Will Money Buy Japan Happiness?

Imperial Japan's battle flag
back on Philippines soil, April 2026

Japan’s Golden Week Diplomacy toward the Indo-Pacific

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 18, 2026
 
While the Diet took a short recess during late April’s Golden Week, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and other ministers visited countries in Southeast Asia and Africa. They sought deals with those countries over resources, including rare earth minerals, that are critical to Japan from both economic and national security perspectives. Diplomacy under the Takaichi administration relies heavily on Shinzo Abe’s legacy of using economic incentives to leverage security policy.
 
Takaichi met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese in Canberra on May 4, and they signed a Joint Declaration on Economic Security Cooperation. Japan depends on Australia for 40 percent of its LNG imports and 65 percent of its coal imports. The declaration affirms that both countries will deepen their partnership on energy security and supply chain resilience. The two leaders also signed a joint statement on critical minerals, which will support projects by Japan’s private sector to develop gallium, magnesium, fluorite, and nickel in Australia.
 
The joint declaration rejects “all forms of economic coercion,” including export restrictions on critical minerals, a statement presumably directed at China. The declaration explains that export restrictions significantly interfere with global supply chains. Last January, China imposed strict controls on exports of dual-use products to Japan. Observers widely interpreted the controls as a sanction for Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency in November 2025 and her later refusal to apologize for it. It was not out of the ordinary then for Takaichi to strike an alternative deal with Australia to secure minerals and other raw materials.
 
Takaichi and Albanese also signed a Leaders Statement on Enhanced Defense and Security Cooperation, which called bilateral relations between their countries a “special strategic partnership.” They agreed to maintain assets, including upgraded Mogami frigates, and to cooperate on supply chain issues. Takaichi called Australia a “quasi-ally” in her meeting with Albanese.
 
Takaichi’s visit to Vietnam, which occurred before her meetings in Australia, showed a similar tendency to emphasize economic incentives. In her meeting with Vietnamese President To Lam on May 2, Takaichi urged cooperation by the two countries to strengthen the supply chain, including the export of rare earth minerals mined in Vietnam. In her policy speech in Hanoi, she emphasized that Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is the lynchpin of Japanese foreign policy. FOIP is a diplomatic concept originated in 2016 by former prime minister Shinzo Abe. It is regarded as one of his major foreign policy achievements.
 
Takaichi’s cabinet ministers took the same tack on their trips abroad. Minister of Defense Shinjiro Koizumi visited Indonesia and the Philippines to reinforce their security ties with Japan. In Indonesia, he signed of a Defense Cooperation Arrangement expanding security ties in people-to-people exchanges, education and joint training, as well as defense equipment and technology cooperation.
 
At his meeting with Philippine Defense Minister Gilberto Teodoro in Manila, the two officials issued a Joint Press Statement (Japanese text) under which Japan would transfer retired Abukuma-class destroyer escorts to the Philippines.
 
Located on the first island chain, the Philippines has been suffering from Chinese maritime advances around its territory, including the Spratly Islands. Japan is now trying to support Manila’s counter-efforts. Takaichi administration has removed well-established restrictions on Japan’s exports of defense equipment in April, which had previously been limited to five categories – rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and minesweeping. The export of Abukuma-class destroyers is expected to mark the first example of Japan’s new policy on defense sales.
 
In his visit to Zambia, Angola, Kenya and South Africa from April 30 to May 5, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi underscored the importance of securing the supply chain for critical minerals and of implementing FOIP. In his policy speech in Nairobi, Motegi said that the core principles of FOIP –freedom, openness, diversity, inclusiveness, and the rule of law – would remain unchanged.
 
The Takaichi administration’s Golden Week diplomacy made clear its emphasis on economic leverage in foreign policy. Takaichi sought the support of Australia, as a quasi-ally, through economic security cooperation. Koizumi used the export of destroyers to the Philippines to enhance security capabilities against China. Motegi explored opportunities for critical minerals in Africa under the name of FOIP.
 
Diplomatic breakthroughs in the form of economic incentives that were good for Japanese businesses were a hallmark of the former Abe administration. He and his advisers believed that the promise of a robust economy would trump issues of pride and history. His negotiations with Russia in the decades-long dispute over the Northern Islands of Japan exemplified this strategy.
 
In 2016, Abe proposed eight points (English) of economic cooperation with Russia, including joint development of natural resources in Sakhalin and financial support for Russian businesses, as leverage to take back the Northern Territories. However, two years later, Abe compromised with Russian President Vladimir Putin to reduce Japan’s demand from four islands to just two.
 
