Takaichi's China Test

Above is Sanae Takaichi when she was running for LDP president in 2021, holding forth at a rally of Tibetan, Uighur, Hong Kong and Taiwan independence activists inside LDP headquarters. Credit to Michael Cucek, Temple University, Japan

Japan Faces China’s Wolf Warriors

By Takuya Nishimura

Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point

Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun

You can find his blog, J Update here

November 25, 2025

A careless reference to a “Taiwan contingency” by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi drew a vocal official retort from China. As Beijing plays its “wolf warrior diplomacy” gambit against Japan, Tokyo has not responded with any effective countermeasures. Japanese foreign policy officials predict that the bilateral disputes will not be settled any time soon and that the negative consequences to Japan of such a failure are growing. It may also be true that China is using Takaichi’s comment as an excuse to broadcast its longstanding views on the place of Taiwan in China’s sphere of influence.

On November 7 at the Diet discussion, Takaichi said that a Chinese blockade around Taiwan deploying warships with the use of force would constitute a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan. In such a condition, Japan could invoke its right to collective self-defense to justify activating its self-defense forces with a country with a close relationship with Japan. The “country” in this context is presumably the United States – although U.S. President Donald Trump has yet to demonstrate the closeness of this relationship.

 Before delivering her comment, Takaichi had had a middle-of-the-night (or early morning) meeting at 3 a.m. to discuss a possible “Taiwan contingency” with her staff. Although Takaichi told her staff after the Diet discussion that she might have gone too far, it is likely that her comment on Taiwan was what she meant as she had consulted with her diplomatic advisers. She has refused to retract her words.

China sees Taiwan as one of its core interests. As a result, Beijing would and did respond aggressively to Takaichi. Whether her remark was merely careless or whether it was an affirmative line in the sand mattered not to China. The Chinese Consul General to Osaka, Xue Jian, posted on social media a comment suggesting the beheading of the “filthy heard” of the Japanese leader. Beijing also issued recommendations to its citizens, including college students, not to travel to Japan. China demanded that the Takaichi administration retract the statement.

Moreover, China decided to treat Takaichi’s comment as a form of military intimidation. The People’s Liberation Army Daily regarded Takaichi’s observation as interference in China’s internal affairs and an infringement on China’s sovereignty. “Any external interference forces will be crushed to ashes,” the paper announced. Four China Coast Guard vessels entered territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands on November 16.

China continues to apply diplomatic pressure on Japan. China’s permanent representative to the UN, Fu Cong, sent a letter to UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, on November 21, stating that Japan had issued a threat of force against China for the first time. China froze again its imports of Japanese seafood by imposing stricter inspections of Japanese cargo. Until this decision, Japan had since May been able to export goods to China with few restrictions.

Other ostensibly private sector actions followed. Some Chinese airlines stopped flights to Japan. Chinese travel agencies cancelled reservations to hotels in Japan. These measures have begun to have an impact on the Japanese economy. The worst decision for Japan was China’s embargo of exports of rare earth minerals an action that Japan had experienced in 2010. Rare earth minerals are crucial for the production of cars and smart phones.

These measures represent China’s confrontational policy in foreign relations, which is called “wolf warrior diplomacy,” named after a 2015 Chinese film. Changing from traditional diplomacy avoiding controversy, China actively seeks its utmost interest by aggressively taking advantage of any diplomatic resources including economic sanctions or military pressure.

Japan’s position has been that Takaichi’s comment did not cross the line that her predecessors had drawn. The Prime Minister tried to explain this view by sending the Director General of Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Masaaki Kanai, to Beijing on November 18. China had none of it.

After Kanai’s meeting, Chinese media broadcast a scene with the the Foreign Ministry’s Director General Liu Jinsong looking down contemptuously on Kanai. Liu had his hands in his trousers’ pockets while Kanai looked to be bowing to Liu. Kanai was obviously not ready for the press.

Although hawkish groups in Japan have called on the government to declare the Consul General to Osaka a persona non grata and send him home, the previous four examples of Japan’s expulsion of foreign diplomats are based on crimes or a highly serious deterioration in bilateral relations. It is questionable whether the expulsion can be applied to the posting on SNS of a Chinese diplomat who is critical of the Japanese government.

The Takaichi administration has miscalculated in its diplomatic relations with China. She mostly had no idea that her comment would cause China to respond so stridently. “I’m not going to discuss a specific issue in this venue anymore,” Takaichi said before the budget committee of the Lower House. But a prime minister cannot be responsible for Japan’s sovereign people without discussing specific issues in the Diet.

