Asia Policy Events, Monday January 26, 2026

A snow storm in Washington has shut the town down. The Federal government, schools, and most businesses are closed.

THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN NEPAL. 1/26, 9:00-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Dinesh Prasad Bhatt, Chief Executive of the National Disaster Risk Reduction & Management Authority (NDRRMA), Government of Nepal; Reena Bajracharya, Anticipatory Action Clinic Technical Coordinator, NDRRMA/Danish Red Cross; Jeevika Khadka, Project Coordinator for Early Warning Systems for Cascading Disasters in Nepal, Stimson.

STRAIGHT TALK WITH RAHM EMANUEL: A FIRESIDE CHAT WITH MICHAEL MCFAUL. 1/26, 4:00-5:30pm (PST), 7:00-8:30pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Stanford University, Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center. Speakers: Rahm Emanuel, former Ambassador to Japan, Chicago Mayor, White House Chief of Staff, Congressman; Moderator: Michael A. McFaul, Ken Olivier and Angela Nomellini Professor of International Studies, Department of Political Science.

Japan's Prime Minister Announces a Snap Election

https://craj.jp/

With a New Competitor

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 19, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi announced on January 19 that she would dissolve the House of Representatives (Lower House) on January 23 and hold a general election of the House on February 8. In anticipation of Takaichi’s election decision, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and Komeito established a new party named Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) [中道改革連合] to cooperate in the coming election.
 
The Japan Innovation Party (JIP), the coalition partner of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), decided to hold gubernatorial and mayoral elections in Osaka on February 8 as well to promote the Osaka Capital Initiative, JIP’s unique policy. Although the prime minister and the major parties claim that the elections will promote the well-being of Japanese citizens, the politicians are takin these actions for their own survival.
 
Asking Public Endorsement for the Administration
In her press conference on the 19^th, Takaichi explained that she would ask voters for their fundamental support of her administration that was established only last October and of her decision to form a coalition with JIP. “This is a decision for the people to make on which direction Japan will go,” Takaichi said. The political vacuum created by a snap election, however, will delay the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill and measures to protect against price inflation. Takaichi dismisses this concern by claiming that they were included in the supplemental budget delivered last December.
 
Takaichi’s goal in the Lower House election is to achieve a simple majority -- 233 seats out of 465 -- for the LDP-JIP coalition. She indicated that she would resign if the coalition did not hit that target. But the leading coalition already has this majority. The premiership is always at stake in a Lower House election.
 
Takaichi thus will dissolve the Lower House for the limited purpose of maintaining the status quo. This fact raises the question of why she wants a snap election. Moreover, the election will not change the composition of the Upper House where the leading coalition is short of a majority.
 
Takaichi must believe that the election will boost her coalition’s voting power in the Lower House, aligning the composition of the Lower House with her popularity in the opinion polls. Takaichi has repeated slogans from her 2025 platform such as “responsible and proactive public finances” and “diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.”
 
These policies require the approval of both chambers of the Diet. Takaichi has attempted to accelerate these policies by taking advantage of her high approval ratings in national polls. Also at issue in the election is her proposal of a two-year moratorium on the consumption tax for food – a key populist issue. Consumers are deeply worried about the future of price inflation as reflected in a survey by the Bank of Japan, in which over 80 percent anticipate higher prices a year from now.
 
Another purpose of the snap election is to increase supporters around Takaichi. The LDP reportedly favors restoring “double nominations” of those lawmakers who had been involved in the kickback fund scandal of the now-former Abe factions in the LDP.  The double nomination is a system that enables a candidate who lost in a single-seat district to nevertheless win a seat through a proportional district. The option was denied to most members of the now-former Abe faction in 2024 election. Takaichi surely hopes to fortify her position by making it easier for former allies of Abe to gain seats.
 
Takaichi also wants to solidify her right-wing position by obtaining the endorsement of the coalition she assembled last year. She refused to admit that it was a mistake for her to have let Komeito leave the leading coalition last October. If the election goes her way, Takaichi will have popular approval for a new coalition, and she will be able to promote such conservative policies described in the agreement with JIP as amending the self-defense provisions in Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, limiting imperial succession to a patrilinear line, and endorsing the official use of nicknames instead of introducing separate surnames of married couples.
 
All this agenda can be achieved without a snap election, if Takaichi can get support from some opposition parties. There is speculation that she decided for an election because she: 1) had failed to persuade the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) to join the leading coalition, 2) China’s pressure on Japan would seriously impact Japan’s economy, and 3) was caught in her own scandal exposing her relationship with the former Unification Church.
 
