Monday, October 14, 2024

Monday Octove 14, 2024 Asia Events

COMMON SECURITY IN THE INDO PACIFIC REGION. 10/14,
8:00pm (PST), 8:00am (EDT) HYBRID. Sponsor: Campaign for Peace, Disarmament & Common Security. Speakers: Francis Daehoon Lee of Peace MOMO is former research professor of peace studies at SungKongHoe University and visiting professor for peace studies at Ritsumeikan University and the International University of Japan; Speakers: Reiner Braun has been actively involved in the German and international peace movements since 1982; Anuradha Chenoy is Adjunct Professor, Jindal Global University and Associate Fellow of the Trans-national Institute (The Netherlands); Enkhsakhan Jargalsaikhan is chair of Blue Banner, a Mongolian NGO dedicated to promoting the goals of nuclear non-proliferation.  

THE CONSERVATIVE WEAPONIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AGAINST TECH. 10/24, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Information Technology & Innovation Foundation. Speakers: Jennifer Huddleston; Technology Policy Research Fellow, Cato Institute; Josh Withrow, Resident Fellow, Technology and Innovation; R Street. 

MYANMAR’S HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND CHALLENGES IN 2024. 10/14, 3:00-4:30pm (SGT), HYBRID. Sponsor: ISEAS Myanmar Studies Programme. Speakers: Dr Su Mon Thazin Aung, Visiting Fellow with the Myanmar Studies Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institut; Dr Surachanee Sriyai is a Visiting Fellow with the Media, Technology and Society Programme at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. 

A CONVERSATION WITH NK NEWS CEO CHAD O’CARROLL. 10/14, 5:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: School of Global Policy and Strategy, US San Diego. Speakers: Chad O'Carroll, founder and CEO, NK News; Stephan Haggard, Director Emeritus, Korea-Pacific Program, School of Global Policy and Strategy, US San Diego. 

THE RISING SUN OF INNOVATION. 10/14, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Dr Peter Gruss, one of the most experienced and "hands-on" doers and thinkers in the world of global science and innovation. 

Sunday, October 13, 2024

Japan's New Prime Minister

Ishiba’s challenge is to unite both the LDP and Japan


by Ben Ascione
, Waseda University and APP member 
First published in the EastAsiaForum, October 6, 2024

On 1 October 2024, Shigeru Ishiba was sworn in as Japan’s new prime minister. To win the top job, he overcame a crowded field with a record nine candidates in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leadership election. He brings extensive political experience with 38 years as a lawmaker and past roles as defence, agriculture and regional revitalisation minister.

Ishiba’s win was perhaps unexpected given his long-standing position as an outsider within the LDP. Known for his wonkish style, he often favours idealist policy solutions. Ishiba was also critical of former prime minister Shinzo Abe, earning him the ire of many of his fellow LDP lawmakers, especially among the nationalist conservatives in the Abe and Aso factions. This outspoken stance even led some Abe allies to label Ishiba a ‘traitor’.

Ishiba criticised Abe’s economic policy, Abenomics, for failing to help rural areas and small businesses, as well as his handling of various political scandals, calling for greater transparency and accountability. Ishiba also criticised Abe’s leadership style, suggesting it was excessively top-down and insufficiently inclusive of diverse public opinion.

Where Abe emphasised outcomes, Ishiba emphasises the importance of democratic processes and engaging the public in what he calls the ‘politics of understanding and empathy’ (nattoku to kyokan no seiji). Even when Abe and Ishiba agreed on policy direction, such as revising the Article 9 peace clause of the constitution or restarting nuclear power plants, Ishiba criticised Abe for being hasty and failing to build sufficient public consensus.

Despite, or perhaps because of, his position as a voice of dissent within the LDP, Ishiba successfully cultivated significant support among the more than 1 million LDP rank-and-file members. But his lack of popularity among fellow lawmakers meant that he was seemingly blocked from a pathway to the prime ministership and sidelined as a major political force.