Takaichi made her comment on Taiwan just a week after her meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in South Korea. She and her staff did not recognize the significance of China’s decision to meet with the new hawkish leader of Japan despite concerns of the Chinese (as well as other nations) about her visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and comments supporting revisionist history. Tokyo was not considerate and Takaichi’s surprise statement caused Xi to lose face with the Chinese public.

The first response of Trump to the contretemps was not to Takaichi’s advantage. When asked about it in an interview with Fox News on November 11, Trump observed that “a lot of our allies are not friends either.” Adding, he said “Our allies took advantage of our trade more than China did.” Japan had little advance knowledge of this change of U.S. policy from the Biden administration toward its allies or China. Trump takes a softer approach to China while eschewing close relationships with traditional allies.

A second and possibly more troubling event was Xi’s call to Trump in the morning of Monday, November 24. Xi’s purpose was to discuss Taiwan, specifically that Taiwan’s return to China is central to the post-World War II international order. At least one U.S. press report has linked Xi’s call to Takaichi’s statement, but there appear to be no reports that Xi mentioned Japan or Takaichi by name. It may be fair to say that China’s disproportionate response to Takaichi reflects a felt need that existed well before she came on the scene to promote its influence over Taiwan.

Trump called Takaichi that evening. Although she did not reveal the substances of their conversation about the Japan-China row over Taiwan, Takaichi told the press that she was briefed on the Trump-Xi call and Trump said she should call him whenever she wanted. The time lag between Trumps calls with China and Japan, however, appears to undermine her efforts to shape a “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.”

Takaichi, as the first female premier of Japan, hopes to be the Margaret Thatcher of Japan. The conservative “Iron Lady” was a hardliner against the Soviet Union. But Japanese observers expect that Takaichi will more likely follow one of two recent and different models: Liz Truss of the UK or Giorgia Meloni of Italy. Truss’s tenure was brief: she stepped down shortly after her installation when the markets looked unfavorably on her tax cut policy that lacked reliable, alternative fiscal resources. Meloni has been more successful. She has adjusted her conservative agenda to account for the realities of domestic and international politics.

Thus far, Takaichi has been able to keep her relationship with U.S. President Trump on an even keel. Maintaining a dialogue with China is more difficult. Her active spending for an economic stimulus has met with skepticism from the market, which now shows a triple low of stocks, bonds, and the Japanese yen a reminder for Japan about the U.K.’s Truss Shock in 2022.

It is true that Takaichi has high approval rate in current polls, despite concerns on relations with China stemming from her own speech. However, the honeymoon period for theTakaichi administration is getting close to an end. If China’s measures start impacting Japan’s economy or security, the one-month-old Takaichi administration may similarly find itself in a Truss situation with questions about its survival.

Asia Policy Events, Monday November 24, 2025

BEHIND THE BUILD: DRIVING FACTORS OF CAPACITY AND EFFECTS OF GEOPOLITICAL RISKS ON THE SHIPBUILDING MARKET. 11/24, 9:30am-5:30pm (CET), 3:30-11:30am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: OECD. Speakers: Ines Nastali, Senior Supply Chain Analyst, S&P Global Intelligence & Analytics; Jayendu Krishna, Director and Head of Maritime Advisors, Drewry; Tim Walters, First Marine International; Jacob Gunter, Head of Program, Economy and Industry, Merics; Capt. Rahul Khanna, Global Head Marine Risk Consulting, Allianz; Brooke Weddle, Senior Partner, McKinsey; Ryan Brukardt, Senior Partner, McKinsey; and more.

TESTING THE WATERS: UNREGULATED MINING IN THE MEKONG REGION. 11/24, 9:00-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Regan Kwan, Research Analyst, Southeast Asia Program and the Energy, Water, and Sustainability Program, Stimson Center; Pai Deetes, Regional Campaigns Director, Southeast Asia Program, International Rivers; Saeng Lee, Vice President, Romphothi Foundation, Chiang Mai, Thailand; Wan Wiriya, Assistant Head, Environmental Science Research Center, Faculty of Science, Chiang Mai University; Moderator: Brian Eyler, Senior Fellow and Director, Southeast Asia Program, Stimson Center.

SUSTAINABLE TRADE INDEX 2025. 11/24, 10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Association of Foreign Press Correspondents in the United States (AFPC-USA), in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. Speaker: Dr. Christos Cabolis, Chief Economist, IMD World Competitiveness Center.

THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE LIVE PODCAST: WHAT DOES CHINA WANT? 11/24, 11:00-11:40am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair; Henrietta Levin, Senior Fellow, Freeman Chair in China Studies; Zenobia Chan, Assistant Professor of Government, Georgetown University.

