Asia Policy Events, Monday February 23, 2026

WHAT COMES NEXT FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY AFTER THE SUPREME COURT’S IEEPA RULING? 2/23, 9:30-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Navin Girishankar, President, Economic Security and Technology Department; Philip Luck, Director, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business; William Alan Reinsch, Senior Adviser and Scholl Chair Emeritus, Economics Program and Scholl Chair in International Business; Angela Ellard, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Economic Security and Technology Department. 

THE UN WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES: THE FUTURE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT. 2/23, 10:00-11:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Heba Aly, Director, Article 109; Charles Kenny, Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development; Sarah E. Mendelson, Distinguished Service Professor of Public Policy, Director, Sustainable Futures, Carnegie Mellon University; Stewart Patrick, Senior Fellow and Director, Global Order and Institutions Program. 

BOOK TALK: GHOST NATION: THE STORY OF TAIWAN AND ITS STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL. 2/23, 4:00-5:15pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University. Speaker: author Chris Horton. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4kIPcV0

THE PHILIPPINE ECONOMY IN 2026: GROWTH WITHOUT MOMENTUM. 2/24, 10:00-11:00am (SGT), 2/23, 9:00-10:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. Speakers: Dr. Jan Carlo Punongbayan, Visiting Fellow, Philippine Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, Moderator: Dr. Jayant Menon, Visiting Senior Fellow, Regional Economic Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. 

BNP RETURNS TO POWER: ASSESSING THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF BANGLADESH’S ELECTIONS. 2/23, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Razia Sultana, Core Senior Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies (BIISS); Avinash Paliwal, Reader in International Relations, School of Oriental and African Studies; Farooq Sobhan, Former Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh, Moderator: Elizabeth Threlkeld, Senior Fellow and Director, South Asia Program, Stimson; Steve Ross, Senior Fellow, Crisis in Rakhine State Project Director, Stimson. 

THE WORLD OF HARD POWER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON UKRAINE. 2/23, Noon-1:00pm (GMT), 7:00-8:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the UK. 

REPORT RELEASE: RECONNAISSANCE GENERAL BUREAU: KIM REGIME’S PRECIOUS TREASURED SWORD. 2/23, 4:00-5:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Committee for Human Rights North Korea. Speakers: Report Author Robert Collins; Dr. Nicholas Eberstadt, HRNK Board Member and Henry Wendt Chair, American Enterprise Institute (AEI); ROKA LTG (Ret.) Chun In-bum; Dr. George Hutchinson, Editor-in-Chief, International Journal of Korean Studies (IJKS); Greg Scarlatoiu, President and CEO, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). 

[POSTPONED] THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER. 2/23, 6:30-8:30pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP). Speakers: Emma Chanlett-Avery, Asia Society Policy Institute; Ken Jimbo, Keio University; Susan A. Thornton, Director, NCAFP Forum on Asia Pacific Security.

THE UK CRITICAL MINERALS STRATEGY: BUILDING NATIONAL RESILIENCE THROUGH GLOBAL POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL COLLABORATION, 2/23, 5:00-6:00pm (GMT), Noon-1:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: Chris McDonald MP, UK Minister for Industry. 

WE THE PEOPLE: THE US CONSTITUTION IN TODAY'S WORLD. 2/23, 5:30-6:30pm (CST), 6:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Speakers: Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago; Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago. 

ALLIED NUCLEAR PARTNERSHIPS: ADVANCING U.S.–KOREA–JAPAN COOPERATION. 2/23, Noon-1:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Global American Business Institute (GABI). Speakers: Nobuo Tanaka, Chair, Steering Committee of Innovation for Cool Earth Forum (ICEF), CEO, Tanaka Global, Inc., Executive Director Emeritus, International Energy Agency (IEA); Joyce Connery, Principal Owner, Connery Strategies, Former Chair, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Moderator: Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Please Contact Mr. Bryan Cheong.

2026 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL TRADE CONFERENCE. 2/23-24. 1:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Washington International Trade Association (WITA). Speakers: Matt Blunt, President, American Automotive Policy Council; Jordan Dickinson, Director of Government Relations, Target; Andrea Durkin, Vice President for International Policy, National Association of Manufacturers; Nasim Fussell, Vice President, Trade & International, Business Roundtable; Khalil Gharbieh, Senior Director, Trade Policy, Microsoft; Peter Harrell, Visiting Scholar, Institute of International Economic Law, Georgetown Law School; William Kimmitt, Under Secretary of Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce; Jonathan McHale Vice President, Digital Trade, Computer and Communications Industry Association (CCIA); Kellie Meiman, Senior Counselor, McLarty Associates; Ambassador Mariana Pacheco, External Consultant, Araujo Ibarra; Greta Peisch, Partner, Wiley Rein LLP; Del Renigar, Vice President, External Affairs, Rio Tinto; Sara Schuman, Managing Director, Beacon Global Strategies; Susan Schwab, Strategic Advisor, Mayer Brown LLP; Kelly Ann Shaw, Partner, Akin; Joe Stockunas, President of SEMI Americas, SEMI; Stephen Vaughn, Partner, International Trade, King & Spalding LLP; Brad Wood, Senior Director, Trade and Innovation Policy, National Foreign Trade Council; Maria Zieba, Vice President of Government Affairs, National Pork Producers Council; Ricardo Zúñiga, Strategic Advisor, Dinámica Americas. /

THE WORLD OF HARD POWER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON UKRAINE. 2/23, Noon-1:00pm (GMT), 7:00-8:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Chatham House. Speaker: General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Ukraine’s Ambassador to the UK. 

BOOK TALK: THE WEST: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA. 2/23, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: author Georgios Varouxakis, Professor of History, Queen Mary University of London; Anatol Lieven, Director of the Eurasia Program, Quincy Institute. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4tpQIPX

CHINA-RUSSIA VIEWS OF THE "DONROE DOCTRINE": HOW MOSCOW AND BEIJING ARE RESPONDING TO TRUMP'S FOREIGN POLICY. 2/23, 10:00-11:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute. Speakers: Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist for China Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA); Lyle J. Goldstein, Director of the China Initiative and Visiting Professor at Brown University’s Watson Institute; Lyle Morris, Senior Fellow for Foreign Policy and National Security at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. 

CONTAINING CHINA WITHOUT CONFRONTATION? THE QUAD'S MARITIME SECURITY PARADOX PLAYS OUT AT SEA. 2/23, 6:45-8:45pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia-Pacific Studies (YCAPS). Speaker: John F. Bradford, Co-founder of YCAPS and Adjunct Senior Fellow at RSIS.

NUCLEAR THREATS AND THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 2/23, 7:00-8:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers: Anna Hood, Associate Professor, University of Auckland; Monique Cormier, Associate Professor, Monash University; Carrie McDougall, Associate Professor, Melbourne Law School; Paul Davis, Adjunct Principal Researcher, RAND; George Perkovich, Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow. 

The Honorary White Men of Kentucky

On February 5, 2025, Representative Andy Barr (R-KY) kicked off his campaign for the U.S. Senate to replace retiring Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) reminding people of his MAGA credentials. 