The situation changed when a political slush fund scandal emerged in December 2023, where LDP factions were found to have underreported fundraising income to create off-the-books funds to evade spending regulations. The scandal plunged the LDP into crisis as its public support eroded. In response, former prime minister Fumio Kishida dissolved his faction as part of his efforts to recover public trust, which pressured other LDP factions — bar the Aso faction — to follow suit.

This meant that when Kishida announced his resignation, after battling for months as a ‘dead man walking’, the LDP leadership election would be contested under a new political landscape. The public were looking for a change in leadership to reform the LDP and the role that money plays in politics. And LDP lawmakers, with an eye on the upcoming upper and lower house elections that must be held by July and October 2025 respectively, would have a free hand to cast their votes rather than taking their cues from factional bosses.

The nine candidates were whittled down to two — Ishiba and Abe-protege Sanae Takaichi — who faced off in a second-round runoff vote. This time, Ishiba succeeded where he had failed before, securing enough support from lawmakers to defeat Takaichi. With the LDP still reeling from the slush fund scandal, many lawmakers perhaps felt their electoral chances would fare better with Ishiba rather than Takaichi at the helm, even if they don’t necessarily like Ishiba.

But Ishiba’s path to the prime ministership and his approach to politics present him with a number of challenges going forward.

Ishiba inherits a fractured party. Lawmakers split fairly evenly between Ishiba and Takaichi in the second-round runoff, with Ishiba winning by a slim margin of 189 votes to 173. This shows that Takaichi, who positioned herself as Abe’s successor, still commands sizeable support within the party for her brand of ‘national greatness’ conservatism. Takaichi reportedly rejected an offer from Ishiba to become chair of the LDP General Council. Takaichi and her supporters are clearly waiting in the wings for Ishiba to stumble, ready for another shot at the crown.

Ishiba also lacks a natural base within the party. This means electoral results and public support will play an outsized role in laying the foundations for him to govern. Ishiba announced a snap election a day before even being sworn into office, set to be held on 27 October, aiming to take advantage of his honeymoon period with the public. Lacking the natural charisma of former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi, who also heavily relied on public support, Ishiba is backing himself to frankly explain the difficulties Japan faces to the public — be it demographic decline, the need for structural economic reform or bolstering Japan’s defence posture — and garner their support for ideal rather than piecemeal solutions.

Another challenge is that some of Ishiba’s ideal solutions will require more than strong public backing. Ishiba has touted the idea of renegotiating the Status of Forces Agreement with the United States, which governs the legal status of US military bases and personnel stationed in Japan, to establish a more equal alliance and to give Japan a say over how the United States uses its nuclear weapons in Asia.

Ishiba has also proposed the establishment of an ‘Asian NATO’ between the United States and its allies in the region, presumably with a collective defence clause. These are ideas whose time has probably not yet come. If not handled delicately, such initiatives risk upsetting Washington, and maintaining good US–Japan relations is imperative for any Japanese prime minister to maintain support at home.

Ultimately, the longevity of the Ishiba government will depend on his ability to garner and leverage public support to rebuff pressure from Takaichi and members of the former Abe faction. This will determine whether Ishiba’s leadership heralds a more democratic era for Japan’s entrenched ruling party or ushers in a period of LDP factionalism, a revolving-door prime ministership and political volatility.

Sunday, October 6, 2024

Monday Asia Events October 7, 2024

NEVER AGAIN IS NOT ENOUGH: REMEMBERING THE TRAGEDY OF OCTOBER 7. 10/7, 9:30-11:30am (EDT). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers Include: Rob Greenway, Director, Allison Center for National Security, Heritage Foundation; EJ Kimball, Director of Christian Engagement, Combat Antisemitism Movement; Mort Klein, National President, Zionist Organization of America. 

EXECUTIVE ROUNDTABLE ON TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION IN EAST ASIA AND THE ROLE OF PATENTS. 10/7, 11:00am-1:00pm (PDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society San Francisco. Speakers: Mark Cohen, Senior Tech Fellow, Asia Society Northern California; Kathi Vidal, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office. 