Abe’s commercial approach was a total failure. Putin held to his absolutist interpretation of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Russia’s administration of all four islands meant ownership and that they would not be returned. Negotiations have not continued as they were interrupted by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Abe’s inability to reach a deal with Putin completely undercut his idea that economic cooperation will reinforce Japan’s security. The Abe administration failed to account for Russian sentiment that territory obtained in the World War II at great sacrifice could not be the subject of a mere economic transaction.
 
Takaichi’s diplomacy has the same structure and rationale as Abe’s. She believes that an offer of economic support from Japan is so attractive that Japan can gain national security advantages. A factor feeding into this view may be that the offices of the Abe Administration were and of the Takaichi Administration are dominated by personnel seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). By replicating Abe’s unsuccessful strategy, Takaichi is now facing pressure from China and, unavoidably, greater involvement in the current turbulent, war-based international order.
 
Takaichi, however, is not leaving Japan’s security to mercantilism alone. She is expanding the country’s hard power. During Golden Week, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces for the first time participated in an annual joint military exercise with the United States and the Philippines, Balikatan 26. In response, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense commented “We urge the relevant countries to stop forming blocs and stoking camp confrontation and do more that truly contributes to regional peace and stability.” Neither Japan’s soft nor hard power expansion is bound to impress a restless China.

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 18, 2026

BEYOND THE SAHEL: RUSSIA’S TOOLBOX FOR INFLUENCE IN AFRICA. 5/18, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Speakers: Anna Borshchevskaya, Harold Grinspoon Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Mvemba Dizolele, Adjunct Lecturer, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Kate Johnston, Associate Fellow, Transatlantic Security Program, CNAS; David McKenzie, Communications Director, CNAS.

IGP RAPID RESPONSE: US-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE TRUMP-XI SUMMIT. 5/18, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Global Politics (IGP), Columbia University. Speakers: Isaac Arnsdorf, White House Bureau Chief, Washington Post, Thomas J. Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, IGP Affiliated Faculty Member, Columbia SIPA, Pritzker Chair, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Erica Downs, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia SIPA; Julian Gewirtz, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Former Senior Director, China and Taiwan Affairs, US National Security Council, author of Never Turn Back; Liza Tobin, Managing Director, Garnaut Global, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation, Former NSC China Director. Moderator: Zongyuan Liu, IGP Senior Research Scholar, Columbia SIPA, Author of Sovereign Funds.

BOOK TALK: IRAN AND THE BOMB: THE ORIGINS AND TRAJECTORY OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM. 5/18, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: author Sina Azodi, Assistant Professor of Middle East Politics, Director, Middle East Studies MA Program, George Washington University; Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Stimson; Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy, Arms Control Association. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4nK3MNt

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 11, 2026

SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA SYMPOSIUM. 5/11, 9:00am-5:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Center for the Study of Contemporary China (CSCC), University of Pennsylvania. Speakers include: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Kyle Chan, Fellow, Brookings Institution; Yangyang Cheng, Research Scholar, Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center; Junmin Wang, Professor, The University of Memphis; Joshua Freedman, Foreign Affairs; Susan Greenhalgh, Professor Emerita, Harvard University; Wanheng Hu, Stanford University; Yuchen Chen, Baruch College; Ke Li, John Jay College of Criminal Justice; Larry Au, The City College of New York; Lizhi Liu, Assistant Professor, Georgetown University; Jamie Wong, Princeton University; Abigail Coplin, Vassar College; Lizzi Lee, Asia Society; Graham Webster, Stanford University; Paul Triolo, DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group; Samm Sacks, New America/Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center; Scott Moore, University of Pennsylvania; Deborah Seligsohn, Villanova University.

A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH KEVIN RUDD & IAN BREMMER. 5/11, 6:30-7:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society, New York. Speakers: Kevin Rudd, Former Australia’s 26th Prime Minister and returning to the Asia Society as its 10th President & CEO; Ian Bremmer, President and Founder, Eurasia Group. FEE

POWERING GLOBAL COOPERATION: INNOVATION, SECURITY, & GEOPOLITICS IN A CHANGING ENERGY LANDSCAPE. 5/11, 4:30pm-6:00pm (PDT), 7:30pm-9:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hoover. Speakers: Condoleezza Rice, Director, Hoover Institution; Arun Majumdar, Dean, Stanford Doerr School of Sustainability; David C. Mulford, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution. Moderator: Šumit Ganguly, Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of May 4, 2026

 📚Books of the Week📖

Privileged but Powerless: How North Korean Elite Grievances Reveal the Regime’s Greatest Weakness

                By Jieun Baek, Doctorate Student of Public Policy, 

Oxford University

PURCHASE BOOK (5/5/2026)

Drawing on hundreds of hours of in-depth interviews with escapees from Pyongyang, Baek examines how members of this privileged class, granted access to forbidden information and superior material benefits, publicly uphold the regime despite their underlying discontent. Baek argues that this performative loyalty, born of fear and a desire to survive, masks a critical vulnerability within the regime’s core.

