APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of June 28, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Red Arrow Across the Pacific: 

The Thirty-Second Infantry Division during World War II

By Mark D. Van Ells, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College of the City University of New York

PURCHASE BOOK 11/12/2024

The story of the renowned Thirty-Second "Red Arrow" Infantry Division: qNational Guard unit—which originated in Wisconsin and Michigan but soon evolved to include soldiers from California to New England—became one of the first US military units deployed overseas in World War II, eventually logging more combat hours than any other US Army division. Offers a cultural history of the Red Arrow's wartime experience, from its mobilization in 1940, to its deployment across New Guinea, Australia, and the Philippines, to its postwar occupation of Japan. Drawing from letters, memoirs, and interviews, Van Ells lets the soldiers speak for themselves, describing in their own words the terror of combat, their impressions of foreign lands, the struggle to maintain their own humanity, and the many ways the war profoundly changed them.

1942: Crux of War

By Jonathan Parshall, Lecturer, 

US Naval War College

PURCHASE BOOK 6/18/2026

By the end of 1942 there had been a sea-change in the conduct of WWII. Within just one 40-day timespan, the British had triumphed over Rommel at Alamein; British and American forces landed in North Africa to confront the Axis position there; the Americans won two naval battles at Guadalcanal, sealing the fate of that campaign and with it Japanese expansionism; the Red Army launched a massive counter-offensive at Stalingrad that would condemn six Axis armies-and hundreds of thousands of German, Italian, Romanian and Hungarian soldiers-to eventual destruction. The Allies had somehow gained the upper hand, forcing the Axis powers into a defensive crouch from which they would not rebound. The war, in short, had turned.

Surviving Chaos: Geopolitics When the Rules Fail

By Mark Leonard, Co-founder and Director,

European Council on Foreign Relations

PURCHASE BOOK 6/23/2026

Trump is blowing up political order. Xi Jinping is scrambling the economy. And Putin is redrawing the map of Europe. At a time when every crisis bleeds into the next – from pandemics and wars to climate shocks and AI revolutions – the old rules of global order are collapsing. Leonard reveals how geopolitics is being rewritten in an age of 'Un-Order', where no one agrees on the rules, and even the concept of order itself is up for debate. Drawing on years of conversations with leaders and thinkers from Beijing to Washington, Leonard argues that we are witnessing a new divide in international politics.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 13, 2026

BETWEEN MYTH AND REALITY: SAMURAI AT THE BRITISH MUSEUM. 7/13, Noon (JST), 7/12, 11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Dr. Rosina Buckland, Asahi Shimbun Curator: Japanese Collections, The British Museum.

CHINA AND THE SECTION 301 INVESTIGATIONS: THE LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND DIPLOMATIC ISSUES. 7/13, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, Asia Society Policy Institute; Mary Lovely, Anthony M. Solomon Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics; Claire Reade, Senior Associate (Non-resident), Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics; Wei Liang, Professor, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. 

NATO SUMMIT DEBRIEF: WHAT COMES NEXT AFTER ANKARA? 7/13, 10:45-11:30am (CDT), 11:45am-12:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: General Christopher G. Cavoli, 20th Supreme Allied Commander Europe and 19th Commander, United States European Command; Julianne Smith, Former US Permanent Representative to NATO; Leslie Vinjamuri, President and Chief Executive Officer, Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

THE FIRST TARGET AUDIENCES: THE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OF THE FOUNDERS. 7/13, Noon-1:00pm, HYBRID. Sponsor: Public Diplomacy Council of America. Speakers: Martha Bayles, Author, Popular Culture, Public Diplomacy, and America's Image Abroad (2014); Caitlin Schindler, Author, The Origins of Public Diplomacy in US Statecraft: Uncovering a Forgotten Tradition (2018); Eric Weiner, Author, Ben & Me (2024).

A CONVERSATION WITH SENATOR BERNIE MORENO AND CHAIRMAN JOHN MOOLENAAR ON CONNECTED CARS. 7/13, 4:15-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Rep. John Moolenaar (R-MI), Chairman, Select Committee on China; Sen. Bernie Moreno (R-OH); Moderator: Chris Miller, Nonresident Senior Fellow, AEI.

Asia Policy Events, Monday July 6, 2026

Asia Policy Point is not publishing a newsletter this week, Congress is in recess, and President Trump will attend the NATO Summit the 7th and 8th in Turkey. Apart from NATO's 32 members, Ukraine will attend along with four of NATO's Indo-Pacific partner states -- Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand -- as well as Middle East partners Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. On the 8th, the IMF will release an update of its World Economic Outlook.