BOOK TALK: MIDDLE EAST CRISES. 11/24, 11:00-11:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speaker: Author James F. Jeffrey, Former U.S. Special Representative for Syria Engagement; John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS, and Langone Chair in American Leadership; Seth G. Jones, President, Defense and Security Department, CSIS; Eliot A. Cohen, Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy, CSIS; Mona Yacoubian, Director and Senior Adviser, Middle East Program, CSIS. PURCHASE BOOK

PROMISES, POWER, AND PROTECTION: THE WEST'S DEBATE OVER SECURITY GUARANTEES FOR UKRAINE. 11/24, 11:00am-Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: American German Institute (AGI). Speaker: Iulian Romanyshyn, DAAD/AGI Research Fellow; Moderator: Jeff Rathke, President and Director of the Foreign & Security Policy Program, AGI.

PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF IRAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS. 11/24, Noon-2:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for International Studies, MIT. Speaker: Peter Krause, Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston College.

Japan’s PM Takaichi Searches for Policies

Launch of Five LDP/JIP Working Groups 

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 17, 2025

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) launched five working groups to implement agreements they reached when forming their coalition. The groups will address five issues: reductions in the number of Diet seats, regulation of political contributions from companies and organizations, amendment of Article 9 of the constitution, reform of the governmental system, and social security reform. Although these issues are a top priority for JIP, the LDP views them as secondary but necessary to discuss in order to keep JIP in the leading coalition. Thus, even at the beginning of this exercise, the two parties are not necessarily headed in the same direction.
 
The working groups met between November 11 and 13. Several lawmakers leading the working groups attended and discussed how to proceed. Neither party has a clear idea of what the groups are likely to accomplish.   
 
Here are the remits for each of the five working groups:
 
1. Reduction of Diet Seats
Headed by Katsunobu Kato (LDP) and Yasuto Urano (JIP)
JIP believes that Diet seat reduction will boost the party’s popularity based on what they think was the success of seat reductions in the Osaka Prefectural Assembly and Osaka City Assembly. JIP also believes that the reductions appealed to voters who were frustrated with too many assembly members who enjoyed privileges as representatives of the people. JIP sold their policy as a self-sacrificing reform.
This issue was an “absolute condition” for the JIP to enter the coalition. The coalition agreement states that the two parties will “seek” to submit and enact a bill in the 2025 extraordinary session that would eliminate 10 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives. The current extraordinary session will close on December 17.

The LDP Secretary General, Shun-ichi Suzuki, has said that it would be difficult for the two parties to pass the bill by the end of the session. The JIP’s co-leader, Fumitake Fujita, has admitted that the coalition cannot bring all of the election reform matters to a close by the end of the year. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has said that she will seek a broad consensus for reform, including the buy-in of the opposition parties. At its first meeting on this issue, the working group merely reconfirmed the October agreement.

Some LDP lawmakers have argued that this Diet seat reduction should be discussed in the broader context of Diet’s election system. Such discussions would include new multiple-seat districts in the House of Representatives to replace single-seat districts. Other LDP members would support only a bill limited to a scheduling of the seat reduction.

Despite an obvious lack of consensus even within the coalition, the JIP does not show any sign of leaving the coalition if the seat reduction does not take place. The JIP’s “absolute condition” for joining the coalition is not non-negotiable; JIP will stay with the LDP provided that the LDP continues to discuss this issue with the JIP.
 
2. Political Contributions from Companies and Organizations
Headed by Sadahisa Furukawa (LDP) and Yasuto Urano (JIP)
Just like the opposition parties, the JIP has advocated for the prohibition of political donations from companies and organizations. The LDP, by contrast, heavily relies on these contributions. After Komeito left the coalition with the LDP, frustrated by the LDP’s laziness on this reform, JIP tried to include this issue in the coalition agreement. However, by its terms, the agreement provides only that the coalition will resolve the issue by the end of Takaichi’s term as LDP president, which will be September 2027. The agreement thus was an obvious setback for JIP.

JIP wants to eliminate donations from companies and organizations since it identifies itself as a reform party. The LDP, however, calls for “more transparency than prohibition,” arguing that a ban on contributions infringes the freedom of political activity that is guaranteed to each business entity. In the working group’s first meeting,, the parties could not even set a schedule for their next meeting.
 
3. Constitutional Amendment
Headed by Yoshitaka Shindo (LDP) and Nobuyuki Baba (JIP)
JIP is more radical on amending Article 9 than is the LDP. JIP argues that Sentence 2 of Article 9, which currently prohibits the use of military force, should be replaced by language that creates a national defense force. The LDP takes a more nuanced and less sweeping view: the party would add an emergency clause to deal with disaster or invasion by a foreign country and a description of a self-defense force in Article 9.  The LDP would not, however, repeal Sentence 2.

