Monday Asia Policy Events, July 14, 2025

DISINFORMATION & MISINFORMATION: CURRENT HAPPENINGS IN JAPAN, THE U.S. AND BEYOND. 7/14, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), 5:30-7:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan. Speakers: Matthew Blomberg Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Journalism, Temple University Japan; John W. Cheng Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Communication, Aoyamagaukin University. 

CAN A GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON HEALTH TAXES FINANCE DEVELOPMENT? 7/14, 1:30-2:30pm (BST), 8:30-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Global Development (CDG). Speakers: Jeremias Paul Jr, Coordinator, Tobacco Control Economics Unit, WHO; N.K. Singh, Former Chairman, Fifteenth Finance Commission of India; Member, Task Force on Fiscal Policy for Health; Moderator: Pete Baker, Deputy Director, Global Health Policy Program and Policy Fellow, CGD.

THE TARIFF DEAL: RECIPROCITY, TRADE BALANCE, AND INDUSTRY. 7/14, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). Speakers: Wendy Cutler, Vice President and Managing Director of the DC Office, Asia Society Policy Institute; Tami Overby, Partner of Government Relations, DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group; Sarah Ahn, Economic Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea; Moderator: Scott Snyder, President and CEO, KEI. 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. 7/14, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Society for International Development, United States Chapter. Speakers: Michael Gubser, Professor of History, James Madison University; Samuel A. Worthington, Author, Prisoners of Hope; Moderator: Anne Simmons-Benton, Co-Head of the U.S. Delegation to the W20 and Principal, Deep Water Point, LLC. 

REIMAGINING EU RESEARCH AND INNOVATION POLICY FOR GLOBAL IMPACT. 7/14, 1:00-2:30pm (CET), 7:00-8:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Centre for European Policy Studies. Speakers: Andrea Renda, Director of Research, Centre for European Policy Studies; Stefaan Verhulst, Co-Founder, GovLab and DataTank; Research Professor, New York University; Lisa Goerlitz, Head, Brussels Office and EU Advocacy, Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevoelkerung (DSW); Sylvia Schwaag Serger, President, Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA); Professor, Lund University; Gunilla Carlsson, Deputy Executive Director, UNAIDS; Former Minister for International Development Cooperation, Sweden; Antoine Mercier, Science and Technology Counsellor, Permanent Representation of France to the EU; Michiel Scheffer, Principal Adviser; President, EIC Board, DG RTD, European Commission; Rosalind Kenny Birch, Second Secretary for Research and Innovation, UK Mission to the EU. 

REPORT LAUNCH: RUSSIA’S FUTURE RULERS. 7/14, 2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Anton Barbashin, Co-founder & Editorial Director, Riddle Russia; Evelyn Farkas, Executive Director, McCain Institute; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, US Department of Defense; Mikhail Zygar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Brian Whitmore, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Assistant Professor of Practice, University of Texas-Arlington.

Japan's Upper House Elections I

Parties Campaign on Three Policy Differences


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 7, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

Japan’s Upper House election season opened on July 3 with the vote to take place on July 20. This election is overwhelmingly about two issues: support of families suffering from price inflation and international relations, specifically with the United States. In addition, the management of political funds by the leading Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) will be front and center for many voters.

Protection against price inflation has largely taken the form of a debate over the consumption tax. Voters are divided over possible measures to reduce price inflation – so the parties have focused on this issue. In an NHK poll in May, 38 percent of respondants favored a consumption tax cut, while just two percent fewer, 36 percent, supported the current consumption tax rate. Eighteen percent wanted to abolish the consumption tax altogether.

Several opposition parties would reduce or eliminate the tax. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) proposes a zero percent consumption tax on food, which is their top priority. The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, insists that the government can eliminate this part of the consumption tax without an impact on government finances that would compel the issuance of new government bonds.

In a debate featuring party leaders at the Japan National Press Club (JNPC) on July 2, Prime Minister Ishiba (the president of the LDP) asked Noda what financial resources would offset the consumption tax cut. Noda pointed to two areas: the surplus in the governmental funds that are reserved for special policy purposes and the foreign exchange fund special account. Noda also said that other, unspecified tax measures could be revised.

The CDPJ has estimated that eliminating the consumption tax on food would reduce tax revenues by five trillion yen a year. Noda said in February that his party had found a 7.8 trillion-yen surplus in governmental funds. He also argued that much more of the government’s profits in foreign exchange could be included in the government’s general account. And he asserted that the special purpose tax on wage increase would increase the government’s revenues by 0.7 trillion yen. In the CDPJ’s view, all these resources would make a consumption tax cut on food feasible.

Taking a different approach, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) calls for halving consumption tax rate (from ten percent to five percent) on all goods on a time-limited basis. The cut would continue until the growth in workers’ wages exceeds consumer price inflation. But the party has not identified as specific budgetary resource for this tax reduction as what the CDPJ listed.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) favors another route: reducing the consumption tax rate on all goods to five percent before taking it to zero. But the party has not announced when the consumption tax will be repealed. Reiwa Shinsengumi, a small party with liberal policies, says that the government can offset these rate cuts by raising other tax rates and issuing government bonds.

The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) does not look to the consumption tax rate to protect against the effects of inflation but rather focuses on reducing premium for social insurance.