Takaichi heavily relies on her popularity to remove those negative elements sticking around her administration. She needs a reassurance for her administration. Her message to the voters of the snap election must be “Do you love me, or someone else?” But it causes an accusation among parties that her decision for a snap election is abuse of power given to the prime minister.
 
Integration of Opposition Parties
Takaichi’s decision on a snap election had two unexpected side effects. Their impact on the coming election is hard to assess. The first was the combination of the CDPJ and Komeito in the Lower House, establishing the CRA. They published their policy platform on January 19, which included sustainable economic policy, formulation of a new social security model, building an inclusive society, realistic diplomacy and security policies and continuing reform of political funds and elections. Note that the combination is only in the Lower House; the CDPJ and Komeito remain as independent parties in the Upper House.
 
The leader of the CDPJ, Yoshihiko Noda, and the Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, are co-leaders of the CRA. Both parties expect their Lower House members to leave their parties and join the CRA. CDPJ currently holds 148 seats in the Lower House and Komeito has 24. If all their members join the CRA, it creates a substantial group of 172 lawmakers in the House, which, while still a minority, can contend in a meaningful way with the LDP-JIP coalition, which holds 233 seats.
 
Noda revealed that he has been approaching Komeito ever since Komeito left the leading coalition with the LDP last October. Even though it was the biggest opposition party, the CDPJ unable to lead the opposition parties against the ruling LDP over the years. For its part, Komeito needed another partner to survive the next election, having rejected the support of the LDP. Both parties have some common policy concerns on their agendas, such as the regulation of corporate political donations and the introduction of selective separate surnames.
 
Noda and Saito stressed that their intention is to form a group of centrists. Komeito left the leading coalition to protest the ascendancy of right-wing leadership in the LDP led by Takaichi. The LDP went further rightward by launching its coalition with the JIP.  On the left, the Japan Communist Party and Reiwa Shinsengumi pursue such eccentric policy positions as the total abolishment of the consumption tax.
 
The CDPJ and Komeito plan to position themselves between the right and left to offer an alternative to the LDP-led government. Noda and Saito plan to approach the DPP and moderate lawmakers in the LDP to join them.
 
Distinguishing themselves from the rise of populism in Japanese politics as seen in advance of Sanseito, the CDPJ and Komeito have several firm supporters. These include the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo) for CDPJ and the Buddhist organization, Soka Gakkai, for Komeito. Backed by these groups, Komeito will support former CDPJ candidates in single-seat constituencies in the coming election. Komeito will focus on proportional districts and not field any candidates in single-seat districts. This decision could be a major threat to LDP candidates whose principal advantage in past elections has been the support of Komeito.
 
For all that, the new party could prove a disappointment. In the most recent poll by Asahi Shimbun, only 20 percent expected CRA to be a serious contender against the Takaichi administration; 69 percent thought that it would not be.
 
Local Election for Osaka to Become a Second Capital
The second by-product of Takaichi’s decision was the JIP’s unilateral decision to hold local elections in Osaka on the same day as the Lower House elections. The JIP’s leader, Hirofumi Yoshimura, resigned as Governor of Osaka and announced that he would run in the gubernatorial election – a race that was brought about by his resignation. He is doing so with the intent of gaining the voters’ endorsement of JIP’s “Osaka Capital Initiative.” The JIP’s vice-leader and the mayor of Osaka city, Hideyuki Yokoyama, took the same course.
 
The “Osaka Capital Initiative” aims to integrate the governments of the Osaka prefecture and Osaka city to create a special autonomous government in Osaka. The initiative is modeled on the government of metropolitan Tokyo. JIP sought voter approval of the initiative through referenda in 2015 and 2020, but voters rejected it twice. Yoshimura once said that he would not seek a third chance as a politician after the loss in the 2020 referendum.
 
Yoshimura’s frequent and sudden policy changes are within his discretion as JIP leader. When he decided that JIP would form a coalition with the LDP, Yoshimura shifted his legislative priority from the regulation of political donations to the reduction of seats in the Diet. His stepping down is recognized as a request for public endorsement of this policy change.
 
The voters in Osaka city will vote for three elections for the Lower House, governor of Osaka and mayor of Osaka on February 8. Yoshimura and Yokoyama expect high voter turnout for the triple elections. Some observers including JIP members ask why the two leaders feel the need to step down and run again in the by-election if it is simply for the purpose of gaining voter support for their unilateral policy change. Other major parties, including the LDP, will not field any candidates in the two elections.
 
