A Third Trump–Kim Summit?

Xi’s North Korea Visit Puts a Trump-Kim Summit Back in Play

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published June 5, 2026 at Korean Economic Institute of America.

Chinese President Xi Jinping will make a rare visit to North Korea on June 8—his first international trip this year—weeks after hosting U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. The sequencing has revived a scenario that seemingly grew less likely as Trump’s second term wore on: a third Trump-Kim summit. This writer shared that skepticism, but recent conversations in Seoul with senior officials and North Korea analysts have produced a case for the summit that is proving harder to dismiss than six months ago.

Before reports of Xi’s Pyongyang visit surfaced, this writer had extensive discussions in Seoul with senior officials and well-informed North Korea analysts, during which the possibility of a Trump-Kim summit seemed to gain credence. The idea that such a meeting could even take place before the U.S. midterm elections in November came up in these conversations.

There are, of course, differing views on this and on relations with North Korea. The Lee Jae Myung administration’s senior advisors are seemingly grouped into two broad camps. The “jaju,” or autonomy, camp emphasizes inter-Korean relations and autonomy. The “dongmaeng,” or alliance, camp prioritizes alliance relations with the United States. While both camps may back another meeting between Trump and Kim to advance their respective goals, they interpret North Korea’s eagerness for talks differently.

The dongmaeng camp is more skeptical on this front. They argue Kim is now in a stronger position thanks to Russian aid and support for its nuclear weapons program, and point to tensions with China and sanctions for further strengthening the North Korea-Russia partnership. For example, when Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi flew to North Korea in April, interlocutors in Seoul told this writer that the Kim regime was unsatisfied with China’s reluctance to recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state.

In this view, economic problems in North Korea are not severe enough to threaten the country’s elite class or incentivize the regime to seek sanctions relief. The regime is focused on an intense military buildup, encouraged by its alliance with Moscow. As a result, the dongmaeng camp believes Kim is uninterested in dialogue but will want recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons in any future meeting.

Why Trump and Kim May Want to Meet

Not everyone is convinced. The jaju camp believes that Kim sees great utility in another summit with Trump because he is the only U.S. president that will give him the kind of reception and respect he seeks. Accordingly, if Trump does not set denuclearization as a precondition for talks and makes the initial move to seek a meeting, Kim will be open to the idea, those in the jaju circle argue. But, if denuclearization is explicitly on the table, one well-informed source told me, “he won’t go.”

From this perspective, a summit can happen even if Trump does not recognize or acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear state. The United States may not officially acknowledge this status, the argument goes, but if Trump refrains from bringing up the issue, Kim will think he has gone more than halfway. Russia has already acknowledged North Korea as a nuclear state. And China may be ready to follow Trump’s lead.

Whether this is a viable outcome for the U.S. president largely depends on how the war in Iran concludes. If it ends with an ambiguous solution to Iran’s nuclear program, that could open the door to the U.S.-North Korea summit outcome above. The claim would be that Trump and Kim have achieved “peace” on the Korean Peninsula, brought to an end the state of war that has existed for more than seventy years, and stabilized the entire region.

Some in Seoul suggested a version of the deal discussed in Hanoi in early 2019 could now be agreed upon, with formal denuclearization put aside for later. Kim would commit to no additional production of nuclear warheads—his current stockpile of more than fifty warheads is more than sufficient—and pledge not to proliferate nuclear technology to others, including Iran. Of particular appeal to Trump, Kim could offer to suspend the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching North America.

“Trump can sell to the U.S. public that he prevented war on the Korean peninsula,” a well-informed source suggested.

The Economic Driver

One important driver of a summit, at least for Kim but maybe for Trump as well, is the prospect of expanded economic cooperation. Conditions within North Korea are extremely stressed, says Kim Byung-Yeon, a North Korean economy expert at Seoul National University.

It is unclear whether living conditions have improved for most North Koreans since Kim took over in late 2011. The country is dealing with extremely high inflation, absurdly low exchange rates, runaway wages, and high rice prices despite Russian assistance. Kim Byung-Yeon says these crisis conditions are due to the regime’s “repression of the market, monopolistic conduct of trade, and suppression of dissent in an attempt to curb South Korean influence.”

From the jaju camp’s view, Kim Jong Un wants to make North Korea a strong and wealthy country. Russian recognition and support alone cannot make this a reality. For that, he needs investment from China and the West, and to that end, the United States and China need to cooperate.

This is not a new argument, and one contested by North Korean experts who see the regime driven mainly by its feverish security buildup, its own survival needs, and even lingering aims of forced unification.

