Imperial Succession

Diet Discussion on the Imperial Family Resumes

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 20, 2026

Both chambers of the Diet, including all the parties, resumed on April 16 their discussion of a stable process for succession to the imperial throne. The Speaker of House of Representatives, Eisuke Mori, hopes to wrap up the discussion and approve a revised Imperial House Law by the end of current session of the Diet, which is scheduled to close on July 15^th. However, opinions of the parties are so different that they are unlikely to reach a consensus soon.
 
It was the first meeting with all the parties since April 2025 when two former prime ministers, Taro Aso with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Yoshihiko Noda with the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDPJ) of Japan, hit an impasse on the details of revision of the law. The structure of both chambers has changed significantly since then after the elections of the Upper House in 2025 and the Lower House in 2026.
 
It is recognized that keeping members of the Imperial Family would contribute stable succession to the throne. With a decrease in the number of male members in the Imperial Family who can succeed to the imperial throne, it is urgent that Japan find a way to put a workable succession process in place. The current Imperial House Law limits succession to male offspring in the male line. The Emperor Abdication Special Law, enacted in 2017, which allowed Emperor Akihito to abdicate, compels the Diet to reach a consensus on imperial succession as the will of the legislative branch.
 
A governmental conference of experts proposed to the Diet in 2021 two options for keeping members of the Imperial Family. They were 1) allowing female members to stay in the Imperial Family after marriage and 2) reinstating male members of the former Imperial Family along the male line through adoption. While the LDP, with its coalition partner the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), considers the latter the top priority, the CDPJ focuses on the former.
 
The CDPJ argues for the first option that the spouse and children of female members in the Imperial Family should also be given the status of members of the Imperial Family. The LDP is adamantly opposed, fearing that it would pave the way for an emperor in the female line. The CDPJ is skeptical about the second option because a former member of the Imperial Family may prefer not to be reinstated in the Imperial Family. These conceptual gaps have not narrowed in the discussions among the parties.

The Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) in the Lower House, which resulted from the merger of the CDPJ and Komeito in January 2026, does not have internal agreement on this issue. Mori has asked the CRA to reach a consensus within a month and before the next meeting. The Democratic Party for the People, Komeito, and Sanseito all agree with both options.
 
The conservative parties, including the LDP, JIP and Sanseito, strongly advocate for exclusively patrilinear succession and oppose an emperor in the female line. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi asserted in her speech to the LDP national convention on April 12^th that the history of succession through the male line is the source of the throne’s authority and legitimacy.
 
It is a controversial argument. The Constitution of Japan does not include her conception of the emperor’s status. Article 1 states that the emperor’s position derives from “the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.” The emperor’s “authority and legitimacy” thus stems from the people – who therefore may call for changes. Takaichi and the conservative powers’ insistence on succession along the male line may undermine the legal basis of the emperor as stated in the Constitution.
 
Currently, there are 16 members alive in the Imperial Family, all of whom are descendants of Emperor Yoshihito of Taisho. Five are males, and 11 females. The order of succession to Emperor Naruhito is topped by Crown Prince Akishino, Naruhito’s younger brother, followed by Akishino’s son Prince Hisahito, and Prince Hitachi, a younger brother of Emperor Emeritus Akihito. Under the patrilinear descent concept, Hisahito is the only possible successor in the next generation of Naruhito. Akihito is not included in the order of possible successors.
 
Female members of the Family include Princess Masako, her daughter Princess Aiko and Akihito’s wife Michiko. In the branches, the Akishino family has two females, Kiko and Kako, and other branches have six who have not married. A female member who marries a commoner must leave the Imperial Family.
 
In 1947, just before the Imperial Household Law took effect, there were 51 members of the Imperial Family. Eleven families left the Imperial Family later that year, partly because the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces shrank the budget for the privileges of the Imperial Family. The departing families were branches of male lines of former Emperors.
 
Those 11 former Imperial Families included the Fushimi, Kan-in, Yamashina, Kitashirakawa, Nashimoto, Kuni, Kaya, Higashifushimi, Asaka, Takeda, and Higashikuni branches. Now, only four of them, Kuni, Kaya, Takeda and Higasikuni, have male members in the male lines. Other families are expected to be eliminated as former Imperial Families, since they have no male successor.
 
Among the 11 families, the Takedas may be the best known. Tsunekazu Takeda is former president of Japan Olympic Committee. He is the third son of Tsuneyosi, a grandson of the Meiji Emperor. Tsunekazu, as the chairman of the bid committee, was involved in lobbying for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games (actually held in 2021), was targeted by French prosecutors in an Olympics corruption probe. Tsunekazu’s son, Tsuneyasu Takeda, is well known as an ultra-conservative TV commentator. Tsunekazu and Tsuneyasu, however, have never been members of the Imperial Family because they were born after the Takeda family had left the royal household.
 
The second option in the 2021 experts’ report proposed that patrilinear members of the imperial family could adopt male members of the eleven families who had left in 1947.  However, the CRA and the CDPJ argue that such adoptions may violate Article 14 of the Constitution of Japan. Article 14 prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Forcing a man in one of the 11 families into the Imperial Family but who does not want to go may constitute discrimination. Debate over the stability of the Imperial Family is hard to keep politically neutral.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 19, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Cold War Comrades: An Emotional History 

of the Sino-North Korean Alliance

By Gregg A. Brazinsky, Professor of History and International Affairs, 

George Washington University

PURCHASE BOOK 1/8/2026

Brazinsky argues that neither the PRC nor the DPRK would have survived as socialist states without the ideal of Sino-North Korean friendship. Chinese and North Korean leaders encouraged mutual empathy and sentimental attachments between their citizens and then used these emotions to strengthen popular commitment to socialist state building. He explains why the unique relationship that Beijing and Pyongyang forged during the Korean War remained important throughout the Cold War and how it continues to influence the international relations of East Asia today.