In lieu of any changes to tax rates, the LDP and Komeito propose to distribute twenty thousand yen to everyone and an additional twenty thousand yen for each child or a low-income family. The parties dismiss consumption tax rate reductions as unviable. To that point, in the debate at the JNPC, the chief representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, asked Noda about what would happen when the government resumes the current consumption tax rate, which in a sense becomes a tax increase. Noda did not provide a clear answer.

Turning to international relations, the opposition parties are critical of Ishiba’s management of foreign affairs. Just a few days before the start of election campaign, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed his frustration with the bilateral tariff negotiations between the U.S. and Japan. “Dear Mr. Japan, here’s the story: You’re going to pay a 25 percent on your cars,” said Trump. He also complained about the small amount of Japan’s imports of American rice, particularly given the rice shortage in the Japanese market.

In a mixed message yesterday, July 7, Trump sent a letter to Ishiba, saying that a 25 percent tariff on all Japanese goods would apply on August 1 unless the countries reach an agreement before then. Trump had previously set a deadline of July 9 for the conclusion of tariff negotiations, so his letter extends the negotiating timeline. Interestingly, the deadline is ten days after the election.

In the JNPC debate, Noda asked Ishiba how he planned to resolve these negotiations. Ishiba did not specify a way forward but stressed that Japan’s unique position as the biggest national investor and biggest job creator in the U.S. “The success of Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel means that they can deliver good products with their technology and U.S. Steel’s labor force. I think our position with the U.S. is more about investment than tariffs,” Ishiba said. When Noda recommended another summit talk with Trump as soon as possible, Ishiba simply repeated that he would protect the national interests of Japan.

The Trump administration has demanded that Japan increase its defense budget to cover the costs of expanding its military and of hosting the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan. At the JNPC debate, the Chairwoman of the Japan Communist Party, Tomoko Tamura, observed that a swollen military budget would not be compatible with social security policies. When Ishiba rejected Tamura’s argument for failing to recognize Japan’s security situation, Tamura accused Ishiba of ignoring suffering families.

On another foreign policy note, the debate covered Trump’s recent reference to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Trump compared those events to the recent U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities as tactics that ended a war. (In the case of Iran, a ceasefire would count as an ending.) Ishiba refrained from criticizing Trump. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, rejected the comparison.

The greatest single reason for the LDP’s major defeat in the Lower House election last October was the party’s mismanagement of political funds. That weakness remains. Ishiba failed to reach a consensus with the opposition parties on the regulation of donations from companies and organizations during the ordinary session of the Diet. The issue surely will weigh in the voters’ decision later this month.

The opposition parties have different views on the question of political donations. The Japan Innovation Party urges a total ban on corporate and organizational donations, while the CDPJ would allow donations from some organizations. The DPP fundamentally opposes any ban on donations. As seen in their mistake of fielding multiple candidates in single-seat districts such as Nara, Shiga or Fukui, the fragmentation of the opposition parties may help the LDP.

Monday Asia Policy Events, July 7, 2025

IS THE DOLLAR IN DANGER? 7/7, Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy. Speakers: Kenneth Rogoff, Author, Our Dollar, Your Problem; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy. 

STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 2025. 7/7, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Energy Security & Climate Change Program, CSIS. Speakers: Nick Wayth, CEO, Energy Institute; Daniel Yergin, Vice Chairman, S&P Global; Angie Gildea, ENR Regional Co-Leader for Americas, KPMG in the U.S.; Joseph Majkut, Director, Energy Security and Climate Change Program. 

RULE OF LAW IN CHINA, 10 YEARS AFTER THE 709 CRACKDOWN. 7/7, 2:00–3:00 pm (EDT), ONLINE. Sponsor: Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS. Speakers: Henrietta Levin, Senior Fellow and Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS; Nicholas Bequelin, Research Scholar in Law and Senior Fellow, Yale Law School; Jonathan Czin, Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings; Donald C. Clarke, David Weaver Research Professor Emeritus of Law, GW Law School; Yaqiu (Rachel) Wang, Chinese Human Rights Researcher and Advocate. 

ADM DENNIS BLAIR - US NATIONAL SECURITY AND WORLD AFFAIRS. 7/7, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Speaker: ADM Dennis Blair, former Commander in Chief, US Pacific Command. 

Lobbying Trump's Tariffs

Tariff-related lobbying surged in the first quarter of 2025

By Leonardo Pini, OpenSecrets, July 1, 2025

Throughout the 2024 campaign, Donald Trump touted the financial windfall to be reaped if the United States were to impose a series of revenue-raising tariffs. Since returning to office, the president has followed through on that promise — but has rescinded or reduced some tariffs and faced multiple court challenges threatening to derail his economic agenda.

As companies, investors and trading partners grapple to keep up with the constantly shifting tariff landscape, one industry has seen a big boost to its bottom line: the lobbying sector, which experienced a surge in tariff-related work in the first quarter of 2025.

In the first three months of this year, lobbyists represented 215 clients on tariff issues, according to lobbying disclosure reports studied by OpenSecrets. In all of 2024, lobbyists handled tariff work for just 120 clients. And it’s not just the number of clients signed — lobbyists stepped up their work on those contracts, filing 1,707 reports on tariff work in the first quarter of 2025. That puts them on track to surpass last year’s total of 5,679. 

If they keep up that pace, they would surpass the number of reports filed in 2018 and come closer to the 2019 total, when Trump implemented tariffs in his first term. 

