Monday Asia Events November 25, 2024

SUPER ACTIVE AGEING SOCIETY CONFERENCE. 11/25, 9:00am-6:00pm (JST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Nikkei; Novartis; Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking; Relive. Speakers Include Keizo Takemi, Member of the House of Councillors, former Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan; Juan Pablo Uribe, Global Director for Health, Nutrition, and Population and the Global Financing Facility, World Bank; Hidenori Arai, President, National Center for Geriatrics and Gerontology. 

DIFFICULT DECISIONS: ALLIES’ PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY. 11/25, 9:00-10:15am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Injoo Sohn, Professor, Seoul National University; Chaesung Chun, Professor, Seoul National University; Victor Cha, CSIS; Bonny Lin, CSIS; Steve Tsang, SOAS. 

BOMBING TO PROVOKE: ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND DRONES AS INSTRUMENTS OF FEAR AND COERCION. 11/25, 11:00-12:15pm (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jaganath Sankaran, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Sarah Kreps, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Bruce Riedel, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy. 

WINNING THE GREAT POWER COMPETITION WITH MATT POTTINGER AND MICHAEL SOBOLIK. 11/25, 11:30am-12:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Matt Pottinger, Chairman of the China Program, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution.; Michael Sobolik, Senior Fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies, American Foreign Policy Council.

A CONVERSATION WITH PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR CAROL SPAHN. 11/25, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Carol Spahn, Director, Peace Corps, US; Charles Edel, Senior Adviser and Australia Chair. 

THE AFTERMATH OF TRUMP'S ELECTION FOR TRADE. 11/25, 10:00am (EST), ZOOM. Sponsor: Association of Foreign Press Correspondents, in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. Speaker: trade expert Keith M. Rockwell, Hinrich Foundation. 

BOMBING TO PROVOKE: ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND DRONES AS INSTRUMENTS OF FEAR AND COERCION. 11/25, 11:00-12:15pm (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jaganath Sankaran, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Sarah Kreps, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Bruce Riedel, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy. 

WINNING THE GREAT POWER COMPETITION WITH MATT POTTINGER AND MICHAEL SOBOLIK. 11/25, 11:30am-12:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Matt Pottinger, Chairman of the China Program, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution.; Michael Sobolik, Senior Fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies, American Foreign Policy Council.

FUTURE OF BIODIVERSITY FUNDING: KEY FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR 2025. 11/25, 2:30-4:00pm (EST). HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: TBA. 

Ishiba Bids for Survival through Diplomacy

Missing Manners

Foreign policy for domestic policy

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 18, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba embarked on his first foreign trip since he and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a miserable defeat in October’s Lower House general elections. In Lima, Peru at the November 16-17 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, Ishiba made his utmost effort to establish stable relationships with his counterparts. Success would have boosted his administration. However, the diplomatic complexities of international politics denied him unmitigated success.
 
The summit talk that received the most attention was his first meeting with Chinese President, Xi Jinping. After Ishiba’s meeting last month with the Chinese Premier, Li Qiang, in Vientiane, Laos, the government of Japan has been coordinating a meeting between Ishiba and Xi.
 
In the October meeting, Ishiba and Li reconfirmed the basic principles of their bilateral relationship, including the Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests and building “constructive and stable Japan-China relations.” Following that shared recognition, Ishiba and Xi reaffirmed the four basic documents that define the relationship between Japan and China: the Joint Communique in 1972, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, the Joint Declaration of Building Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peaceful Development in 1998, and Joint Statement in 2008.
 
In the meeting with Xi, Ishiba focused on lifting China’s trade ban against Japanese products, which was a response to Japan’s release of “processed” water from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Ishiba requested that China resume discussions over Japan’s beef and rice exports. Ishiba also sought greater cooperation on the green economy, environment and energy conservation, medical care, nursing care and health care.
 
Regarding security, Ishiba expressed Japan’s concern about the situation in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands and the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits. Ishiba also asked that China enhance its safety measures for Japanese residents in China, particularly in light of the murder of a Japanese boy in Shenzhen. Xi assured Ishiba that China would protect the safety of foreigners, including the Japanese.
 
Overall, China was willing to engage in further talks with Japan. As it prepares for a possible trade conflict with the incoming Trump administration, China will benefit from an improved bilateral relationship with Japan. Compared to former hawkish leaders in Japan, Ishiba is an easy person for China to deal with. Ishiba’s political mentor is former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, a distinguished figure in China’s eyes, who cultivated the bilateral relationship.
 
Ishiba’s determination to revise the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and to organize an Asian version of NATO are goals that China will respect insofar as they serve to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S. Xi urged Ishiba to work with China to establish a global framework of free trade with the idea of expanding the market for Chinese goods in Japan.
 
In contrast to China’s positive response to Japan’s approaches, U.S. President-elect, Donald Trump, has dismissed Ishiba’s request for a meeting in the U.S. after the G20 summit November 18-19 in Brazil.
 
Ishiba has said, even before the U.S. Presidential election, that he would explore an early meeting with the President-elect. It is commonly recognized in Japan that a solid personal relationship with the U.S. President may support the Prime Minister’s political standing in Japan. For a prime minister in minority government, Ishiba needs to establish a stable relationship with the U.S. to maintain his cabinet as long as possible.
 
