By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 29, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point
On July 28, the secretaries and ministers for foreign affairs and defense of both Japan and the United States issued a joint statement following the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) in Tokyo. Their statement focused on enhancing the interoperability of Japan and U.S. forces, including a new command system in each country’s defense organization, procurement of defense equipment and upgrading the countries’ discussion of extended deterrence. This cooperation is intended to counter recent demonstrations of military strength by China, Russia, and North Korea.
With the National Defense Strategy in 2022, Japan decided to establish a permanent Joint Headquarters to unify the commands of the three Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in order to reinforce its military readiness. The Diet finally passed a bill in May to set up the headquarters in the Ministry of Defense by the end of FY 2024.
Along with these internal actions in Japan, the 2+2 joint statement notes the U.S. intention to reconstitute the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as a joint force headquarters. The statement thus implemented the joint statement of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the U.S. President Joe Biden from April of this year, which announced that both countries would upgrade their command and control frameworks for greater interoperability.
Both countries are consolidating their commands in order to address the evolving security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, and to plan for contingencies regarding Taiwan. The USFJ has been under jurisdiction of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. To better integrate operations and strengthen interoperability and planning between Japan and the U.S., the U.S. will give the USFJ greater autonomy.
While the principle of interoperability assumes the equivalence of both forces, there is a concern in Japan that the JSDF will be a junior partner to the USFJ given the JSDF dependence on the USFJ for information, capabilities, and decision making. Some hope that the commander of the USJF will have the rank of General to balance the titles of both commanders.
The 2+2 also agreed to cooperate more in manufacturing defense equipment. Quoting the joint statement, “the Ministers welcomed high-priority efforts to pursue beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of Advanced Medium-range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).”
At their summit meeting in April, Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden agreed to convene a forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS). The 2+2 confirmed this decision and encouraged efforts in both the public and private sectors to improve missile technology, as well as supply chain resilience and repair of ships and aircrafts.
In 2023, the Japanese government eased restrictions on exports of defense equipment to the U.S. by revising the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Because Japanese manufacturers have been producing defense equipment under a U.S. license, exports of this equipment to the U.S. would be allowed. The 2+2 agreed that Japanese manufacturers would export to the U.S. about 3 billion yen’s worth of Patriot missiles.
A highlight of the 2+2 meetings was an upgrading of the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) to the minister level. Both governments have conducted EDD at a senior official level since 2010. Both countries now recognize a need to enhance cooperation on deterrence, given the current military environment.
The first minister-level EDD was held at the 2+2. The joint statement described concerns with “North Korea’s continued destabilizing behavior and sustained pursuit of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs, China’s accelerating and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and Russia’s undermining of arms control and the global nonproliferation regime.” Their concerns grew out of a 2023 DOD report on China’s military capability. That report indicated that China could acquire over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
However, EDD means that Japan will rely further on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Some Japanese newspapers noted that the Kishida administration has sent contradictory signals. As the chairman of the G7 Hiroshima Summit 2023, Kishida promoted a world without nuclear weapons. Yet the elevation of EDD might, according to a nuclear disarmament expert quoted in the Tokyo Shimbun, give North Korea a justification for its nuclear weapons arsenal.
The biggest reason for Japan and the U.S. to enhance their security cooperation is the growing power of China in the Indo-Pacific region. “The Ministers concurred that the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy seeks to reshape that international order for its own benefit at the expense of others,” said the 2+2 joint statement. China’s behavior is regarded as a serious concern to the alliance and the international community. The two governments reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands under the Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
Japan, meanwhile, keeps on trying to maintain a diplomatic channel with China. Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wan Yi in Laos behind the backdrop of ASEAN foreign ministers meeting. The two countries intend to strengthen their “strategically reciprocal relationship.” However, the meeting yielded no concrete results.
The 2+2 meeting reflected the fact that both Japan and the U.S. must solidify their security cooperation given the volatility of leadership in both countries. President Joe Biden has announced his withdrawal from the presidential election in November. If Republican Donald Trump is reelected it is uncertain if he would maintain the bilateral relationship. He has argued that U.S. allies, including Japan, have not paid their fair share of defense costs, relying instead on U.S. support.
As for Japan, Kishida’s unpopularity augurs poorly for his continuation as prime minister after the Liberal Democratic Party elections in September. Recent secrets and corruption scandals in the Defense Ministry and JSDF combine with Yasukuni Shrine visits by JSDF officers and the undisclosed sexual violence by U.S. servicemen undermine trust between the two militaries as well as the Japanese public. Officials in both countries, thus, hope the 2+2 statement will institutionalize existing bilateral agreements and encourage greater accountability.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 29, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point
On July 28, the secretaries and ministers for foreign affairs and defense of both Japan and the United States issued a joint statement following the meeting of the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) in Tokyo. Their statement focused on enhancing the interoperability of Japan and U.S. forces, including a new command system in each country’s defense organization, procurement of defense equipment and upgrading the countries’ discussion of extended deterrence. This cooperation is intended to counter recent demonstrations of military strength by China, Russia, and North Korea.