U.S. - CHINA-SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION. 10/7, Noon-1:45pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Foundation. Speakers: Dr. David M. Lampton, Senior Research Fellow at SAIS Foreign Policy Institute; Dr. Kuik Cheng-Chwee, Professor of International Relations and Head of the Center of Asian Studies, at the National University of Malaysia; Dr. Da Wei, Director, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University; John Brandon, Senior Director of International Relations Programs for The Asia Foundation ; Yun Sun, Senior Fellow and Co-Director of the East Asia Program and Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.  [By invitation...]

OCTOBER 7, ONE YEAR LATER: THE HAMAS ATTACK, THE FUTURE OF GAZA, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES. 10/7, 4:30-5:30pm (EDT). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers Include: Elliott Abrams, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; David A. Deptula, Dean, Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies; Eyal Hulata, Senior International Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

Friday, October 4, 2024

LDP Chooses Ishiba for its Next Leader

The Occam's Choice Candidate

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
Special to Asia Policy Point, September 30, 2024

Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected its former Secretary General Shigeru Ishiba as its 28th President on September 27. Ishiba immediately started forming his administration, inviting supporters in the election to join his team. After he is elected as the 102nd Prime Minister of Japan in tomorrow’s extraordinary session of the Diet, Ishiba says he will dissolve the House of Representatives (Lower House) and call a general election on October 27.
 
The presidential election was, as expected, a close race between Ishiba, Minister of Economic Security Sanae Takaichi and former Minister of the Environment Shinjiro Koizumi. Takaichi bested the other two with 181 votes in the first round, compared to 154 for. Ishiba and 136 for Koizumi. As the two leading vote-getters, Takaichi and Ishiba proceeded to a run-off, because no candidate among nine obtained majority votes.
 
Surprising enough for members of the LDP, Ishiba overtook Takaichi in the run-off by a narrow 21-vote margin, 215 to 194. Ishiba added 143 lawmaker votes, from forty-six in the first round to 189 in the run-off, while Takaichi received another 101, from 72 to 173. While each of 368 lawmakers had one vote, 6 were supposed to have abstained or their votes were invalid in the run-off. Ishiba’s greater increase in lawmaker votes indicates that lawmakers who supported the losers in the first round clearly preferred Ishiba. Of the 47 rank-and-file votes available, Ishiba received 26 and Takaichi 21.
 
Notwithstanding public criticism, obscure faction politics, as shown in the LDP’s slush fund scandal, it was the backstage moves of the factions that determined the result of the election, especially at the run-off stage.
 
LDP Vice-president Taro Aso, the leader of the eponymous Aso faction with 54 members, decided to support Takaichi a day before the voting and instructed his faction members to follow him. Takaichi’s surge among lawmakers’ votes in the first round, despite recent polls that had shown she had as little support in the Diet as Ishiba, was the result of the Aso faction’s support.
 
On the other side, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was concerned about Takaichi’s boost among the lawmakers. As a prime minister firmly committed to diplomacy, Kishida opposed the hawkish stance of Takaichi. For example, earlier she had promised to visit the Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister. Kishida advised the 47 members of his former faction never to vote for Takaichi. Although the Kishida faction had been dissolved, former members collectively voted against Takaichi and supported Ishiba in the run-off.
 
As part of his rivalry with Aso as a would-be kingmaker, former prime minister Yoshihide Suga supported Ishiba in the run-off and persuaded young colleagues to follow him. In the first round, Suga supported Koizumi, for whom Suga is guardian.  The support of lawmakers who voted for Koizumi in the first round (95 votes) was supposed to go to Ishiba in the run-off. Although the former Abe faction (92 members) and the Motegi faction (47 members) expected to vote for Takaichi in the run-off, they seemed unable to act collectively.
 
Ishiba started building up his administration the day after the election. He appointed as Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama, the Chairman of General Council in the Kishida Administration. Ishiba expects Moriyama, as the former leader of his own small faction, to balance the different interests in the LDP.
 