The Third Wheel

The odd man out in this game is South Korea. Kim has abandoned unification, declared the South a hostile state, and severed inter-Korean channels that brokered the 2018 engagement period. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung has far less, if any, leverage compared to President Moon Jae-in at that time.

Opening the doors to engagement with South Korea would be the most effective means of rapid economic development for the North. But a senior official noted with some resignation, “It would lead to regime collapse. That is why they are open to every other country except the South.”

The Lee administration continues to call for broader talks. Minister of Unification Chung Dong Young, a prominent member of the jaju group, recently called for four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the United States, and China. But there is little reason to expect this proposal to go anywhere.

Ironically, perhaps, the Lee administration is now forced to rely on Trump’s outreach to Kim as the only means of improving inter-Korean relations.

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 8, 2026

JAPAN'S CRACKDOWN ON FOREIGN BUSINESS OWNERS. 6/8, 1:30-2:30pm (JST), 12:30-1:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Sakura Uchikoshi, Member of the House of Councillors; Kazuki Yuda, Touch Immigration Law Firm.

2026 JAPAN–PHILIPPINES FRIENDSHIP YEAR COMMEMORATIVE SYMPOSIUM. 6/8, 2:30-6:00pm (JST), 1:30-5:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation Tokyo. Speakers Include: H.E. Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of the Philippines; H.E. Shinjiro Koizumi, Minister of Defense, Member of the House of Representatives; Sen. Juan Miguel Fernández Zubiri, Senator, the Republic of the Philippines; Yoshiaki Wada, Member of the House of Representatives, Japan; Maryjun Takahashi; Shun Ohno, Affiliated Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University; Ines Yamanouchi Mallari, School President, Philippine Nikkei Jin Kai International School, School President, Mindanao Kokusai Daigaku.

PETRO DIPLOMACY 2026: ENERGY IN CRISIS. 6/8, 9:00am-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Phillip Cornell, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Global Energy Center, Atlantic Council; Mason Hamilton, Vice President of Economics and Research, American Petroleum Institute; Ben Cahill, Nonresident Fellow, AGSI; Ambassador William Roebuck, Executive Vice President, AGSI; Sarah Ladislaw, Founding Director, New Energy Industrial Strategy Center, Former Senior Director for Climate and Energy, U.S. National Security Council.

GAZA UPDATE: REALITIES, RISKS, AND THE ROAD AHEAD. 6/8, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Jaser Abu Mousa, Senior Fellow, MEI; Natan Sachs, Senior Fellow, MEI; Moderator: Lucy Kurtzer-Ellenbogen, Senior Fellow, MEI.

THE END OF TURKEY'S DEMOCRACY?: ERDOĞAN'S ATTEMPTS TO NEUTER THE LAST OPPOSITION PARTY. 6/8, 3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: Amb. Eric Edelman, Distinguished Scholar, JINSA, Former U.S. Ambassador to Turkey; Svante E. Cornell, Scholar, Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, JINSA; Blaise Misztal, Vice President for Policy, JINSA. Exclusively for JINSA National Leaders in good standing, program participants, congressional and administration staff, U.S. military, press, and select members of the policy community.

FRAGILITY, CONFLICT, AND THE FUTURE OF AID IN TURBULENT TIMES. 6/8, 4:00-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Global Development Department, CSIS. Speakers: David Miliband, President and CEO, International Rescue Committee (IRC); Rabih El Chammay, Head, National Mental Health Programme, Ministry of Health, Lebanon; Roya Rahmani, Director of Global Engagement, World Bank Group; Moderator: Enoh T. Ebong, President, Global Development Department, CSIS.

FROM YORKTOWN TO PHILADELPHIA: GEOPOLITICAL IMPERATIVES AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION. 6/8, 6:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Hillsdale College [MAGA]. Speaker: Paul A. Rahe, Professor of History, Charles O. Lee and Louise K. Lee Chair, Western Heritage, Hillsdale College.

KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES AND US NATIONAL SECURITY. 6/8, 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Speaker: Xavier Brunson, General Commander UNC/CFC/USFKs, United States Army.

FISCAL POLICY FORUM: THE ROLE OF FISCAL POLICY DURING GLOBAL ECONOMIC CRISES. 6/8, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Institute for Korean Studies at George Washington University, School of Public Policy and Management at Korea Development Institute. Speakers: Tom Ramage, Fellow/Economic Policy Analyst, Korea Economic Institute of America; Tami Overby, Partner, DGA Group Government Relations; Taesuk Lee, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Public Finance and Social Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI); Younghyun Kim, Director, Budget Communication Cooperation Division, Republic of Korea’s Ministry of Planning and Budget; Moderator: Celeste Arrington, Korea Foundation Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University.