In his first TV campaign ad, Andy railed against DEI and declared that "it is not a sin to be white." 

This phrase used by Barr is a variation of “It’s OK to be white,” which has been adopted by white supremacists. It has been designated as a “hate slogan“ by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL). The phrase surfaced in 2017 on racist message boards, often abbreviated as IOTBW.

Barr's top Republican primary opponent, former Kentucky Attorney General Daniel Cameron is Black. One of his top potential Democratic opponents, former state representative Charles Booker, is as well.

According to campaign finance records reviewed by the nonprofit Popular Information, Barr’s campaign ad is being bankrolled by dozens of major corporations, including General Motors, State Farm, JPMorgan Chase, Delta, and Microsoft. They identify 67 corporations. As he is a member of the powerful House Financial Services Committee and Chair of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and a member of the Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial Institutions, he is supported by all major banks, securities and insurance companies. His membership on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on East Asia and Pacific is likely an added attraction to Aflac that has substantial investment in Japan.

There were also two Japanese companies among the Barr donors. Both have substantial investments in Kentucky. Toyota gave $8,500 and Suntory that makes Jim Beam and Maker's Mark gave $10,000.

The Opposition is CRA_P_arty

Japan’s Shrinking Opposition

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 16, 2026

As the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) led by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi garnered more than two-thirds of the seats in the Lower House in the February 8 election, the opposition parties have shrunk. This gives Takaichi’s government great power to turn its policies into law. It is a major question how the opposition powers are going to survive under huge pressure from the Takaichi administration and its high popularity. Democracy in Japan may depend on whether the opposition parties can properly check her unilateral exercise of power that is not limited by any need to compromise.

The top opposition party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), lost 71% of its seats, falling from 167 to 49, in the election. The CRA is a new entity in the Lower House that is the result of a merger of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito. The parties merged just one day before Takaichi dissolved the Lower House. Voters saw the merger as a cynical political ploy by the two parties to keep power in the Lower House. The CRA’s policy differences with the LDP did not register with the voters in any significant way.

Unsurprisingly, the co-leaders of the CRA announced their resignations the day after the election. “We have an obsolete image,” said one of them, Yoshihiko Noda. Just four days later, on February 13, the CRA held an election for a new leader.

In that election, former CDPJ Secretary General, Jun-ya Ogawa, 54, defeated former Parliamentary Vice-minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, Takeshi Shina, by 27 to 22 votes. A son of a hairdresser in Takamatsu, Kagawa, Ogawa has positioned himself on the liberal side of the CDPJ, representing the interests of ordinary citizens. He is known as a policy expert from his time at the Ministry for Internal Affairs and Communications.

Ogawa made clear his differences with Takaichi in his press conference as the new leader where he emphasized the role of the CRA in advocating for democracy, promoting pacifism, and engaging in people-first and transparent politics. He questioned Takaichi’s slogan “responsible and proactive public finances” as an outmoded process of limiting the government’s budget to a percentage of GDP. According to Ogawa, it is not meaningful to compare an indicator under the government’s control (the budget deficit) with a measurement that is not (GDP). .

Before it can compete with the LDP’s super majority in the Lower House, the CRA must integrate itself. Now, the CRA exists only in the Lower House. The CDPJ and Komeito in the Upper House decided not to merge into the CRA, splintering the two parties’ power there. In the Lower House, the powers of the two former parties are not equivalent.

The CRA fielded 236 candidates in the Lower House election; 202 for single-seat districts (SSD) and 34 for proportional districts (PD). All the candidates for SSD were from the CDPJ. In PD, 28 were from Komeito and 6 from the CDPJ. It is notable that 200 were doubly nominated both on SSD and PD, who had chance to get seats in PD even after they had lost in SSD.

Here’s the result. The CRA achieved 7 seats in SSD and 42 in PD. Of the CRA’s slate of candidates for PD, all the 28 from Komeito won the seat, because they were ranked at high position. Only 14 candidates from the CDPJ could secure their seats in PD. The seats with legacy CDPJ lawmakers fell by 86% from 148 to 21. The former Komeito gained seats in the Lower House from 24 to the 28 CRA candidates who were elected.

Former CDPJ members in the CRA are of course frustrated with the results of unification of the two parties. They have lost not only colleagues but also substantial parts of their policy agenda. The CRA accepts the constitutionality of the 2015 security legislation while the CDPJ does not. The CRA also does not object to nuclear power or the resumption of shut down nuclear power plants, although the CDPJ has been looking to end use of nuclear power. These positions have been pillars of the CDPJ platform, but they have been given up in the Lower House. Some former CDPJ lawmakers believe that the CRA’s rejection of the two CDPJ policies alienated liberal supporters.

Ogawa has not bridged the differences between the two groups. Komeito favors a constitutional amendment expanding the definition of self-defense, and Ogawa did not rule out an amendment to describe “self-defense force” in the constitution. But this is one part of four in the LDP’s agenda for discussion. The CDPJ group in the CRA firmly opposes any such change and is worried about the hawkish movement to increase war preparations. Ogawa has since explained he did not mean to concede so easily to the LDP’s proposed amendment.

Meanwhile, the CRA hopes to develop a cooperative relationship with the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), which is popular among young voters. Both the CRA and the DPP enjoy support from the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). Although the LDP considered adding the DPP as a coalition partner, the LDP’s overwhelming electoral success eliminated any need for the LDP to ask for the DPP’s cooperation. The DPP has said that it will not join the LDP coalition.

From the DPP side, the party has no great interest in cooperating with the CRA, which comes across as an old and undynamic political body. The CRA’s positions on the constitutional amendment and on the resumption of nuclear power plants will push the DPP away. Still, the CRA will try to find commonalities with the DPP over some issues in the Diet.

Other populist parties, Sanseito and Team Mirai, that received a modest surge in the Lower House election, will go their own way, given the size of the LDP majority. These parties are also unlikely to coordinate their positions with those of the CRA. The leftist parties, Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi, lost significant numbers of seats in the election and will not have a substantial presence in the Lower House.

Politics in Japan is now much like our solar system in which small planets orbit the sun. As long as the LDP maintains its majority and the Japan Innovation Party supports the LDP agenda, opposition parties cannot take meaningful countermeasures to constrain Takaichi’s free hand in bringing her policies to fruition.

Asia Policy Events Monday February 16, 2026

Today is a national holiday in the United States - President's Day.
Birth date of Kim Jong Il - National Holiday in North Korea.
Lunar New Year Eve.

BANGLADESH’S PIVOTAL ELECTIONS: CHALLENGES FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION. 2/16, 4:00-5:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: International Crisis Group. Speakers: Thomas Kean, Senior Consultant, Crisis Group; Sara Hossain, Lawyer and Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of Bangladesh; Mubashar Hasan, Adjunct Researcher, Western Sydney University; Margarite Clarey, Senior Advocacy and Communications Officer, Crisis Group. 