Most active lobbyists

• One of the industries that has had a difficult time navigating the strategy behind Trump’s trade war has been pharmaceuticals. In recent weeks, Trump has threatened to impose tariffs on medicines as part of a broader strategy to manufacture more drugs domestically. As a result, amongst the companies that have increased their lobbying spending the most from Q1 2024 to Q1 2025 we can find major organizations like the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacture of America, Ely Lilly and Apotex. PhRMA increased its spending from $9.8 million to almost $13 million. Ely Lilly boosted its spending from $1.9 million to $3.5 million. Apotex’s expenses surged from $140,000 to $810,000, as the company spent more in Q1 2025 than all of 2024.
• The three companies have lobbied on significantly different issues. Apotex has lobbied to exempt pharmaceutical products from becoming part of the broader trade war launched by the Trump administration. Eli Lilly has lobbied mostly on intellectual property, access to markets through trade negotiations and general issues related to tariffs and trade talks with Japan, the European Union, China, India, the United Kingdom and Brazil. Some of the issues PhRMA has been focusing on regard intellectual property as well tariffs policy related to the pharmaceutical sector and section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which gives the president powers to take actions against unfair trade practices. 
• One of the companies more active on lobbying on tariffs has been Hawaii Gas, which had not reported any lobbying activity in previous years. The company lobbied on issues related to the imports of propane from Canada. Propane and energy products are protected by the USMCA (U.S.-Mexico-Canada) trade agreement. It spent $40,000 in Q1 2025 on that and more general issues related to tariffs on Canada. 
• Nike Inc. and Adidas AG, amongst the biggest apparel companies in the world, are amongst the companies that offshore their production the most, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, set to be hit hard by Trump’s tariffs. Both companies have boosted their lobbying expenditures: Nike went from $410,000 in Q1 2024 to $630,000 in Q1 2025, while Adidas went from $10,000 to $27,000. According to the Budget Lab at Yale University, tariffs could spike clothing and textiles price lines by 17 percent. Nike lobbied mostly on policies that could result in adversary foreign tariffs and goods imported from China. Adidas filed only one report in 2025 regarding tariffs. 
• General Motors also reported a huge spike in lobbying expenditures in the first quarter, with trade being one of the top priorities. The automotive giant has surged its lobbying expenses from $4.8 million in Q1 2024 to $8.2 million in Q1 2025, a 69 percent increase. Amongst the most pressing issues for the company are non-tariff trade barriers, USCMA and the international auto supply chain. The company has also said that tariffs will cost it up to $5 billion. 
• Apple has been a target for Trump for some time, as he tries to compel the tech giant to bring its manufacturing to the United States, saying recently that he has “a little problem with Tim Cook.” Trade-related issues has been one of the main focuses for the company, filing three reports regarding trade in the first quarter of 2025. Reports touch on different issues such as U.S. competitiveness in global markets and reintroduction of the American Innovation and Choice Act and/or the Open App Markets Act. The company,  headquartered in Cupertino, California, has increased its lobbying efforts from $2.1 million in Q1 2024  to $2.5 million in Q1 2025. 
• Paper Excellence, a North-American pulp and paper company, has increased its lobbying expenses on tariffs by 237 percent between Q1 2024 and Q1 2025. The company went from $80,000 in the first quarter of last year to $270,000 in the first quarter of this year. It filed different reports on tariffs: one regarding the miscellaneous tariff bill, one regarding general discussions on the impact of tariffs and one regarding section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. 
• Two aluminum companies — Century Aluminum and Aluminum Association — also reported a spike in lobbying on tariffs. The latter went from $80,000 in Q1 2024 to $230,000 in Q1 2025, lobbying mostly on aluminum trade and tariffs issues. Century Aluminum went from $119,000 to $229,000. It lobbied on section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gives the president powers to adjust imports of certain goods if there’s a concern for national security. Century Aluminum also lobbied to support the effort of the administration to increase tariffs on imports of steel and aluminum from China. In June 2025, Trump announced an increase of tariffs on those products from 25 percent to 50 percent. 

Why does it matter?

U.S. and international companies are trying to keep up with the administration’s shifting tariff policies, knowing any changes would impact supply chains, production lines, the cost of putting together a product or offering a service, and therefore the final cost consumers will pay. 

According to the Budget Lab at Yale University “the price level from all 2025 tariffs rises by 2.3% in the short-run, the equivalent of an average per household consumer loss of $3,800 in 2024$. Annual losses for households at the bottom of the income distribution are $1,700.”

And it’s not just big companies and their consumers that are going to pay the price of Trump’s decisions. Small businesses are also affected by the scale of these measures and the on-again, off-again policies. 

No Gains for Ishiba in the 12-Day War

But not a “survival-threatening situation"

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun. You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 30, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

The military conflict between Israel and Iran, in which the United States became directly involved, has been a real source of anxiety for Japan. Not only did Japan worry about the impact on its economy if Iran moved to block the Strait of Hormuz, but it also had to keep its distance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The conflict, which the U.S. President Donald Trump has called the 12-day war, reminded Japan about the cost of its alliance with the U.S.
 
Israel launched military attacks on nuclear sites in Iran on June 13 and killed Iranian military leaders. Iran immediately struck back on cities in Israel, including Tel Aviv, causing some deaths. After days of deliberation, Trump launched a military operation on June 21, bombing three nuclear facilities in Iran with a weapon called the “bunker buster.” On June 24, Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran, but it has been an uneasy time for both countries.
 