JAPAN’S AI START-UP ECOSYSTEM AND TRENDS IN VENTURE INVESTMENT. 7/6, Noon-1:00pm (BST), 7:00-8:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Japan Society-London. Speakers: James Riney, Founding Partner and CEO, Coral Capital; Jesper Koll, Expert Director, Monex Group and Japan Catalyst Fund; Bill Emmott, Visiting Fellow, Tokyo College, University of Tokyo.

A NEW ERA FOR OLD ALLIANCES: CHINA-NORTH KOREA AND US-SOUTH KOREA TIES IN 2026. 7/6, 9:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: National Committee on North Korea (NCNK). Speaker: Dr. Chung-in Moon, Former Special Advisor for Foreign Affairs and National Security to South Korean President Moon Jae-in.

PRESERVATION AS CONTINUITY: PROTECTING JAPANESE BUILT CULTURAL HERITAGE. 7/6, 6:45pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society-London. Speaker: Andrea Carlson, Founder, Kominka Collective.

CRITICAL MINERALS AND THE FUTURE OF KOREAN INDUSTRY. 7/7, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Korea Inter-Parliamentary Exchange Center (KIPEC). Speaker: Meredith Schwartz, Associate Fellow, Critical Minerals Security Program, CSIS.

Takaichi's Constitutional Reform

Takaichi Pushes Her Conservative Agenda

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 29, 2026
 
With less than three weeks before the end of the current Diet session, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has accelerated work on her conservative agenda. Opposition parties have signed on to some of her agenda items, but others require additional support to build a majority in the Upper House. In some cases, Takaichi’s maneuverings have frustrated the opposition parties. 
 
Penalty for National Flag Vandalism
Article 92 of Penal Code prohibits damaging the national flag of a foreign country for the purpose of insulting the country. The law is intended to protect diplomatic relations with foreign countries. But Japan does not have any proscription on vandalism to its own national flag. Conservative lawmakers, including Takaichi, are dissatisfied with a situation in which defilement of the national flag of Japan goes unpunished.
 
Conservatives are proud of the national flag of Japan, or Hinomaru, which depicts a rising sun. They believe that paying respect to Hinomaru exemplifies patriotism. In wartime Japan, people were obliged to salute the Hinomaru hoisted along the streets. Although they may not hope to bring back that pre-war culture, the conservatives cannot abide insulting a symbol of Japan.
 
When they formed the leading coalition last October, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) agreed on the terms of legislation to establish the “crime of damaging the national flag” in 2026 ordinary session of the Diet. Although the ordinary session was closed on January 23 when Takaichi dissolved the Lower House for a snap election, a special session was convoked after the election; this session is scheduled to adjourn on July 17.
 
The LDP approved a draft of a bill named the National Flag Vandalism Punishing Act in early June, on which the JIP agreed. Although the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) had been skeptical about the need for the law, it signed on after the LDP struck a provision that would have criminalized the posting of a scene of damage to Hinomaru on a social networking service. The bill was finally submitted to the Diet sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and the ultra-conservative Sanseito. It also gained support of populist Team Miral and is expected to pass both chambers of the Diet.
 
It is highly unclear what interest the bill represents. The law will prohibit any age to Hinomaru “in a way that causes the public to feel uncomfortable or disgusted.” A violation will carry up to two years in custody and a fine of up to two hundred thousand yen. The sponsors of the bill have argued that the law will protect the feelings of people who think Hinomaru is precious and will prevent flag-vandalism in the future. The bill is based on the premise that Hinomaru is precious to everyone. It is unusual for the Diet to make a law with little factual basis for it.
 
The Diet has continued to entertain these strange discussions. Sponsors have cited such instances of supposed defilement of Hinomaru as tearing Hinomaru apart in a train station, stomping on Hinomaru, blotting it with increment, and livestreaming an act of vandalism. But streaming a recorded video of damage to the flag will not be punished. The sponsors have also created exceptions for disposal of an old flag, cutting off a flag that has twisted around ceiling light, and signing messages on Hinomaru for a national sports team.
 
The sponsors of the bill argue that the law will not force the people to pay respect to Hinomaru. However, the law will inevitably be coercive. Meanwhile, freedom of expression will be on the verge of erosion with a concern that not paying respect to Hinomaru might be punished even if the law does not obligate the people to love the Hinomaru.
 
Securing Imperial Family Members
The Speakers and Deputy Speakers of both chambers of the Diet submitted a “unanimous opinion” of the Houses on membership in the Imperial Family to the government of Japan in early June. The Takaichi government is preparing a bill to revise the Imperial House Law, an effort that is supposed to implement the unanimous opinion. It is possible, however, that the government is manipulating the process to favor the conservatives.
 