The Future of Japan's Constitution

articles on Constitution

The Leading Coalition Accelerates a Constitutional Amendment

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 1, 2026

The leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) has accelerated its effort to amend the Constitution of Japan to deal with emergencies. The two parties claim that the discussion of proposed amendments is nearly wrapped up. However, some opposition parties expect further discussion. Even LDP lawmakers are divided over whether the Lower House or the Upper House should be the primary forum for debate. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi encourages the discussion, presenting herself as a brave leader grappling with a divisive issue – but with no clear hope of success.
 
An amendment to address emergencies that prevent the Diet from acting have taken at least two forms. One was a rough draft of an amendment that the Lower House Legislation Bureau submitted to the Commission on the Constitution of the House on May 14. The draft primarily would add a clause to the constitution that would, in the event of certain emergencies, allow Diet members to remain in office even after their terms expire. The amendment recognizes four categories of emergency: a major natural disaster, a major spread of infectious disease, social disorder by civil war and an armed attack of foreigners.
 
According to the draft, each of these emergencies can create an “election difficulty situation”: a time in which a national election cannot be held in broad geographic areas for a certain long period. Members of the Lower House have four-year terms, and six years are given to those elected to the Upper House. The draft of the amendment states that these terms will be extended in emergency. An election difficulty situation will be declared in advance by the Cabinet with the approval of the Diet.
 
A second type of response to an emergency is also in the draft. It includes a controversial provision to authorize the Cabinet to issue an “emergency ordinance.” “In a special occasion in which it cannot afford to wait for legislation by the Diet,” the draft says, “the Cabinet can enact an emergency ordinance which is equivalent to a law.” Although the draft requires approval of the Diet after the ordinance is declared, there is no time limit on Diet action and thus no time limit on an emergency ordinance.
 
A member of the Lower House commission who represents the LDP, Yoshitaka Shindo, commented to the press that most parties agreed on the extension of terms of lawmakers in emergency and that issue can be said to be “pinned down.” Another commission member from the JIP, Nobuyuki Baba, said that all the talking points on the amendment have now been proposed and discussed. The two parties in the leading coalition hope to proceed to the next step of drafting a provision to initiate an amendment.
 
Opposition parties do not want to rush the process. The Centrist Reform Alliance disagreed with Baba’s notion that the discussion was over and that new measures were necessary to maintain the ordinary functions of the Diet in an emergency. Article 54 of the Constitution of Japan already provides that the Cabinet can convoke an emergency session of the Upper House in a national emergency. The opposition parties believe that this existing power to gather the Upper House in an emergency session will ensure that the Diet will function even if the Lower House is empty.
 
Opposition parties are further skeptical about introducing the emergency ordinance. The leader of Democratic Party for the People, Yuichiro Tamaki, argued that the proposal for an emergency ordinance power was dropped in an agreement of five parties, including the LDP and the JIP, in 2024. Moreover, a situation in which the Diet would not work at all was unimaginable if lawmakers’ terms could be extended. The Japan Communist Party has pointed out that there was an imperial emergency ordinance in pre-war Japan that was issued in Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923. That power confirmed that the emperor had the highest state power.
 
This concept of imperial authority ended after World War II. Article 41 of the constitution states that the Diet is “the highest organ of state power and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.” If the Cabinet obtains the power to issue ordinances that are equal to a statute passed by the Diet, the relationship between the legislative and executive branch under the constitution will fundamentally be changed. The introduction of the executive branch’s power to declare an emergency ordinance would erode the status of the Diet as the supreme organ of state power.
 
An unignorable fact in the discussion over the constitutional amendment is that the leading coalition does not have even a simple majority in the Upper House. A super majority – a two-thirds vote – in each House of the Diet is necessary for a constitutional amendment to move forward. While the LDP and the JIP have that majority in the Lower House after the LDP’s sweeping victory in the February elections, they do not have even a simple majority in the Upper House.
 