Takaichi’s sudden decision to call a snap election for her survival induced unusual responses by other parties. Neither the election nor the responses will appeal to citizens who are frustrated with how the national government has managed economic and security policies. Rather, these events are for the politicians and parties themselves. A Lower House election costs 80 billion yen.
 
Abrupt moves in the new year reflect the situation in today’s politics in Japan, which is filled with populism, jingoism, and political maneuvering. The politicians’ actions distance the government and the parties from the Japanese who, the majority who suffer from the unstable economy.

South Korea's Continued Political Polarization

Lee Jae-myung’s foreign policy successes
in the shadow of political polarisation

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published January 18, 2026 on the East Asia Forum.

South Korean President Lee Jae-myung came into power in an early unscheduled election in June 2025, under perhaps some of the most trying circumstances to face a South Korean leader in the past decade.

The election followed a failed attempt to declare martial law by then-president Yoon Suk-yeol, followed by his impeachment, deepening a political divide that spilled out into the streets of the capital and beyond. The new leader was immediately faced with a trade war from the United States, South Korea’s security ally led by President Donald Trump, that threatened to upend the economy. At the same time, Lee had to shape a policy to balance relations with China and Japan alongside a belligerent and well-armed North Korea, closely tied to Russia and its war in Ukraine.

Yet Lee has exceeded the expectations of many observers of South Korea’s turbulent politics. The leader of the progressive Democratic Party has proven himself to be not only a consummate pragmatist, as some predicted, but even more surprisingly a deft diplomat as well.

In January 2026, Lee managed a highly successful summit in Beijing, followed shortly by a surprisingly warm and positive trip to Japan hosted by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. All along, he avoided getting drawn into the sharpening confrontation between Japan and China.

In the year ahead these diplomatic gains may be overshadowed by the continuing — even sharpening — lines of political polarisation domestically. There is a double divide in South Korean politics. On one level, it exists between the ruling progressives and the conservative opposition People Power Party. Both camps themselves are also split between ideological extremism and more centrist elements.

The South Korean right is increasingly at odds with itself, pitting the hardline followers of former president Yoon, who have adopted the rhetoric and imagery of Trump’s Make America Great Again movement, against the conservatives who crucially broke with Yoon’s martial law bid. On the left, the Lee administration is dominated for now by advocates of pragmatism, not only in the realm of foreign policy but also in fostering the support of chaebols. There are though, more ideological leftists within its ranks and in the membership of the party’s National Assembly bloc.

Those divides are tested by Lee’s increasingly aggressive pursuit to prosecute the leaders and supporters of Yoon’s insurrection, not only through the courts but also via his attempts to regulate conspiracy-driven social media. In the name of defending democracy, the administration has also targeted the Unification Church and other right-wing evangelical movements.

Former US ambassador to South Korea Kathleen Stephens noted that Lee’s actions on these fronts, alongside the perception of his party as being ‘dangerously soft on North Korea’, have led him to be ‘viewed with deep distrust by many [South] Koreans’.

This deepening polarisation will begin to impact not only domestic stability but also the conduct of foreign policy. This is already evident in the difficult job of balancing relations with China, favoured by many on the left but denounced on the right, with increasing unease among progressives over American unilateralism and isolationism.

Lee made significant concessions on trade and investment issues in talks with the Trump administration to preserve the security alliance, though he can claim to have won a better bargain than Japan on both fronts. South Korean negotiators pushed the timetable for the long-sought transfer of wartime operational control of armed forces and made a deal to construct nuclear-powered submarines that could lead to a revision of restrictions on nuclear fuel enrichment and reprocessing. But even within the Lee administration, there is unhappiness over a shift in the focus of US military presence towards contingencies for confrontation with China.

‘Traditional leftist orientations on major domestic and foreign policy issues are colliding with very different geopolitical and geo-economic drivers that Lee has to accommodate’, argues Chung Min Lee. The South Korean right also faces significant challenges, remaining ‘shell shocked and in near-total disarray’ with no ‘viable party leadership and agenda’.

The looming question that may push these divisions to the forefront, not least within the Lee administration itself, is how to respond to North Korea’s growing confidence in its power. Progressive advocates of engagement, led by Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-seok, are pushing for more attempts to woo Pyongyang, even towards de facto acceptance of its nuclear status.