Although the coalition agreement calls for the parties to agree by the end of FY2026 on language for a proposed constitutional amendment, neither party is really focused on this issue. At its first meeting, the working group simply confirmed that the parties will accelerate their discussions. We may assume that the parties have not yet assembled the necessary two-thirds majorities in both chambers of the Diet.
 
4. Reform of Governmental System
Headed by Ichiro Miyashita (LDP) and Alex Saito (JIP)
For JIP, reform of the governmental system is all about a “backup capital initiative” —the designation of Osaka as the backup capital in the event of a disaster in Tokyo. With its main office not in Tokyo but in Osaka, JIP primarily represents Osaka’s interests. Although it failed to win two referendums in Osaka on the “Osaka Capital Initiative,” JIP still hopes to move the political functions of Japan’s capital from Tokyo to Osaka. The backup capital initiative will come into play if a disaster occurs. This can be a revised version of the Osaka Capital Initiative.

Most LDP lawmakers have little interest in this matter since it originates in the JIP.  Undeniably, the issue is less urgent than the issues, such as political reform and management of price inflation, taken up by the other working groups. In the first working group meeting, both parties agreed to prepare talking points for the next meeting.
 
5. Social Security Reform
Headed by Norihisa Tamura (LDP) and Satoshi Umemura (JIP)
Social security reform is another crucial issue for JIP. The party included it in their campaign platform for the Upper House elections in July. JIP promised an annual 60-thousand-yen reduction in social insurance premiums.

A specific issue that JIP has raised is the reduction of the costs of “over the counter (OTC)” medicines whose formularies are close to those of commercial drugs in drug stores. The cost of OTC medicines is funded by health insurance. Both parties shared at the first meeting of this working group an end-of-the-year target of the end of 2025 to reach an agreement. 
 
The Takaichi administration recognizes that these five working groups are necessary to maintain its coalition government. However, the LDP has its own history on each of the issues. It is unlikely that formation of a coalition will suddenly bridge the wide gap between the two parties. In the past, the LDP used working groups in the coalition with Komeito and in the trilateral coalition with the Japan Socialist Party and New Party Sakigake.
 
It is far more important for Takaichi to implement her own agenda. She established some working groups in her government to promote economic and security policies, including the Panel on Economic Growth Strategy, as soon as she formed her Cabinet.
 
In her discussion at Plenary Sittings of the House of Representatives, Takaichi said that the Shinzo Abe administration’s economic growth strategy, which was one of the three pillars of Abenomics, had been insufficient to boost the Japanese economy. Takaichi intends that this new panel will discuss economic strategy regardless of budgetary requirements, while the traditional Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy will manage the balance between revenue and spending.
 
Takaichi also convened a Cabinet meeting on Foreigners to address problems with foreign visitors in Japan. Some conservative parties such as Sanseito call for stricter regulation. Takaichi wants to take on this issue to bring the voters who voted for those conservative parties back to the LDP. She has also directed the council on the establishment of National Intelligence Bureau to discuss enhancement of the intelligence community.
 
However, there already are bodies in the government to discuss these issues, which Takaichi hopes will produce specific policies. Establishing an array of working groups to pursue various policies was a common practice for previous prime ministers. Launching working groups does not mean that policies a prime minister has promised to the voters will become a reality.

Asia Policy Events, Monday November 17, 2025

JAPAN’S ROLE IN NAVIGATING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL UNCERTAINTY. 11/17, 2:00-6:00pm (JST), Midnight-4:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). Speakers: Kenichiro Sasae, President, JIIA; Naoko Eto, Senior Fellow, Institute of Geoeconomics; Jacob Happymon, Director, Council on Strategic and Defense Studies, India; Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Nguyen Minh Vu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam; Naoko Shimazu, Professor, University of Tokyo, and more.

5TH INDO-PACIFIC STRATEGY FORUM. 11/17-18, IN PERSON ONLY, Ottawa, Canada. Sponsor: Institute for Peace & Diplomacy (IPD). Speakers: RSVP for speaker list.

TRUMP AND MBS: WHAT’S IN STORE FOR U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS? 11/17, 10:00-10:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Aaron David Miller, Senior Fellow, American Statecraft Program, Carnegie; Michael Ratney, Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia; Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern History of the Gulf Cooperation Countries, Princeton University.