With the National Defense Strategy in 2022, Japan decided to establish a permanent Joint Headquarters to unify the commands of the three Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in order to reinforce its military readiness. The Diet finally passed a bill in May to set up the headquarters in the Ministry of Defense by the end of FY 2024.
Along with these internal actions in Japan, the 2+2 joint statement notes the U.S. intention to reconstitute the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) as a joint force headquarters. The statement thus implemented the joint statement of Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and the U.S. President Joe Biden from April of this year, which announced that both countries would upgrade their command and control frameworks for greater interoperability.
Both countries are consolidating their commands in order to address the evolving security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, and to plan for contingencies regarding Taiwan. The USFJ has been under jurisdiction of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in Hawaii. To better integrate operations and strengthen interoperability and planning between Japan and the U.S., the U.S. will give the USFJ greater autonomy.
While the principle of interoperability assumes the equivalence of both forces, there is a concern in Japan that the JSDF will be a junior partner to the USFJ given the JSDF dependence on the USFJ for information, capabilities, and decision making. Some hope that the commander of the USJF will have the rank of General to balance the titles of both commanders.
The 2+2 also agreed to cooperate more in manufacturing defense equipment. Quoting the joint statement, “the Ministers welcomed high-priority efforts to pursue beneficial co-production opportunities to expand production capacity of Advanced Medium-range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) and Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE).”
At their summit meeting in April, Prime Minister Kishida and President Biden agreed to convene a forum on Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition and Sustainment (DICAS). The 2+2 confirmed this decision and encouraged efforts in both the public and private sectors to improve missile technology, as well as supply chain resilience and repair of ships and aircrafts.
In 2023, the Japanese government eased restrictions on exports of defense equipment to the U.S. by revising the Three Principles of Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology. Because Japanese manufacturers have been producing defense equipment under a U.S. license, exports of this equipment to the U.S. would be allowed. The 2+2 agreed that Japanese manufacturers would export to the U.S. about 3 billion yen’s worth of Patriot missiles.
A highlight of the 2+2 meetings was an upgrading of the bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue (EDD) to the minister level. Both governments have conducted EDD at a senior official level since 2010. Both countries now recognize a need to enhance cooperation on deterrence, given the current military environment.
The first minister-level EDD was held at the 2+2. The joint statement described concerns with “North Korea’s continued destabilizing behavior and sustained pursuit of its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs, China’s accelerating and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and Russia’s undermining of arms control and the global nonproliferation regime.” Their concerns grew out of a 2023 DOD report on China’s military capability. That report indicated that China could acquire over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
However, EDD means that Japan will rely further on U.S. nuclear deterrence. Some Japanese newspapers noted that the Kishida administration has sent contradictory signals. As the chairman of the G7 Hiroshima Summit 2023, Kishida promoted a world without nuclear weapons. Yet the elevation of EDD might, according to a nuclear disarmament expert quoted in the Tokyo Shimbun, give North Korea a justification for its nuclear weapons arsenal.
The biggest reason for Japan and the U.S. to enhance their security cooperation is the growing power of China in the Indo-Pacific region. “The Ministers concurred that the People’s Republic of China’s foreign policy seeks to reshape that international order for its own benefit at the expense of others,” said the 2+2 joint statement. China’s behavior is regarded as a serious concern to the alliance and the international community. The two governments reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the defense of the Senkaku Islands under the Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.
Japan, meanwhile, keeps on trying to maintain a diplomatic channel with China. Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wan Yi in Laos behind the backdrop of ASEAN foreign ministers meeting. The two countries intend to strengthen their “strategically reciprocal relationship.” However, the meeting yielded no concrete results.
The 2+2 meeting reflected the fact that both Japan and the U.S. must solidify their security cooperation given the volatility of leadership in both countries. President Joe Biden has announced his withdrawal from the presidential election in November. If Republican Donald Trump is reelected it is uncertain if he would maintain the bilateral relationship. He has argued that U.S. allies, including Japan, have not paid their fair share of defense costs, relying instead on U.S. support.
As for Japan, Kishida’s unpopularity augurs poorly for his continuation as prime minister after the Liberal Democratic Party elections in September. Recent secrets and corruption scandals in the Defense Ministry and JSDF combine with Yasukuni Shrine visits by JSDF officers and the undisclosed sexual violence by U.S. servicemen undermine trust between the two militaries as well as the Japanese public. Officials in both countries, thus, hope the 2+2 statement will institutionalize existing bilateral agreements and encourage greater accountability.
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