Narrowing Sea: Fukuoka, Pusan, and the Rise 

and Fall of an Imperial Region

By Hannah Shepherd, Assistant Professor of History, 

Yale University

PURCHASE BOOK 12/2/2025

Shepherd examines the shared histories of Pusan and Fukuoka over the eight decades from Japan's forced opening of Korea's ports in 1876 to the end of the Korean War in 1953. Wars, colonization, and capitalist industrialization forged intimate connections between the two, knitting together an imperial region that transcended its maritime boundaries. She challenges traditional views of empire and urban growth and shows how local networks, migration, and capital flows shaped the region's exploitative and uneven geographies.

Tradecraft, Tactics, and Dirty Tricks: 

Russian Intelligence and Putin's Secret War

By Sean Wiswesser, Former Senior Operations Officer,

Central Intelligence Agency

PURCHASE BOOK 4/21/2026

Using historical examples and firsthand accounts, this book reveals the tactics employed by the three main services of Russia's intelligence apparatus: the SVR, GRU, and FSB. Wiswesser's unparalleled expertise comes from years of sitting across from Russian intelligence officers, operating overseas, and using their own methods against them. He breaks down ten key elements of their tradecraft, offering invaluable insights.

Japanese Rebels: Non-Conformists in a Conformist Society

By David McNeill, Former Correspondent, The Independent 

and The Economist

&

Stephen McClure, Freelance Journalist, Former Asia Bureau Chief, Billboard

PURCHASE BOOK 4/28/2026

Japan is often seen through the lens of an unusually resilient stereotype that it is a nation of risk-averse conformists. McNeill and McClure deconstruct that stereotype by showing that there have always been Japanese people who have rejected the status quo, challenged injustice, and fought for personal freedom. 

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Asia Policy Events, Monday April 20, 2026

ISHIGAKI RESORT DEVELOPMENT AND THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS. 4/20, 1:00-2:00pm (JST), Midnight-1:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speakers: Seiji Hayama, Director, Wild Bird Society of Japan; Tomoko Oda, Field Project Leader, Wildlife Group, Conservation Division, WWF Japan.

THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, FOUR DECADES LATER. 4/20, 3:00-4:00pm (JST), 2:00-3:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan (FCCJ). Speaker: Karel van Wolferen, Former President, FCCJ.  PURCHASE BOOK

PAKISTAN AT THE CENTER: A YEAR OF CHANGE AT HOME AND ABROAD FOR ISLAMABAD. 4/20, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Christopher Clary, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University at Albany; Elizabeth Threlkeld, Senior Fellow and Director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center; Asfandyar Mir, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program, Stimson Center. Moderator: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow, South Asia Program, Stimson Center.

STRATEGIC FORCES PRIORITIES: A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR DEB FISCHER. 4/20, 9:30-10:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS, HTK Series, Aerospace Security Project, Missile Defense Project, Project on Nuclear Issues, Defense and Security. Speakers: Senator Deb Fischer (R-NE), Chair, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces; Heather Williams, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department; Tom Karako, Director, Missile Defense Project, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department; Kari A. Bingen, Director, Aerospace Security Project, Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department.

THE IMPACT OF THE IRAN WAR ON TURKEY. 4/20, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Serhat Güvenç, Head of Faculty of Economics, Administrative, and Social Sciences at Kadir Has University; Jason Campbell, Senior Fellow, MEI; Gönül Tol, Senior Fellow, MEI. 

HOW THE IRAN WAR IS SHIFTING REGIONAL DYNAMICS. 4/20, 1:00-2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute. Speakers: Yasmine Farouk is the Project Director of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula at International Crisis Group; Mirette F. Mabrouk is a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute; Kenneth M. Pollack (Moderator) is Vice President for Policy at the Middle East Institute.  

AI AND NATIONAL SECURITY: WHO'S REALLY IN CONTROL? 4/20, 6:00-7:15pm (BST), 1:00-2:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speakers: Joyce Hakmeh, Associate Fellow, International Security Programme; General Sir Richard Barrons KCB CBE, Senior Consulting Fellow, International Security Programme; John Thornhill, Innovation Editor, Financial Times; Katja Bego, Senior Research Fellow, Europe Programme.

LESSONS FROM CANADA ON ALLIED BURDEN-SHARING IN GLOBAL WMD THREAT REDUCTION. 4/20, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Troy Lulashnyk, Director General, Peace and Security Programs, Global Affairs Canada; Timothy Edwards, Director, Weapons Threat Reduction Program, Global Affairs Canada; Moderator: Brian Finlay, President and CEO, Stimson Center.

THE CHINESE ECONOMY AND FUTURE OF SINO-US ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 4/20, 3:30-5:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: School of International Service, American University. Speakers: Liqing Zhang, Professor of Economics, Director of Center for International Finance Studies and Former Dean of School of Finance with Central University of Finance and Economics (CUFE) in Beijing, China; Randall Henning; Professor of International Economic Relations (IER) at SIS. 

WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IMPACT ON ASIA'S SEA LANES. 4/20, 10:00am (SGT), 10:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speakers: Collin Koh Swee Lean, Senior Fellow, Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS); John Bradford, Japan Foundation Indo-Pacific Partnerships Fellow, Executive Director, YCAPS, Adjunct Senior Fellow, RSIS; Fang Yang, Asia Maritime Security Analyst at Ambrey; Adrian Ang U-Jin, Research Fellow and Coordinator, US Program within the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, RSIS, Nanyang Technological University. 

Takaichi Moves Forward without Concensus

PM Takaichi Grapples with a Divisive Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 13, 2026
 
Having passed the FY2026 budget bill, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi will spend the rest of the Diet’s current session promoting her conservative agenda. This may include establishing a National Intelligence Council, criminalizing the destruction of Japan’s national flag, and reviewing Japan’s three critical security documents. Takaichi characterizes her agenda as “policies dividing public opinion into two.” Takaichi seems to have decided to be a divisive leader, uninterested in uniting the nation. 
 
On January 19, Takaichi announced the dissolution of the House of Representatives. “I’m going to boldly grapple with issues that may divide national opinion,” Takaichi said, explaining her decision to dissolve the House. She interpreted the sweeping victory of her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the Lower House election on February 8 as total public support for her agenda.
 
Takaichi may have meant that she would tackle controversial issues without compromise, that is, to perform as the leader who makes progress toward her own ambitious goals. However, it soon became clear that her “divisive agenda” meant conservative policies, certain to meet opposition from liberal parties in the Diet.  Having no majority in the Upper House, it is unclear how she and the LDP will bring her controversial policies to fruition.
 
National Intelligence Council
The Takaichi Cabinet has submitted to the Diet a bill to establish a National Intelligence Council (NIC). The council would research and discuss national security, including potential terrorist activity and foreign espionage in Japan. Members of the council would be the prime minister and her cabinet members whose ministries deal with national security issues. 
 
The council would be supported by a bureaucratic organization called the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) -- the Japanese version of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. It would be an upgraded organization from the current Cabinet Intelligence and Research Agency and would integrate the functions of some intelligence sections in the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, as well as the police agency. It is still unclear whether these ministries can share with another body the information that they collected for their own purposes. 
 
Debate on the bill started in the Diet in early April. The minority parties are concerned that the new NIA will collect information about their political and campaign activities that would oppose the government that is in office. Takaichi insists that the legislation would not allow the government to violate the privacy of individuals and would not target the activities of civil groups.
 
However, the legislation contains no provision for oversight of the NIC’s activities, nor does the bill enable the Diet to operate as a check on the NIC or the NIA.
 
The Takaichi administration has proposed additional anti-espionage legislation to reinforce security against foreign spies. The coalition agreement between the LDP and Japan Innovation Party (JIP) last October included work on legislation that would require foreign agents to register with the government and to disclose their lobbying.
 
Punishment for Damaging the National Flag
Article 92 of Penal Code penalizes a person who damages the flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country with up to two years imprisonment or a fine of two hundred thousand yen. Although Article 92 is a part of the criminal law that deals with crimes against diplomacy, some right-wingers claim it is unreasonable for Japan’s criminal code not to include any punishment for damaging the flag of Japan.
 
This argument has resonated with Takaichi, and the LDP-JIP agreement from last October affirmed that they would pursue legislation to create the “crime of damaging Japan’s flag” during the 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. An opposition party, Sanseito, also support criminalizing damage to Japan’s flag as part of their “Japan First” agenda. This legislation is a high priority for the conservative voters who have supported Takaichi.
 
The LDP held its first meeting on the issue in late March. The legislative team, headed by former Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hirokazu Matsuno, examined examples of similar legislation in foreign countries and anti-flag-desecration measures by former administrations in Japan. When Japan legislated Hinomaru (日の丸) as the national flag and Kimigayo (君が代) as the national anthem in 1999, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announced that he did not intend to make damage to the Japanese flag a criminal offense.

The LDP and JIP hope to conclude their discussion of a bill by late April. However, they have not yet reached an agreement on what kind of damage to the Japanese flag should be punished. There are skeptics about criminalization. Liberal groups argue that doing so may violate freedom of thought or freedom of expression as described in Article 19 and 21 of the Constitution of Japan. Even some LDP members believe that the act should be remained in conceptual provisions and damaging Japanese flag should not be criminalized.
 
Arms Exports
Takaichi tends to see security policy in the context of money. Her administration is promoting arms exports since they contribute to economic growth. She intends to reduce the regulation of shipments that the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology now cover. The implementation guidelines of the Three Principles allow arms exports for only five purposes: rescue, transportation, vigilance, surveillance, and minesweeping.
 
The Takaichi government presented to the LDP in early April a draft of a regulation to ease restrictions on arms exports. The draft would replace the five functional categories with an export control regime that distinguishes between exports of “arms” and “non-arms.” “Arms” are weapons and lethal systems; the draft regulation would allow exports to partner countries. There would be no restrictions on exports of non-arms. The National Security Council is planning to revise the guidelines in late April with approval of the leading parties.
 