Eurasian Maritime Geopolitics: The United States and China in an Age of Indo-Pacific Transformation

By Kent E. Calder, Director, Edwin O. Reischauer Center 

for East Asian Studies

PURCHASE BOOK (2/7/2025)

Examines the strategic geography of the sea lanes from Northeast Asia through the Indian Ocean to Europe, through which much of the world's energy and information flow. Changing technology and economic patterns have profoundly transformed the global significance of those passageways since the end of the Cold War, with fateful consequences for the strategic calculations of both the United States and a rising China. A timely contribution to today's geopolitics.

Moral Economics: From Prostitution to Organ Sales, What Controversial Transactions Reveal About How Markets Work

By Alvin E. Roth, Professor, Stanford University and Harvard University

PURCHASE BOOK (5/12/2026)

Disagreements are fierce because arguments on both sides are often made in uncompromising moral or religious terms. Roth asserts that we can make progress on these and other difficult topics if we view them as markets—tools to help decide who gets what—and understand how those markets can be fine-tuned to be more functional. Markets don’t have to allow everything or ban everything. 

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Can the Food Consumption Tax be eliminated?

Takaichi Faces the Food Consumption Tax Problem

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
May 4, 2026
 
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi is having difficulty living up to her campaign commitment to eliminate the consumption tax on food for two years. Takaichi plans to introduce a tax cut bill by the end of fiscal year 2026, that is, by the end of March 2027, but the sales registration system cannot be adjusted to reflect the elimination within that timeframe. The leading parties are discussing a one percent tax rate, which the system can manage, but which is different from what Takaichi committed to in February’s Lower House election.
 
When Takaichi decided this past January to have a Lower House snap election in February to strengthen her political base in the Diet, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) included this policy in its campaign platform. The LDP said that “we accelerate considering the exclusion of food from the consumption tax for two years.” It was a countermeasure to the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) proposal to permanently eliminate the consumption tax on food.
 
After the party achieved a sweeping victory in the election, Takaichi explained that she would accelerate discussion on a zero-percent consumption tax on food for two years as a temporary measure until a refundable tax credit bill was introduced. The food consumption tax cut and the refundable tax credit are intended to support low-income families.
 
To implement these policies, Takaichi launched the National Conference on Social Security in late February, which includes members of some opposition parties. During a series of meetings, the Conference realized that elimination of the consumption tax has a technical problem. Major software engineering companies testified in April before the Conference that it would take nine to twelve months to adjust retailers’ sales registration systems to include elimination of the consumption tax on food. The system could not readily include zero-percent taxation. This timeframe would not meet Takaichi’s deadline.
 
The engineers assured the Conference, however, that they could modify the system within three months if the adjustment were to one percent rather than zero percent. Reducing tax rate from the current eight percent to one percent eases the tax rate by a substantial amount. The chairman of the conference and the chief of the LDP Research Commission on Tax System, Itsunori Onodera, reportedly said “That’s a good idea.” So, the one percent consumption tax on food suddenly appeared on the table.
 
The size of the cut notwithstanding, one percent, is totally different to the public from zero percent. Citizens have already taken account of a zero percent tax. Indeed, they believe it to be one of Takaichi’s core promises to the voters in the February Lower House election. If she fails to implement it, the Takaichi Cabinet’s approval rating will fall; indeed, this consequence is already showing up in current polls.
 
The consumption tax cut has other problems besides the registration system. Restaurants will be adversely affected because consumers will prefer buying untaxed food in supermarkets to more expensive restaurant dinners. Local governments will lose revenue since the national government now sends 40 percent of the consumption tax proceeds to them. 
 
Despite these hurdles, Takaichi still plans on zero percent. She envisages a schedule in which the national Conference concludes its work in early summer, the cabinet submits tax elimination bills in the Diet’s fall session, and the Diet passes the bills by the end of 2026. The two-year hiatus of the food tax rate would take effect at the end of the fiscal year next March.
 
Takaichi’s ideas on the consumption tax cut have occasionally changed. In May 2005, two months before the Upper House election, Takaichi told her disappointment on negative stance on consumption tax cut by then prime minister Shigeru Ishiba. She proposed no consumption tax on foods. Then, when she ran for the LDP presidency last September, she became reluctant to push for the elimination. Her reluctance was based on her view that, given current price inflation, elimination of the tax would not be an efficient way to fight inflation. Moreover, she already understood the considerable length of time that would be required to change the retailers’ sales registration system. Observers believe that she opposed a total elimination to garner the support of an LDP heavyweight, Taro Aso, who also opposed a tax cut. She at least acknowledged the practical difficulties of a consumption tax cut at this time.
 