But this outreach is frustrated by North Korea’s dismissal of their legitimacy. The administration seeks to use improved ties to China to open dialogue with the North Korean regime but Pyongyang seems to prefer relying on its new alliance with Russia and waiting to see what Trump may offer them. Even if Trump’s Beijing visit in April 2026 were able to help foster inter-Korean relations, there is no guarantee that North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un will have a dialogue with Seoul.

Policy choices that were deferred will come to the fore in 2026 and bring the double divide of South Korean politics into play. Lee ‘will be walking on a tightrope’ — evidence so far suggests he may be up to the task, but time will tell.

Asia Policy Events, Monday January 19, 2026

Monday, January 19th is a National Holiday and day of service in the United States. It is a celebration of civil rights leader Martin Luther King's birthday.

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Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

Takaichi Considers an Early Snap Election

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 12, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi reportedly is considering dissolution of the Lower House at the beginning of the ordinary session of the Diet, now scheduled to convene on January 23. A snap election would follow in early or mid-February. Her motivation is to restore the power of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) before her cabinet’s approval rating falls. If she does so, she will face criticism for bringing about a period of political vacancy and leaving behind the Diet’s discussion of the FY2026 budget bill.
 
“I asked my ministers to execute policies included in the supplementary budget as early as possible. It is important to let the people realize the benefit of measures taken by my Cabinet to curb price inflation. I am focused on those immediate issues,” Takaichi said  in her new year’s press conference on January 5. This answer to a question from press was widely interpreted as a firm refusal to call an early snap election.
 
Four days later, late on the night of January 9, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported that Takaichi was thinking of an early snap election. According to Yomiuri, the Lower House election would be on February 8 or 15, if the House were dissolved on the first day of ordinary session, January 23. Mainichi Shimbun published a similar account early in the morning of January 10, and other media outlets followed on January 11.
 
It is well established that the prime minister has the power to dissolve the Lower House.  This authority derives from the cabinet’s duty to advise and approve the Emperor’s actions in matters of state. These actions include dissolving the Lower House. Once the Lower House is dissolved, Japan’s Constitution requires that a general election take place within 40 days. The period from dissolution to election has diminished in recent snap elections. The last Lower House election was in October 2024. Some argue that calling a snap election in a short period may be an abuse of power.
 
The rationale for an early snap election is Takaichi’s relatively high popularity. She has maintained a 60 to 70 percent approval rating in the polls since she took office last October. Some lawmakers in the LDP expect that the party will secure a large enough victory to give the LDP a simple majority in the Lower House. They also expect that the high approval rating will decline as discussions in the ordinary Diet session continue.
 
Even with a majority in the Lower House, Takaichi’s government, including the LDP’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), does not have a majority in the Upper House. If the LDP wins a majority in a Lower House snap election, Takaichi will still need to ask opposition parties for support to pass bills in the Upper House. It is possible that an endorsement by the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) of the FY2026 budget bill, which is to be discussed in the coming ordinary session, has encouraged Takaichi to contemplate an early election.
 
To have an early and successful snap election, Takaichi must counter criticisms of her decision. She argues that a majority will ensure action to support her priorities. The highest one on her list is support for people suffering from price inflation, for which she has adopted the slogan of “responsible and proactive public finances.” Although she delivered a certain amount of economic stimulus in the supplemental budget last year, anti-inflation measures are only at a halfway point.
 
If the snap election occurs, no discussion of the FY2026 budget bill can take place until new Lower House members are elected, the Lower House elects a prime minister (presumably Takaichi) again, and the newly elected prime minister delivers a policy speech to the Diet. The budget bill is unlikely to pass the Diet before the end of March.  Without a finished budget bill, the government will have to develop a provisional budget for FY2026 beginning in April.
 
A snap election creates political vacancy, though she said wants to deal with price inflation. There is no reason or cause for dissolution,” the leader of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, said. Noda also indicated that the regular convocation of the ordinary session could invite some discussions that Takaichi does not want to face. There is speculation that Takaichi is afraid of questioning in the Diet about her relationship with the former Unification Church. Weekly Bunshun has reported that the Church had hoped that she would become the LDP president.
 
The DPP leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, has expressed his concern that an early election would delay implementation of the economic policies embedded in the FY2026 budget bill. “A dissolution will leave the economy behind,” he said. Although he had agreed with Takaichi last December to support passage of the FY2026 budget bill by the end of March, Tamaki said that he would now reconsider that agreement. The Chief Representative of Komeito, Tetsuo Saito, was terser: when questioned about an early election in light of the urgent issues in economy and foreign affairs, he said, “Why now?”
 