Moriyama in turn persuaded Aso to join Ishiba’s team as LDP Supreme Advisor. Ishiba invited Suga to come aboard as the LDP Vice-president as a way of, thanking him for his efforts to shift lawmakers’ votes to Ishiba in the run-off. Two hopeful kingmakers, Aso and Suga, now stand together at two of the highest positions, though nominal, in the party.
 
As for other members of the administration, their experience with defense policy seemed to be the main guidepost for Ishiba. In addition to Ishiba himself, the incoming Minister for Foreign Affairs Takeshi Iwaya, Minister of Defense Gen Nakatani, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi, and LDP Chairman of Policy Research Council Itsunori Onodera are all former defense minister.
 
On September 25, the Hudson Institute published an essay by Ishiba on security policy. Speaking in his personal capacity (rather than as Prime Minister), Ishiba proposed revisions to the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement “to allow the Self-Defense Forces to be stationed in Guam to strengthen the deterrence capabilities of Japan and U.S.” The appointment of defense experts reflects Ishiba’s desire to strengthen Japan’s defense capability.
 
Unsurprisingly, Ishiba’s political enemies are not part of his administration. Ishiba offered Takaichi the position of chief of the General Council, but Takaichi declined. Ishiba also asked another hawkish presidential candidate, Takayuki Kobayashi, to serve as the LDP’s chief of public affairs, but he rejected the offer. Ishiba may well have offered them these positions as a nominal attempt at party unity but fully expecting that they would refuse, either because they felt the positions beneath them or because they wanted to avoid being co-opted by his administration.   
 
Elsewhere in his administration, Ishiba picked Seiichiro Murakami as the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications. Murakami once called Shinzo Abe “public enemy.” Thus, Murakami’s appointment may stir anger among former allies of Abe in the party. Once the glow surrounding the new administration begins to dim, the struggles within the LDP may resume.
 
Although Ishiba in the past said that a general election of the Diet should occur after the traditional detailed discussion of his policies in the Diet, Ishiba has now shifted his stance to an earlier snap election. He made this decision on the advice of senior LDP leaders, including Moriyama, Kishida, and Aso. He has announced a general election of the House of Representatives on October 27.
 
October will be busy for the new prime minister. After his election in the Diet on Oct. 1, there will be: Ishiba’s policy speech on Oct. 4; discussion of those policies in a Diet plenary session on Oct. 7 and 8; dissolution of the House of Representatives on Oct. 9; Ishiba’s trip to the ASEAN Summit in Laos on Oct. 10 and 11; and proclaim on Oct. 15 a general election of the House of Representatives. The month ends with a snap election on the 27th. 

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BILL BROOKS OBSERVATIONS
Senior advisor at the Reischauer Center and adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins SAIS since 2009, after retiring from the U.S. Department of State. For 15 years, he served as the head of the U.S. Embassy in Japan’s media analysis and translation unit.

My recollection of Ishiba is that he is one of the LDP's most seasoned defense policy wonks. But whether his policy vision for the Alliance and regional security is implementable is another matter. His proposed establishment of an Asian-style NATO arrangement has been considered and rejected as unworkable long ago due to the variety of diverse security interests in the region. ASEAN would prefer to remain unaligned, not choosing one side or the other. The US has long expressed no interest in such a security arrangement, and Japan is certainly not capable of putting a NATO-like scheme together. China would react strongly to any security arrangement that seeks to contain it or threaten it. 

Regarding a revision of the SOFA, such a proposal has been kicking around the LDP for decades and going nowhere. I don't think it will gain traction among the majority of the party. The US would continue to reject any revision, arguing that problems with the US forces in Japan can be resolved by administrative actions, such as a memorandum of understanding with Japan. 

The greater question is whether Ishiba will continue the defense policies of Abe and Kishida, including the defense buildup plan and other commitments to the Alliance that have pleased Washington.