The Upper House is focused on an entirely different constitutional issue. In the meeting of the Upper House Commission on the Constitution on May 20, the main topic of discussion was not the emergency clause but the election system. In Upper House elections, each prefecture has had its own seats. But with the decline of eligible voters, the districts of Tottori and Shimane were integrated into a single district, just as the Tokushima and Kochi were combined, for the 2016 election and thereafter. Members of the Upper House from both sides of the aisle have urged the elimination of such integrated districts
 
The LDP accordingly has proposed a constitutional amendment to abolish integrated prefectural districts. However, the top opposition party in the Upper House, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), does not believe that an amendment is necessary; rather, the Diet can achieve this end simply by amending the election laws. Komeito, as a partner of the CDPJ in the Lower House, supports this view.
 
The LDP and JIP have different priorities regarding a constitutional amendment. The JIP is focused on an emergency clause that would enhance executive power in a time of crisis. The LDP is going in a different direction, prioritizing electoral system reform in the Upper House. The LDP thinks it will be easier to reach a consensus there on election reforms than on the emergency clause amendment. 
 
As a lawmaker in the conservative bloc, PM Takaichi has presented herself as a firm proponent of the theory of constitutional amendments. “The constitution should occasionally be updated to meet contemporary demands,” said Takaichi to a recent meeting of supporters for constitutional amendment. She did not, however, provide any details on which provisions should be amended adding uncertainty to how the debate should proceed.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of May 24, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

China's War on Faith

By Ambassador Sam Brownback (R-KS), Chairman, National Committee for Religious Freedom

PURCHASE BOOK (5/12/2026)

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) spends billions of dollars annually to either control or exterminate people of all faiths. It is a strategic imperative for them. Christians, Buddhist, Muslims, Falun Gong, and more are seen as a threat to the control of China and the world by the CCP. 

The Modern Japanese Garden

By Stephen Mansfield, Author and 

Freelance Photo-Journalist based in Japan

PURCHASE BOOK (10/7/2025)

Japan has an immense diversity of garden designs, from animist-infused, prototypical stone arrangements placed in sacred groves, to extraordinary post-war innovations. Mansfield examines post-war shifts in attitudes towards the contemporary garden as they moved from status symbols and expressions of influence to spaces of healing, mediation, and connection to nature. The book contains brief essays from notable specialists in the fields of landscape design, garden aesthetics, and architecture, including Shyunmo Masuno, Japan’s leading garden designer.

Realizing Saudi Vision 2030: Governance, 

Institutions and Human Capital Development

By the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (ABOUT)

PURCHASE BOOK (2/19/2026)

A behind-the-scenes investigation into the current transformations taking place in Saudi Arabia. It comprises contributions from academics, researchers, policymakers and practitioners who have access to the decision-makers and relevant institutions in the country. Chapters focus on the remodeling of government entities, the creation of institutions, and the new opportunities made available for Saudis through human capital development initiatives, all key issues that are central to the Vision. 

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Monday in America, May 25, 2026

Ode for Memorial Day

By Paul Laurence Dunbar

1869

Done are the toils and the wearisome marches,

    Done is the summons of bugle and drum.

Softly and sweetly the sky overarches,

    Shelt’ring a land where Rebellion is dumb.

Dark were the days of the country’s derangement,

    Sad were the hours when the conflict was on,

But through the gloom of fraternal estrangement

    God sent his light, and we welcome the dawn.

O’er the expanse of our mighty dominions,

    Sweeping away to the uttermost parts,

Peace, the wide-flying, on untiring pinions,

    Bringeth her message of joy to our hearts.

Ah, but this joy which our minds cannot measure,

    What did it cost for our fathers to gain!

Bought at the price of the heart’s dearest treasure,

    Born out of travail and sorrow and pain;

Born in the battle where fleet Death was flying,

    Slaying with sabre-stroke bloody and fell;

Born where the heroes and martyrs were dying,

    Torn by the fury of bullet and shell.

Ah, but the day is past: silent the rattle,

    And the confusion that followed the fight.

Peace to the heroes who died in the battle,

    Martyrs to truth and the crowning of Right!

Out of the blood of a conflict fraternal,

    Out of the dust and the dimness of death,

Burst into blossoms of glory eternal

    Flowers that sweeten the world with their breath.

Flowers of charity, peace, and devotion

    Bloom in the hearts that are empty of strife;

Love that is boundless and broad as the ocean

    Leaps into beauty and fullness of life.

So, with the singing of paeans and chorals,

    And with the flag flashing high in the sun,

Place on the graves of our heroes the laurels

    Which their unfaltering valor has won!

🇺🇸

Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026

Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 
While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 18, 2026

BEYOND THE SAHEL: RUSSIA’S TOOLBOX FOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. 5/18, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Speakers: Anna Borshchevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Mvemba Dizolele, Adjunct Lecturer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Kate Johnston, Associate Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS; David McKenzie, Communications Director, CNAS.