The Ishiba administration criticized Israel for its attack on Iran early in June. “The use of military means amid the ongoing diplomatic efforts, including U.S.-Iran talks aimed at the peaceful resolution of the Iran’s nuclear issue, is completely unacceptable and deeply regrettable,” said the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takeshi Iwaya, in a statement on June 13.
 
Japan changed its view, however, after the U.S. bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities. “Amidst the extremely difficult circumstances surrounding Iran’s nuclear issue, the United States has been seriously pursuing dialogue, and Japan understands that the U.S. action demonstrates its determination to de-escalate the situation while preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons,” said Iwaya in another statement on June 23.
 
While Japan regards Israel’s attacks on Iran as a violation of international law, it nevertheless “understood” the U.S. attacks that supported Israel.  Anticipating a push-back from within Japan about a double standard of diplomacy, Ishiba said in a press conference that “it is difficult for us to make a fixed assessment in terms of international law.”
 
Ishiba meanwhile stressed that Japan depended on the Middle East for over 90 percent of its oil imports. According to data from the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in 2021, 86.7 percent of Japan’s energy came from fossil fuels, of which 37.7 percent was oil. Middle Eastern crude oil accounted for 92.5 percent of oil supplies in Japan for that year. Oil from the Middle East thus is essential for Japan.
 
The most serious concern in Japan was the possibility that Iran would block the Strait of Hormuz, through which most Middle East oil tankers pass. When former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reinterpreted Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan in 2015, his administration said that a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would constitute a ” triggering Japan’s collective self-defense right.
 
If Iran were to block the strait, if the U.S. were to ask Japan to send minesweepers, and if Japan were to do so, Iran could claim that Japan had entered the war. In a discussion on June 23 of this risk, the Chief of the Policy Research Council of the Liberal Democratic Party (and formerly the Minister of Defense in the Abe Cabinet), Itsunori Onodera, concluded that the situation in the strait did not yet threaten Japan’s survival for the purpose of Article 9.   
 
Also on June 23, the Israel-Iran conflict caused a rise in gasoline prices in Japan for the first time in nine weeks. The opposition parties showed unusual unity in pushing for gasoline tax reductions at the last moment of the ordinary session of the Diet. If the prices remain high in the coming weeks, it may have a negative political impact on the Ishiba administration, with the Upper House election scheduled for late July.
 
Recognizing the possibility that the conflict could affect Japan’s security, Ishiba was reluctant to become involved in the politics among the Western powers. He cancelled the leaders’ meeting of NATO in the Hague, Netherlands, as other Asian partners from South Korea, Australia, New Zealand also withdrew. Although NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte praised Trump’s decision to strike Iran, Japan was not ready to stand together with the U.S. President who had been demanding that Japan significantly increase its defense budget.
 
Trump unexpectedly drew a parallel between the U.S. strikes on Iran and the atomic bombing of Japan in August 1945. “I don’t want to use an example of Hiroshima, I don’t want to use an example of Nagasaki, but that was essentially the same thing. That ended that war,” said Trump at his meeting with Rutte.
 
The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, decried Trump’s remarks. “I do not approve of his statement, which would justify dropping atomic bombs. Our stance on nuclear weapons is that it is an absolute evil,” Saito told Ishiba. Ishiba said that he felt the same way.  Developments in the Middle East have only underscored Ishiba’s political weakness.  Ishiba has been unable to gain any political advantage from Trump’s agenda for peace through strength.

Monday Asia Policy Events, June 30, 2025

PARTNERS OR RIVALS? AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF INTERESTS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 6/30, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Dr. Alexander Korolev, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations in the School of Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, at the University of New South Wales, Sydney; Thomas J. Shattuck, Fellow in the Eurasia Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute; Colonel (Retired) Robert E. Hamilton, Ph.D., Head of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s Eurasia Program. 

BOOK TALK: THE GREAT POWERS, AND IRAN’S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EVOLUTION. 6/30, Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Speakers: author Shireen Hunter, Honorary Fellow, Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Moderator: Roxane Farmanfarmaian, Non-resident Fellow, Quincy Institute, Director, International Studies and Global Politics, University of Cambridge Institute for Continuing Education. PURCHASE BOOK

BOLSTERING THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AT A GLOBAL INFLECTION POINT. 6/30, 2:45–4:00 pm (EET), 7:45–9:00 am (EDT), ONLINE. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Frederick Kempe, President and Chief Executive Officer, Atlantic Council; Michael Dickerson, Chargé d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Romania; H.E. Cătălin Predoiu, Deputy Prime Minister of Romania; Minister Cristian Diaconescu, Presidential Adviser, Department of National Security, Chancellery of the President of Romania; H.E. Alexandru Nazare, Minister of Finance of Romania; H.E. Oana-Silvia Țoiu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania; Landon Derentz, Vice President, Energy and Infrastructure, and Senior Director, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council; Jörn Fleck, Senior Director, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Catalina Dodu, Partner and Cybersecurity Leader, EY Romania; Antonia Colibasanu, Senior Geopolitical Analyst, Geopolitical Futures; Ambassador Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Atlantic Council; Olga Khakova, Deputy Director, European Energy Security, Atlantic Council.

WHAT DO STRIKES ON IRAN MEAN FOR CHINA, RUSSIA, AND NORTH KOREA? 6/30, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair; Mona Yacoubian, Senior Adviser and Director, Middle East Program; Maria Snegovaya, Senior Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Brian Hart, Deputy Director and Fellow, China Power Project. 