A controversial point in the draft is how the Diet is engaged in the decision on arms exports. The draft would require the administration to report to the Diet on arms exports only after the equipment has been exported. Post hoc reporting of arms sales is unusual. In the United States, the executive branch must give Congress advance notice and an opportunity to review proposed arms sales. In the UK, Parliament and even the courts have had roles in reviewing arms sales before they are concluded.
 
Takaichi’s idea is based on a notion that Japan can earn money and promote her conservative agenda by expanding arms exports. However, strictly refraining from these exports has been Japan’s traditional policy as a pacifist nation—an ethos adopted in the wake of the devastation of the war. One Komeito lawmaker quoted a 1976 comment by then Minister for Foreign Affairs Kiichi Miyazawa: “Even if some foreign exchange surplus could be earned, our nation has not stooped so low as to make money by exporting weapons.” No such pride or moral authority as a leader of Japan can be seen in Takaichi.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 12, 2026

📚Books of the Week📖

 

Korean Messiah: Kim Il Sung and the Christian Roots 

of North Korea's Personality Cult

By Jonathan Cheng, Beijing Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal

PURCHASE BOOK 4/14/2026

North Korea’s founder, Kim Il Sung, was the son of two fervent Christians who created his own cult-like ideolog, Kimilsungism. It was an excuse that fostered idolatry that elevated him, and his successor son and grandson, to Christlike status. Drawing on letters, diaries, and never-before-unearthed archival material, Cheng tells the true story of a country shrouded in fictions and oppression.

Defending Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent War with China

By Eyck Freymann, Hoover Fellow, Stanford University

PURCHASE BOOK 4/15/2026

Freymann argues that Washington's deterrence strategy, especially against China, must extend beyond conventional military power and familiar threats of mutually assured destruction. America must work with allies to develop a bold new vision of technological and economic statecraft--and a plan to secure its interests if deterrence fails. 

West Asia: A New American Grand Strategy in the Middle East
By Mohammed Soliman, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute

PURCHASE BOOK 2/3/2026

Soliman shows how the U.S. could lock in a new balance of power in the Eurasian supercontinent to offset China and Russia's efforts to disrupt the status quo and create a rival system. This new strategy rests on three layered coalitions ― geostrategic, hard-power, and geo-technological ― that together can anchor a stable order stretching from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. But this will require a fundamental shift in U.S. grand strategy, with 'West Asia' at its core.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Asia Policy Events, Monday April 13, 2026

SCIENCE DIPLOMACY SUMMIT 2026. 4/13-14, IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Johns Hopkins University, Bloomberg Center. Speakers Include: Marcia McNutt, President, National Academy of Sciences; Karen Pierce, UK Special Envoy for the Western Balkans, Chair of Ditchley; Brother Guy Consolmagno, SJ, Director Emeritus, Vatican Observatory; Juliet Gerrard, Professor, University of Auckland.

PRINCIPALS OF THE NEW WORLD ECONOMY. 4/13-17, IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Semafor World Economy. Speakers Include: Cristiano Amon, CEO, Qualcomm; Bill Anderson, CEO, Bayer; Jason Buechel, CEO, Whole Foods Market; David Burritt, CEO, U.S. Steel; Calvin Butler, CEO, Exelon; Thasunda Brown Duckett, CEO, TIAA; Brad Garlinghouse, CEO, Ripple; Michelle Gass, CEO, Levi’s; Ken Griffin, CEO, Citadel; Rene Haas, CEO, Arm Holdings; Reid Hoffman, Co‑founder, LinkedIn. 

THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE REWIRED: JAPAN’S QUANTUM POLICY BETWEEN INNOVATION AND SECURITY. 4/13, 6:00-7:30pm (JST), 5:00-6:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsors: French Institute of Research on Japan (IFRJ-MFJ) Tokyo; Economic Department, French Embassy in Japan. Speakers: Sebastian Maslow, Associate Professor, University of Tokyo. Moderator: Malo Mofakhami, Associate Professor, Sorbonne Paris Nord University, IFRJ-MFJ, CNRS. 

ADMIRAL DARYL CAUDLE ON THE STRATEGIC VISION FOR THE US NAVY. 4/13, 9:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: Admiral Daryl Caudle, 34th Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy; Michael Andersson, Head of Strategic Partnerships and International Affairs, Saab, Inc., Board Director, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Joe Costa, Director, Forward Defense, Atlantic Council. 

ASSESSING THE U.S.-IRANIAN TRUCE AND FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS. 4/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Arab Gulf States Institute (AGSI). Speakers: Kristin Smith Diwan, Senior Resident Scholar, AGSI; Hussein Ibish, Senior Resident Scholar, AGSI; Sultan Al-Nuaimi, Director General, Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research; Moderator: Douglas A. Silliman, President, AGSI.

WHAT PATH FORWARD? THE BOARD OF PEACE, GAZA, AND THE FUTURE OF MULTILATERALISM. 4/13, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Yasmine Farouk, Project Director, Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, International Crisis Group; Joseph Saba, Chairman, Board of Directors, ANERA; Former Regional Director for the Middle East, World Bank; Michael Mattler, Former Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs, U.S. Department of State; Muhammad Shehada, Visiting Fellow, Middle East and North Africa Program, European Council on Foreign Relations; Zaha Hassan, Senior Fellow, Middle East Program. 