But Takaichi then confirmed her original position in January 2026 when she called the dissolution of the Lower House. She began to say that a consumption tax cut had been her long-cherished wish. But the remarkable fact is that Takaichi has never explicitly said that she has decided to introduce zero percent consumption tax on food. She has only said that she would accelerate consideration of a full if temporary elimination.
 
The consumption tax issue has destroyed some previous administrations. The LDP lost in the 1979 Lower House election when prime minister Masayoshi Ohira considered introducing a major indirect tax, including a food consumption tax. The defeat ignited a sharp division in the LDP, and Ohira died of fatigue the following year.
 
It was former prime minister Noboru Takeshita who introduced a consumption tax for the first time at three percent. But it became one of the reasons that the approval rating for him fell into the single digits. A later prime minister who decided the consumption tax rate from five percent to ten was not Shinzo Abe but Yoshihiko Noda in 2012. Noda led a three-party consensus of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the LDP, and Komeito to push for an integrated reform of social security and taxes in 2012, but his DPJ lost its government in the Lower House election later that year.
 
The consumption tax has been introduced as a fiscal resource to support senior citizens as Japan becomes an increasingly aging society. However, the Japanese people have been complaining about the tax on their daily consumption. The function of the tax and the popular desire to eliminate it are incompatible. Like other prime ministers, Takaichi is now facing this political tension.

Japanese Wagyu in the American Market

Japan’s Wagyu Quest and the Case for Reciprocal Beef Trade

by Phil Seng, Affiliate Professor in the Department of Animal Sciences at Colorado State University, Past President & CEO of the U.S. Meat Export Federation, and Past President of the International Meat Secretariat, and APP Member.

First Published March 10, 2026 on Meatingplace. PDF version here.

N.B.: This issue was not discussed at the Summit.

Japanese Prime Minister Takaichi and President Donald Trump will meet on March 19, where both leaders are expected to reaffirm their commitment to fair and reciprocal trade. For decades, U.S. presidents urged Japan to open its tightly restricted beef market, which once symbolized the closed nature of the Japanese economy.

Today, the roles are reversed. Prime Minister Takaichi should urge the United States to remove restrictions that limit Japanese Wagyu beef exports to the American market. Japan now finds itself in the unusual position of having a bilateral trade agreement with the United States — yet still faces a trade-distorting tariff-rate quota (TRQ) on beef imports, including the 26.4% out-of-quota tariff currently applied once the quota is triggered.

Implemented in 2020 through executive authority rather than a comprehensive congressional free trade agreement, the current U.S.–Japan Trade Agreement (USJTA) delivered important tariff reductions, but it did not resolve the structural barrier that Wagyu exporters now face in the U.S. market.

Japan’s Longstanding Support for U.S. Agriculture
Beef access may not rank among the top issues in the broader U.S.–Japan relationship. Yet a closer look reveals that liberalizing the U.S. market for Japanese Wagyu would reinforce a mutually beneficial agricultural partnership. Thirty-five years ago, Japan eliminated its own beef import quota, and 20 years ago it reopened its market to U.S. beef following the BSE crisis. Expanding access for Wagyu today would strengthen a supply chain that significantly benefits American farmers. More than 80% of the feed used by Japanese livestock consists of imported grains and oilseeds, much of it from the United States.

A compelling argument for reform lies in Japan’s longstanding role as a cornerstone customer for U.S. agriculture. For more than 75 years, Japan has been one of the most reliable buyers of American feed grains and oilseeds — imports that sustain Japan’s livestock sector and directly support U.S. farmers. Japan consistently imports roughly 10–15 million metric tons of corn annually from the United States, along with significant volumes of soybeans, wheat, and sorghum.

In other words, a thriving livestock sector in Japan directly supports U.S. agriculture, from Midwestern grain farmers to the broader feed supply chain that underpins livestock production. This raises the natural question of why isn’t there stronger support among U.S. grain producers for more liberalized Japanese beef access when their own export success depends so heavily on Japan’s livestock industry?

Tariff-Rate Quotas and Market Challenges
When the USJTA entered into force in 2020, Japan’s previous country-specific quota of 200 metric tons was folded into the broader “All Others” quota of 65,005 metric tons. At the time this appeared workable because Japan had not historically filled the quota.