ADJUSTING TO A SLOW-MOVING CRISIS: AGEING AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN JAPAN. 2/16, 6:00-7:30pm (JST), 4:00-5:30am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: French Research Institute on Japan at the Maison Franco‑Japonaise (IFRJ‑MFJ). Speaker: Brieuc Monfort, Associate Professor, Sophia University (Tokyo) & Research Fellow, European Institute of Sophia University; Moderator: Malo Mofakhami, Sorbonne Paris Nord Univ., IFRJ-MFJ, French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). 

HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN: WHY DOES CHANGE LAG BEHIND? 2/16, 6:45pm (GMT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Japan Society, London. Speaker: Sanae Fujita, Fellow, Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.

Burning a lot of bridges

Redrawing America’s Security Bargains in Northeast Asia

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published February 11, 2026 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

The stability of Northeast Asia has long rested on two strategic bargains with South Korea and Japan, forged out of the Korean War and formalized in security treaties. South Korea was compelled to accept the de facto division of the country in exchange for a treaty commitment, manifested in continuous U.S. ground forces, to defend against any North Korean threat of attack. With Japan, the bargain was different. The security pact provided a broad U.S. security umbrella, allowing Japan to focus on its economic recovery. In exchange, Japan provided bases and infrastructure that allowed U.S. air, naval, and marine infantry forces to project power regionally and globally. Both bargains depended on extended deterrence, or the credible threat that the United States would use force, including nuclear weapons if necessary, to protect its allies. That commitment also reduced incentives for South Korea and Japan to develop their own nuclear arsenals.

U.S. National Security and Defense Strategies
Donald Trump’s White House believes in a very different version of these security bargains. This was laid out in two documents—the National Security Strategy (NSS), issued in late November, and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), issued in late January.

Taken collectively, the Trump administration’s policymakers envision a situation in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific where South Korea has the principal, if not almost sole, responsibility for defense against a potential North Korean attack. U.S. forces are repurposed and perhaps redeployed with a regional mission, mainly aimed at China, with potential use in situations such as a Taiwan contingency. Both South Korea and Japan are pushed, in turn, to not only spend much more but also to focus their spending on building capacities to defend the First Island Chain rather than their own territories.

As this writer noted in an earlier commentary, the NSS contained no mention of the U.S. defense of Korea and Japan, nor of extended deterrence commitments. Instead, Washington says it “must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain.”

Strikingly, the NSS did not reference the Korean Peninsula broadly and did not reaffirm the long-standing goal of North Korean denuclearization. There was also no mention of the new strategic alliance between North Korea and Russia, despite Russia’s potential to vastly improve North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction program. The document also dilutes the potential China threat, focusing primarily on economic terms.

The NDS largely follows that framework but offers at least some limited discussion of the security environment in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific. China’s military buildup is less of a direct threat in the NDS’s language than a rising power that needs to be balanced by the United States and its allies. The goal is one of an offshore counterweight, one more appropriate to the reduced global role envisioned by the Trump administration. The document also acknowledges that North Korea poses “a direct military threat” to South Korea and Japan and that the former must stay vigilant against the threat of invasion. While there is a nod to North Korea’s nuclear capability, there is no mention of the role of the nearly 30,000 U.S. forces stationed in South Korea.

Instead, the NDS states South Korea “is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support.” What that support may be is not spelled out, but both the NSS and NDS hint that this may include the removal of U.S. ground and air forces, or at least their redeployment elsewhere. “This shift in the balance of responsibility is consistent with America’s interest in updating U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula,” according to the NDS. Extended deterrence is totally absent, or even the clear commitment made in the security treaty to fully defend South Korea.

The Colby Speech
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby presented the implications of these policy statements more explicitly during recent visits to South Korea and Japan in late January. Colby stated the central purpose of U.S. national security policy in the Western Pacific as the search for a “stable balance of power” with China. To that end, Colby told an audience of elite Korean policymakers:

“We are focused on building a military posture in the Western Pacific that ensures that aggression along the first island chain is infeasible, that escalation unattractive, and war is indeed irrational. This includes a resilient, distributed, and modernized force posture” across the region.

Colby praised South Korea’s defense spending, calling the country a “model ally.” But in what may be considered a stunning omission for any senior U.S. defense official visiting Seoul, there was not a single word devoted to North Korea, its nuclear and missile buildup, its military axis with Moscow, or the United States’ seventy-three-year-long commitment to defend against it.

This was not lost on the audience. “In an 18-minute address, Colby mentioned China seven times but did not refer to North Korea even once,” the major daily Chosun Ilbo wrote in its account. Colby, whom the South Korean media credited as leading the drafting of the NDS, which was issued just before his arrival, “made these points during meetings with senior South Korean government officials.”

The Pursuit of a Trump-Kim Summit
The White House directed Colby to omit North Korea from his public comments as part of an effort to convince North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to meet President Trump again, a source within the administration told this writer on condition of anonymity. Talk of a meeting, perhaps tied to Trump’s planned visit to China in April, has been widely circulating. “The White House is opening a line of communication to Kim,” the source said.

“Considering how the Trump administration has sent mixed signals on this from day one, it is not really that surprising,” says Clint Work, a Research Fellow at the National Defense University. “I read it similarly, as an effort to tamp down language so as to try and open an avenue to, at the very least, talk with Pyongyang,” Work told the author.

South Korean officials offered little in the way of public reaction to Colby’s message. One reason for this is that President Trump threatened higher tariffs on South Korea the same day that the message was delivered, ostensibly because the National Assembly is slow-walking approval of a trade deal made last year. The timing was so coincidental that it sparked speculation that the tariff move was meant to reinforce Colby’s defense message, but sources within the Trump administration deny that intent.

For its part, the Lee Jae Myung administration may see a U.S. retreat serving its own goals of greater defense autonomy and engagement with North Korea. The South Korean president recently called on the country to rid itself of a “submissive mentality” of being dependent on others. A less engaged United States may accelerate the timetable for South Korean forces to assume operational control on the peninsula, create space for South Korea to enrich nuclear fuel, and incentivize new kinds of defense partnerships, such as in nuclear submarine technology. Support for nuclear armament remains high across South Korea as well.

South Korean policymakers have long resisted the idea that U.S. forces in the country should have any role other than defending against North Korea, or be reduced. But there is more willingness, says Work, to acknowledge and grapple with the idea that U.S. forces may need the “strategic flexibility” to deploy outside the peninsula.

South Korea-based researchers articulated the long-standing counterpoints to such flexibility in a recent paper published at one of the nation’s foremost think tanks, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. “South Korean administrations have resisted any changes to U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula, whether in terms of total size or operational focus,” argue Peter Lee and Esther Dunay. “This is due to the ongoing North Korean military and nuclear threat, fears of a potential entanglement in any Taiwan Strait conflict, and longstanding fears of alliance abandonment.”

On the surface, the U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan remain intact and manageable. But beneath that appearance of solidarity, the Trump administration’s attempts to redraw the security bargains that have underlain stability and peace in Northeast Asia are creating growing tension and uncertainty.