BOOK TALK: RETRENCH, DEFEND, COMPETE: SECURING AMERICA’S FUTURE AGAINST A RISING CHINA. 4/13, Noon-1:30pm (PDT), 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University. Speaker: author Charles L. Glaser, Senior Fellow, MIT Security Studies Program and Professor Emeritus of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/48poKe4 

THE NEXT GENERATION OF GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE PARTNERSHIPS. 4/13, 1:00-2:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Jose Manuel “Babe” del Gallego Romualdez, Ambassador, Embassy of the Philippines in Washington D.C.; Alexander Benard, Co-Head of Cerberus Frontier and Senior Managing Director, Cerberus Capital Management; Carlos Ruiz-Hernandez, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Americas Program; Derek Berlin, Senior Vice President, Logistics Plus Inc.; Romina Bandura, Senior Fellow, Project on Prosperity and Development. 

MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR/MISSILE THREATS. 4/13, 1:30-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Speaker: Vann H. Van Diepen, Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. 

VATICAN DIPLOMACY IN AN AGE OF ESTRANGEMENT, POWER POLITICS, AND WAR. 4/13, 2:00pm (EDT), HYBRID, 1334 Longworth House Office Building. Sponsor: Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Speakers: Jackie Aldrette, Deputy Secretary General for US Relations of the AVSI Foundation; Victor Gaetan, Senior International Correspondent at the National Catholic Register; Peter G. Martin, Special Assistant to the President of Boston College and former U.S. diplomat accredited to the Holy See.  

GASTON SIGUR MEMORIAL LECTURE: CHINA'S REIMAGINED FUTURE. 4/13, 5:00-6:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. Speakers: Elizabeth Economy, Hargrove Senior Fellow and co-chair of the Program on the US, China, and the World, Hoover Institution; Moderator: Bruce Dickson, Professor, George Washington University. 

BOOK TALK: KOREAN MESSIAH: KIM IL SUNG AND THE CHRISTIAN ROOTS OF NORTH KOREA'S PERSONALITY CULT. 4/13, 6:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Society. Speakers: author Jonathan Cheng, China Bureau Chief, Wall Street Journal; Barbara Demick, author of Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea. Moderator: Jonathan Corrado, Policy Director. PURCHASE BOOK

Japan's Energy Security Threatened

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant

Concerns on Energy Scarcity

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 8, 2026

It is possible that Japan will go back to the stone age before Iran does. Concern about an energy shortage is growing in Japan ever since the United States began to attack Iran and Iran effectively blocked most oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, including those headed to Japan. Sanae Takaichi’s administration has been taking interim measures to remedy the resulting shortage and to limit oil price hikes. However, the government of Japan does not have a clear path to get through its current energy scarcity.

In 2025, Japan depended on the Middle East for 94 percent of its crude oil. The ratio had increased from 72 percent in 1990 as Indonesia and China reduced their exports to Japan and later as Russian oil became unreliable after it started the war with Ukraine. Now that Iran has created a de facto blockade in the Strait of Hormuz, Japan has not found any alternative route to transport oil from the Middle East.

Gasoline prices immediately responded to the attacks on Iran by the U.S. and Israel. The retail price of regular gasoline rose from 153 yen per liter in late February to 183 yen in the second week of March. Gasoline retailers always raise the gasoline price more swiftly than reducing it. Long lines of cars waiting to get gas were common at service stations by early March.

Prime Minister Takaichi decided to subsidize gasoline retailers to bring the gasoline price down to 170 yen per liter. She found resources for the subsidy in a governmental fund established during the COVID-19 pandemic to stabilize living standards. Although the regular gas price is controlled at 170 yen for now, the subsidy is not very sustainable because it will upset the government’s financial balance if it is prolonged.

Japan had an oil reserve for 254 days when the war in Iran began. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) announced that it would eventually release that reserve as needed to maintain the supply to industries and families. Following the release of a fifteen-day supply from a private reserve on March 16, the government released a month’s supply from the national reserve on March 26. It was the first release from the oil reserve since 2022 when Russia invaded Ukraine.

It is undeniable that the release of oil reserves is an interim measure. Concern about an oil shortage is spreading throughout the business sectors. One key product is naphtha, which is refined from oil and which serves as a raw material for chemical products. It is used, for example, in making a thinner that removes grease from industrial machines. In his press conference, Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara dismissed social media rumors that the Japan’s supply of naphtha would run out in June.

A major oil retailer, Idemitsu, decided to reduce production of another oil-based product, ethylene used for plastic bags. Price hikes in oil will also reduce the supply of polyester for clothes and acetone for cosmetics.

Elsewhere, the negative impact on power generation is immeasurable. Japan depends on thermal power generation for 70 percent of its electricity. The fuel for this 70 percent breaks down to a little more than 30 percent in natural gas, a little less than 30 percent of in coal, and 10 percent in oil. An oil shortage thus puts 10 percent of Japan’s total power generation at risk.

It is urgent that the government of Japan find alternative fuel for power generation before the beginning of summer, the season when the Japanese need copious amounts of electricity to cool every room in the house. Deaths from heat stroke is so prevalent that they no longer make a news. The Takaichi administration did decide to increase the share of coal as a fuel for thermal power generation for a year to cover for the potential shortage of oil. Takaichi did not rule out a request for citizens to conserve power this year, while she insisted that it would not be necessary, with the perspective of enough oil for next year at least.