That changed when Brazil, previously ineligible to export beef to the United States, gained U.S. market access and was included in the same quota category. Since then, Brazil has repeatedly fillednearly the entire quota. In 2025 the quota was triggered after just 17 days, and  in 2026 it was exceeded on Jan. 6, with approximately 99% of the quota filled by Brazilian shipments. As a result, Japanese Wagyu exporters and U.S. importers face steep tariffs almost immediately each year.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has approved specific quota arrangements or allocations for other countries. The U.S.–UK trade agreement created a 13,000-metric-ton carve-out for British beef within the same quota framework, while Argentina recently received a 100,000-metric-ton allocation. In contrast, Japanese Wagyu imports face the 26.4% tariff once the TRQ is filled, even though Japan remains one of the United States’ closest economic and strategic partners.

For American importers, the consequences are significant. Wagyu beef can be five to 10 times more valuable than commodity beef, meaning the ad valorem tariff becomes proportionally more expensive for importers, foodservice operators, and retailers. The quota also creates uncertainty in the marketplace, forcing importers to speculate about when tariffs will take effect and limiting decisions about product range, quality grades, and whether to import frozen or chilled beef.

This uncertainty discourages participation across the supply chain, from importers and distributors to restaurants and retailers, ultimately reducing availability for American consumers w,tarhile pushing prices higher for one of the world’s most prized beef products.

Japan’s Track Record as a Trusted Trade Partner
Japan has repeatedly strengthened the bilateral agricultural relationship over the past four decades. It liberalized its beef market between 1988 and 1991, reforms that later served as a model for market-opening agreements in Korea. Japan also reformed its retail and distribution laws, allowing U.S. exporters to sell directly into the Japanese market. In 1995 Japan decoupled domestic pork prices from import pricing, enabling a surge in chilled U.S. pork exports. In 2006 it reopened its market to U.S. beef following the BSE crisis, restoring one of America’s most valuable export destinations.

The results speak for themselves: Over the past 50 years Japan has imported more than $100 billion in U.S. red meat and by-products and remains one of the most dependable markets for American agriculture.

At the same time, Japanese beef represents an almost negligible presence in the U.S. market, accounting for less than 0.003% of total U.S. beef imports. Japanese Wagyu also occupies a highly specialized ultra-premium niche that complements rather than competes with the mainstream U.S. beef market. In practical terms, expanded Wagyu access would be economically negligible for U.S. producers but symbolically important for maintaining credibility in reciprocal agricultural trade.

Why Equal Treatment Matters
Japan is not seeking special treatment — only equal treatment. For decades, Japan has opened its markets, invested in American agriculture, and supported the livelihoods of U.S. farmers and ranchers. Ensuring fair access for Japanese Wagyu to the United States would acknowledge the depth of this partnership while reinforcing a trade relationship that benefits both countries.

Trade between allies should reflect trust, reciprocity, and long-term partnership. When nations invest in each other’s success, market access should move in both directions. That is how trade becomes durable, balanced, and mutually beneficial.

A Gift for the Future
It is customary when heads of state meet to exchange gifts. In this case, the United States could offer one with lasting value — leveling the playing field for Japanese Wagyu in the American market. After all, Japan has already made the down payment.

Asia Policy Events, Monday May 4, 2026

WHAT’S NEXT FOR JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY AND U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS? PERSPECTIVES FROM THE DIET. 5/4, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Itsunori Onodera, Member of the House of Representatives, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Chairperson, Research Commission on the Tax System; Former Minister of Defense; Fumitake Fujita, Member of the House of Representatives, Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party); Secretary-General, Nippon Ishin (Japan Innovation Party); Asei Ito, Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo; Moderator, Kristi Govella, Senior Adviser and Japan Chair, Associate Professor, University of Oxford.

IS AMERICA WINNING OR LOSING IN IRAN? 5/4, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Middle East Institute (MEI). Speakers: Jon Finer, Former Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Co-Host, The Long Game Podcast; Victoria Coates, Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Middle East and North African Affairs, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Vice President, Davis Institute for National Security, The Heritage Foundation; Moderator: Brian Katulis, Senior Fellow, MEI. 

ECONOMIC SECURITY AND MEGA CHOKEPOINTS: JAPAN’S STRATEGIC RESET. 5/4, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Keiro Kitagami, Former Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, Liberal Democratic Party; Keitaro Ohno, Chief Secretary, Promotion of Economic Security Headquarters, Liberal Democratic Party, Former State Minister of Economic Security; Mira Rapp-Hooper, Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies; Akihisa Shiozaki, Director General, Headquarters for Intelligence Strategy, Liberal Democratic Party; Moderator: Mireya Solís, Director, Center for Asia Policy Studies, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Asia Policy Studies, Philip Knight Chair in Japan Studies.