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SUPPORTING SURVIVORS OF CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE. 11/17, Noon-1:15pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics, Columbia University. Speakers: Grace Achan, Board Member, Global Survivors Fund, Co-founder, Women’s Advocacy Network; Esther Dingemans, Executive Director, Global Survivors Fund; Ajna Jusić, President, Forgotten Children of War; Khrystyna Kit, Head of JurFem Ukrainian Women Lawyers Association. Moderator: Rachel Vogelstein, Associate Professor of Professional Practice, Director, IGP Women’s Initiative, Director of Human Rights, Gender, and Equity Concentration, Columbia SIPA.

THE US AND CHINA: COMPETITION, COEXISTENCE, OR COLLISION? 11/17, 5:30-6:30pm (CST), 6:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago; Rana Mitter, S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Leslie Vinjamuri, President & CEO, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

SHIFTING SECURITY LANDSCAPE: U.S.-JAPAN DEFENSE RELATIONS. 11/17, 6:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Japan Society, New York. Speakers: Ken Jimbo, Professor, International Relations, Keio University, Managing Director of Programs, International House of Japan; Sheila A. Smith, John E. Merow Senior Fellow, Asia-Pacific Studies, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

FORMER PRIME MINISTERS IN JAPANESE POLITICS: POWER, INFLUENCE AND THE ROLE OF INFORMAL POLITICS. 11/17, 6:45pm (GMT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society, London. Speakers: Hugo Dobson, Professor of Japan’s International Relations, School of Languages, Arts and Societies, University of Sheffield; Karin Narita, Research Associate in Japanese Politics and International Relations, School of Languages, Arts and Societies, University of Sheffield; Caroline Rose, Emeritus Professor of Sino-Japanese Relations, School of Languages, Cultures and Societies, University of Leeds.

Takaichi’s First Debates in the Diet: Strong Words, Shakey Ground

Takaichi’s First Debates in the Diet: Strong Words, Shakey Ground

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 10, 2025

Last week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi participated in a series of debates in the Diet, both in the Plenary Sittings and in budget committee appearances. Although she refrained from asserting an ambitious agenda in the Plenary Sittings, given her minority government in both Houses, Takaichi revealed her intention to take bold steps on issues of security and the economy in the Committee on the Budget. Regardless she does not have a sufficiently firm political base to implement those policies, she is proceeding as if she does.
 
The Diet typically holds Plenary Sittings for debate after a prime minister’s policy speech. In the current extraordinary session, Takaichi delivered her policy speech on October 24. The parties in both chambers submitted written questions to her, and she prepared written responses before her appearance at the sittings between November 4 and 6. On the following day, November 7, unscripted debate started in the Committee on Budget of the Lower House. A similar debate will in the budget committee of the Upper House will begin on November 12.
 
In the Plenary Sittings, the opposition leaders asked Takaichi how she would promote political reform, which would affect every party. (Since the LDP’s current coalition is only with the Japan Innovation Party, all other parties are in opposition.) Specific reform proposals now include reductions in the number of seats in the Diet and the regulation of political donations from companies and organizations.
 
On the former point, Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed, when they established their coalition in October, to cut Lower House seats by 10 percent. They have focused on reductions in the proportional districts. The small opposition parties depend heavily on the proportional districts and oppose the approach of the LDP and JIP. The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, argued that the seat reduction should be balanced between single-seat districts and proportional districts.
 
“It is important to have a broad consensus,” Takaichi told Noda. Opposition parties and even some LDP lawmakers have protested the LDP-JIP proposal. Although the LDP and JIP originally agreed to introduce and enact a seat reduction bill in the current Diet session, the strong push back suggests that this timeline may be too aggressive. This result may increase the JIP’s frustration with its coalition with the LDP.
 
On the second point, the regulation of political fundraising, it was the LDP’s failure to deal with this issue that caused its serious defeats in the national elections last fall and spring and led Komeito to leave the leading coalition with the LDP. This history does not disturb Takaichi. She repeated the LDP’s longstanding position – which lacks public support – that the issue of political fundraising is not about the prohibition, but the transparency of these contributions. Indeed, she believes that that the regulation of fundraising may violate business entities’ freedom of political activities. That is, the LDP still wants to maintain a system for siphoning money from business sectors.
 
Unlike the Plenary Sittings, the discussions in the budget committees of both Houses do not include written Q&As and have an improvisational and ad hoc air. Lawmakers can be agitated and aggressive in the budget committee discussions.
 
Exciting may be an understatement for what may have been an offhand (and in any case careless) remarks about a “Taiwan contingency” by Takaichi in the Lower House budget committee meeting. The “Taiwan contingency” is the question whether and how Japan should respond to military hostilities between China and the U.S. over Taiwan. Her remarks, careless though they may have been, have created a diplomatic incident – just weeks into taking office.
 