Ishiba was forced to announce during his visit to Peru for the APEC Leaders’ meeting that he had failed to set up an appointment with Trump. According to Ishiba, many foreign leaders have asked to meet the President-elect. The Trump transition team has explained that Trump will not meet with any foreign leaders before the inauguration next January. A U.S. statute, the Logan Act, prohibits any unauthorized American citizen to negotiate disputes with other countries. Ishiba looks for another opportunity after the inauguration.
 
Ishiba did meet with U.S. President Joe Biden in Lima. Ishiba thanked him for his contributions to the Japan-U.S. alliance. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the continuation of the network of like-minded countries, including the Republic of Korea.
 
Also in Lima, Ishiba and Biden met with the President of the ROK, Yoon Suk Yeol. At this trilateral summit, the leaders agreed to institutionalize their network. They will establish a Trilateral Coordinating Secretariat to deal with various security issues, including nuclear and missile development in North Korea. With considerable effort, the three leaders may be able to do so before Trump takes office.
 
While Ishiba was meeting with foreign leaders in Lima, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takeshi Iwaya, visited Kyiv, Ukraine, and met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Iwaya stressed that Japan will stand by Ukraine and shared serious concerns about the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. Afraid that Trump may try to distance the U.S. from the network of like-minded countries, Japan is accumulating as many diplomatic accomplishments as possible.
 
The expected retreat of the U.S. under the Trump Administration from the multilateral framework promoting democracy, trade, and human rights, there is a growing argument in Japan that Tokyo should take a leadership role in preserving democratic values, the liberal international order, and free trade. At the APEC summit, Ishiba explicitly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and emphasized the importance of preserving fairness and transparency in trade and international investment. He also announced Japan’s bid for the APEC chair in 2031.

Monday Asia Events November 18, 2024

FUTURE OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF DIVISION. 11/18, 2:00-4:00pm (JST) MIDNIGHT-2:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Forum on International Relations (N.B. Conservative Nationalist funded by Worldmate). Speakers Include: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kazutoshi Suzuki, Professor, Sophia University; Kristi Govella, Associate Professor, Oxford; Saori Tezuka, Associate Professor, Nanzan University. 

COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT BY JOHNSTONE AND DENMARK. 11/18, 2:00-3:00pm (JST); Midnight-1:00am (EST). HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. Speakers: Christopher B. Johnstone, Managing Principal, The Asia Group; Abraham Denmark, Senior Advisor, The Asia Group. 

WILL CHINA’S MOST DYNAMIC COMPANIES KEEP LISTENING OUTSIDE THE MAINLAND? 11/18, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: Guiyang Laura Wu, Associate Professor in Economics, Nanyang Technological University Singapore; Wendy Liu, Managing Director, Global Market Strategy, J.P. Morgan Asia. 

MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY FORUM. 11/18, 9:00am-7:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institue for Peace & Diplomacy. Speakers: Abdulaziz Sager, Founder and Chair, Gulf Research Center; Shira Efron, Senior Director, Policy Research, Israel Policy Forum; Daniel Mouton, Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Atlantic Council; Jon Hoffman, Research Fellow, Defense and Foreign Policy, Cato Institute; Randa Slim, Director, Conflict Resolution & Track II Dialogues, Middle East Institute; Nawaf Bin Mubarak Al-Thani, Former Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché of the State of Qatar to the United States of America, Canada, and Mexico; H.E. Stephan Klement, European Union Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament and Special Adviser on the Iran Nuclear Issue; Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; Heidi Matthews, Assistant Professor, Osgoode School of Law, York University; Mai El-Sadany, Executive Director, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Jeremy Wildeman, Fellow, Human Rights Research & Education Centre, University of Ottawa; Arif Lalani, Former Canadian Ambassador to Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan & the United Arab Emirates; Peggy Mason, Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament; Jon Allen, Former Canadian Ambassador to Israel; Andrew Latham, Senior Washington Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Miloud Chennoufi, Chair, Department of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College.

ELECTIONS AFTERMATH: EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS. 11/18, 9:00am-4:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Keio Center for Strategy, Keio University; Keio Institute of East Asia Studies; Columbia-Harvard China and the Wolrd Program; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center, Columbia University. Speakers: Duy Linh Nguyen Tu, Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Professional Practice, Columbia University; Lien-Hang Nguyen, Director, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Yuichi Hosoya, Director, Keio Center for Strategy, Keio University; Junya Nishino, Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Politics, Keio University; Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, Global Senior Advisor, McLarty Associates; Scott Snyder, President & CEO, Korea Economic Institute of America; Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor Emerita of History, Columbia University; Gerald Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Columbia University; Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Ambassador Masafumi Ishii, Special Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University; Ken Jimbo, Managing Director, International House of Japan; Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University​; Lien-Hang Nguyen, Dorothy Borg Associate Professor of the History of American-East Asian Relations, Columbia University; Ann Marie Murphy, Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University; Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University; Thomas Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, Columbia University; Satoru Mori, Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University; Ayumi Teraoka, Postdoctoral Research Scholar and Lecturer, Columbia University; George Miller, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs and Adjunct Professor, Columbia’s Journalism School; Michito Tsuruoka, Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University; Stephen Biddle, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Merit Janow, Professor of Practice in International Economic Law and International Affairs, Columbia University. 

FOURTH ANNUAL CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL LAW & POLICY CONFERENCE. 11/18, 9:45am-5:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal. Speakers Include: Darius Sultani, Doctoral Researcher, Potsdam Institute, Climate Impact Research, Sequencing Carbon Dioxide Removal into the EU ETS; Ingrid Udd Sundvor, Co-Founder, Director, Carbon Balance Initiative; Danny Cullenward, Senior Fellow, Kleinman Center for Energy Policy; Senior Fellow, Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal, American University. 