INSIGHTS INTO OPERATION RISING LION. 6/30, 3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: IDF BG Effie Defrin, Head, IDF Spokesperson's Unit; Former JINSA Visiting Fellow; Dr. Michael Makovsky, President and CEO, JINSA. 

MYANMAR’S POST-QUAKE ECONOMIC REALITIES. 6/30, 3:00-4:00am (EDT), 3:00-4:00pm (SGT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS). Speakers: Vicky Bowman, Director, Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business (MCRB), Senior Adviser, Institute for Human Rights and Business; Thet Zaw Htwe, Head, Policy and Strategy, EuroCham Myanmar. 

G7 READOUT: IMPLICATIONS OF THE KANANASKIS SUMMIT FOR JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH US AND CANADA. 6/30, 7:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: International House of Japan; American Friends of the International House of Japan. Speakers: Jonathan Berkshire Miller, Co-Founder and Principal, Pendulum Geopolitical Advisory; Emma Chanlett-Avery, Deputy Director and Director for Political-Security Affairs, Asia Society Policy Institute, Washington, DC Office; Kristi Govella, Associate Professor, University of Oxford; Matthew Millar, Chairman and CEO, The Millar Group; Joshua Walker, President and CEO, Japan Society; Ken Jimbo, Managing Director, International House of Japan; Moderator: David Janes, Vice President, North America, International House of Japan.

GREEN TECHNOLOGIES - DECARBONIZING DEVELOPMENT IN EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC. 6/30, 9:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: World Bank. Speakers: Martin Raiser, Vice President, South Asia, World Bank Group; Francesca de Nicola, Senior Economist, International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group; Arnunchanog Sakondhavat, Director, Macroeconomic Strategy and Planning Office, NESDC, Thailand; Trang Thu Tran, Senior Economist, International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group; Liew Chin Tong, Deputy Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry Malaysia; Moderator: Aaditya Mattoo, Chief Economist, East Asia and Pacific, World Bank group. 

Japan's Ordinary Diet Session Ends

Japan’s PM Ishiba Survives the Ordinary Diet Session 2025


By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 23, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

The Ordinary Session of the Diet closed on June 22. Despite the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP’s) minority in the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba survived: the Diet passed the FY2025 budget bill by the end of March, and Ishiba avoided a no-confidence resolution. As he had to make concessions to the opposition parties, Ishiba failed to complete parts of his agenda such as political funds control and the separate surname system. The vulnerability of Ishiba’s position may affect the coming Upper House election in July.

The recently concluded session was the first time in over thirty years that the leading parties had to deal with a minority government in the House of Representatives. The last time was in 1994 when an anti-LDP coalition led by Tsutomu Hata lost its majority when the Socialist Party’s seceded from the coalition government. In the ordinary session this year, the LDP and its partner Komeito were able to accommodate enough policy concerns of some opposition parties to gain a majority to pass the FY2025 budget. The budget was the critical issue in the first half of the session.

Although Ishiba was at first not able to find an opposition party to vote for the budget, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) eventually offered a helping hand. This support came after Ishin, the LDP, and Komeito reached a deal to add support for high school tuition to the bill. The Diet enacted the bill in the nick of time, by the end of March when FY2024 ended.

Ishin’s co-leader in charge of Diet affairs, Seiji Maehara, who had been the head of a small party advocating free education before joining Ishin last October, paved the way for the deal. Maehara was a minister in the administration of Democratic Party of Japan (2009-2012) when Ishiba was the policy chief of the LDP, which was then an opposition party. Maehara and Ishiba had debated policy in the Diet and have maintained their personal relationship since then.

Maehara also played a key role in the second half of the ordinary session. It is not unusual for the opposition parties to consider a no-confidence resolution at the end of a session. Maehara blocked this adventure. As the leader of one of the major opposition parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, was reaching a final decision whether to move forward with the resolution, Maehara announced that he thought Ishiba would dissolve the Lower House and go to a double election of both Houses as soon as a no-confidence resolution bill was submitted.

The Constitution of Japan states that the prime minister must resign when the Diet passes a "non"-confidence resolution -- unless the Lower House is dissolved. Maehara said that Ishiba would immediately dissolve the Lower House as soon as a no-confidence resolution bill was submitted without waiting for a House vote on the resolution. The Constitution empowers the prime minister to dissolve the Lower House at any time.

Noda ultimately refrained from the submission of a no-confidence resolution bill, afraid of a political vacancy brought by the double election at a particularly uncertain time in Japan and the world. That is, the security situation in the Middle East is worsening, tariff negotiations with the Trump administration are dragging on, and rice prices in Japan are highly volatile.

Ishiba cannot be said to have been successful in pushing his agenda through the Diet session. He failed to make good on his promise to enact legislation on political donations from companies and organizations by the end of March. Five opposition parties and the LDP each submitted bills to revise the Political Funds Control Act. But none of them garnered majority support. The bill was postponed to the next session.

Other items fell by the wayside. The LDP could not conclude internal discussion over creating a separate surname system for married couples, although the opposition parties were ready for it. The party also failed to wrap up debate on stable succession to the Imperial Throne, an issue that the Speakers of both Houses had hoped to enact legislation by the end of this Diet session. The conservatives in the LDP were reluctant to change rules for surnames and royal succession.