The LDP and the JIP have not reached any agreement on electoral cooperation in the single-seat districts of the Lower House. If JIP suffers a significant defeat in the snap election, particularly in those districts, JIP may reconsider the merits of its coalition with the LDP. The DPP may also rethink its approach to the Takaichi administration if the party loses seats in the Lower House election and finds the coalition to be unbeneficial. A victory by the LDP thus could undermine its coalition framework.
 
Takaichi’s policies have not achieved outstanding results. The Japanese yen has continued to depreciate and fell to 158 yen to the dollar after news broke of a possible snap election. The fall was interpreted as reflecting a concern that Takaichi’s “proactive” fiscal policy would further destabilize the government’s delicate financial balance. The political vacancy resulting from a snap election will delay delivery of an economic stimulus package.
 
On the international front, ever since Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency, China has been boosting its pressure on Japan. China most recently announced that it would impose greater restrictions on exports of dual-use goods to Japan. Although China ruled out regulation of private trade, The Wall Street Journal has reported that China has begun choking supply of rare-earths. Takaichi has not taken either effective countermeasures or other steps to mend the relationship with China.
 
Takaichi has stressed that her upcoming March visit to the United States is one of her diplomatic achievements. But President Donald Trump is focusing elsewhere, such as pursuing his America First agenda in Venezuela, Greenland, Cuba, and Iran. The Japan-China relationship is out of his sight. Trump also wants to have a successful, grand summit with China’s Xi Jinping in April. A snap election will give voters in Japan a chance to evaluate Takaichi’s diplomatic work. 

Asia Policy Events, Monday January 12, 2026

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Takaichi’s 2026

Foreign Affairs, Coalition Building, and a Snap Election Headline Takaichi’s 2026

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow,  Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
January 5, 2026

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi entered the new year learning of the United States’ raid on Venezuela. Takaichi issued an anodyne comment, hoping for sustainable democracy in that country. Trump’s action may be a sign for Takaichi that 2026 will be diplomatically busy, even while her political focus should be on reinforcing the leading coalition and calling for a snap election.
 
It was in the evening of January 3, Tokyo time, when news broke of the U.S. attack on Caracas and the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. Having no opportunity to speak to the press on the day, Takaichi posted on X that the government of Japan was insisting on the importance of restoring democracy in Venezuela. The Japanese government “will promote diplomatic efforts to restore democracy in Venezuela and to stabilize the situation there, in close cooperation with neighboring countries and taking the utmost measures to secure the safety of Japanese citizens,” Takaichi said.
 
Although Takaichi had a telephone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump only the day before, she gave the reporters no hint about whether they had talked about Venezuela. “Having reconfirmed the close relationship between Japan and the U.S., we agreed on coordinating for my visit to the U.S. this spring,” Takaichi said in a press briefing after the call.
 
For Takaichi, who naively complicated bilateral relations with China by the observation that Japan could use force if the Taiwan contingency occurs, it would be the U.S. that she can rely on to reestablish diplomatic normality with China, without any apology or regret about her comment. As Trump agreed with Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit Beijing in April, it is a diplomatic requirement for her to meet with Trump before his meeting with Xi.
 
Japan has opposed a unilateral change in the international status quo by force since criticizing China’s conduct toward Taiwan and its aggression in the South China Sea. No argument is heard in Japan that the U.S. raid on Venezuela was not a unilateral change of the status quo by force. “I am concerned that it would send a dangerous message that this American military operation could be regarded as a unilateral change in the status quo,” former Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera said.
 
Professor Kazuhiro Maeshima of Sophia University indicated that Japan will need to balance its security against critical comments about U.S. action in Venezuela. “In case China invades Taiwan, it will not be easy to say ‘stop changing the status quo,’ ” after the U.S. action in Venezuela, Maeshima said. Indeed, North Korea launched ballistic missiles into the Japan Sea after the U.S. sent military forces into Venezuela. An event in South America can thus affect security in Northeast Asia.
 
Takaichi’s domestic agenda is no less crucial than the increasing complications in foreign affairs. Takaichi’s priority in 2026 is to stabilize her administration. In the first half of this year, Takaichi must survive the ordinary session of the Diet, which will convene on January 23. She has obtained support for the FY2026 main budget bill, which must pass the Diet by the end of March, from the Democratic Party for the People (DPP). On other legislation, though, the leading coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), must find votes from other opposition party members.
 