“We’re burning a lot of bridges,” the administration source told this writer. “We’re stressing the relationships with our allies.”

The LDP's Landslide Victory

Now the Hard Part, Governance

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 9, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, as the president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), achieved a landslide victory in the February 8 general election of the House of Representatives. The LDP received a record-high two-thirds majority with 316 seats out of 465 (68 percent) in the House. The win is attributed to the prime minister’s extraordinary popularity. With this super majority, she will be able to enact her agenda, including investment in defense build-up.
 
The previous record of 308 seats out of 480 was set by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009, during a major regime change that flipped the House from the LDP to the DPJ. Including the thirty-six seats won by the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the LDP-JIP coalition occupies 352 seats (75 percent). The LDP received so many votes above the number of candidates on its slate in proportional districts that it gave away fourteen seats to other parties.
 
An opposition coalition created for the purpose of the election, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), sank from 167 to 49, losing support for their plan to build a politically centrist entity. Populist parties such as the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), Sanseito and a new party, “Team Mirai,” failed to make expected progress since the LDP offered a reliably hawkish platform. Leftist parties such as the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi lost a significant number of their seats.
 
The next Diet session will be convened on February 18 with 150 days of duration. Takaichi and all the current ministers in her Cabinet will resign on the first day. Takaichi will then be formally reelected as prime minister. After that she will form her second Takaichi Cabinet. Most ministers are expected to be reappointed. Takaichi will give a policy speech on February 20.
 
Success in Agenda Setting
Takaichi defined this snap election as a referendum on her leadership. “Choose me or someone else” was her explanation of why she dissolved the Lower House when she did. It is unusual for a prime minister to call a snap election not to demand endorsement for specific policy but to confirm public support for his or her cabinet. Takaichi’s campaign strategy was not to focus the public eye on her policy decisions.
 
Voters responded with enthusiasm. “She has leadership,” “I have a good impression of her,” and “I believe her” were the public’s top three reasons to vote for LDP candidates, according to a poll in January. For the voters, the election was not about their Diet members or their policies. The voters in the Lower House election knew that a vote for the LDP in their districts would help Takaichi.
 
Her missteps did not matter to the voters. Neither her careless comment on the Taiwan contingency last November nor her approval of the depreciation of the Japanese yen during the election campaign had any significant impact. Indeed, after last week’s report in the Weekly Bunshun magazine of the close relationship between Takaichi and the former Unification Church, support for Takaichi surged.
 
In two elections during the Ishiba administration, the LDP lost its majority after the scandal over certain factions’ management of political funds became public. This time, however, the LDP accumulated seats even after Takaichi decided that the LDP would endorse formerly disgraced candidates who had personally been involved in the scandal. While the Lower House election is not by its nature a referendum on a prime minister -- voters vote only for candidates in the House -- the voters favored Takaichi’s presentation as a leader who works hard in a male-dominated political community.  This fact garnered substantial votes, regardless of her policies. 
 
Crush of the Liberals
Another major reason for the LDP’s victory was the failure of the CRA, which was formed with merger in the Lower House of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito, to gain any traction with voters. Although both parties had been talking about a coalition since last October after Komeito left its coalition with the LDP, they did not announce the formation of the CRA until after Takaichi had called the snap election. Voters perceived the CRA as simply an electoral gimmick, and the CRA did not have a ready answer.
 
Still, the CRA was expected to at least retain its seats for two reasons: strong labor union support of the CDPJ and the support for Komeito from the Buddhist religious group, Soka Gakkai. Observers believe that members of Soka Gakkai reliably voted for the CRA in this election, but that voters from the former CDPJ did not give comparable support.
 
Before dissolution of the Lower House, the CDPJ held 148 seats and Komeito had 24. It is likely that the CDPJ has in the past relied on swing voters who had been critical in the last Lower House election of the LDP’s kickback fund scandal. These swing voters returned to the LDP in this election. In addition, the CDPJ compromised on at least two of its policy positions to form the CRA. This alienated traditional CDPJ supporters. The compromises included approving the 2015 security legislation to exercise the right of collective self-defense and abandoning the policy against nuclear power plants.
 
The disastrous election results also meant that the CRA lost at least six skilled veteran lawmakers including the founder of CDPJ, Yukio Edano. The co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito, announced their were stepping down. The liberals power to oppose the LDP has overwhelmingly shrunk.
 
Policies to Go
With her two-thirds majority, Takaichi has almost unlimited power to pursue her stated policy goals. She argues that her campaign slogan “responsible and proactive public finances” means investment in crisis management. That is, she intends to mitigate the three principles for regulating exports of defense equipment and to remove restrictions on the transfer of five categories of defense equipment. Takaichi thus will bring the exportation of weapons under the umbrella of economic growth.
 
Takaichi is likely to move quickly to ensure that national security embodies conservative politics. Her administration will increase the defense budget in line with the request from the United States. The administration also is likely to review the well-established three non-nuclear principles: not producing, not possessing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons. Takaichi has argued for redefinition of the third principle – the ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons. Most JIP candidates approve of sharing nuclear secrets with the U.S. Takaichi is also eager to enact anti-spy legislation, even in the face of concerns about violating individual privacy.
 
The LDP and JIP will accelerate discussion of constitutional amendments with two-thirds majority in the Lower House, which is necessary to initiate the amendments. But they have a little difference. JIP argues paragraph 2 of Article 9, which prohibits Japan to possess military force, should be dropped. The LDP maintains four points for the amendment: 1) clarify the status of the self-defense force in Article 9, 2) maintain Diet functions in a national emergency, 3) guarantee at least one seat in every prefectural district of the Upper House, and 4) confirm the importance of education.
 
The Constitution requires a two-thirds majority of “each house” for an amendment process to begin. The LDP lacks this majority in the Upper House, even after including the votes of members of the JIP, DPP, and other pro-amendment parties. Any constitutional amendments thus will require furr discussion among almost all the parties.
 
Article 59 of the Constitution provides that a bill becomes a law when the Lower House passes the bill for a second time with a two-thirds majority, even if the Upper House has rejected the bill. With its super majority, the Takaichi administration has now obtained unconstrained power to enact any bill. The administration, however, is likely to forego using this power, being afraid of criticism on unilateral management of politics.
 
Takaichi ended her reluctance to cut the consumption tax cut just before entering the election campaign, saying that the LDP would “accelerate consideration” of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax on foods. While the LDP can pass any tax-cut bill, Takaichi will be careful about how to move forward because changes or possible changes to the consumption tax have damaged previous administrations. She will discuss the matter at a multi-party conference and wrap up an interim report by this summer.
 
As President Donald Trump endorsed the Takaichi government before the election, Japan’s relatively warm relationship with the U.S. should continue in a summit meeting scheduled for March 19. Takaichi’s sweeping victory will not, however, improve diplomatic relations with China. Beijing remains concerned about what it views as provocative actions by Japan. If Takaichi makes a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine as the prime minister, relations with China will further deteriorate.
 