BOOK TALK: AI SNAKEOIL. 11/18, 10:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Elliott School, George Washington University. Speaker: author Sayashi Kapoor, Ph.D candidate, Princeton University and member of Times 100 most influential on AI.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Cp6Dry

THE RETURN OF DONALD TRUMP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. 11/18, 10:00am-11:00am (EST),VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS). Speakers: Robert Sutter, Professor Practice of International Affairs, Elliot School, George Washington University; Zhuqun Zhu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Bucknell University; Nong Hong,, Senior Fellow, National Institue for China Sea Studies; Sourabh Gupta, Senior Fellow & Head, Trade 'n Technology Program, ICAS. 

PULSE CHECK ON TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE. 11/18, 10:30am-2:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsors: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University (GWU). Speakers: Dr. Chiaoning Su, Associate Professor, Communication, Journalism, Public Relations, Oakland University; Dr. Dennis Lu-Chung Weng, Associate Professor, Political Science, Sam Houston State University; Dr. Austin Horng-En Wang, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Dr. Li-Yin Liu, Associate Professor, Political Science, Tunghai University in Taiwan; June Lin, Senior Program Manager, Asia-Pacific Programs, National Democratic Institute (NDI); Dr. Kharis Templeman, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution. 

AMERICA’S FUTURE IN EAST ASIA. 11/18, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Program on US-Japan Relations at Harvard University. Speakers: Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State. 

EVIDENCE BASE FOR POLICY: EXPLORING NEW DATA ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECOLOGICAL THREATS AND CONFLICT. 11/18, 2:00-3:00pm (EST). HYBRID. . Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: David Bonnardeaux, Director, Environment and Energy, Pact; Michael Collins, Executive Director, Institute for Economics & Peace; Jade Cooper, Deputy Director of Americas, Institute for Economics & Peace; Tracy Hart, Lead Environmental Specialist, Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice, World Bank; Andrew Hyde, Director and Senior Fellow, Multilateral Financial Diplomacy, Powering Peace, Stimson Center; Cassandra Schneider, Senior Climate, Environment, and Conflict Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace; Natalie Fiertz, Research Associate, Environmental Security, Stimson Center (Moderator).

BOOK TALK: ON XI JINPING. 11/18, 3:30-5:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Center for Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific. Speaker: Dr. Kevin Rudd, Ambassador to US, Australia. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4fnHwnt

PENSION FUNDS AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS. 11/18, 6:00-7:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Columbia Business School Center on Japanese Economy and Business. Speakers: Terezie Hesounova Trivell, Director, Private Markets, United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund; Suyi Kim, Ex-Senior Managing Director, Head, Private Equity, CPP Investments. 

The Nightmare Of Trump Returns

Can Asia Manage What Is Coming?

By Daniel Sneider, Lecturer, International Policy at Stanford University, APP Member
First published in The Oriental Economist, November 7,2024
In Japanese

Donald Trump has regained power in the United States, riding a wave of fear and anti-incumbent desire for change. For Americans, it is now the greatest test of its democratic and constitutional order since the Civil War.

But for the rest of the world, it is no less a traumatic moment. The United States is now poised to retreat from its leadership of the postwar liberal order.

What does Trump’s return mean for Asia and for American allies in Japan, South Korea, and the Pacific?

Japanese and Korean leaders may be reassured by soothing words from some American security experts, including would-be advisors to Trump. Nothing will change in the Indo-Pacific under Trump, those experts counsel.

“U.S. foreign policy in this region is likely to remain constant,” Derek Grossman, a RAND specialist on Asian security and former intelligence official, wrote just before the vote in The Diplomat. Trump may be “a more transactional and unpredictable leader,” but he left alliances in the region intact. No matter what happens, he wrote ahead of the vote, “the China factor will foster the continued development of the U.S. alliance network.”

These views ignore the abundant evidence, mostly in Trump’s own words, of his intention at the end of the first term to abandon much of those alliance commitments.

As his former Defense Secretary Mark Esper and National Security advisor John Bolton documented in their memoirs, he planned to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea, to complete the unfinished bargain with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un which would leave his nuclear forces intact, and to demand massive payments from Japan to pay for the American defense role.

It also brushes past Trump’s repeated intention to impose massive across the board tariffs on foreign goods – not only aimed at China but also at allied nations in Europe and Asia.
More importantly, the idea that foreign policy in Asia can be distinct and separate from what happens elsewhere, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, is an illusion.

As Japan’s own National Security Strategy made clear, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security situation in East Asia. It has created a close military alliance between Russia, China, and North Korea, threatening the stability of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and all of East Asia.

Trump made it repeatedly clear, as did his running mate J.D. Vance, that he intends to cut off military aid to Ukraine and push it to accept the surrender terms offered by Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

He also threatened to abandon the security commitment to NATO, opening the door for Putin to retake control of parts of the Soviet empire, beginning with the Baltic states and threatening Poland.

“Trump will feel like he has an electoral mandate to do these crazier things,” predicts Michael McFaul, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and director of Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies.

“If he wins again when it comes to things like NATO or our allies in Asia, he thinks that the American people support him in saying to Putin do whatever the hell you want. I think history shows that when we are strong, the United States of America when we exhibit peace through strength, we have more peaceful outcomes. When we signal weakness, when we try to appease dictators, that's when bad things can happen.”