The failures may affect the Upper House election, which will take place July 20. In the recent election of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly (June 22), the LDP lost a considerable number of seats due to voters’ complaints about mismanagement of political funds. In the absence of substantial support for the LDP, opposition parties were able to scoop up votes, but the results did not show that voters favored a particular party over the others. By all appearances, Ishiba has yet to establish a stable voter base for the Upper House elections, which will determine his administration’s fate. 

Monday Asia Policy Events June 23, 2025

THE US-JAPAN PARTNERSHIP IN THE NEW ERA. 6/23, 2:00-3:30pm (JST), 1:00am (EDT). HYBRID. Sponsor: Nikkei Global Events, The Asia Group. Speakers: Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who oversaw Asia policy during the Biden presidency; former Deputy National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger, involved in Asia diplomacy in the first Trump administration; and former National Security Advisor Takeo Akiba, who long guided Japan's diplomacy.

THE NEXT DECADE: SHAPING THE FUTURE OF US-ROK NUCLEAR COOPERATION. 6/23-24 (KST), HYBRID. Sponsors: Atlantic Council; Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power. Speakers Include: Matt Bowen, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, University of Columbia School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA); Scott Campbell, President, Howard Baker Forum; Sungyeol Choi, Associate Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Seoul National University; Bumjin Chung, Professor, Department of Nuclear Engineering, Kyung Hee University.

ENERGY SECURITY AND THE ISRAEL-IRAN WAR. 6/23, 9:00-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Clayton Seigle, Senior Fellow and James R. Schlesinger Chair in Energy and Geopolitics, Energy Security and Climate Change Program; Adi Imsirovic, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program; Raad Alkadiri, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Energy Security and Climate Change Program.

US ATTACKS IRAN: ISRAEL IRAN CONFLICT UPDATE. 6/23, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: General Joseph L. Votel, US Army, Retired, Distinguished Military Fellow, Middle East Institute; Daniel Benaim, Associate Fellow, Middle East Institute; Colby Connelly, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute.

SPACE FORCE INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP STRATEGY: A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH AIR MARSHAL PAUL GODFREY. 6/23, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Air Marshal Paul Godfrey, Assistant Chief of Space Operations for Future Concepts and Partnerships, United States Space Force; Sarah Mineiro, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Aerospace Security Project, CSIS.

DIGITAL TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY REFORM IN EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC. 6/23, 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: WTO. Speakers: Aaditya Mattoo, Chief Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank; Alessandro Barattieri, Senior Economist, East Asia and Pacific Region, World Bank.

OPERATION MIDNIGHT HAMMER: U.S. STRIKES AGAINST IRAN'S NUCLEAR SITES. 6/23, 3:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Yaakov Amidror, JINSA Distinguished Fellow; Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Yaacov Ayish, Senior Vice President for Israeli Affairs, Julian & Jenny Josephson; Israel Defense Forces MG (ret.) Amikam Norkin, JINSA Distinguished Fellow; John Hannah, Randi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow, JINSA.

CENTRAL ASIAN FIGHTERS AND GLOBAL JIHAD. 6/23, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL .Sponsor: Center for the National Interest. Speakers: Dr. Gavin Helf, Adjunct Professor, Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies (CERES), Georgetown University; Dr. Asfandyar Mir, Senior Fellow for South Asia, Stimson Center; Dr. Noah Tucker, Senior Research Consultant, Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs. 

USING LABOUR MIGRATION TO SUPPORT EUROPE’S GREEN TRANSITION. 6/23, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Center for Global Development; Fragmen. Speakers: Gemma Hyslop, Director, Fragomen; Nina Vafaee, Global Mobility Immigration Manager, RWE. 

THE HOUSE FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE AGENDA: A CONVERSATION WITH REPRESENTATIVE FRENCH HILL (R-AR). 6/23, 2:00–3:00 pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speaker: Rep. French Hill, Chair, House Financial Services Committee. Moderator; Nellie Liang, Senior Fellow, Brookings; fmr. U.S. Treasury Undersecretary for Domestic Finance. 

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICAL TENSIONS ON GLOBAL SEMICONDUCTOR SUPPLY CHAINS. 6/23, 10:00–11:30 am (SGT), 10:00–11:30 pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Speaker: Professor Archanun Kohpaiboon, Visiting Senior Fellow, ISEAS, Professor, Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University. 

BOOK TALK: THE SENKAKU ISLANDS CONFRONTATION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE. 6/23, Noon-1:30pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS), Temple University, Japan Campus. Speaker: author Dr. Paul Midford, Professor, Political Science, Meiji Gakuin University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/43ZcfD0

Japan's Science Council Politicized

Transformation of Japan’s National Academy through Governmental Oversight

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.

The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 16, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

On June 11, Japan’s Diet enacted a law to convert the Science Council of Japan (SCJ) from an independent consultative body to a special public corporation with stronger governmental oversight. The new law enables the Japanese government to participate in the selection of the council’s new members.

The Council historically has represented Japan’s scientific community. The new law takes effect in October 2026. The changes to the Council’s membership are controversial: some scholars are adamantly opposed, dubbing the law the “SCJ Control Act.”

The SCJ was established in 1949 as a special organization of the government of Japan to provide a scientific perspective on government actions. “Based on a belief that science constructs the basis of cultural state, SCJ is hereby established with consensus of scientists, upholding mission of peaceful reconstruction of our country, contributing welfare of human society, and supporting academic progress connected with world academy,” as the current SCJ Act states.