The unanimous opinion would allow female members to remain in the Imperial Family after marriage and would authorize the Imperial Family to adopt male members who had been in the male line of former Imperial Families. Retaining female members has broad public support. The adoption provision faces hurdles, however: current Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits adoption and it receives less public approval than retaining female members. But conservative lawmakers firmly support adoption to ensure that the Imperial House is sustained by males in the male line.
 
On Friday, the 26^th, most major newspapers reported with some surprise that the Takaichi government was drafting an amendment to the Imperial House Law that would permit the male offspring of an adopted member of the Imperial Family to succeed to the throne of the Emperor. The draft would not place the adopted male member himself in the line of succession to the throne, but a son or grandson could join the line.
 
This move reflects the confidence of the conservatives on keeping the male line. One LDP conservative lawmaker, Hirofumi Nakasone, definitely remarked that Princess Aiko, the daughter of Emperor Naruhito, cannot become Emperor. “Nobody wants to be married with Emperor Aiko,” Nakasone added. JIP is still not satisfied with the provision of adoption, which is limited to a man 15 years old or older. The conservative bloc is not united on details of revision of Imperial House Law.
 
The “unanimous opinion” did not touch on succession to the throne and limited itself to the size of the imperial family. Centrist Reform Alliance argues that the draft of the Takaichi government does not reflect the unanimous opinion of the Diet. Article 1 of the Constitution of Japan provides that the position of Emperor derives from will of the people, and the Diet represents the will of the people. Without the full support of the Diet, the Takaichi government draft could destabilize the position of the Emperor.
 
Constitutional Amendment on Emergency Terms of Office
The LDP and JIP have sped up consideration in the current session of the Diet of a constitutional amendment that would extend the term of a Diet member in the lower chamber in the event of a national disaster. The Lower House Commission of the Constitution has been discussing this amendment. However, the Upper House has focused instead on election system of the house that would integrate some districts beyond the border of a prefecture. The parties have at least agreed to present such a change for a constitutional referendum.
 
Prime Minister Takaichi declared in the LDP national convention this past April that, by the spring of 2027, she would introduce a constitutional amendment. The Lower House commission has already proposed an emergency clause to extend the term of lawmakers in an emergency and to enable the Cabinet to issue orders with the same legal effect as laws enacted by the Diet. The opposition parties oppose the idea of giving the executive branch what is essentially the power of legislation.
 
The Upper House is not willing to discuss the emergency clause, because the constitution already provides that the Upper House will maintain the functions of the Diet when the Lower House is empty. Most parties can agree on the issue under review in the Upper House election – abolishing electoral districts beyond prefectural border to represent people’s will of every single prefecture.
 
But the integration of electoral districts was made to respect the one-man, one-vote principle that stems from the constitutional principle of equality under the law. In one rural district, a vote had 3.13 times greater value than those in an urban district in the 2025 Upper House election. Two concepts in the constitution, equality in value of one vote and implementation of autonomy, are competing each other

A minimum accomplishment of the parties in the current Diet session will be the revision of the National Referendum Act for constitutional amendments. It includes minor changes in the process of a national referendum. The bill was sponsored by the LDP, JIP, DPP and Sanseito. It passed the Lower House with the support of the Centrist Reform Alliance and Team Mirai. It is also expected to pass the Upper House in current session. Any further progress on wrapping up discussion of the details of a constitutional amendment in this session is unlikely. 

China Strategy Isolates Japan

 Takaichi Goes It Alone at the G7

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 21, 2026
 
At this month’s annual Group of Seven (G7) Summit Meeting in Evian-les-Bains, France, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi made it clear that she had a quite different concern on international issues than the other leaders did. The summit is traditionally a forum to reconfirm unity of the group to lead the world. Such was the case this year when the group reviewed progress to end the war in Iran. Takaichi, however, emphasized the vulnerability of industrial supply chains and competition with China’s trade strategy. Her tack gained no enthusiastic supporters among the G7 as an explicit supply chain policy would strain rather than ease international tensions.
 
It was obvious at the outset that the Iran war would dominate the discussions. Just before the leaders’ meeting began, the United States and Iran reached an apparent 60-day ceasefire (although not nearly a permanent solution). The memorandum of understanding (MOU) obligates Iran to use its best efforts to ensure safe passage of commercial traffic in the Strait of Hormuz for 60 days. (In fact, Iran has now closed the Strait.) To Iran’s benefit, the MOU also includes – again for a 60-day period – termination of Israel’s military operations in Lebanon, plans (but no financial commitments) for a $300 billion reconstruction program, waivers of U.S. sanctions crude oil exports from Iran, and the return of frozen assets to Iran.
 