Cooperation or Unilateral Leadership
Although the LDP has two-thirds power in the Lower House to overcome any Upper House decision, Takaichi seems to be seeking cooperation with other parties on policies for a smooth procedure in the Diet. The LDP and JIP reconfirmed their coalition the day after the election. Takaichi has asked JIP to join her cabinet and they appear to have accepted her offer.
 
The biggest change in the coalition will be a shift in leadership on policymaking from JIP to the LDP. The initiative for reducing seats in the Lower House, an important item in JIP’s agenda, may now face greater opposition from some LDP lawmakers. Having said that, it is still possible that Takaichi promotes the seat reduction beyond reluctance in the LDP. Takaichi is sometimes closer to JIP, especially over some hawkish issues, than to moderate groups in the LDP.
 
Whether DPP will join a cooperative framework with the LDP will be key to construction of a new political regime in Japan. The DPP may be willing to do so -- if the LDP accepts their economic policies. Saniseito is another target for Takaichi. However, the DPP and Sanseito response has so far been negative. 
 
Takaichi is likely to exploit populism in her politics. Taking advantage of social media was a powerful tool in her surprising victory in the LDP presidential election last fall. She also succeeded in taking conservative voters away from other populist parties through a campaign strategy that relied on the Internet. Although she does not yet have a solid political base within the LDP, a feature she shares with the former Junichiro Koizumi administration, she will try to control her administration by keeping her popularity high with voters.

Asia Policy Events, Monday February 9, 2026

INSIDE JAPAN’S HIGH-STAKES SNAP ELECTION. 2/9, 8:00-9:00AM (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Speakers: Nicholas Szechenyi, Vice President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, CSIS; Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, CSIS; Associate Professor, University of Oxford; Charles McClean, Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), Japan Chair, CSIS, Assistant Professor, Yale University; Moderator: Nicholas Szechenyi, Vice President, Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department and Senior Fellow, Japan Chair, CSIS.

BOOK TALK: RUNAWAY CAPITALISM. 2/9, Noon-1:30pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: American University School of International Service. Speakers: author, James Mittelman, Distinguished Research Professor and University Professor Emeritus, American University; Maria De Jesus, Professor, School of International Service, American University; Patricia Aufderheide, University Professor of Communication Studies, School of Communication, American University, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Media & Social Impact; Clarence Lusane, Professor, Howard University; Director, International Affairs Program; Julie Radomski, Global China Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Boston University Global Development Policy Center; Yang Zhang, Professor, School of International Service, American University.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4qR3l4n

BOOK TALK: CANCELING RUSSIA: THE UKRAINE WAR AND THE RISE OF THE WESTERN HAWKS. 2/9, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy Institute. Speakers: author, Andrei Pavlovich Tsygankov, Professor of Russian and International Politics, San Francisco State University; Anatol Lieven, Director, Eurasia Program, Andrew Bacevich Chair in American Diplomatic History, Quincy Institute.

DECODING TRUMP’S CHINA POLICY. 2/9, Noon (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE (FP). Speakers: Kurt Campbell, Former U.S. deputy secretary of state and current chairman and co‑founder of The Asia Group; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in chief of Foreign Policy and host of FP LIVE. 

Policy? What Policy?

Vigorous Policy Discussion Missing in the Campaign

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
February 2, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s February 8th call for a snap election in the House of Representatives has dealt a blow to the campaigns of those parties that did yet have a fully built policy platform to present to voters. The only recourse for these campaigns has been to contest details about the consumption tax cut or about minor defense and foreign policies. Parties with populist agendas are exploiting public concern about the swelling number of foreign visitors. The campaigns are already in the second half.

The central feature of this campaign season is not policy debate, however, but the prospect that Japan may endorse its first female prime minister – and perhaps by a wide margin. News organizations have conducted several polls to predict the possibility that the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) may achieve a simple majority in the Lower House, obviating the need for a coalition partner.

A poll by the Asahi Shimbun (telephone and online survey of approximately 370,000 people between January 31 and February 1) indicated a significant surge of support for the LDP that would take it from its current 196 seats to between 270 and 280. The media’s treatment of the campaign as a horse race – a phenomenon well known in other countries – has superseded meaningful discussion of policies that will determine Japan’s near-term future.

Management of Public Finances
The LDP has presented a campaign platform with five planks: 1) a strong economy, 2) the local community as the engine of Japan’s economy, 3) responsible defense and diplomacy strategies to strengthen the international order, 4) financial security for every generation and responsibility for future generations, and 5) a new constitution compatible with contemporary Japan. Of these, Takaichi has focused on the economy and defense policy.

The catchword for the Takaichi campaign is “responsible and proactive public finances.” What does “responsible” or “proactive” mean? Observers suppose that “responsible” means a national budget not dependent on the issuance of governmental bonds and that “proactive” means investments for the future. Takaichi thus promises that her administration will manage public finances without an excessive issuance of Japanese government bonds (JGBs).

But even during her so-far brief period as prime minister, Takaishi has favored more JGBs. Her FY2025 supplemental budget from last December totaled ¥18.4 trillion last December. The principal source of funding (63% to be precise) was the issuance of ¥11.4 trillion in JGBs. The FY2026 budget bill will set a spending record of ¥122.3 trillion, funded in part by the issuance of ¥29.5 trillion in JGBs, but it has not been discussed in the Diet yet as a result of Takaichi’s dissolution of the Lower House.

The LDP platform explains that “responsible and proactive public finances” means “producing a positive cycle in which further investment is possible through the sustainability of public finances, powerful economic growth and an increase in tax revenue.” The LDP aims to improve the balance of governmental debt against Japan’s GDP. Takaichi claims that she will begin fundamental reform of public finances by ending the annual tradition of a supplemental budget.

However, the prime minister has not proven her capacity to communicate smoothly with the markets. Reflecting investors’ fundamental concerns about Takaichi’s budget deficit, the market for long-term bonds has been declining ever since she took office last October. The rate on 10-year JGBs has steeply risen 60 basis points from 1.6 percent in late October to 2.2 percent in late January 2026. When she referred to exporters’ prosperity with yen’s depreciation, Japanese yen suddenly dropped against dollar early February. So far, there is little to suggest that Takaichi can implement her budget proposal “with the confidence of the markets.”

The opposition parties have not built a counterargument to Takaichi’s public financing plan. They have instead focused on such granular issues as whether a consumption tax cut should cover all consumption or be limited to foods, and whether the cut should be permanent or limited to two years. While most parties have not produced a plan to offset the decrease in revenues from a consumption tax cut, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) proposes to establish a governmental fund to cover the tax cut. Takaichi has not identified any fiscal resource to substitute for a consumption tax cut.

Diplomacy at the Center of the World
“We will resume our diplomatic standing at the center of the world by restoring the power of the economy and our defense systems,” says the LDP platform. It is not clear that in the last 80 years Japan has ever stood at the center of the world or shaped it in any significant way. The best guess is that Takaichi wants to revive former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s policy that Japan “flourish at the center of the world.”