Trump was constrained from pursuing those goals during his first term, in large part due to the presence of responsible figures from the Republican national security elite and by his own incompetence and unfamiliarity with the levers of power. Those restraints will no longer be present.

“In his first term, he relied on traditional Republicans to fill his foreign policy team, people like (former Secretary of State Mike) Pompeo, (former) Secretary of Defense (James N.) Mattis, (former national security advisors) H.R. McMaster and John Bolton,” McFaul told the Kyiv Independent.

“They most certainly stopped Trump from doing some of the craziest things that he proposed – pulling out of NATO being at the top of that list. What's going to be different this time around is that none of those people are going to be in the Trump administration; he's disparaged all of them.”

What about China? And North Korea?
Despite these concerns, it is assumed Trump will at least continue to see China as the principle adversary of the United States, particularly in the realm of trade and economic policy. For that reason, Japanese policymakers, and to a lesser extent those in South Korea, believe the alliances in Northeast Asia will continue to have value to a Trump administration.

Even if this is true, that does not mean smooth sailing for Tokyo, or for Seoul. It may lead to increased demands on both allies to spend vastly more on defense and to join in export controls and other curbs on trade and investment with China that would cause potentially severe consequences for their economies.

“The Trump administration is going to twist a lot of arms and they better be ready for that,” says Tobias Harris, the founder of Japan Foresight, a respected advisory organization. Trump's advisors have already pushed Japan to greatly increase its defense spending beyond the 2 percent GNP target and to be responsible for its own defense.

The Trump tariff policy may pose an even greater problem, argues Harris:

“If Trump follows through, even partially, on threats to impose off-the-board tariffs on US imports, plus significant imports on US tariffs from China and Mexico, it will have a significant, immediate impact on Japan’s largest manufacturers, prompting them to consider whether to shift manufacturing to the US, back to Japan, or to other markets. Japanese companies may also have to grapple with greater pressure from Washington on technology export controls with China, though as Trump’s vocal opposition to Nippon Steel’s bid for US Steel suggests, they will also have to navigate political and national security considerations if they opt to shift investment into the US in response to the Trump administration’s policies.”

It may be premature, however, to assume that Trump will want to line up Japan and South Korea for a grand confrontation with China. Some analysts suggest that Trump instead may opt for a grand bargain with Xi Jinping, one that could even include abandoning Taiwan.

The President-elect made several comments during the campaign about Taiwan, complaining that their firms have destroyed the U.S. semiconductor industry and questioning whether the U.S. should come to its defense.

“Making China a key target or centerpiece of his second incarnation is unnecessary and possibly unlikely,” a former senior intelligence official and long-time China hand told me.

“There is likely to be little immediate payoff for him or his minions. He will bluster, threaten tariffs, and brag about his relationship with Xi, but probably not come out swinging.”

Trump’s new primary backer, billionaire Tesla owner Elon Musk, has extensive business ties in China, where over half of the company’s global car production takes place at their massive Shanghai factory.

The other target of Trump’s affection may be North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Trump continues to speak about his warm relationship with Kim and lament the missed opportunity to forge a peace deal with him.

That bargain was almost reached at their second summit meeting in Hanoi, but faltered due both to Kim’s overly grand demands and due to opposition from within Trump’s own administration, backed by the intervention from then Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.

There will be no such resistance within the new administration. And Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru does not have any such relationship with Trump, nor is he likely to be able to create one. The most serious obstacle to a deal, one which would seal in North Korea’s nuclear capability and the missile systems that can reach Japan, may come from Kim himself.

Trump may claim Kim is waiting for him with open arms, but the North Koreans have since forged a close military alliance with Russia, marked by the deployment of 12,000 troops to the Ukraine front. An opening to North Korea would likely have to follow a Trump-Putin embrace, and even then Kim is likely to use his new power to ask for a far greater payoff from Trump.

What is more likely, however, is a breakdown in U.S.-South Korean ties, demands to renegotiate defense cost-sharing payments from Korea, and to begin withdrawal of the some 28,500 U.S. forces based there.

“Trump has given no indication he values South Korea as an ally, and quite the contrary, seems set to redefine it either through withdrawal or demanding South Korea take more responsibility for its own defense vis-a-vis North Korea as U.S. forces are reoriented to directly confront China,” Benjamin Engel of Seoul’s Dankook University told NK News.

Whither Japan?
For Japan, the shocking events in the U.S. came just after the ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost its majority in last month’s election, and Prime Minister Ishiba is facing the unusual task of forming a minority government. As a veteran observer of Japan put it to me, “internal political paralysis in Tokyo is limiting the ability of Japan to navigate this new, extremely dangerous situation.”

Ishiba has promptly congratulated Trump and, as one would expect, expressed hope in the continuation of the postwar security alliance as a foundation of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

But suppose Trump goes deeply down the road of undermining that alliance or even forcing an unwanted confrontation with China. In that case, Japan may be compelled to look for alternatives, including improving ties with Beijing while flattering the newly powerful American autocrat.

“Japanese are not going to end the alliance,” says Japan expert Harris. “But they are going to have to learn how to do things on their own more.”

Japan’s Diet Elects Ishiba, Again

Japan new new government

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 11, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The 215^th Diet was convoked on November 11. It elected Shigeru Ishiba, President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as 103rd Prime Minister of Japan without a simple majority in the House of Representatives. Ishiba immediately appointed his new cabinet. But with the loss of seats and the simple majority, Ishiba and the LDP face difficulty in completing any legislative plans through a hung parliament.
 