On the nuclear issue, Iran “reaffirmed” that it would not procure or develop nuclear weapons; that is, Iran confirmed an earlier commitment. Iran and the U.S. also committed to develop a mechanism to dispose of Iran’s “stockpiled enriched material,” which could mean on-site down-blending, but the MOU does not rule out other disposition methods such as removal. The MOU allows – for the 60 days it is in effect – Iran to maintain its nuclear program and without any new sanctions from the U.S. The MOU does not mention missiles. By many accounts, the MOU considered a victory for Iran.
 
The G7 countries welcomed the deal as an attempt to normalize international relations and the oil trade. A leaders’ statement stressed that the deal was “secured under the strong leadership of President Trump,” noting efforts by France and the United Kingdom to resume maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. The G7 chairman, French President Emmanuel Macron, described the summit as “a moment of unity, of quality discussion, and of genuine cooperation of the leaders.”
 
Upon receiving the news of the U.S.-Iran agreement, Takaichi welcomed it as a major step toward settling the situation in the Middle East. She emphasized the importance of implementing the agreement. But she did not offer any commitment by Japan to the reconstruction of Iran, including mine-sweeping in the strait. “Nothing has been determined for dispatching the Self-Defense Force,” Takaichi stated in a press conference. As readers know, the Constitution of Japan strictly limits sending troops to a battlefield.
 
On the sidelines of the summit, Takaichi had a five-minute conversation with Trump. In his press conference afterward, Trump limited his warmth to Japan by characterizing Takaichi as his “biggest fan.” Otherwise, Trump said, “I’ll be honest, Japan was not willing to get involved during the war.” There was no report that Takaichi affirmed her compliment of Trump in her visit to the White House in March, which was that “Donald is the only person who can bring peace and prosperity across the world.”
 
Instead, Takaichi tried to pursue Japan’s interest by connecting the war in Iran with pressure on China. She put economic security at the center of Japan’s views in the G7 rather than joining with the other members in focusing on ending the war in Iran or post-war reconstruction. Although she proposed building a system of oil reserves for developing countries, Takaichi’s clear goal was to gain support for stockpiling critical minerals and lessening dependence on China. The G7 issued a declaration on supply chains for critical minerals, but it went only as far as to say that the group “will work together with partners to reduce critical dependencies and ensure that attempts or threats to weaponize economic dependencies fail.”
 
China immediately responded to that statement. “It’s leader’s latest G7 remarks on China were particularly obtrusive, exposing that its attempt to rally allies and stir up confrontation wins no support and is bound to fail,” said China’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Lin Jian. Lin said that Takaichi’s posture against China was a “glaring self-contradiction” and an instance of “Japan’s hypocrisy.” Despite her stated willingness to talk, Takaichi has made no serious effort to resume bilateral leaders’ talks and normalize economic relationship with China. Takaichi’s G7 diplomacy seems to have only exacerbated tensions with China.
 
It has not helped Takaichi that other G7 countries, suffering from Trump’s tariff policies, have approached China about trade deals that might restore their economic performance to the pre-U.S. tariff levels (or beyond). Macron visited China last December, calling for efforts to promote multinationalism with Chinese President Xi Jinping. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney visited Beijing last January and agreed with Xi on advancing a strategic partnership between the two countries. Carney described relations with China as “more predictable” than those with the Trump administration.
 
Outgoing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer met Xi in Beijing also in January. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz visited China in February. And Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni paid an official visit to China in July 2024.
 
Even worse, from Takaichi’s perspective, Trump himself visited China in May, agreeing with Xi on building a relationship of strategic stability between the two countries. Takaichi is the only G7 leader who has not made a visit to China. All that she has been able to do was to visit the White House before Trump visited China. Japan finds itself uniquely isolated in its adversarial China policy. It is time for Takaichi to emulate her G7 colleagues and improve bilateral relations with China.

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 29, 2026

U.S. BASING POSTURE IN THE WAKE OF EPIC FURY. 6/29, 10:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA). Speakers: General Frank McKenzie, Jr. (ret.), Hertog Distinguished Fellow, JINSA; Moderator: Jonathan Ruhe, Fellow for American Strategy, JINSA.