There is nothing new in the content of her foreign policies. The LDP platform calls for strengthening relations with allied countries and the global south through shared values based on a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” This policy incorporates the concepts of freedom, democracy, and rule of law. The platform cites as an example the Abe administration’s solution to the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea.

The LDP platform also stresses constructive and stable relations with China, but Takaichi has already worsened the relationship with her careless comment in November on the Taiwan contingency. Since then, the Japanese economy has suffered. China has taken counter actions, including advising its citizens not to travel to Japan and banning exports of dual use items to Japan. The Chinese have also indicated that they may restrict exports of rare earth minerals.

On other national security issues Takaichi has discussed defense spending in the context of active public investment in economic growth. The LDP platform proposes revisions to three national security documents and the removal of regulations covering exports of defense equipment. Takaichi also hopes to revise the three anti-nuclear principles that now prohibit Japan from possessing, producing, or introducing nuclear weapons.

The CRA has pointed out that the LDP’s hawkish coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), is behind these national security planks, and the CRA emphasizes its support for an exclusively defense-oriented policy. But the party is still explaining why it turned away from the traditional position of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, which opposed Abe’s 2015 security legislation to maximize Japan’s exercise of its right to collective self-defense.

Populistic Agenda for Foreigners
Some parties embrace xenophobic policies that would regulate foreigners, as if to say that Japan is suffering from a foreign invasion. But wide-ranging restrictions on foreigners are not feasible because the Japanese economy depends heavily on foreign workers and travelers. As a result, any new restrictions on foreigners would replicate traditional measures for travelers and immigrants.

The LDP would impose stricter controls on immigrants, a tax on foreign citizens, and a prohibition on real estate acquisitions by foreign investors. JIP and Sanseito are proposing an anti-spy act although such legislation could violate the privacy of Japanese citizens. Pressured by these two right-wing parties, Takaichi has said that she will protect privacy by strengthening governmental oversight of the legislation by establishing a new organization equivalent to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Japan’s economy is in fact highly dependent on foreign citizens. The Japanese government introduced a new system for foreign workers to make up for the shortage of Japanese labor brought about by Japan’s low birth rate. Foreign staff run most convenience stores in Tokyo. Foreign travelers and their heavy luggage regularly crowd trains in urban areas. These phenomena do not require xenophobic measures, but rather proper information for foreign visitors on how to abide by customs in Japanese society.

The CRA argues that it will establish an environment in which the Japanese and foreigners can live comfortably and with mutual respect. Although, as a practical matter, there are not many things that the Japanese government can do to reduce foreign presence, parties that say they will do something about it, like using the rallying cry, “the Japanese first,” are attracting voters. And voters supporting these attitudes are likely to help propel the LDP and its allied parties to garner a super majority of over 261 seats in the Lower House guaranteeing Takaichi’s premiership.

Asia Policy Events, Monday February 2, 2026

THE RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF MYANMAR’S ELECTIONS. 2/2, 9:00-11:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Morgan Michaels, Research Fellow for Southeast Asian Security and Defence, IISS; Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Chulalongkorn UniversitySteve Ross, Senior Fellow, Stimson; Min Zin, Executive Director, ISP-Myanmar; Amara Thiha, Nonresident Fellow, Stimson; Moe Thuzar, Senior Fellow and Coordinator, Myanmar Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS); Moderator: Yun Sun, Senior Fellow, Myanmar Project; Co-Director, East Asia Program, Stimson. 

THAILAND’S 2026 GENERAL ELECTION AND REFERENDUM: WHAT TO EXPECT. 2/2, 10:00-11:30am (SGT), 2/1, 9:00-10:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: ISWAS Yusof Ishak Institute. Speakers: Mathis Lohatepanont, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan; Thanisara Ruangdej (GG), CEO and Co-founder, WeVis.

WHAT FUTURE AFTER THE WAR? OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINE’S SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND PROSPERITY. 2/2, 9:00am-Noon (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Speakers: Anatolii Amelin, Executive Director, Ukrainian Institute of the Future; Max Bergmann, Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Hans Braunfisch, Founder, Pravo Ventures; Serhii Haidaichuk, Founder, CEO Club Ukraine; John E. Herbst, Senior Director, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Mykola Murskyj, Program Director, Razom for Ukraine; Senator Rob Portman, Distinguished Visiting Fellow in the Practice of Public Policy, AEI; Dalibor Rohac, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kori Schake, Director, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, AEI; Ambassador Olga Stefanishyna, Ambassador of Ukraine to the United States; Angela Stent, Senior Fellow, AEI.

FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF US DEMOCRACY. 2/2, 10:00-11:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics. Speakers: Marie Gottschalk, Edmund J. Kahn Distinguished Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania; G. Elliott Morris, data journalist and author of the Strength in Numbers Substack; Elora Mukherjee, Jerome L. Greene Clinical Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Ilan Wurman, Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; Moderator: Alex Hertel-Fernandez, Herbert H. Lehman Professor of Government and Director of IGP American Democracy Initiative, Columbia SIPA. 

BOOK TALK: RETRENCH, DEFEND, COMPETE: A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY TOWARD CHINA. 2/2, Noon-1:00pm (EST). Sponsor: Quincy Institute (QI). Speakers: author Charles Glaser, Senior Fellow, MIT Security Studies Program; Michael J. Mazarr, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation; Michael D. Swaine, Senior Research Fellow, East Asia Program, QI. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4cbcAbg

JAPAN’S NATIONAL SECURITY. 2/2, Noon-1:15pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA. Speaker: Ryo Sakai, 35th Chief of Staff of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and International Fellow at the Naval Postgraduate School. For inquiries, please contact Mr. Kenji Nagayoshi, knagayoshi@spfusa.org.

IN CONVERSATION WITH TOM STEYER. 2/2, 6:30-8:00pm (BST), 1:30-3:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: London School of Economics (LSE). Speakers: Tom Steyer, Co-Founder and Co-Executive Chair, Galvanize, Founder, NextGen America, Investor, Climate Advocate; President and Vice Chancellor, Larry Kramer, London School of Economics, Former President, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, Former Dean, Stanford Law School; Susana Mourato, Professor of Environmental Economics, Vice President and Pro-Vice Chancellor (Research), Department of Geography and Environment; Jonathan Pershing, Dean of the Global School of Sustainability, Professor in Practice, The Global School of Sustainability at LSE; Lord Stern, IG Patel Chair of Economics and Government, Chairman, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, Department of Economics, The Global School of Sustainability, London School of Economics (LSE). 

TARIFFS, TECH & TRUST: NAVIGATING THE NEXT PHASE OF U.S.–JAPAN TRADE TIES. 2/2, 5:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Washington, DC. Speakers: Emma Chanlett-Avery, Deputy Director & Director for Political-Security Affairs, ASPI; William Chou, PhD, Senior Fellow & Deputy Director, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; Yuka Hayashi, Vice President, Japan Practice, The Asia Group; Moderator: Wendy Cutler, Senior Vice President, ASPI. LIVESTREAMING HERE.

Will Scandal Upend Japan's Lower House Elections?