A shortage of oil from the Middle East also may make it harder than ever for Japan to meet its of carbon emission target. Japan has set targets of a 46 percent cut in the 2013 level of emissions by FY2030 and a 73 percent cut by FY2040. Japan has promised net zero carbon emissions by 2050. Oddly enough, there has been no immediate discussion in the Japanese government on how to increase renewable energy to cover an oil shortage.

One theoretical alternative is nuclear power. Japan cannot, however, look to this source of energy, having imposed strict regulations after a catastrophic accident in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011. Although the government restarted a reactor in the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in January, the reactor suffered repeated, unexpected malfunctions in its control system.

Nuclear power generation also presents another problem: there is nowhere for the nuclear waste produced from a nuclear reactor to go. A law on nuclear waste directs that used nuclear fuel be buried underground, but Japan has yet to find a suitable location.  While the government hopes that Minamitorishima Island in the middle of Pacific Ocean will be a candidate site, it will take decades to finish geological research.

There is an interim facility to store used nuclear fuel in Aomori prefecture. Some used fuel has already been transferred to the facility. But the governor of Aomori, Soichiro Miyashita, has refused to permit further transfers to the facility without a designated final disposal site to which the used nuclear fuel in the prefecture will be transferred. All things considered, then, nuclear power cannot replace oil as an energy resource for present-day Japan.

The U.S. President Donald Trump announced two-week ceasefire in Iran, based on conditions including opening the Strait of Hormuz. However, the deal does not guarantee Iran’s safety from future attacks by the U.S. or Israel, which means the ceasefire may not work for to lower the price of oil price. 

In the absence of an immediate replacement for oil, the government of Japan is looking for alternative routes to transport oil from the Middle East. But it has not found viable waterways so far. The war in Iran thus has revealed Japan’s energy vulnerability – a condition like the one that put them on the road to World War II.

Asian Art Corner

ARTS JAPONICA

GLOBAL SAMURAI CONFERENCE. 4/10-11, HYBRID. Sponsors: British Museum and SOAS. Speakers: Filippo Cervelli (SOAS); Rosina Buckland (British Museum); Oleg Benesch (University of York); Joe Nickols (British Museum); Edward Boyle (Nichibunken); Rebekah Clements (Autonomous University of Barcelona and ICREA); Helen Macnaughtan (SOAS); Birgit Tremml-Werner (Stockholm University); Satona Suzuki (SOAS); Nam-lin Hur (University of British Columbia); Chika Tonooka (Cambridge University); Luke Gartlan (University of St Andrews); Sarah Thal (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Mark Ravina (University of Texas Austin); Sven Saaler (Sophia University); Michele Monserrati (Smith College); Maria Framke (University of Erfurt); Tatiana Linkhoeva (New York University); Ignacio López-Calvo (University of California Merced); Hiromu Nagahara (MIT); Natasha Bennett (Royal Armouries); Julie Reynolds and Emile de Bruijn (National Trust); Sarah Panzer (Missouri State University); Clemens Büttner (University of Heidelberg); Ethan Mark (Leiden University); Thomas D. Conlan and Christina Lee (Princeton University). This event is part of the public programme supporting the exhibition Samurai (open until 4 May). PURCHASE EXHIBITION CATALOG: https://amzn.to/4mqEJ1h

SAMURAI: THE MAKING OF A GLOBAL ICON. 4/23, 5:30–6:30pm (DST), 12:30-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: British Museum. Speakers: Satona Suzuki, Senior Lecturer in Japanese and Modern Japanese History at SOAS; Oleg Benesch, Professor and Head of the Department of History at the University of York and co-author of the exhibition book, Samurai; Matt Alt, co-founder AltJapan, a Tokyo-based company that specialises in localisation and author of Pure Invention: How Japan Made the Modern World (2021). This event is part of the public programme supporting the exhibition Samurai (open until 4 May).

FORTHCOMING art two special issues of the Japan Review focused on the samurai.

And if you had enough of all this Samurai stuff--most of which is made up for Western consumption--see here for a humorous take: LORD IT'S THE SAMURAI.

BOOK TALK: SIMPLY DONABE! (JAPANESE CLAY POT COOKING). 4/ 19, Noon-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Kinokuniya New York. Speaker: author Ms. Naoko Takei Moore, owner of TOIRO, an online and brick-and-mortar shop in West Hollywood that specializes in Japanese kitchen goods. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4dPUYTd

TOIRO kitchen supply (donabe), https://toirokitchen.com/

BOOK TALK: IMPERIAL ANIMATIONS IN TRANSPACIFIC CONTEMPORARY ART. 5/4, 9:00-10:30pm (EDT), 9:00-10:30am (HKT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Centre for Cultural Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Speaker: author Namiko Kunimoto, Director of the Center for Ethnic Studies, Associate Professor, Department of History of Art, Ohio State University; Moderator: Prof. SaeHim Park (CUHK). PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4bImyzf

THESE EVENTS ARE PAST BUT MAY HAVE RECORDINGS

*EXHIBITING JAPAN IN MID-CENTURY NEW YORK. 3/30, 6:00-8:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Digital Museum of the History of Japanese in NY. Speaker: Dr. Angus Lockyer, author of Exhibitionist Japan: The Spectacle of Modern Development (Cambridge, 2025) and Japan: A History in Objects (Thames and Hudson, 2026). He currently teaches at the Rhode Island School of Design. 