BRIDGING NORDIC DUAL-USE INNOVATION AND TAIWAN’S DEFENSE ECOSYSTEM. 6/29, 11:00am-Noon (CEST), 5:00-6:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Security & Development Policy. Speakers: Bryce C. Barros, Defense Innovation and Dual-use Technology Strategist; Martin Längkvist, Senior Lecturer in Computer Science, AI, Robotics, and Cybersecurity Center (ARC), Örebro University, Sweden.

USMCA JOINT REVIEW: WHERE TO FROM HERE? 6/29, 9:00-10:20am, (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for China-America Studies. Speakers: Diego de Leon Segovia, Director, APCO; David Collins, Professor of International Economic Law, The City Law School; Wenting He, Postdoctoral Scholar, China Institute, University of Alberta; Enrique Dussel Peters, Professor, Graduate School of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Moderator: Sourabh Gupta, Senior Fellow, Institute for China-America Studies.

THE IMPOSSIBLE STATE LIVE PODCAST: WHAT IS NORTH KOREA LEARNING FROM RUSSIA'S WAR IN UKRAINE? 6/29, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Victor Cha, President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department, Korea Chair; Kateryna Bondar, Senior Fellow, Wadhwani AI Center; Bruce Klingner, Senior Fellow, The Mansfield Foundation. 

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 22, 2026

SHADOW OF CATASTROPHE AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. 6/22, Noon-1:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Speakers: Colin Kahl, Director, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford; Janice Stein, Founding Director, Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy; Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, Chief, Norwegian Intelligence School. Moderator: Ulrich Kuehn, Head of Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, University of Hamburg.

PHILIPPINES ASEAN CHAIRSHIP 2026: ADVANCING REGIONAL RESILIENCE AND U.S.-ASEAN COLLABORATION. 6/22, 3:00-5:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: US-ASEAN Center; Embassy of the Philippines; US-Philippines Society. Speakers include: Jose Manuel G. Romualdez, Ambassador of the Philippines to the United States; Hunt VanderToll, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of State; Hans Siriban, Economic Minister and Consul, Philippine Embassy to the U.S.; Heather Variava, Senior Advisor, Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

STABILITY MULTIPLIERS: FOOD AND CLIMATE SECURITY IN A FRACTURED WORLD. 6/22, 6:00-8:30pm (BST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks; Strategic Climate Risks Initiative; Ditchley Foundation; Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University. Speakers: TBA; Moderator: Erin Sikorsky, Director, Center for Climate and Security, Council on Strategic Risks.

WOMEN ARTISTS IN ACTION: VISUALIZING THE 1970S WOMEN’S LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. 6/22, 6:00pm (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Workshop. Speaker: Kanako Tajima, PhD Candidate, Columbia University. 

TAIWAN’S STRATEGIC OUTLOOK AND THE FUTURE OF US-TAIWAN RELATIONS. 6/22, 6:30-8:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Speakers: Tom Chih-Chiang Lee, Director-General, Taipei Economic and Cultural Office; Shihoko Goto, Vice President of Programs and Director, Asia Program, FPRI; Chris Estep is a Non-Resident Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI; Rupert Hammond-Chambers, President, US-Taiwan Business Council; Aaron Stein, President, FPRI; Vincent Wei-Cheng Wang, Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Asia Program, FPRI.

Expanding Japan's Imperial Family

The Diet’s Unanimous Opinion on Maintaining the Imperial Family

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
June 8, 2026 Updated June 15, 2026

The Speakers and Vice-Speakers of both chambers of the Diet agreed to a draft of a “unanimous opinion” [立法府の総意] of the legislative branch to secure members of the Imperial Family. The draft proposes expansion of the family in two ways, adopting expert recommendations from 2021. First, female members of the family would be allowed to remain in the family after marriage. Second, male members of branches of the Imperial Family that were excised in 1947 could be adopted and thus re-enter the family.
 
The acting chair on this issue, Speaker of the Lower House Eisuke Mori, hopes to make these changes through amendments to the Imperial House Law by the end of the current session of the Diet on July 17. 
 
The Imperial House currently has 16 members, only three of whom are male and eligible to succeed to the throne. Members of the public, members of the Diet, and the imperial family itself are concerned that the family may dwindle. There is a near-term issue about lightening the responsibilities of each family member. The duties of the imperial family to participate in the life of the nation – such as participating in ceremonies of national events or official visits of foreign heads of state – are in fact extensive and occasionally burdensome. Spreading out these responsibilities by expanding the imperial family would be helpful to all.
 
Allowing married female members to remain in the family has the overwhelming support of all the parties. Article 12 of the Imperial House Law provides that a female loses her status as a family member when she marries. If female members could remain in the family, they could share the roles of the Imperial Family. The draft accordingly would allow all female members to stay after marriage. The draft also includes transitional measures to respect the will of female members who have been living their lives based on current law – i.e., not all female members may wish to stay in the family.
 