PM Takaichi Prepares for the Lower House Elections

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 26, 2026

Japan’s House of Representatives was dissolved on January 23. All the members of the House are up for election. The House is empty now. A general election to fill its 465 seats was officially announced on January 27, and voters will go to the polls on February 8. While the election itself requires voters to choose between Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and another person to be the leader of Japan, the election presents deeper choices between the right and the center and between pressure groups and populism. (The parties on the left are not a realistic option.) The voters will consider the Prime Minister’s economic and security policies, as well as her political ethics. 
 
It will be a highly unusual election. This is the first time a prime minister has dissolved the Diet at the beginning of its annual ordinary session since 1966 when former prime minister Eisaku Sato dissolved the House to bolster popular support for his administration. The 2026 general election also will have the shortest timeframe; election day is only 16 days after the dissolution. The previous record was 17 days when former prime minister Fumio Kishida dissolved the Diet in 2021.
 
Just before the election campaign begins, polls conducted by news organizations showed that the Takaichi Cabinet’s approval rating had fallen. The decline appears to reflect public doubts about holding a snap election before the Diet has passed the FY2026 budget bill. In the poll by Mainichi Shimbun, 41 percent disapproved of the snap election, while only 27 percent approved.
 
A Vote for the Right or the Center
Takaichi is asking the voters to validate the coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). The LDP’s previous coalition partner, Komeito, had been working as a brake on the LDP’s rightward drift, but the JIP identifies itself as an “accel” or accelerant of the move to the right. The JIP is now quickening the pass by calling on the LDP to promote such conservative policies as eliminating Paragraph 2 of Article 9 in the Constitution of Japan, which prohibits maintaining armed forces and other “war potential”.
 
Takaichi has long been known as a hawkish figure among the LDP members; for example, she has advocated prime ministerial visits to the Shinto Yasukuni Shrine for Japan’s war dead. On several matters, the LDP-JIP government is taking positions further to the right than previous administrations led by Shigeru Ishiba or Fumio Kishida. Takaichi hopes voters will endorse her conservative agenda, similar to Shinzo Abe’s, including a review of the three principles for transferring defense equipment and of the three non-nuclear principles.
 
The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito offer another choice for voters by establishing a new party, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), in the Lower House. One of the two co-leaders of the CRA, Yoshihiko Noda, has explained that the new party will integrate centrist parties so that they can effectively challenge Takaichi’s right-wing administration.
 
Although the CDPJ on its own has been taking positions on the left and has in the past sought to cooperate with the Japan Communist Party (JCP) in elections, the new CRA is staking out positions on the center-right to attract moderate and conservative lawmakers. As former CDPJ lawmakers have left the party before joining the CRA, CDPJ’s leftist tradition was not succeeded to the CRA. Because the JCP, Reiwa Shinsengumi, and the Social Democratic Party are unable to build a coalition on the left, the voters will have to choose between the right with the LDP-JIP coalition and the center with the CRA.
 
Populism or Solid Supporters
Recent elections in Japan are testimony to the advance of populism. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Sanseito embody this movement. They can attract young voters with eccentric policy proposals and video messages through social networking services.
 
Following its successful campaign in the Upper House election last summer, the DPP has been repeating its slogan: “We will increase your take-home pay.” The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, reached a deal with Takaichi last month to raise the threshold for the imposition of income tax to an annual income of 1.78 million yen. Tamaki is asking for even more in the campaign.
 
Sanseito focuses on xenophobic policies. Some conservatives worry about the increasing number of foreigners seen in the streets, trains and popular tourist destinations. Sanseito promises to deport low-skilled workers to their home countries and to regulate more stringently foreign investment in Japanese real estate. The party targets independent voters who lean conservative.
 
By contrast, the CRA is trying to distance itself from populism. The alliance is basing its campaign on support from established organizations. Candidates from the CDPJ have solid support from labor unions in the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). Komeito lawmakers are backed by Soka Gakkai, which has about 20,000 votes in each single-seat district. Although the CRA is not popular with young and independent voters, the party nevertheless has a good chance to win single-seat districts around Japan.
 
The LDP has historically relied on several large organizations, including major corporations, local chambers of commerce, agricultural organizations, and associations of medical services to bring out the vote. But its leader, Takaichi, is now pursuing a populist agenda, including an increase in take-home pay and stricter regulation of the foreign presence in Japan. Takaichi’s strategy indicates that even the ruling party cannot depend entirely on its traditional supporters and must turn to the constituency of independent voters.
 
Campaign Policies
It is notable that Takaichi announced that she would consider a consumption tax cut. Although she had opposed it on the view that it would not have an immediate impact on the economy, she introduced a tax cut bill after pressure from opposition parties. Her policy change made the bond market skeptical of her economic and financial policies, resulting in a sudden increase in interest rate on long-term government bonds. The consumption tax cut has now become a critical issue in the election.
 
Consistent with the view of the LDP’s coalition partner, Takaichi is suggesting a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food. How the government will make up for the moratorium’s reduction in tax revenue is a discussion for later – after the election. The CRA has proposed a permanent consumption tax cut for food backed by a governmental fund. The DPP would cut the tax rate from ten percent to five percent.  The JCP, Sanseito, and Reiwa Shinsengumi have all called for a permanent abolition of the tax.
 
The CRA has prioritized every walk of life in the domestic economy, and not a nationalistic agenda such as a constitutional amendment, to present a clear contrast with the leading coalition. The LDP and the JIP also are emphasizing their efforts to combat inflation. To reduce contributions by the current working generation, the JIP is stressing the need for social security reform.
 
The Scandal Factor
The campaigns of three of the parties will likely suffer from negative public reaction to scandals or misdoings. First, the LDP has decided to give formal party backing to the lawmakers who were involved in the kickback fund scandal of some of the former factions in the party. Takaichi insists that those members who were re-elected in 2024 election have cleared the voters’ scrutiny. The LDP still rejects stricter regulation of political contributions, which the opposition parties highlight as evidence of the LDP’s unwillingness to engage in true political reform. 
 
Second, the Weekly Bunshun magazine reported in mid-January that the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (FFWPU), formerly the Unification Church, has been working behind the scenes to establish Takaichi’s presidency of the LDP – and her prime ministership. Bunshun found that Takaichi’s name appeared 32 times in the FFWPU’s special reports to the “True Mother (Han Hak Ja)” between 2018 and 2022. The report also identified her as the best choice to be Japan’s prime minister. The opposition parties may demand that Takaichi explain her relationship with the FFWPU.
 
Third, the JIP allowed its local leaders to avoid paying their own health insurance premiums, an evasion scheme premised on the theory of an exception for board members of any incorporated association. The party has expelled these leaders, but the fallout will hurt the JIP’s effort to keep to its target of 38 seats in the Lower House. As seen in 2024 election, some scandals of the leading parties may slow down their campaigns.

Trump’s Choice for Japan

Why Donald Trump Wants Takaichi to Win

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published January 26, 2026 on Toyo Keizai Online.

Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae wants the coming election to be a referendum on her personal leadership. In that contest, she has already won one vote – from U.S. President Donald Trump.