The Japan Academy (Nippon Gakushi-in) is another government-authorized academic organization. The Meiji government established Gakushi-in in 1879 to reward scientists who had made outstanding scientific breakthroughs. While the members of Gakushi-in have life-time membership, SCJ is limited to 210 members, who are frequently replaced.

One unusual decision of a prime minister in 2020 prompted proposals to reform the SCJ. Then Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga rejected six scientists as new members of the SCJ. The SCJ Act provides that the prime minister appoints the members of the SCJ based on recommendations from the council. Former prime ministers had previously approved all members recommended by the council as a matter of course. The six scientists rejected in 2020 were known to be critical of some government policies, and they are not the members of the SCJ up until now.

In March 2025, the government of Japan submitted the bill for the new law to replace current SCJ Act. Reflecting the view of the leading parties, mainly conservative ones, that a government organization contribute to the government, the bill stripped from the SCJ its status as a special organization in the Cabinet Office, which makes independent decisions and receives sufficient financial support.

The new law includes provisions to establish new sections in the council. They include a Member Candidate Selection Committee, a Selection Advisory Committee, and a Management Advisory Committee. The law requires the SCJ to abide by various conditions in selection of new members. In addition, the law sets up an SCJ Evaluation Committee in the Cabinet Office. This committee will evaluate SCJ’s annual self-assessment report on its activities, as well as reviewing the mid-term plans of the council.

The SCJ argued that the law should maintain the SCJ as a national academy in its statement in April. The statement proposed five elements necessary for the SCJ to be a true national academy: status as an academic representative of the state, public qualification, a stable financial base in the form of funding in the government’s budget, independence from government regulation of its activities, and autonomy and independence in selecting members.

Six former presidents of the SCJ issued a statement in May that the SCJ Act would not include those five elements and urged that the bill be abandoned.. They recommended maintenance of a cooptation system in the selection of new members, arguing that the new law would erode the SCJ’s academic independence with the government’s intervention in the management of the council.

The government never explained, even in the Diet discussion, why former prime minister Suga rejected the six scientists as new members in 2020. It merely repeated that the new law would guarantee higher independence and autonomy. Although the leading coalition, the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito, did not have a majority in the Lower House, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) joined them in passing the bill in the Lower House on May 13 and the Upper House on June 11.

At a press conference after the bill passed the Diet, one of the six former presidents who opposed the bill, Juichi Yamagiwa, the former President of Kyoto University, labeled the new law the “SCJ Disorganization Law.” “The reason for Suga’s rejection has not made clear and the law entails stricter control on academism,” said Yamagiwa.

The Suga administration was a loyal successor to the Shinzo Abe administration. Abe worked aggressively for constitutional amendment, but in the face of criticism by liberal scholars, his efforts failed. It is likely that the conservative lawmakers and the loyalist bureaucrats close to Abe were frustrated with the academic community in Japan.

Knowing that Suga’s rejection of the six scientists was an arbitrary decision against liberal scholars, they might have thought that they could control the SCJ by reviving the law. They did not choose a course of correcting Suga’s decision. Today’s Japanese government, not unlike the Trump administration in the U.S., appears not to appreciate scholarly advice from experienced scientists on national policies.

Monday Asia Policy Events, June 16, 2025

ASSESSING IRANIAN, U.S., AND GULF REACTIONS AND OPTIONS FOLLOWING ISRAEL’S UNPRECEDENTED ATTACK ON IRAN. 6/16, 9:00-10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Ali Alfoneh, Senior Fellow, AGSI; Kristin Smith Diwan, Senior Resident Scholar, AGSI; Robin Mills, Non-Resident Fellow, AGSI. 

A CLOSER LOOK: RECENT SHIFTS IN THE U.S. SANCTIONS LANDSCAPE. 6/16, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Washington Foreign Law Society. Speakers: David Tannenbaum, Director, Blackstone Compliance Services; Manny Levitt, Associate, Holland & Knight; Moderator: Andrew McAllister, Partner, Holland & Knight. 

KOREA-JAPAN RELATIONS: WHAT TO EXPECT? 6/16, 9:30-10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Christopher B. Johnstone, Partner & Chair of the Defense & National Security Practice, The Asia Group; Yuki Tatsumi, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the Japan Program, Stimson Center; Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Korea Chair, CSIS; Mark Lippert, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Korea Chair, CSIS. 

A REDRAWN MIDDLE EAST? 6/16, 10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speakers: Vali Nasr, Professor, Johns Hopkins University; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy. 

THE VIEW FROM INDONESIA. 6/16, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speaker: Dino Patti Djalal, Former vice minister for foreign affairs, Indonesia. 

BOOK TALK: THE GREAT TRADE HACK: HOW TRUMP’S TRADE WAR FAILS AND THE WORLD MOVES ON. 6/16, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speaker: author Richard Baldwin, Nonresident Senior Fellow, PIIE, Professor, International Economics, IMD Business School, Founder, Editor-in-Chief, VoxEU.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4mHk5JT

BOOK TALK: CHILD WELFARE AND PROBLEMS OF WELL-BEING IN JAPAN. 6/16, 6:30pm (JST) 5:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at Temple University, Japan Campus; Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: Kathryn Goldfarb, Associate Professor, University of Colorado Boulder.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3ZmKT8s

INAUGURAL LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN LECTURE ON LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL WILLIAM BARR. 6/16, 4:00-5:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute. Speaker: William Barr, former US Attorney General; Moderator: Adam J. White, Laurence H. Silberman Chair, Constitutional Governance, American Enterprise Institute. 