Whether the husband and children of a female member remaining in the family should also have the status of members of the Imperial Family has been a controversial point. While some lawmakers with Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) support such inclusion, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) oppose it. If the husband and children do not have the imperial status, possible questions are “Do they have the right of freedom of religion or political activities?” or “Can they spend the governmental funds for the Imperial Families?
 
The draft does not take a position on the status of husband and children and merely recommends adding a supplementary provision to the revised Imperial House Law that hopes to resolve the issue sometime in the future.
 
More divisive in the draft is a process for the Imperial Family to adopt a male from a branch of the former Imperial Family that had been excised in 1947. That former Imperial Family share the same ancestor of over 600 years ago with current Imperial Family. Article 9 of the Imperial House Law unequivocally prohibits Imperial House members from adopting children to prevent members from disrupting the imperial lineage.
 
While the LDP and JIP approve of the adoption proposal, as do some conservative opposition parties, some CRA members have protested it. For them, an adoption without consent may violate the constitutional provision that prohibits discrimination based on family origin. Even some conservative scholars are skeptical about the idea of adoption.
 
Considering the CRA’s objections, the draft includes conditions on adoption. There would be a minimum age for adoption, which is supposed to be fifteen. The draft also demands a decision on who in the Imperial Family can adopt a child. Most importantly, an adopted child would not be eligible to succeed to the throne. With these conditions, the CRA accepted adoption. The draft also recommends the Diet to resolve that this rule for adoption should be subjected to ongoing reviews.
 
Complicating things, the Speaker Mori announced his own view in his press conference that male offspring of adopted children should have eligibility to succeed to the throne. That represented a conservative standpoint which insists on making paternal succession certain rather than the legitimacy of lineage concerning adoption. Some opposition parties firmly oppose Mori’s idea. Mori later explained that he was referring to an interpretation of the current law, and not binding future discussions.
 
The draft would not affect other Imperial Family rules. The draft unequivocally reconfirms the current order of succession to the throne. The first successor of Emperor Naruhito is Crown Prince Akishino, followed by his son, Prince Hisahito. Maintenance of the current order was a requirement of the experts’ report in 2021. That report separated discussion about provisions to enlarge the Imperial House from the line of succession.
 
The speakers distributed the draft to the parties on June 8 and concluded the draft as “unanimous opinion of the legislative branch” with approval of seven parties out of all thirteen on June 10. The Emperor Abdication Special Law of 2017 demands such unanimity. The opinion was submitted to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Takaichi Cabinet is expected to submit a bill of revised Imperial House Law to current session of the Diet.

It is noteworthy that the Emperor Naruhito commented on securing Imperial Family members right after the Speakers wrapped up the unanimous opinion. “I hope it to be understood by the people,” he said in his press conference before leaving Japan to visit Europe on June 11. Although reserving judgement on the opinion, he clearly wants the process to be democratic and reflecting the views of the Japanese people. The emperor began his remarks by noting that the fundamental principle of the imperial family is "to share the joys and sorrows of the people."

 It is still unclear, however, whether the unanimous opinion will receive the full support of the people. Polls by news organizations find that the concept of the adoption of male members of former Imperial Family branches faces a certain amount of opposition. A substantial percentage of those polled support the right of female members to remain the in family after marriage.
 
There is a popular expectation that Aiko, the daughter of Naruhito, will succeed to the throne. The “unanimous opinion” would rule out this possibility. Takaichi revealed her opposition to a female emperor during a discussion in the Diet last March. “The time has not come for discussing it. It may destabilize imperial succession,” said Takaichi, Japan’s first female prime minister. This is a view more representative of Japan’s conservatives who believe that succession should be only along the male line than of its citizens.

Cruciatus in cruce

 

U.S. Senator Bob Packwood, 93, died on June 6 in California. A relatively liberal Republican senator representing Oregon, he was forced to resign the Senate in 1995 because he accepted a bribe from Mitsubishi Electric Corp (MEC). Although the Justice Department declined to prosecute him, the details of the case combined with multiple accusations of sexual misconduct with female staff to have his fellow Senators to demand his resignation. It is possible that the harassment claims were cover for the more serious charges of bribery. However, his obituaries only mention the "sex scandal."