The 215^th Diet is a “special session” stipulated in the Constitution of Japan. Article 54 of the Constitution requires that the Diet be convoked within 30 days after a general election of the House of Representatives. The cabinet resigns en masse on this convocation per Article 70.
 
Accordingly, all the ministers in the Ishiba Cabinet resigned on the morning of October 11. Each House of the Diet then held an election for prime minister in the afternoon. The House of Councillors elected Ishiba with a simple majority.
 
In the House of Representatives, no candidate obtained a simple majority in the first round. For the first time in 30 years, the House held a run-off between the top two vote-getters, Ishiba and Yoshihiko Noda, the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ). Ishiba won with 221 votes versus 160 for Noda. Eighty-four votes were invalid: these were cast by members of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) for their leaders, who were not eligible for the run-off.
 
Following his afternoon election, Ishiba formed his new cabinet early in the evening.  There were three vacancies to fill. The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries had both lost their seats in the general election for the House of Representatives. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Trade and Tourism, Tetsuo Saito, resigned to assume the position of chief representative of Komeito. The other ministers remained in the same positions as in the previous Ishiba cabinet.
 
Again, the Ishiba Cabinet faces real difficulty in attaining any policy goals. The leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito lost almost seventy seats from 290 to 221, less than a half of the 465 seats in the House of Representatives. The opposition parties occupy over half the seats.
 
However, notwithstanding their aggregate numerical dominance, the opposition parties failed to unite behind one candidate for nomination as the new prime minister. If all the opposition lawmakers and some independents had voted for Noda, Noda may have outgained Ishiba and become prime minister. However, the DPP and Ishin refused to vote for him even before the election, because of basic policy differences with the CDPJ. They knew that their action would benefit Ishiba and the LDP.
 
The DPP also has had to deal with its own troubles. On the morning of the election for prime minister, a weekly magazine reported a scandal: the DPP’s leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, had engaged in an extramarital affair with a former bikini model. Tamaki admitted that most of the report was true. Tamaki now teeters on the edge of losing his leadership post.
 
Although Tamaki refused to join the leading coalition, the LDP continues to target the DPP as a partner from time to time on the LDP’s legislative initiatives. Indeed, the LDP has begun talks with the DPP at the policy leader level. The DPP has insisted on raising the annual earnings threshold for the imposition of income tax from 1.03 million yen and on activating “trigger clause” to automatically reduce gasoline tax.
 
Another concern for the LDP is that the structure of the standing committees will work against it. The leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito had occupied 15 chairs out of all 17 standing committees before the general election. But the coalition now has only ten.
 
The CDPJ gained the chair of the Committee on Budget where any kind of issue is up for grabs, including scandals on the management of political funds. The chair has the power to set the agenda, to order the prime minister to answer questions from the opposition committee members, and to terminate debate and take votes.
 
Former CDPJ leaders occupy other important posts. Kenta Izumi can control the Committee on Fundamental National Polices in his capacity as chair. This committee is the forum for opposition party leaders to hurl questions at the prime minister in “Question Time.” Yukio Edano is now the chair of the Commission on the Constitution.  Any progress on the constitutional amendment will be slow, given the CDPJ’s reluctance on the matter.
 
The current special Diet session will end on November 14. After the session, Ishiba plans to go abroad to attend the APEC Summit meeting in Peru and the G20 meeting in Brazil. Then, he hopes to have an opportunity to meet with U.S. President-elect, Donald Trump, in Washington, DC or Florida. Ishiba’s telephone call with Trump after his victory led Ishiba to believe that Trump was a man with whom he could have frank conversations.
 
However, Trump is likely to demand that Japan make further expenditures for its own defense. Japan pledged 43 trillion yen for its defense budget for between FY 2023 and FY 2027 to raise defense expenditures to 2% of Japan’s GDP. If Ishiba tries to increase the budget to meet such a demand, the LDP-Komeito coalition lacks the simple majority in the House of Representatives to approve an increase on its own.
 
Ishiba plans to call an extraordinary session of the Diet after returning, in which he hopes to pass the supplementary budget bill to implement the economic stimulus package. In the ordinary session that begins next January, the Ishiba administration will have to pass an annual budget by the end of March to avoid a government shutdown.
 
Previous cabinets without a simple majority in one of the two Houses had a hard slog to obtain necessary consents from the opposition parties. Ishiba’s Cabinet will be tested in a similar way. If Ishiba fails to gain cooperation from the opposition parties to pass the bills in the Diet, it is likely that the LDP will want to replace Ishiba with someone who they believe can lead the party to win the next general election. Domestic politics and international uncertainty will make Ishiba’s tenure challenging, and maybe short.

Seats of Groups in the House of Representatives
	Last session			Current
LDP	258	290		197		221
Komeito	32			24
CDPJ	99	163		149		232
Ishin	44			38
DPP	7			28
JCP	10			8
Reiwa	3			9
Others	12			12
Total	465
Election of Nominating P.M. in the House of Representatives
First Round					Run-off
Ishiba (LDP)			221		Ishiba		221
Noda (CDPJ)			151		Noda		160
Baba (Ishin)			38		Invalid		84
Tamaki (DPP)			28
Yamamoto (Reiwa)			9
Tamura (JCP)			8
Others			10
Total			465		Total		465

Monday & Tuesday Asia Events November 11 & 12, 2024

November 11 is Veterans Day in Washington, DC

Watch President Biden and Defense Secretary Austin 

at Arlington Cemetery at 11:00am EST

2024 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: HIGH STAKES FOR ASIA. 11/11, 4:00-5:30pm (PST), 7:00-8:30pm (EST). HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Program, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC), Stanford University. Speakers: Francis Fukuyama, Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Stanford University's; Kiyoteru Tsutsui, Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor, Senior Fellow, Japanese Studies, Shorenstein APARC; Gi-Wook Shin, William J. Perry Professor of Contemporary Korea, Professor of Sociology, Senior Fellow, FSI, Stanford University; Gita Wirjawan, Visiting Scholar, Precourt Institute for Energy, Stanford. 