RUSSIA'S INFORMATION CONFRONTATION DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE – INTENT, EVOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS. 6/16, 9:30-11:00am (BST), 4:30–6:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Speaker: Julia Voo, Senior Fellow for Cyber Power and Future Conflict, IISS. 

The Republic of Korea’s New Leader and Japan

Will Cooperation Continue? Maybe

By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun. The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 9, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point

A major question in Japan is whether Japan can get along with South Korea’s new progressive leader, LEE Jae-myung, who once called Japan an “enemy country.” At present the Japanese government has no explicit differences with Korea’s Democratic Party (KDP). The KDP has so far avoided discussing Japan, especially on the history issues that have long divided the two countries. The current optimism about relations between the two countries reflects changes in each country’s domestic politics and national security policies. The history issues have not been resolved, however.

It is broadly recognized in Japan that the bilateral relationship between Japan and South Korea improved under the leadership of YOON Suk Yeol, Lee’s predecessor. Yoon was, however, impeached after his abrupt declaration of martial law last December. Yoon’s decision to compensate Koreans for wartime forced labor without seeking contributions from Japanese corporations silenced conservatives in Japan who had advocated for a hard line against Korean progressives. The greatest concern in Japan now is that Korea may go back to the time before Yoon – and reopen old wounds.

Lee refrained from negative remarks about Japan in his presidential campaign. Right after his victory, he even suggested that he would maintain the bilateral relationship forged by Yoon. “Policy coherence is especially important in managing relations between nations,” Lee said on the day he was sworn into office.

The Trump Administration’s tariff policy necessitates that South Korea make common cause with Japan. Moreover, to deal with North Korea, which is expanding its missile and nuclear capability and enhancing its ties to Russia, Lee will pursue “pragmatic diplomacy:” adjusting Korea’s foreign policies to account for the latest developments in international affairs. Japan and the U.S. are likely to be at the heart of Lee’s approach.

The Prime Minister of Japan, Shigeru Ishiba, congratulated Lee on his victory. “This is the year of 60th anniversary from diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea, and I want to vitalize exchanges including non-governmental relationship. Enhancing cooperation between Japan and South Korea, or with the U.S., has a significance, as Japan shares such common issues as low birth rate, demographic concentration to the capital, and an alliance with America,” Ishiba said. He hopes for early meeting with Lee in the nature of “shuttle diplomacy.”

Ishiba and Lee had a telephone talk on June 9, in which Ishiba said he hoped to promote bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea based on the common ground the both countries had built. Both leaders emphasized the importance of cooperation in their bilateral relations, or their trilateral one including the United States, given the severe strategic environment.

Ishiba’s observations about common – and troubling – demographic conditions warrant serious attention. With respect to low birth rates, according to the Vital Statistics of Japan, the fertility rate (the number of babies that a woman delivers in her lifetime) was 1.15 in 2024, a year in which Japan hit a record low with fewer than 700,000 births. The situation is even more dire in the South Korea, which has the lowest fertility rate in the world: 0.75 in 2024. As to population trends, the capitals of Japan and the ROK are expanding at the expense of rural areas. Tokyo recorded the greatest population increase in 2024, while most of the other prefectures lost residents. In South Korea, half of the population lives in Seoul.

Beyond demographics, Japan and South Korea have common national security interests, which bring the United States into the picture. To protect its security environment, which is affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and to protect against China’s advances, Japan has been reinforcing its multilateral arrangements for security cooperation with like-minded countries in the region.

The security frameworks of both Japan and South Korea are based on alliances with the U.S. In his policy speech to the Diet last January, Ishiba extolled the leadership of Japan and the U.S. in building multi-layered regional security networks, including the Japan-U.S.-India-Australia, Japan-U.S.-South Korea and Japan-U.S.-Philippines. For South Korea’s part, Lee said that he would “pursue pragmatic diplomacy with neighboring countries and boost trilateral Seoul-Washington-Tokyo cooperation.”

Bilateral relations between Japan and South Korea fell to their lowest point since World War II under the respective leaderships of Shinzo Abe in Japan and Moon Jae-in South Korea. That fall stemmed in large part from Abe’s revisionist view on history issues. Specifically, on the mobilization of “comfort women,” Abe in 2007 denied that Japanese officials had engaged in “coercion in narrow definition,” while emphasizing that brokers (that is, parties outside the government) had conducted “coercion in broad definition.”

Although Moon’s predecessor, Park Geun-hye, agreed with the Abe administration on a “final and irreversible” settlement of the comfort woman claims in December 2015, Moon was skeptical about the validity of the agreement. In fact, the relevant document was unique, unsigned, and unratified and existed only as two different “announcements” at a “joint press occasion.” In the absence of a conventional agreement, South Korean courts have continued to order Japan to compensate Korea’s former comfort women.

Yoon and Fumio Kishida ended the personal rivalry between the leadership of the two countries. However, domestic developments may cause Lee to take a hard line on the comfort woman issue. Even the dispute over wartime forced labor can reappear, if potential frustration against Japan grows among the people in South Korea. In 2018 and 2023, South Korea's Supreme Court dismissed the argument of Japanese corporations that compensation over the wartime forced labor was all settled.

Both countries also continue to dispute control over Takeshima Island (Dokdo in Korean). Meaningful cooperation with South Korea on national security matters will require the Ishiba administration to settle decades-long disputes over compensation of World War II comfort women and the conflicting territorial claims.