The lobbyist who worked on Senator Packwood for MEC and many other Japanese companies was Steven Saunders (Saunders & Co. one of the more notorious lobbyists for Japan) . He died last year at 78 in Alexandria, VA. MEC was the focus of congressional inquiry and a Harvard Business School case study on its aggressive and eventually successful effort to co-opt the patent and put out of business Fusion Systems that was then-owned by the rowing legend Don Spero (who is still alive,1964 Olympian and 1966 world champion).

Asia Policy Events, Monday June 15, 2026

Hudson Institute’s Center for Defense Concepts and Technology launch of a new report, Strengthening the Front Line: Transforming the Japan Self-Defense Force for 

Twenty-First-Century Deterrence

with David Byrd and Bryan Clark

AFTER THE WAR: REORIENTING GULF ECONOMIC STRATEGY. 6/15, 4:00-5:15pm (GMT+3), 8:00-9:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Frédéric Schneider, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Mohammed Al-Hashemi, Economic Expert; Sultan Barakat, Professor at the College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University. Moderator: Logan John Robert Cochrane, Associate Professor, College of Public Policy, Hamad Bin Khalifa University.

NAVIGATING LOCAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA IN EUROPE. 6/15, 3:00-4:00pm (CEST), 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Speakers: Tomasz Kamiński, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska, Associate Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of Lodz; Paul Costello, Senior Program Manager, GMF Cities; Mareike Ohlberg, Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Program, GMF.

NEW ADVOCATES AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS. 6/15, 4:00-5:00pm (BST), 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: Binaifer Nowrojee, President, Open Society Foundations; Moderator: Marc Weller, Director, Global Governance and Security Centre, Chatham House.

THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM. 6/15, 1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers Include: Azeka Abramoff, Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation; Barbara M. Angus, Consultant, Ernst & Young (Washington, DC); Pat Brown, Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers; George Callas, Founder, Callas Strategy Group; Nate Carden, Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Todd Castagno, Head of Global Valuation, Accounting & Tax (GVAT), Morgan Stanley; Alan Cole, Senior Economist, Tax Foundation; Ronald A. Dabrowski, Principal, KPMG; Tijana J. Dvornic, Partner, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Lilian V. Faulhaber, Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Mindy Herzfeld, Professor of Practice, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Brian Jenn, Partner, McDermott, Will, & Schulte.

VICE PRESIDENT MIKE PENCE IN CONVERSATION WITH ROBERT COSTA. 6/15, 7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: National Press Club. Speakers: Mike Pence, 48th Vice President of the United States; Robert Costa, Chief Washington Analyst, CBS. FEE

Japan’s FOIP Faces a Trump Contradiction

Japan can’t hedge against Trump without stabilising relations with China

By Mike Mochizuki, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute, Japan-U.S. Relations Chair in Memory of Gaston Sigur at the Elliott School of International Affairs in George Washington University, and APP Member.

First Published June 3, 2026 on East Asia Forum.

Despite US President Donald Trump’s disruptive foreign policies, Japan is trying to lock in its alliance with the United States, out of fear of China. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has flattered Trump and appeased his defence and economic demands while vowing to implement former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP). This is a strategy that will not work.

Trump has undercut the key pillars of Japan’s FOIP by defying the rules-based international order, rejecting the provision of international public goods, and weakening multilateral agreements to promote free trade. The contradiction between embracing Trump and promoting FOIP is so stark that it hollows out FOIP’s goals and principles.

While Japan is fixated on maintaining supply chain resilience against possible Chinese economic coercion, the tragic irony is that the US–Israeli war against Iran has sabotaged Japan’s economic security. Trump’s erratic behaviour means that US allies can no longer rely on Washington.

US allies should seriously consider a Plan B as an alternative to their Plan A of virtual wholesale accommodation of Trump. But rather than developing a Plan B, mainstream Japanese strategists are advocating what they call a ‘Plan A+’ — a hedge against the uncertainties of US foreign policy.

Under Plan A+, Japan would supplement its brand of ‘America First’ diplomacy in two ways. It would strengthen ties with like-minded middle powers to counter Chinese military assertiveness and economic coercion. Japan would also build up its defence capabilities to reduce dependence on the US security commitment.

This dual-track hedge is inadequate and misguided.

Though European middle powers are wary of China, they cannot compensate for a weakening US security commitment. European states may show a naval presence, but they are too distant to play a critical role in Japan’s paramount security concerns, such as the defence of Taiwan.

Many European countries have also reset relations with China in a more positive direction. This contrasts sharply with the acute deterioration in Japan–China relations after Takaichi became prime minister. Most middle powers in the Asia Pacific likewise remain reluctant to join Japan in a collective defence pact that risks a military conflict with China.