TOWARD AN EAST ASIAN UTOPIA: AMBITION AND ILLUSION IN IMPERIAL JAPANESE MILITARY MUSIC. 11/11, 7:00pm (JST), 5:00am (EST), ZOOM. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Workshop. Speaker: Emily Lu, Florida State University. 

BOOK TALK: GAMBLERS, FRAUDSTERS, DREAMERS AND SPIES: THE OUTSIDERS WHO SHAPED MODERN JAPAN. 11/12, 10:00am (JST), 11/11 8:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: author Robert Whiting. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/40btWiw

FROM THE FAB TO THE FUTURE: HOW JAPAN AND ITS PARTNERS ARE WORKING TOWARDS SEMICONDUCTOR RESILIENCE AND INNOVATION. 11/12, 8:00am (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Nikkei; Government of Japan. Speakers: David Keohane, Tokyo Correspondent, Financial Times; Bruce Andrews, Senior Vice President and Chief Government Affairs Officer, Intel; Yasuyuki Todo, Professor, Waseda University; Kristy Tsun Tzu Hsu, Director, Taiwan ASEAN Studies Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research. 

MYANMAR’S 2024 CENSUS: LURCHING TOWARDS ELECTIONS? 11/12, 9:00-10:15pm (EST); 11/13, 10:00-11:15am (Singapore Time), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Speaker: Mary P. Callahan, Associate Professor, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.

CHINA INSTITUTE 2024 EXECUTIVE SUMMIT “NOW WHAT?” – A POST ELECTION OUTLOOK. 11/12, 9:00am-5:00pm (EST). IN-PERSON. Sponsor: China Institute. Speakers Include: Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc, former Under Secretary of State under the Obama Administration; Henry Fernandez, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, MSCI; Robert H. McCooey, Vice Chairman, Nasdaq. 

EXPERT TAKE: U.S.-NORTH KOREA RELATIONS WITH FORMER DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE STEPHEN BIEGUN. 11/12, 10:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Society. Speaker: Stephen Biegun, fmr. US Deputy Secretary of State, fmr. Special Representative for North Korea.  

AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY FUTURE: A POST-ELECTION ANALYSIS. 11/12, 10:00-11:30am (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Nancy A. Youssef, National Security Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal; Amy Mackinnon, Reporter, Foreign Policy; Kelly Grieco, Senior Fellow, Reimagining US Grand Strategy, Stimson Center; Rachel Minyoung Lee, Senior Fellow, Korea Program and 38 North, Stimson Center; Robert Manning, Distinguished Fellow, Strategic Foresight Hub, Stimson Center; Christopher Preble, Senior Fellow and Director, Reimagining US Grand Strategy, Stimson Center; Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Co-Director, China and East Asia, Stimson Center; Elizabeth Threlkeld, Senior Fellow and Director, South Asia, Stimson Center; Elias Yousif, Fellow and Deputy Director, Conventional Defense, Stimson Center; Sally Yozell, Senior Fellow and Director, Environmental Security, Stimson Center; Nudhara Yusuf, Research Associate, Global Governance, Justice & Security, Stimson Center.

RUSSIA AND CHINA IN CENTRAL ASIA: COMPETE, COOPERATE, OR DE-CONFLICT. 11/12, 2:00-3:00PM (EST). Sponsor: CNAS. Speakers: Donald Lu, Assistant Secretary of State, South and Central Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Lisa Curtis, Senior Fellow and Director, Indo-Pacific Security Program, CNAS; Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Senior Fellow and Director, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS. 

BOOK TALK: THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ILLIBERALISM. 11/12, 4:00-5:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU. Speaker: editor Marlene Laruelle, Elliott School Research Professor of International Affairs and Political Science and Director of the Illiberalism Studies Program; Samuel Goldman, CCAS Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the John L. Loeb, Jr. Institute for Religious Freedom and the Politics & Values Program. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3YrROvA

THE PROMISE OF PARTICIPATION: HOW COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAKING CAN GET US TO MORE EFFECTIVE CLIMATE POLICIES. 11/12, 4:00-6:00pm (CET) 10:00am-Noon (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: International Idea. Speaker: Greta Rios, People Powered, Mexico City. 

CONVERSATIONS BEFORE MIDNIGHT: ANNUAL DINNER. 11/12, 5:15-9:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Speakers: David Ignatius, prize-winning columnist, Washington Post; Edmund Gerald Brown, former governor of California; Emily Strasser, author, Professor of the Practice, English, Tufts University; Rachel Bronson, President CEO, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Fee.

A New Coalition Government for Japan

A Partial Union with the DPP?

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 4, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

To compensate for the significant loss of seats by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the October 27 general election, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba—who will remain prime minister—decided to begin frequent policy discussions with the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). This small party agreed to cooperate with the LDP on budget plans and tax reform, but has refused to join the leading coalition with the LDP and Komeito. News organizations in Japan call this type of political cooperation a “partial union.”
 
The leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito has been looking for additional partners to maintain control of the government. Between them, the two parties need 18 or more seats to claim a simple majority in the House. To demonstrate the party leaders’ accountability for losing seats in the election, the Chairperson of the LDP Election Strategy Committee, Shinjiro Koizumi, stepped down. Chief Representative of Komeito, Keiichi Ishii, also announced his resignation. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Tetsuo Saito, will replace Ishii.
 
The LDP has targeted the DPP, which gained 28 seats in the election, to cover its shortfall in seats for a simple majority. LDP Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama met with DPP Secretary General Kazuya Shimba on October 31. They agreed to conduct policy talks on the national budget and reform of the tax system. For the LDP, the talks will secure enough votes to pass a budget bill in the House of Representatives, while for the DPP the talks provide a connection with the ruling party to implement DPP policies.
 
However, the DPP did not send a minister to the Ishiba Cabinet. The party may hope to preserve its ability to distance itself from the LDP and return to the group of the opposition parties led by the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ). The CDPJ still hopes that the DPP members will vote for its leader, Yoshihiko Noda, in nominations for the prime minister in the Diet.
 
The DPP has already decided to vote for its leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, in that election and even in a possible run-off. A run-off likely would be a contest between Ishiba and Noda.  Votes by DPP members for Tamaki would be invalid, which would benefit Ishiba.
 
It is indisputable that the DPP now has swing votes that give it the power to decide every bill in the House of Representatives. How did the party attain this power?
 
The DPP has a complicated history. The party is one of the descendants of the former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). The successor to the DPJ was the Democratic Party (DP). When the DP broke up in 2017, 14 lawmakers (most of them from the DP) established the Party of Hope, headed by the Governor of Tokyo, Yuriko Koike. Other liberal lawmakers in the DP helped create the CDPJ, led by Yukio Edano. Together, the Party of Hope and certain lawmakers who had remained in the DP established the DPP in 2018.
 
After only two years, in 2020, the DPP split apart. Most DPP members joined the CDPJ. The remaining members maintained DPP as a small opposition party under the leadership of Tamaki. Before the recent election, the DPP had only seven lawmakers in the House of Representatives. As a result of the election, the party expanded to 28 House seats. Following a strategy of approaching young voters and taking advantage of YouTube, the DPP collected the most votes from voters between the ages of 20 and 39 among all parties.
 
The DPP’s campaign slogan, “We will increase take-home pay,” attracted young voters. Tamaki has said that raising the threshold for the imposition of an income tax and reducing household energy costs are conditions for the DPP to cooperate with the leading coalition.
 
Specifically, Tamaki has demanded that the LDP commit to raising the income tax threshold from annual earnings of 1.03 million yen to 1.78 million. This increase is based on increases in the consumer price index over the past several years. He also wants the coalition to activate the “trigger clause” in the gasoline tax. This clause reduces taxes on gasoline when gas prices exceed 160 yen per liter for three consecutive months. The DPP also upheld in its campaign platform education for free or revision of the Political Funds Control Act for further political reform.
 
The LDP is reluctant to accept Tamaki’s demands, due to fiscal difficulties.  Consequently, the LDP may not be able to cobble together a majority government. That is why the LDP is forced to accept some policies of the DPP to maintain its government.
 
This would not be the first time the LDP led a minority government. After the LDP lost its majority in the House of Councillors in 1989, it formed a partial union with Komeito and the Democratic Socialist Party. This union passed the epoch-making International Peace Cooperation Act 1993, which sent the Japan Self-Defense Force overseas for the first time
 
Assembling a majority coalition is not impossible. In 1998, the LDP lost its majority again in the House of Councillors. The LDP entered a coalition with the Liberal Party (LP), but it did not reach a simple majority in the House. The LDP finally invited Komeito in the coalition to form a majority in 1999. The LP served as a critical buffer between the LDP and Komeito. Over the following twenty-five years up to the present time, the LDP has maintained the coalition with Komeito even though the LP has left it.
 
The lesson here is that a coalition is more stable when it includes other parties in a Cabinet, as opposed to a more limited partial union. The DPP still seeks a deal with the CDPJ over political reform, including the abolition of political donations from corporations and organizations, which has met resistance from the LDP. A deal for a partial union with the DPP may not strengthen Ishiba’s leadership over Japan’s politics.

Monday Asia Events November 4, 2024

IN CONVERSATION WITH SHASHANK JOSHI, EDITOR OF THE ECONOMIST. 11/4, 12:30-1:30pm (AEDT), 11/3 8:30-9:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Lowy Institute. Speaker: Shashan Joshi, Defence Editor, The Economist.

NAVIGATING GPS VULNERABILITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ECONOMIC AND NATIONAL SECURITY. 11/4, 10:00-11:30am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson. Speakers: Nathan Simington, Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission; Dana Goward, President, Resilient Navigation Foundation and Member, National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board (PNTAB), National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Todd Humphreys, Ashley H. Priddy Centennial Professor in Engineering, University of Texas at Austin; Zac Kassas, Professor and TRC Endowed Chair in Intelligent Transportation Systems, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Ohio State University; Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, Senior Director, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

AMERICA’S COLD WARRIOR: PAUL NITZE AND NATIONAL SECURITY FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN. 11/4, 4:00-5:30pm (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: History and Public Policy Program, Cold War International History Project, Wilson Center. Speakers: James Graham Wilson, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State; Thomas Schwartz, Distinguished Professor of History and Professor of Political Science and European Studies, Vanderbilt University; Victoria Phillips, Global Fellow, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4fp8fzY

BOOK LAUNCH: PROSTITUTES, HOSTESSES, AND ACTRESSES AT THE EDGE OF JAPANESE EMPIRE: FRAGMENTING HISTORY. 11/4, 7:00-8:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Department of History Michigan State University. Speaker: Nobuko Yamasaki, Author, Professor, Associate Professor of Japanese, Lehigh University.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3YHLgKT

LDP-Komeito Coalition Loses Its Majority

Now what?