IGP RAPID RESPONSE: US-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE TRUMP-XI SUMMIT. 5/18, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics (IGP), Columbia University. Speakers: Isaac Arnsdorf, White House Bureau Chief, Washington Post, Thomas J. Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, IGP Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia SIPA, Pritzker Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Erica Downs, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA; Julian Gewirtz, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Former Senior Director, China and Taiwan Affairs, US National Security Council, author of Never Turn Back; Liza Tobin, Managing Director, Garnaut Global, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Former NSC China Director. Moderator: Zongyuan Liu, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Author of Sovereign Funds.

BOOK TALK: IRAN AND THE BOMB: THE ORIGINS AND TRAJECTORY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 5/18, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: author Sina Azodi, Assistant Professor of Middle East Politics, Director, Middle East Studies MA Program, George Washington University; Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson; Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4nK3MNt

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 11, 2026

SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA SYMPOSIUM. 5/11, 9:00am-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for the Study of Contemporary China (CSCC), University of Pennsylvania. Speakers include: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Kyle Chan, Fellow, Brookings Institution; Yangyang Cheng, Research Scholar, Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center; Junmin Wang, Professor, The University of Memphis; Joshua Freedman, Foreign Affairs; Susan Greenhalgh, Professor Emerita, Harvard University; Wanheng Hu, Stanford University; Yuchen Chen, Baruch College; Ke Li, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Larry Au, The City College of New York; Lizhi Liu, Assistant Professor, Georgetown University; Jamie Wong, Princeton University; Abigail Coplin, Vassar College; Lizzi Lee, Asia Society; Graham Webster, Stanford University; Paul Triolo, DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group; Samm Sacks, New America/Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center; Scott Moore, University of Pennsylvania; Deborah Seligsohn, Villanova University.

A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH KEVIN RUDD & IAN BREMMER. 5/11, 6:30-7:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society, New York. Speakers: Kevin Rudd, Former Australia’s 26th Prime Minister and returning to the Asia Society as its 10th President & CEO; Ian Bremmer, President and Founder, Eurasia Group. FEE

POWERING GLOBAL COOPERATION: INNOVATION, SECURITY, & GEOPOLITICS IN A CHANGING ENERGY LANDSCAPE. 5/11, 4:30pm-6:00pm (PDT), 7:30pm-9:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hoover. Speakers: Condoleezza Rice, Director, Hoover Institution; Arun Majumdar, Dean, Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability; David C. Mulford, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution. Moderator: Šumit Ganguly, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of May 4, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Privileged but Powerless: How North Korean Elite Grievances Reveal the Regime’s Greatest Weakness

                By Jieun Baek, Doctorate Student of Public Policy, 

Oxford University

PURCHASE BOOK (5/5/2026)

Drawing on hundreds of hours of in-depth interviews with escapees from Pyongyang, Baek examines how members of this privileged class, granted access to forbidden information and superior material benefits, publicly uphold the regime despite their underlying discontent. Baek argues that this performative loyalty, born of fear and a desire to survive, masks a critical vulnerability within the regime’s core.

Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics: The United States and China in an Age of Indo-Pacific Transformation

By Kent E. Calder, Director, Edwin O. Reischauer Center 

for East Asian Studies

PURCHASE BOOK (2/7/2025)

Examines the strategic geography of the sea lanes from Northeast Asia through the Indian Ocean to Europe, through which much of the world's energy and information flow. Changing technology and economic patterns have profoundly transformed the global significance of those passageways since the end of the Cold War, with fateful consequences for the strategic calculations of both the United States and a rising China. A timely contribution to today's geopolitics.

Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work

By Alvin E. Roth, Professor, Stanford University and Harvard University

PURCHASE BOOK (5/12/2026)

Disagreements are fierce because arguments on both sides are often made in uncompromising moral or religious terms. Roth asserts that we can make progress on these and other difficult topics if we view them as markets—tools to help decide who gets what—and understand how those markets can be fine-tuned to be more functional. Markets don’t have to allow everything or ban everything. 

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Can the Food Consumption Tax be eliminated?

Takaichi Faces the Food Consumption Tax Problem

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 4, 2026
 
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is having difficulty living up to her campaign commitment to eliminate the consumption tax on food for two years. Takaichi plans to introduce a tax cut bill by the end of fiscal year 2026, that is, by the end of March 2027, but the sales registration system cannot be adjusted to reflect the elimination within that timeframe. The leading parties are discussing a one percent tax rate, which the system can manage, but which is different from what Takaichi committed to in February’s Lower House election.
 