MEETING STRATEGIC DEMAND FOR BATTERIES. 5/4, 2:00-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: CSIS, Energy Security and Climate Change Program. Speakers: Joseph Majkut, Director, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS; Jane Nakano, Senior Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS; Ray Cai, Associate Fellow, Energy Security and Climate Change Program, CSIS; Speakers from U.S. Department of Energy, J.P. Morgan, Google.

BOOK TALK: TRADECRAFT, TACTICS, AND DIRTY TRICKS: RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AND PUTIN'S SECRET WAR. 5/4, 4:30-6:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institute of World Politics (IWP). Speaker: author Sean M. Wiswesser, Former Senior CIA Operations Officer. PURCHASE BOOK

BOOK TALK: THE NARROWING SEA: FUKUOKA, PUSAN, AND THE RISE AND FALL OF AN IMPERIAL REGION. 5/4, 8:00-9:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Modern Japan History Association. Speakers: author Hannah Shepherd, Assistant Professor, Yale University; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, Professor Emerita of Japanese History, Australian National University. Moderator: Joseph Seeley, Associate Professor of History, University of Virginia. PURCHASE BOOK

Can South Korea Hedge?

How South Korea Can Buy Alliance Insurance

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. 

First Published April 28, 2026 on The Peninsula.

The case for South Korea hedging its relationship with the United States may be harder to dismiss. Washington’s trade policies and the economic consequences of the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran have raised the cost of close alignment at the same time they have weakened confidence in U.S. commitments. Seoul has options short of rupture, that include joining regional trade frameworks, arming Ukraine directly, and pursuing its own diplomacy with Iran on energy shipments.

“While the biggest threat to the alliance remains North Korea, the biggest challenge to the alliance now comes from the United States,” argues long-time Korea watcher [and APP member] Bruce Klingner. “Having bullied Seoul into a disadvantageous trade deal that violated the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement and the U.S. Constitution, the Trump administration is demanding more and promising less to its security and economic partners.”

“The U.S. may have degraded military deterrence by undermining the perception – in the minds of both allies and opponents – that Washington is a dependable security partner,” Klingner said.

This sense of unreliability is hardly confined to South Korea—it is felt by all U.S. allies. As Washington Post columnist Fareed Zakaria wrote recently, the United States has used allied security dependence “to squeeze them hard.” The response is not to break ties with the United States “but to accept that our interests are no longer as close as they once were, and that in current circumstances it cannot be a high priority to accommodate American wishes,” writes prominent British historian and commentator Lawrence Freedman.

The result, wrote Zakaria, is that allies “have decided to buy insurance, to protect themselves from an unreliable America.” In that spirit, below are three ideas for South Korea to develop an insurance policy against U.S. uncertainty.

Accelerate Application to Join CPTPP

The most urgent—and, in some ways, easiest—step toward greater independence for South Korea is to expedite its application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The twelve-member economic and trade pact is the kernel of an alternative free trade system, particularly if it partners with the European Union, which is under discussion. It offers a comprehensive framework for addressing not only traditional trade markets but also supply chain cooperation, digital trade, and state-owned enterprises.

There are several advantages for South Korea in joining CPTPP. “The Iran war, rising protectionism and a deepening divide between the United States and China have reshaped the international economic order,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies President Choi Kang wrote in Joongang Ilbo. “For Korea, a mid-sized trading nation, survival now depends on diversifying markets and stabilizing supply chains. The CPTPP offers a network well suited to those goals.”

Aside from market gains, CPTPP membership would also cement the strategic partnership between South Korea and Japan, as well as with other partners who share similar issues with the United States, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

South Korean membership in CPTPP has been under discussion for some time. “Earlier this decade, Japan had given South Korea its very cold shoulder on entry,” Michael Beeman, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea and APEC [and APP member], told this writer. “Kishida-era warming in Japan-ROK ties seemed to have turned that around.”

The recent joint statement following the meeting between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi indicated Japanese support for South Korea’s membership. “I don’t sense Japan’s posture is any longer a top obstacle,” says Beeman, author of Walking Out, an authoritative book on U.S. trade policy.

The greater obstacle seems to stem from South Korean domestic politics, driven by fears among agricultural producers and auto manufacturers that CPTPP membership will lead to greater competition from Japanese and other foreign producers. But supporters argue that structural adjustment assistance for vulnerable sectors could mitigate those effects and that the CPTPP could catalyze much-needed restructuring of South Korean industries.

Lift Restrictions on Arms Sales to Ukraine

A more controversial step would be for South Korea to lift long-standing restrictions on the sale of lethal weapons to countries engaged in active combat, and in particular to Ukraine. South Korea has provided indirect weapons support by selling weapons to allied states such as Poland and non-lethal systems to Ukraine, as well as other forms of aid and participation in NATO mechanisms to finance U.S. weapons to Ukraine. But there is an urgent need to intensify support for Ukraine, particularly in areas such as missile defense systems, because of the Trump administration’s decision to cut U.S. military assistance to Ukraine and divert weapons to the Iran war.