Katsuya Okada, a veteran CDPJ lawmaker and a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, asked Takaichi about the Taiwan contingency. She said that a contingency in Taiwan could create a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan “if it is a situation with use of warships or use of armed force,” Takaichi said – the first time a Japanese prime minister has so characterized possible events surrounding Taiwan. 
 
One of the problems with Takaichi’s remark is that “survival-threatening situation” is a specific term that appears in 2015 security legislation backed by the Shinzo Abe administration. One of those packaged laws defines a “survival-threatening situation” as “a situation in which an armed attack against a foreign country that has a close relationship with Japan occurs, and, as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger of fundamentally overturning people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness.” The purpose of this definition is to enable Japan to exercise a right of collective self-defense that the constitution might otherwise prohibit.
 
Prime ministers since then have assiduously avoided any discussion of what might constitute a “survival-threatening situation.” Takaichi’s description of a Taiwan contingency as a survival-threatening situation broke with that tradition and implied that Japan would send troops to support United States forces, if attacked by China.
 
This unprecedented statement about a Taiwan contingency immediately struck a nerve in China, although Takaichi tried to walk her comment back. The Chinese consul-general in Osaka, Xue Jian, posted on social media that an “intruding dirty neck must be cut off without a moment’s hesitation.” The Chief Cabinet Secretary, Minoru Kihara, responded that Xue’s posting was “extremely inappropriate.”
 
Takaichi’s statement, however, has gone further up the ranks in the Chinese government. “The remarks are seriously inconsistent with the political commitments the Japanese government has made so far, and their nature and impact are extremely egregious,” Chinese foreign policy spokesperson, Lin Jian, said in a press conference.
 
It seems unlikely that Takaichi, with no experience in foreign affairs or defense, wanted to spark a diplomatic incident, but, in her carelessness, she has done so. “I realized the danger of her going it alone without consulting others,” Noda said about Takaichi’s comments. But backed by a high approval rating in the polls, Takaichi looks to be pushing her agenda full speed ahead almost regardless of the consequences.

Asia Policy Events, Monday November 10, 2025

TRANS-PACIFIC SUSTAINABILITY DIALOGUE 2025: SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES. 11/10-11/11, 9:00am-6:00pm (PHST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University; Ban Ki-moon Foundation for a Better Future. Speakers: Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Director, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) and APARC’s Japan Program, Stanford University; Arsenio M. Balisacan, Secretary, Department of Economy, Planning, and Development, Republic of the Philippines; Ban Ki-moon, 8th Secretary-General, United Nations; Chairman, Ban Ki-moon Foundation for a Better Future, and more.

THE 21ST KOREA-MIDDLE EAST COOPERATION FORUM: A PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY. 11/10, 10:00am-5:30pm (AST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council); Korea Arab Society (KAS); Jeju Peace Institute (JPI). Speakers: Dr. Maryam bint Ali bin Nasser Al-Misnad, Minister of State for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Qatar; Dr. Cho Hyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Dr. Khalid Al-Jaber, Director, Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Young Hoon Kang, President, Jeju Peace Institute; Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Qatar; Dr. Waleed Siam, Ambassador, Permanent General Mission of Palestine to South Korea and Japan; Woong-Yeob Song, Former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan; and more.

THE STATE OF TAIWAN: WHAT'S NEXT AFTER THE TRUMP-XI MEETING? 11/10, 9:00-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Bonny Lin, Director, China Power Project, Senior Fellow, Asian Security, CSIS; Dan Blumenthal, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director, Indo-Pacific Program, German Marshall Fund; I-Chung Lai, President, Prospect Foundation; Ryo Sahashi, Professor, University of Tokyo.

STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT ON CHINA: EU APPROACHES AND TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION. 11/10, 10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Global China Hub; Europe Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Jörn Fleck, Senior Director, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; The Hon. John Moolenaar, United States Representative (R-MI-02); Zoltán Fehér, Nonresident Fellow, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council; Michael Laha, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology, DGAP; Jacqueline Ramos, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State, Valbona Zeneli, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Melanie Hart, Senior Director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council.

LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KĘSTUTIS BUDRYS ON NATO, ENERGY SECURITY, AND EUROPE-CHINA RELATIONS. 11/10, 2:30-3:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Kęstutis Budrys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania; Marshall Billingslea, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.

PM Takaichi’s Week of Diplomacy

Staying the Abe Course

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.

November 3, 2025

The last week of October 2025 was Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s diplomatic debut. Inaugurated barely a week before, she spoke with world leaders and attended multi-lateral conferences. Takaichi hoped to project Japan’s importance in international community. While she is still on her way to that goal, it became clear that her foreign policy will be based on that of her predecessors – mainly, Abe.