When Takaichi decided this past January to have a Lower House snap election in February to strengthen her political base in the Diet, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) included this policy in its campaign platform. The LDP said that “we accelerate considering the exclusion of food from the consumption tax for two years.” It was a countermeasure to the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) proposal to permanently eliminate the consumption tax on food.
 
After the party achieved a sweeping victory in the election, Takaichi explained that she would accelerate discussion on a zero-percent consumption tax on food for two years as a temporary measure until a refundable tax credit bill was introduced. The food consumption tax cut and the refundable tax credit are intended to support low-income families.
 
To implement these policies, Takaichi launched the National Conference on Social Security in late February, which includes members of some opposition parties. During a series of meetings, the Conference realized that elimination of the consumption tax has a technical problem. Major software engineering companies testified in April before the Conference that it would take nine to twelve months to adjust retailers’ sales registration systems to include elimination of the consumption tax on food. The system could not readily include zero-percent taxation. This timeframe would not meet Takaichi’s deadline.
 
The engineers assured the Conference, however, that they could modify the system within three months if the adjustment were to one percent rather than zero percent. Reducing tax rate from the current eight percent to one percent eases the tax rate by a substantial amount. The chairman of the conference and the chief of the LDP Research Commission on Tax System, Itsunori Onodera, reportedly said “That’s a good idea.” So, the one percent consumption tax on food suddenly appeared on the table.
 
The size of the cut notwithstanding, one percent, is totally different to the public from zero percent. Citizens have already taken account of a zero percent tax. Indeed, they believe it to be one of Takaichi’s core promises to the voters in the February Lower House election. If she fails to implement it, the Takaichi Cabinet’s approval rating will fall; indeed, this consequence is already showing up in current polls.
 
The consumption tax cut has other problems besides the registration system. Restaurants will be adversely affected because consumers will prefer buying untaxed food in supermarkets to more expensive restaurant dinners. Local governments will lose revenue since the national government now sends 40 percent of the consumption tax proceeds to them. 
 
Despite these hurdles, Takaichi still plans on zero percent. She envisages a schedule in which the national Conference concludes its work in early summer, the cabinet submits tax elimination bills in the Diet’s fall session, and the Diet passes the bills by the end of 2026. The two-year hiatus of the food tax rate would take effect at the end of the fiscal year next March.
 
Takaichi’s ideas on the consumption tax cut have occasionally changed. In May 2005, two months before the Upper House election, Takaichi told her disappointment on negative stance on consumption tax cut by then prime minister Shigeru Ishiba. She proposed no consumption tax on foods. Then, when she ran for the LDP presidency last September, she became reluctant to push for the elimination. Her reluctance was based on her view that, given current price inflation, elimination of the tax would not be an efficient way to fight inflation. Moreover, she already understood the considerable length of time that would be required to change the retailers’ sales registration system. Observers believe that she opposed a total elimination to garner the support of an LDP heavyweight, Taro Aso, who also opposed a tax cut. She at least acknowledged the practical difficulties of a consumption tax cut at this time.
 
But Takaichi then confirmed her original position in January 2026 when she called the dissolution of the Lower House. She began to say that a consumption tax cut had been her long-cherished wish. But the remarkable fact is that Takaichi has never explicitly said that she has decided to introduce zero percent consumption tax on food. She has only said that she would accelerate consideration of a full if temporary elimination.
 
The consumption tax issue has destroyed some previous administrations. The LDP lost in the 1979 Lower House election when prime minister Masayoshi Ohira considered introducing a major indirect tax, including a food consumption tax. The defeat ignited a sharp division in the LDP, and Ohira died of fatigue the following year.
 
It was former prime minister Noboru Takeshita who introduced a consumption tax for the first time at three percent. But it became one of the reasons that the approval rating for him fell into the single digits. A later prime minister who decided the consumption tax rate from five percent to ten was not Shinzo Abe but Yoshihiko Noda in 2012. Noda led a three-party consensus of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the LDP, and Komeito to push for an integrated reform of social security and taxes in 2012, but his DPJ lost its government in the Lower House election later that year.
 
The consumption tax has been introduced as a fiscal resource to support senior citizens as Japan becomes an increasingly aging society. However, the Japanese people have been complaining about the tax on their daily consumption. The function of the tax and the popular desire to eliminate it are incompatible. Like other prime ministers, Takaichi is now facing this political tension.