreed to convene an official JPM on August 8, which Ishiba’s opponents in the LDP had requested. These lawmakers had been collecting signatures in support of a JPM, but Moriyama’s decision supersedes this effort. The JPM will be held not at the request of anti-Ishiba members, but at the initiative of Moriyama.
This means that Moriyama can set the agenda for the JPM on August 8. The JPM is the second decision-making body, after the Party Convention. Article 33 of the LDP Constitution states that a JPM deliberates and decides particularly important issues of party management and Diet affairs. Moriyama has set the agenda of the JPM as “review of Upper House election and revitalization of the party,” excising “replacement of LDP leadership” as an agenda item.
The Party Constitution contains no rule for replacing the president at a JPM; instead, it simply says that, in an emergency, the JPM (rather than the Party Convention) can elect a president, when the current president vacates his or her seat. Ishiba has shown no intention to do so. It is unlikely for August 8 JPM to be a meeting for replacing the president.
There is another way to replace Ishiba. Article 6 of LDP Constitution provides that a presidential election will be held at the request of more than half of total party Diet members and a representative from each local branch of the party.
Anti-Ishiba groups have considered invoking Article 6 and garnering support from lawmakers and local branches. However, the provision has not been invoked since it was added to the constitution in 2002, when former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori stepped down during a prolonged struggle in the party. A presidential election based on Article 6 could damage the party significantly.
If Ishiba shows no inclination to step down, it will be hard for LDP members to replace him. “The only way is to explain without escaping,” Ishiba said to reporters after the unofficial JPM on July 28. Ishiba earlier had told opposition leaders in a meeting on July 25 that he would not resign as prime minister.
Ishiba is now devoting himself to policies, expecting that implementation of his agenda will be sufficient cause for others to support him remaining in office. Debates in the Diet on August 4 reflected a consensus that Japan must have a written agreement with the United States to reduce tariffs on Japanese cars. Ishiba made it clear that he was willing to formalize such an agreement in Japan’s national interest.
A summit meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump to confirm the tariff agreement is Ishiba’s fondest wish. The opposition would favor a meeting too, knowing how difficult it would be to arrange. The Anti-Ishiba group in the LDP has a different reason: it would be Ishiba’s last act as prime minister.
Ishiba may also be able to survive by working with opposition parties to find common ground on legislation. The leading coalition, the LDP and Komeito, has agreed with the four major opposition parties -- the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai), and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) – on legislation to abolish the temporary gasoline surtax by the end of the year.
In 1974, the government placed a “temporary” gasoline surtax on top of the ordinary gasoline tax to finance the construction and repair of public roads. More than 50 years on, this temporary measure remains on the books. The opposition parties introduced a bill in the ordinary session of the Diet in June that would have abolished the surtax, but the LDP-Komeito coalition, with a majority in the Upper House, defeated it.
The coalition has now lost that power. LDP and Komeito have joined with the four opposition parties to establish a task group to develop a proposal to eliminate the surtax. With concessions like this from the LDP-Komeito coalition, the opposition parties spared Ishiba from a no-confidence resolution in the extraordinary session in August.
To avoid provoking conservatives in the LDP, Ishiba reportedly walked away from his planned release of a statement on August 15 marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. He has hinted that he may postpone a statement to September or later.
August is ordinarily the time for politicians to return home and pray on August 15 for Japan’s war victims. No rest for the weary this year, however. Both Ishiba and his opponents will use the time to rebuild their strategies to eliminate the other. The struggle will intensify in late August when the LDP wraps up its review of the Upper House election.
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