The Golden Age of Alliances
Takaichi prepared for her diplomatic week by focusing on U.S. President Donald Trump’s state visit from October 27 to 29. In her meeting with Trump, Takaichi reminisced about his old friend and her political mentor, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. She gave Trump a golf putter used by Abe and a set of gold-gilded golf balls, acknowledging Trump’s fondness of golf and gold. The two signed a document titled “Toward a NEW GOLDEN AGE,” named after a sentence in Trump’s inaugural address in January: “The golden age of America begins right now.”

In addition to the gift-giving, and without any explicit request from Trump, Takaichi described to him Japan’s initiative to increase its defense spending. Takaichi earlier had announced to the Diet that Japan would reach its defense budget target of two percent of GDP earlier than expected. Japan also will revise three defense documents signed in 2022 to increase its purchases of military equipment from the U.S. On this latter commitment, Takaichi took a page from Abe’s book. In 2018, as Trump was considering higher tariffs on Japanese cars, Abe bought F-35 fighter jets and other military equipment from the U.S.

Both leaders labeled the bilateral tariff agreement in July as a “great deal.” They exchanged a joint factsheet on the anticipated 60 trillion yen of investments in the U.S. by Japanese companies. The factsheet shows only “interest from companies.” One example of a possible investment is the construction of nuclear reactors and small modular reactors by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba. Notwithstanding the lack of firm commitments, the factsheet was a diplomatic card that Trump could play in a summit talk with President Xi Jinping of China after he left Japan.

Helped by Pragmatic Diplomacy
Abe’s legacy was not a resource for Takaichi in her meeting with the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Lee Jae Myung, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju on October 30. During his time in office, Abe had brought Japan-ROK relations to their lowest level since 1965, when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. Note that while Abe was in office, a liberal, Moon Jae In, headed the ROK government. Moon was a political mentor of President Lee, just as Abe was of Takaichi.

The stage thus was set for renewed antagonism between the heirs to the Abe and Moon administrations. That drama did not take place, however. Takaichi was lucky enough on three points. First, Lee holds to the principle of “pragmatic diplomacy” and is trying to solidify relations with foreign countries. Second, Takaichi’s predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, had improved bilateral relations with the ROK and then-President Yoon Suk Yeol. Finally, Japan and the ROK need to reinforce their trilateral security framework with the U.S. to counter the growing military alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea.

Takaichi and Lee promised to maintain a “shuttle diplomacy” with frequent visits to each other. In the ROK, Takaichi is widely considered a hawkish leader, who frequently visits the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined, and who disagrees with both the Murayama Statement, which is an apology for Japan’s wartime aggression, and the Kono Statement, which admits the Japanese Imperial Armed Force’s role in trafficking women and girls. Avoiding these issues, Takaichi tried to build a personal relationship with Lee, expressing her preferences for Korean seaweed, Korean cosmetics, and Korean TV drama.

An Unusual Exchange on Domestic Issues
Takaichi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju on October 31 did not go as smoothly as the meetings with Trump and Lee. Both leaders met and shook hands without a smile.

Takaichi is one of the lawmakers who are close to Taiwan. She had visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te in April. Lai immediately congratulated Takaichi on her election as president of the Liberal Democratic Party in early October, and her colleagues brought a message from her to Lai in their visit to Taiwan. Takaichi obviously is not a preferable counterpart for Xi.

Xi referred to the Murayama Statement as embodying a spirit of contrition that should be upheld. Takaichi expressed serious concerns over China’s escalation of maritime survey and military activities in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku Island and in the South China Sea. She also criticized China’s oppression in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It was unusual for the leaders to discuss the domestic issues of their counterparts.

Although Takaichi hoped to make progress on some concerns, such as easing regulations on the import of sea products from Japan and taking greater safety measures for the Japanese in China, Xi did not offer any clear commitment. They at least agreed on maintaining an old bilateral diplomatic principle, a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” a term originated in the first Abe administration.

Distance from Center Stage
In her first policy speech to the Diet on October 24, Takaichi invoked the Abe policy of a “Japanese diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.” The diplomatic week was the premiere of Takaichi’s role on that stage. It is a work in progress, as Takaichi insisted in her press conference at the end of the week that her diplomacy had just begun.

In one instance, on October 26, at the Japan-ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Takaichi prompted collaboration between the Free and Open Asia Pacific (FOIP) and another framework, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The FOIP concept was invented by Abe in 2016. However, Takaichi’s proposed collaboration remains focused on traditional economic cooperation for building infrastructure. ASEAN still faces a choice between Japan and China as the country to cooperate with.