*REMAKING THE ACADEMIC MUSEUM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. 4/2, 8:00-9:15am (JST), 7:00-8:15pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society. Speakers: James Steward, Director, Princeton University Art Museum; Kit Brooks, Curator of Asian Art, Princeton University Art Museum. 

*FROM KIRIN TO CASA BRUTUS: HISTORY OF JAPANESE DESIGN. 4/2, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), 5:30-7:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS), Temple University, Japan. Speakers: Ian Lynam | Associate Professor of Graphic Design, Temple University Japan; Moderator: Benoit Hardy-Chartrand | Senior Lecturer Temple University Japan & ICAS Faculty Fellow. 

What happens when Japan curates its aesthetic for the world?

By Erik Augustin Palm, Japan Times, Mar 28, 2026
     Scathing review of the Japanese government's exhibition of the Japan Sui Collection in Kyoto and Paris that is meant to showcase Japanese regional crafts and cuisine framed around the concept of sui (an Edo Period [1603-1867] concept of aesthetic refinement).

Official Japan's penchant for dealing with the West by leaning into Orientalism can be startling. It is so ingrained that Japanese embassies and consulates still display sensoga, the carely controlled statist art of 1930s wartime Japan. Japan has a vibrant modern art community. It is a shame that it is not promoted more.

Isamu Noguchi

In full swing

from the Monocole Minute on Design, March 18, 2025.

Isamu Noguchi is a household name thanks to his abstract totem-like sculptures, Vitra’s bestselling glass Coffee Table and the ubiquitous Akari paper lamps. Still, the Japanese-American designer maintained that his best projects never saw the light of day. He harboured ambitions to be an urban planner, particularly to make playgrounds, but city officials wouldn’t hear of it. Those torpedoed ideas, such as this swing set, are the subject of Noguchi’s New York, an exhibition at The Noguchi Museum in Queens, which runs until 13 September.

This three-piece swing was originally conceived in 1940 for a playground in Hawaii, which would also have included a curved slide and a jungle gym. That plan was derailed by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a year later, with Noguchi spending seven months in an internment camp in Arizona. Later, he pitched the scheme in New York but was unsuccessful; a version of the design finally went up in Atlanta in 1975. With hindsight, everyone can agree that Noguchi should not have had to work so hard to bring play to public spaces. 

Defending Asia Has Gotten Harder

Why Nuclear Deterrence in Asia Is Collapsing

By Patrick M. Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute, Scholar in Residence at Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Strategy and Technology (CMIST), and APP Member.

First Published March 31, 2026 on The National Interest. 

As the 2027 “Davidson window” approaches, Washington appears less concerned about deterrence failure in Asia than at any point in recent years. The phrase, drawn from former US Indo-Pacific commander Admiral Philip Davidson’s warning about China’s timeline for achieving combat readiness for a Taiwan contingency, once became shorthand for fears of imminent conflict, especially in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Yet “deterrence” is scarcely mentioned in the US Intelligence Community’s 2026 Annual Threat Assessment, the intelligence community’s capstone document. While it notes that Beijing’s ambitions over Taiwan remain undiminished, it asserts that “Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification.” The intelligence community appears to have embraced a view of Xi Jinping’s strategy as gradual, positional, and political, aimed at tightening control over what Beijing calls a rogue province, even though the People’s Republic of China has never governed Taiwan.

Admiral Davidson’s warning was never a prediction of impending war. It was a caution about the convergence of two trends: China’s military modernization milestone in 2027 and a potentially declining US force posture, which could create a gap in deterrence. Ironically, on the eve of the People’s Liberation Army’s centenary in 2027, Washington risks becoming overly sanguine about the durability of deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

Although the Annual Threat Assessment reflects reasonable analytical caution, it risks strategic complacency.

Across both South and East Asia, structural trends are eroding deterrence. A fracturing international order, the expansion of conflict below the nuclear threshold, and the accelerating impact of emerging technologies are together undermining stability. This is no time to slacken efforts to shore up deterrence.

The Failure of Nuclear Deterrence

Recent conflicts suggest the stark lesson that while nuclear weapons may still deter large-scale war, they do not prevent conflict. Indeed, nuclear-armed states appear increasingly willing to incur risk by operating below the nuclear threshold. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine remains the most obvious case. Had Kyiv retained its nuclear arsenal, it is difficult to imagine Russia prosecuting a prolonged war of aggression on its territory.

Iran provides a more recent example of deterrence failure. Tehran exposed its capabilities through premature use, delegated credibility to unreliable proxies, and lingered at a nuclear threshold sufficient to provoke an attack but insufficient to prevent it. What should have imposed caution instead created opportunity for its adversaries. Deterrence did not fail quietly; it collapsed visibly.

More broadly, deterrence is no longer reliably governing the space below major war. This was evident in South Asia in spring 2025.

After a terrorist attack in Pahalgam killed 26 civilians, India launched Operation Sindoor, striking deep inside Pakistan, including near sensitive military infrastructure. The episode demonstrated a higher tolerance for risk on both sides. It reinforced the parlous conclusion that even nuclear-armed rivals believe there is still room to engage in conflict without triggering nuclear escalation. Tensions continue to simmer on the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and last year was not the last time terrorism will prompt military reprisal. India’s subsequent shift toward compellence, outlined in Defence Forces Vision 2047, underscores this trend.