Even if Japan builds up its defence capabilities to deter China, Beijing will respond with its own military buildup to dissuade Japan from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. The ensuing arms race will favour China, which has more economic resources and fewer political constraints on military spending. China’s vast geographic area makes Japan more vulnerable to missile attacks and China more militarily resilient. A Japanese defence buildup is not a hedge against a weakening US security commitment, but wishful thinking that the United States will return to its previous role after Trump. In fact, Japan’s current face-off with China will make Japan more militarily dependent upon the United States.

Plan A+ will also exacerbate Japan–China tensions. The growing antagonism between Tokyo and Beijing is becoming a liability for Japan’s middle power diplomacy. When Japan was an economic superpower, Tokyo made the strategic choice not to become a great power in the traditional sense by adopting stringent constraints on its own defence policies as well as upholding the pacifist article 9 of the postwar constitution. Japan therefore emphasised multilateral cooperation and pursued positive engagement with China as well as maintained its alliance with the United States.

Today, Japan has been relaxing many of these self-imposed constraints and is seriously considering constitutional revision, but the relative decline of its economic capabilities and the shrinkage of its population are cementing Japan’s status as a middle power. Even more so than before, Japan must cooperate with other countries and eschew unilateralism. But its current middle power diplomacy of trying to get Asia Pacific countries to counter China will intensify China’s hostility towards Japan.

Most countries in the region, however, do not want to choose between the United States and China, nor between Japan and China. Though they prefer Japan to restrain US–China rivalry, Tokyo is instead anxious about Trump’s interest in stabilising US–China relations.

Takaichi has indicated that Japan remains open to dialogue with China, but her approach is passive. Tokyo needs to act proactively to stabilise relations by addressing concerns that Japan seeks the independence of Taiwan or its permanent separation from China. To reassure China, Japan should reaffirm the points about Taiwan made in the 1972 Japan–China normalisation communique. It should also explicitly state that it does not support Taiwan’s independence and would accept any resolution accepted by both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

When Japan normalised relations with China in 1972, then foreign minister Masayoshi Ohira stated that Japan does not support the Taiwan independence movement. Moreover, former prime ministers Keizo Obuchi and Yasuo Fukuda reaffirmed this stance in 1998 and 2007 respectively by declaring that Japan does not support the independence of Taiwan. Since then, Japanese leaders have refrained from providing this reassurance to Beijing, which has raised Chinese suspicions that Japan is veering away from its one-China policy. This shift contrasts sharply with the United States, which has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan’s independence.

Stabilising Japan–China relations would let Japan reformulate FOIP to restrain great power competition and develop a more stable and cooperative Asia.

Though Japanese officials claim FOIP is not directed against China and that Japan would welcome China’s participation, the operational reality of FOIP is to counter Chinese influence. FOIP stresses international public goods, but Japan’s regional capacity-building, promotion of connectivity, security minilateralism (small-group diplomacy among aligned states) and support for high standard trade and investment rules look more like international club goods.

In May 2026, Prime Minister Takaichi updated Abe’s FOIP framework by stressing regional cooperation to enhance economic resilience and energy security. But even under this slightly amended FOIP framework, Tokyo still seeks to mobilise Asian countries to resist China rather than nurture an inclusive regional order.

A more divided and conflict-ridden world makes a fundamentally revised FOIP more vital for advancing regional cooperation.

Japan could encourage the deepening of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest regional trade bloc, which includes China. Tokyo could push to reduce non-tariff barriers, accelerate tariff elimination, strengthen services and investment rules and improve enforcement and dispute settlement.

Japan could also be more forward-looking on China’s interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), encouraging China to undertake the economic reforms needed to meet CPTPP standards on labour rights, environmental protection, digital trade and state-owned enterprises. This would help both China and Taiwan join the CPTPP—facilitating a resolution of the Taiwan question through dialogue rather than military coercion.

A revised FOIP could also help Japan promote maritime confidence-building and crisis prevention. For example, in addition to coast guard capacity building for Southeast Asian countries, Japan could encourage joint exercises with China on search and rescue missions and responses to maritime disasters. Tokyo could also work with Beijing to strengthen the bilateral maritime and aerial communication mechanism and encourage the development of such mechanisms among other states in the region.

With the United States having abandoned international efforts to address climate change, Japan could help lead an Asian effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and improve energy efficiency. This demands close cooperation with China, which has made major strides in green technology, as well as with regional middle powers.

Reorienting FOIP cuts against Takaichi’s conservative nationalist instincts and the mood of the Japanese people. But a reorientation is necessary if Japan is to lead as a middle power that restrains great power rivalry rather than fuels it.