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 27, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The long-standing ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito shattered in Japan’s October 27 House of Representatives elections. They lost their simple majority. To continue its hold on the country’s leadership and policies, the traditional coalition needs to add at least 18 outside lawmakers in the House – yet it is not obvious where the 18 will come from. Meanwhile, the opposition parties are too fragmented to build a new coalition to counter a modified LDP and Komeito bloc. All this throws into question the direction of politics in Japan.
 
The House has 465 seats, and the majority is 233. The LDP lost 56 seats in the election, down from 247 to 191. Komeito lost six seats, going from 32 to 24. The two parties now have a total of 215 seats, 18 seats short of a majority.
 
Three opposition parties made significant gains at the LDP-Komeito coalition’s expense. The Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) gained 148 seats, up 50 from its 98 seats before the election. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) quadrupled its seats from 7 to 28, and Reiwa Shinsengumi tripled its seats from 3 to 9. Two opposition parties lost seats, however. The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) saw a reduction of six seats, from 44 to 38. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) lost two seats, from 10 to 8.
 
The biggest reason for the LDP’s losses was its reluctance to make meaningful political reforms. Despite public concern about the slush fund scandal, the LDP has not departed from the obsolete management of its political fund. Although the fund is discredited in Japan, the LDP nevertheless used it to distribute 20 million yen to their candidates, even including independent candidates who had been excluded from the LDP slate.
 
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba failed to exercise his leadership to reform the party. In fact, he actively avoided reform. He decided to call the early snap election in part to avoid pre-election policy discussions in the Diet. Indeed, the snap election was contrary to his earlier position on timing. In addition, Ishiba embraced bad actors: he included 34 candidates in the LDP slate who had accepted secret funds from factions within the LDP. The election at least included a measure of justice: over half of the 34 lost their seats. These lost seats were the margin by which the LDP lost its majority. 
 
These were not the only significant losses. In the wake of the scandal, prominent and otherwise unassailable candidates lost, including Minister of Justice Hideki Makihara and Minister of Agriculture Yasuhiro Ozato, Traditional LDP heavyweights and prominent conservative nationalists, such as Hakubun Shimomura, Akira Amari, and Seishiro Eto, also were unseated. The former Abe faction within the LDP, the basis of conservative nationalism in the party, saw several members, including Tamayo Marukawa in Tokyo, go down in defeat. The chief representative of Komeito, Keiichi Ishii, also lost.
 
Article 54 of the Constitution requires that a Diet session must be convoked within 30 days after an election. The Cabinet will resign en masse. Then, each Chamber holds an election to nominate a new prime minister. If the Lower and Upper Houses nominate different people, the vote in the Lower House trumps that in the Upper House. The Diet is now scheduled to meet on November 11.
 
Ishiba will be reelected prime minister if he is a member of a majority coalition. But the LDP-Komeito coalition no longer has that majority. If no candidate receives a majority of the votes, the election will go to a run-off, which does not require majority. In the case of a run-off between Ishiba and CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda, Ishiba seems certain to win, because the opposition parties are not united to vote for Noda.
 
Once a coalition loses its majority, no bill submitted by the cabinet (i.e., annual budget bill) is sure to pass the Diet. The prime minister will always be exposed to the risk of a forced resignation if the opposition parties pass a no-confidence resolution. So, Prime Minister Ishiba must pull enough seats together to secure the majority. It is likely that some independent lawmakers who were dropped from the LDP slate will return to the LDP, but they would not be enough.
 
Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Ishiba floated to his aides the idea of cooperation with the DPP. The DPP has just enough members to take a coalition with the LDP and Komeito over the top. Although DPP leader Yuichiro Tamaki once said that his party would not enter into a coalition with the LDP and Komeito, the DPP will cooperate with any party willing to implement DPP policies.
 
There are several ways to effect cooperation with the DPP: the DPP could send a member to join the cabinet as a minister, or it could enter into an agreement over some basic policies but without having a representative minister in the cabinet. The LDP once in the past invited some lawmakers of opposition parties to join them to secure majority.
 
The Ishiba administration’s policy agenda has lost its momentum because the LDP-Komeito coalition needs to focus on building a majority. The government is now supported by only a minority of the Lower House and may have to abandon some policies to invite some lawmakers into a majority coalition.
 
It is likely that security policies of Ishiba, such as revision of Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement or establishing Asian NATO, will significantly slow down. However, since CDP leader Noda is relatively aligned with the LDP on security issues, there will be no major conflicts over security issues, including diplomacy to enhance security in East Asia. Debates among the parties will center on political reform – an issue that is fatal for the LDP – and on how the budget may serve as an economic stimulus.
 
Meanwhile, Noda hopes to build a coalition of the opposition parties. Although the total sum of seats of the CDP, DPP, and Ishin is less than a majority of the House, a critical mass of lawmakers in the opposition parties can have an impact on such policies as political reform or the economy.