Changing South Korea’s policy on arming Ukraine would signal its readiness to take positions that differ from those of the United States and would immensely strengthen its ties with the European Union. Rather than acting on behalf of the United States, as some South Korean progressives argue, this would demonstrate South Korean independence of action and self-defense.

By bolstering Ukraine’s defense, South Korea would also strengthen its own security interests by preventing a Russian victory that would only drive North Korea and Russia closer together. Morally and strategically, it would balance the impact of North Korea’s participation in the Ukraine war.

An Independent Approach to Iran and Maritime Security

The Lee administration has taken initial, though still tentative, steps toward shaping an independent policy response to the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran and maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz. But there are grounds to argue that South Korea, perhaps in tandem with Japan, should negotiate directly with the Iranian regime to seek exemptions for the passage of its stranded vessels.

One important initiative underway is President Lee’s decision to participate in the European-led multilateral mission to secure the free passage of ships through the strait once the war is over. Lee attended the recent international summit led by France and the United Kingdom and stated that South Korea was ready to make “substantive contributions” to this mission, including using South Korean military forces to clear mines and escort passage following a stable ceasefire.

If the Islamabad talks fail, the alternative may be a “broad based international coalition” that strikes a deal with Iran, wrote British strategist Freedman.

Given the uncertain outcome of the war and the collapse of even the pretense of direct talks, Seoul should accelerate its own diplomacy toward Tehran. Earlier this week, South Korean special envoy Chung Byung-ha traveled to Iran to meet with Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Abbas Araghchi to request cooperation on the safe transit of all vessels, particularly Korean ships, through the Strait of Hormuz.

Conclusion

So far, however, Seoul has decided not to pay the toll fee requested by Tehran for ship passage. It may be time, however, to reconsider that decision, though it is likely to anger the Trump administration. The most effective approach would be to coordinate with Japan, which not only shares South Korea’s extreme dependence on Middle Eastern oil and gas but also maintains its independent ties and diplomacy with Iran.

None of these steps is without cost. But the pressures driving them are unlikely to ease over the next three years, and the question for Seoul is not whether to create distance from Washington but how much, and on what terms.

APP'S BOOKS OF THE WEEK of April 27, 2026

📚Books of the Week📖

The Broken China Dream: 

How Reform Revived Totalitarianism

By Minxin Pei, Professor of Government, 

Claremont McKenna College

PURCHASE BOOK 12/2/2025

When China embarked on its transformative journey of modernization in 1979, many believed the country’s turn toward capitalism would put its totalitarian past to rest and mark the birth of a democratic, open society. Instead, China reverted to a neo-totalitarian state, one backed by one of the fastest-growing, most formidable economies on earth. Pei explains why the reforms of the post-Mao era have been reversed on nearly every front.

Goliath's Curse: The History and Future 

of Societal Collapse

By Luke Kemp, Research Associate, Centre for the 

Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge

PURCHASE BOOK 9/23/2025

Kemp traces the emergence of “Goliaths”: large societies built on a collection of fragile hierarchies that collapse time after time across the world. Drawing on historical databases and the latest discoveries in archaeology and anthropology, he uncovers that more democratic societies tend to be more resilient. In our modern, global Goliath, a collapse is likely to be long-lasting and more dire than ever before. Collapse may be invisible until after it has occurred and has often had a more positive outcome for the general population than for the 1%.

Israel on Trial: Examining the History, 

the Evidence, and the Law

By Roy K. Altman, U.S. District Judge for 

the Southern District of Florida

PURCHASE BOOK 4/28/2026

Judge Altman applies courtroom-tested standards—burden of proof, corroboration, chain of custody— to examine claims of colonialism, apartheid, and genocide with dispassionate precision. In an era shaped by viral slogans and curated outrage, Judge Altman offers a disciplined method for discerning truth from propaganda and what it means to demand proof.

*Books purchased through the links here support Asia Policy Point*

Books selected on the APP website are not a sign of endorsement. 

They are simply new and interesting.

Reviving Nuclear Power in Japan

Japan Depends on Nuclear Power

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
April 27, 2026

The military attack on Iran by the United States and Israel and the ensuing blockade of the Strait of Hormuz have had a major impact on Japan’s economy. A shortage of naphtha, which must be shipped through the Strait, has limited Japan’s manufacture of medical equipment, and it is unclear how long the governmental subsidy on gasoline will last. While Sanae Takaichi’s government has said that Japan has enough oil reserves for the time being, the government is accelerating the resumption of nuclear power generation.
 