At another meeting, the APEC summit at Gyeongju on October 31, Takaichi proposed active investment to support innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technology in order to enhance resilience in responding to natural disaster. In her policy speech to the Diet, Takaichi spoke of “investment for crisis management” and promised to make Japan “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” Nevertheless, there is no AI in Japan that is as prevalent in the world as ChatGPT or Copilot. So far, it is unclear how she will have Japan flourish on the world’s stage.

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Prime Minister Takaichi’s First Policy Speech

Ambitions Lacking Details

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy PointYou can find his blog, J Update here

November 1, 2025

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivered her first policy speech to the extraordinary Diet session on October 24. She emphasized that her administration would make the Japanese economy and Japan itself stronger. However, it was not at all clear how she would do so or how Japan will fare under her leadership. One thing that was clear was her commitment to follow the policies of the former Shinzo Abe administration, which she greatly admires.

“I will strive to build a robust economy, turning people’s unease and apprehension over their current lives and the future into hope and foster a Japan that is stronger and more prosperous,” Takaichi said. She was adamant that she would restore Japanese diplomacy so that it “flourishes on the world’s center stage” – a term coined by Abe when he advocated for an active role for Japan in the world.

One question remains: What exactly is a strong economy? A “responsible and proactive public finances” is Takaichi’s main concept. She calls for bold governmental spending, which, she says, will raise incomes, transform people’s mindsets regarding consumption, and boost tax revenues without raising tax rates as business earnings increase. She aims to curb the growth of Japan’s outstanding debt so as not to exceed the rate of economic growth and lower Japan’s ratio of outstanding government debt to GDP.

This concept does not differ in any significant way from the “economic virtuous cycle” that former administrations had hoped to achieve. However, neither Abe nor other prime ministers were able to grow real wages. As these administrations poured money into the market by issuing government bonds, wages could not catch up with price hikes. While Takaichi and her allies have great nostalgia for Abenomics, that policy was a remedy for deflation, not for inflation from which the Japanese public is now suffering.

When she talks about responsibility for economic policies, Takaichi must show fiscal resources that will give effect to her policies. She promised in her policy speech that her administration would pass a bill in the current session of the Diet to remove the provisional gasoline tax rate. But she did not propose how she would find the fiscal resources to make up for lost revenue.

Takaichi listed several policies her administration would pursue, including subsidies for the wages of workers in medical services and nursing care facilities, for local communities to support small and mid-size entrepreneurs, and for payments to high schools for school lunches. But she never explained how she would pay for them. It is notable that, during her campaign for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Takaichi did not rule out issuing government bonds to fund her economic policies.

Takaichi also introduced the concept of “crisis management investment.” She defines it as strategic investments “to address various risks and social issues, including economic security, food security, energy security, health and medical security, and measures to enhance national resilience” with coordination between the private sector and the government. Another goal is to advance Japan as “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” To implement this economic agenda, she proposed establishing a “Council for Japan’s Growth Strategy.”

LDP governments have long used disaster management to justify expenditures for infrastructure construction. Mirroring the views of her immediate predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, Takaichi stressed the need to prepare for the Nankai Trough Great Earthquake and to continue reconstruction following the great earthquakes in northeast Japan in 2011 and Noto Peninsula in 2024.

Takaichi’s respect for Abe comes through in her diplomatic policies. A “Free and Open Asia-Pacific (FOAP)” is at the center of her foreign policy. Abe proposed FOAP in 2016 to counter Chinese advances in the region. Takaichi appointed Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official, Keiichi Ichikawa, to be the new Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat. Ichikawa originated the idea of FOAP in MOFA. 

Takaichi also declared that she would take “front-loaded measures” to increase the defense budget to two percent of GDP within FY2025. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida assumed that income tax, corporate tax, and tobacco tax revenues would fund the two percent commitment. Takaichi has yet to adopt that view, and she has not indicated how she would pay for the increase in the defense budget.

As a practical matter, the most important agenda item for the Takaichi administration is how to ensure the survival of her current minority government. Yet, she did not meaningfully address the priority policy of her coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) – a reduction in the number of Diet seats. This reduction was the “absolute condition” for the JIP to enter a coalition with the LDP. In her speech, Takaichi did not mention any reduction at all, instead referring to the policy as social security reform. But it is nothing more to her than a topic to “discuss quickly.” 

Takaichi also omitted any mention of campaign financing reform, namely the prohibition of donations from companies and organizations. The LDP’s resistance to reform was the greatest reason Komeito left the coalition with the LDP. Indeed, far from pursuing reform, Takaichi appointed lawmakers who had been involved in the kickback fund scandal, to positions in her government and on the LDP board. Her indifference to political reform may engender some criticism.