Is a clear victory for Takaichi the best outcome for the U.S? “Absolutely,” Kenneth Weinstein, an advisor to Trump, declared without hesitation.

Weinstein is the Japan Chair at the conservative Hudson Institute think tank and was the nominee to be Ambassador to Japan during the first Trump administration. In an interview with Toyo Keizai Online, he explained why a Takaichi triumph fits the Trump administration agenda.

“She is clearly focused on defense, national security, upgrading Japan’s security posture, upgrading Japan’s security capabilities, someone willing to work closely with the United States, and our allies, and willing to deepen the ties in the Indo Pacific that we in the United States have been less effective in doing,” Weinstein explained.

Clearly, Takaichi is seen as a loyal follower of Trump, one unlikely to challenge the U.S. as Europe and Canada are now doing in response to the military operations in Venezuela and the threat to seize Greenland.

“I don’t think the Takaichi administration is going to say a word about Greenland,” the distinguished American Japan scholar Gerald Curtis told Toyo Keizai. “Of all the allies, Japan is the one with which Trump has the least problems.”

American preference for Japan to be governed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) is hardly unusual. But Takaichi is viewed as a significant improvement over the previous government of Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru who sought to create some distance from the U.S.

Instead, the Trump administration expects a victorious Takaichi government to rapidly increase defense spending and take on the responsibility for regional security in the Asia Pacific.

“We also need someone who understands the immense burdens that the Japanese people are going to have to bear in terms of their own national security,” Weinstein said. “And she is as good as it gets.”

The China question between Trump and Takaichi

For China hawks, like Weinstein, a strong Takaichi government is useful in bolstering those who are worried about an American retreat from Asia and a grand bargain with China’s Xi Jinping when the President goes to China in April.

“We need a strong leader and strong partner to keep us focused, on China, on the Taiwan challenge, on the Scarborough Shoal challenge,” the Hudson Japan chair who formally was the CEO of the think tank, told us.

Weinstein and other Japan hands are carefully critical of Trump’s failure to come to the open support of Takaichi after her comments on Taiwan and the massive pressure campaign mounted by China against her government.

But he and others dismiss fears that Trump is heading toward some kind of G-2 grand pact with China. They point to the attack on Venezuela and the pressure on Iran as moves that effectively strike at China which is dependent on those countries for oil.

They see the approval of arms sales to Taiwan and the recent trade agreement with Taiwan as further evidence that Trump is not planning on abandoning Taiwan in the pursuit of a deal with Xi.

Trump is seeking a bargain with Xi but not a grand alliance, Weinstein contends. His hesitation in backing Takaichi against China was tactical. “The president doesn’t want to have an open confrontation with China on the eve of his summit,” he said.

“Trump wants to strike a big deal with China,” Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific security chair at Hudson, told this writer. “But this is not some game-changing G2 moment.” He compared it to the talks between Xi and former President Joe Biden in seeking strategic stability, one that avoids the difficult issue of Taiwan.

Takaichi’s “big mistake” was to undermine Trump’s desire to make this deal with Xi, observed Curtis, an emeritus professor at Columbia University. “I wasn’t surprised that he was upset with Takaichi and called her and told her to get out of this mess.”

If Takaichi manages a decisive victory in the February election – and there is no consensus on this among American Japan hands – she will then head to Washington for a meeting ahead of Trump’s April trip to Beijing.

But that meeting may be even more challenging for a stronger Takaichi than if she still leads a weak coalition government.

Curtis predicts that Takaichi will not focus on China in Washington. “She knows that is not a winning issue for her in dealing with Trump,” he told Toyo Keizai. “Trump is interested in money and he wants to have his 550 billion bucks. It is his money and she better get it to him.”

Trump of course is unpredictable but within the Trump administration bureaucracy, to the extent it plays a role in forming policy, the focus is on strengthening security ties. That is particularly true for those who want to push a harder line toward China and want Japan to vastly increase its defense spending.

“Both State and Defense are very interested in making effective cooperative deals with Japan and they think Prime Minister Takaichi is clearly the best person for that now,” said Cronin, a prominent security expert.

“From the Pentagon’s perspective, you are either helping deterrence against a China contingency or you are not,” he explained. “You have to look tough if you want to keep the peace. She has bought into that security paradigm.”

How the Americans see the election prospects

Among the Trump advisors, there is praise for Takaichi’s decision to call a snap election and, at this early stage, an expectation of a clear, even dramatic victory.

“It seems like an incredibly smart move politically,” Weinstein told TOE. “If the polling numbers stay where they are for her, she should have a resounding victory that will really change the shape of the Diet moving forward. It looks like a strong return of the LDP after the weaknesses shown in the Upper House elections not too many months ago.”

Even some non-Trump analysts share this assessment of the decision to go down this somewhat uncertain road.

“No election is free of risk but for Takaichi the risk of losing seats in an election held now would not be as nearly as great as the risk she would be facing by waiting too long,” argued Curtis, probably the most well respected observer of Japanese politics in the U.S. “Better to strike now with her public support at more than 70 percent, the political opposition in disarray, and public opinion polls and the LDP’s own election district by district analysis indicating the strong possibility that the LDP would win the 235 seats needed for a majority and perhaps garner as many as 260 seats.”

Both men attribute the prospects for victory to Takaichi’s personal appeal, not to the popularity of the LDP or her policy proposals for taxes or other domestic issues, even including her embrace of Trump-like anti-immigrant rhetoric.

Takaichi “is running a presidential style race,” said Weinstein. “I don’t see her running as the LDP,” he added. Others have compared her not to Abe Shinzo, her mentor, but to Koizumi Junichiro who won election a quarter century ago by running in some ways against the LDP as well as the opposition.

Takaichi’s popularity, in their view, seems to be due primarily to the uniqueness of her being the country’s first female prime minister, her image as a decisive and confident leader, and her ability to benefit from a rightwing shift among the Japanese public and among younger people in particular. Her ability to manage ties with Trump, and with South Korea’s Lee Jae Myung, as well as stand up to China has worked to bolster this image of a strong leader.

This assessment is not universally shared among American Japan experts who are also intrigued by the formation of a new centrist alliance of the Constitutional Democratic Party and the Komei party, whose loyal voters provided a key margin of victory for decades in their now broken alliance with the LDP.

Cronin, who is also based on the pro-Trump Hudson Institute, is more skeptical about a clear Takaichi victory next month.

“I think the assumption a couple of weeks ago was that she could ride her huge popularity and enlarge her majority in the Diet,” he told TOE. “But the politics now look challenging for her. She is facing a united opposition, she lacks a unified coalition, and she is facing a twin set of pressures from China and from the US, in terms of economics. She can still win a majority, but I wouldn’t bet on it.”

Whether Trump is even thinking much about this situation, given the focus on Greenland and his domestic battles, is doubtful. Nor is there much thought about the possibility that a rightwing nationalist government in Japan may head off in a very independent direction. But for now, the fact that Takaichi is Trump’s choice for Japan is undeniable.