Energy has traditionally been the weakest point in Japan’s national security strategy. Japan has said that it attacked Pearl Harbor in 1941 to secure oil in Southeast Asia without U.S. interference. As fuel for power generation shifted from coal to oil in the post-war era, Japan increasingly relied on oil imports from the Middle East. Currently, over 95 percent of imported oil comes from the Middle East, and most of it passes through the Strait of Hormuz.
 
An alternative to oil is nuclear power. Through 2010, Japan had built 54 reactors for nuclear power generation that supplied about 30 percent of all electric power in Japan. In 2011, however, the Great East Japan Earthquake severely damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant when protective structures failed, leading to several deaths and mass evacuations. The event seriously undermined Japan’s energy strategy. The government began to set strict limits for power companies to operate nuclear reactors or construct new ones. 
 
Japan nevertheless took the course of resuming transmission at as many of the existing reactors as possible to secure stable and powerful electricity. The government did not take an alternative course developing renewable energy as European countries had done after the accident in Chernobyl 40 years ago this month.
 
The restart two weeks ago of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant is an epoch-making event for energy supply in Japan. Reactor 6 at the plant began its commercial operation on April 16, 2026, for the first time since it paused operations in March 2012. The plant is known as one of the biggest nuclear power plants in the world with seven reactors that have the capacity for 8,212 megawatts of power.
 
The Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant is owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), which was responsible for the inadequate defenses of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant to the 2011 earthquake and for the ensuing deaths and evacuations.  Restarting the plant has been controversial. Although two reactors out of seven passed the examination by the Nuclear Regulation Agency (NRA) in 2017, the NRA issued an order to prohibit their operation in 2021 because of failure to take anti-terrorist measures.
 
The NRA lifted the prohibition order in 2023, and in December 2025, the governor of Niigata, Hideyo Hanazumi, approved resumption of the plant’s operation. TEPCO restarted Reactor 6 in January 2026 but paused the operation at least twice due to an unexpected alarm from a control rod and a leak of electricity on the land surface. Those malfunctions delayed commercial operation of Reactor 6, damaging TEPCO’s credibility. Reactor 7 is expected to start up again in 2029.
 
Even with the restart of Reactor 6, there is no place for nuclear waste to go. Japan has no final disposal site. Mutsu city, Aomori, has an interim storage facility to keep used nuclear fuel until it can be transferred to a nuclear recycling factory, which is planned to be finished in Rokkasho village, Aomori.
 
Although the interim facility in Mutsu was expected to accept 60 metric tons of used nuclear fuel from Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in FY2026, the Governor of Aomori, Soichiro Miyashita, announced that he would not approve any new transfers of used nuclear fuel to the Mutsu facility in FY2026. Miyashita believed it was unpredictable whether the recycling factory in Rokkasho could pass an examination by the NRA. Japan thus has not established a credible recycling system for used nuclear fuel.
 
The government of Japan, meanwhile, is looking for a site to build a final disposal facility somewhere in the country. The government decided in 2000 that nuclear waste from nuclear power plants should be buried underground, a method known as geological disposal, but the government has not decided on a site.
 
To decide on a location, the government must take three steps: a survey of technical literature, a preliminary investigation, and a detailed investigation. The government will grant a two-billion-yen subsidy to a municipality that accepts the literature survey. Another seven billion yen is provided for a preliminary investigation.
 
The government has identified three possible sites: Suttsu Town and Kamoenai Village in Hokkaido, and Genkai Town in Saga. Ogasawara Village, Tokyo, has emerged as a fourth candidate, and the government on April 21 decided to have a literature survey which will take about two years. Although the three earlier candidates voluntarily stepped forward to accept the survey, Ogasawara has left the decision of accepting the survey to the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI). It made the first example to conduct a literature survey with initiative of the national government.
 
METI expects to survey Minamitorishima Island (Marcus Island) in the administrative area of Ogasawara village. Marcus Island is a tiny saucer-like coral atoll with a raised outer rim of between 5 and 9 m (16 and 30 ft) above sea level. It is 2,000 kilometers from mainland Japan.
 
The chief of Ogasawara village, Masaaki Shibuya, has reserved his decision on whether to go forward with a preliminary investigation after the literature survey is finished. There is no one among other three front runners that has decided to proceed to a preliminary investigation. METI is still far from deciding the location for final disposal site, which is needed for operating nuclear power plants in Japan.
 
It is obvious that the effort to build a whole new nuclear power generation system, including a disposal locale for nuclear waste, will not ameliorate the current concerns about energy supply. Construction will take many years. Nevertheless, the government of Japan does not want to stop focusing on nuclear power generation, fearing that it will lose its status as a major economic power in the world.