Across recent conflicts, from Ukraine to Iran, states are testing the limits of escalation, probing how far they can go without crossing nuclear red lines. Indeed, a Carnegie Endowment study of nuclear threats in recent years suggests that nuclear-armed governments have grown more adept at manipulating fears of nuclear exchange to pursue conventional aims. Some may think that even a tactical nuclear use might not elicit more than conventional retaliation.

That assumption is profoundly misplaced. As the line between coercion and conflict blurs, and as conventional and nuclear domains become increasingly entangled, ambiguity is rising. And with ambiguity comes a heightened risk of miscalculation. These pressures are global, but nowhere are they more dangerous than in Northeast Asia.

Northeast Asia’s Nuclear Paradox

North Korea has moved beyond deterrence by retaliation toward a doctrine that emphasizes early, limited use to control escalation. Its focus on tactical nuclear weapons, preemption, and potential pre-delegation lowers the threshold for nuclear employment. As Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un made clear in a speech amid the Iran conflict, North Korea’s “nuclear shield…drives the development of all sectors of the country” and guarantees “the dignity of the state, national interests, and ultimate victory.”

Russia acts as an accelerant. Its deepening alignment and“invincible alliance” with North Korea, its reliance on nuclear coercion, and its reported support for Pyongyang’s missile programs are contributing to a more interconnected and volatile deterrence environment. North Korean systems tested in Ukraine are already demonstrating improved survivability and maneuverability, as the KN-23 short-range ballistic missiles are increasingly able to evade interception.

China, meanwhile, is undertaking a rapid and opaque nuclear expansion. Whether Beijing seeks parity or something more ambitious, its trajectory, combined with possible movement toward a launch-on-warning posture, introduces new instability into crisis dynamics.

These trends are not isolated. They reinforce one another, creating an interlinked nuclear system that is more complex, less predictable, and harder to stabilize.

At the strategic level, deterrence still holds. The catastrophic costs of nuclear war continue to constrain major powers. But at the operational level, where crises unfold and decisions are made, deterrence is fragmenting. The central paradox of the current moment is that, as destructive capabilities grow, predictability declines.

The US’ Nuclear Credibility Gap

Credibility, the currency of deterrence, is also steadily fading. Allies increasingly question the reliability of US commitments, even as technological advances fail to deliver greater security. US force posture adjustments have compounded these concerns.

Taiwanese officials have warned that the expenditure of long-range strike systems such as Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs) and Tomahawks erodes deterrence across the Taiwan Strait. South Korean officials have voiced similar unease over the redeployment of missile defense assets, including Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Patriot systems, especially given the domestic political and economic costs Seoul previously incurred to host them.

At the same time, the credibility of US extended deterrence, the foundation of security for Japan and South Korea, is under growing strain. The longstanding question of whether the United States would risk Los Angeles to defend Seoul or Tokyo is no longer theoretical, but increasingly being asked in allied capitals.

South Korea is hedging by investing in nuclear-powered submarines, expanding its latent nuclear capability while remaining faithful to the nonproliferation regime. Tokyo, constrained by domestic politics, is strengthening its conventional strike capabilities while reassessing old assumptions, including the role of US nuclear weapons on its territory.

Deterrence rests not only on capability but also on trust and belief. And trust and belief are becoming harder to sustain.

Along with a decline in credibility is the questionable assumption that conflicts in Asia can be geographically contained. The Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea are increasingly interconnected. A Taiwan contingency, for example, would draw US and allied assets away from Korea, weakening deterrence on the peninsula and potentially inviting opportunistic action. In a multi-front scenario, even strong alliances can be stretched thin.

Emerging technologies are exacerbating these risks. Artificial intelligence and autonomous systems are compressing decision-making timelines, reducing the space for human judgment. What once unfolded over days may now occur in minutes. Advances in surveillance are making military movements more visible, increasing incentives for preemption. The logic of “use it or lose it” is becoming more salient. Even the undersea domain, long the foundation of secure second-strike capability, may become more transparent, undermining a key pillar of strategic stability.

Crises are moving faster than the institutions designed to manage them.

How to Strengthen US Nuclear Deterrence Without Breaking It

What, then, is to be done? There is broad agreement on the need to strengthen deterrence, but less consensus on how to do so. Some advocate deeper allied integration. For instance, tighter trilateral coordination among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, enhanced missile defense cooperation, and a more unified defense of the First Island Chain are all prevailing lines of effort for bolstering deterrence in East Asia.

Others emphasize preparing for limited nuclear use, ensuring that alliances can absorb and respond without uncontrolled escalation. But there is also a growing recognition that overreliance on preemption and rapid escalation could sow crisis instability. Efforts to strengthen deterrence may inadvertently accelerate the very dynamics that make it fragile. The policy challenge is fortifying deterrence without breaking it.

Defense modernization programs that envision a “spine” of AI-enabled technologies across all domains, with a focus on resilience of the system, could also invite foes to paralyze the spine, or at least lead them to believe that they might be capable of doing so. Deterrence is no longer a slow-moving, bilateral system. It is a fast, interconnected, multi-actor environment shaped by nuclear modernization, technological disruption, and shifting political commitments.

The greatest danger is not that deterrence collapses outright, but that it fails in ways we do not anticipate. A misinterpreted signal. A limited strike. A decision made too quickly.

The Davidson window may never have been a countdown to war. But it was a warning about vulnerability, and that vulnerability has deepened rather than disappeared. The danger is not that deterrence collapses. It is that it fails in ways we fail to anticipate.