The LDP and JIP tabled action on a bill that would reduce the number of seats in the House of Representatives in the ordinary session. The two parties did, however, agree to proceed in the ordinary session with a bill that would impose greater restrictions on real estate investments and sales by foreigners and that would establish the Japanese version of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). To find a majority to pass the bill in the Upper House, the LDP-JIP coalition must garner votes from the opposition parties.
 
The DPP is willing to support the LDP more broadly than in previous sessions, after the LDP agreed at the end of last year to the DPP’s policy to raise the threshold for imposing income tax to 1.78 million yen of annual income. But, the DPP has not decided to participate in the leading coalition. The DPP is worried that the LDP may field candidates against DPP candidates in single-seat districts of the Lower House in the next election. Further, by not joining the coalition, the DPP may exercise discretion in deciding whether to support bills sponsored by the LDP.
 
Because the LDP currently has no margin for error in passing bills in the House of Representatives, it is important to watch whether Takaichi will call a snap election of the House. The prime minister of Japan is regarded as having the power to dissolve the Lower House at any time of her choosing. Every prime minister hopes to call a snap election to reinforce the political basis of his or her administration.
 
To do so, Takaichi must resolve at least three practical issues. First, there are two conflicting factors. On the one hand, she will need the approval of the LDP’s coalition partner. The LDP and JIP so far have no agreement to cooperate in elections. JIP has overwhelming strength in single-seat districts in Osaka. If the parties do not agree to cooperate, they will compete in those districts. On the other hand, a decision against running candidates in districts with JIP lawmakers will frustrate the LDP’s local organizations. Takaichi will have to weigh the risks whether to cooperate or to compete.
 
Second, Takaichi must find a cause to run on. Former prime minister Shinzo Abe dissolved the Lower House in 2014, asking voters to approve his decision to postpone a consumption tax hike. Fumio Kishida in 2021 and Shigeru Ishiba in 2024 sought approval of their new premierships. To hold a snap election, Takaichi must clarify what she will ask voters in the election.
 
Third and most important, is whether a snap election will reinforce or erode Takaichi’s currently high approval rating. Public opinion for prime ministers tends to go down as time passes after inauguration. If Takaichi calls a snap election, she will want her administration to keep its fresh image.
 
Perhaps the earliest possible time to dissolve the Lower House is in April, right after it passes the FY2026 budget bill. The voters will evaluate Takaichi’s budget achievement and the success (or lack thereof) in her visit to the U.S. now planned for March. Another chance to dissolve the Lower House is at the end of the ordinary session in June after the Diet has passed conservative bills such as legalizing the use of maiden names for wives, rather than allowing for separate surnames.
 
If Takaichi feels she cannot call an election during the ordinary session of the Diet, she may still do so at the extraordinary session in the fall at which she will submit a supplementary budget bill. Notwithstanding her high approval rating in the polls, it is unclear if Takaichi can win a snap election. The state of the economy and international affairs cannot be foretold but will certainly affect the election and the Takaichi administration’s longevity.

Balancing History and Strategy: South Korea's Challenge

South Korea Walks a Narrow Bridge between China and Japan

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published January 9, 2026 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung is spending the first weeks of the new year attempting a feat of diplomatic engineering that would challenge the most experienced leader. He began the year in Beijing, the first official visit by a South Korean president since 2019. Next week, he is scheduled to join Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in her hometown of Nara.

Both China and Japan are eager to draw South Korea to their side as President Lee walks across a narrowing bridge between them. His task is to foster closer ties while avoiding being drawn into conflict, even perhaps to help ease tensions.

This careful management of the complex triangular relations in the region takes place against a backdrop of growing global uncertainty, manifest in U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive intervention in Venezuela. In the capitals of Northeast Asia—as well as in Europe—the talk is of a world splintering into spheres of influence.

“Trump’s America seeks to position itself not as a global hegemon but as a great power whose sphere of influence is the American continent,” commented Jung E-gil, senior international affairs writer at Hankyoreh. “Looking at the situation surrounding Ukraine, Taiwan, and Venezuela, one wonders if the US, China, and Russia are now carving up separate spheres of influence.”

Xi Woos Lee to Join Hands Against Japan

Lee’s four-day visit to China was a continuation of a Chinese charm offensive toward the new government that began with Xi’s attendance at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit late last year. As was the case then, the language and messaging of the summit were mainly focused on friendship and mutual benefit, founded in deepening economic and cultural cooperation. The South Korean leader was accompanied by some 200 corporate leaders, making the focus clear.

But Xi and his colleagues did not conceal their concerted effort to frame the relationship in the historical context of shared battles against the Japanese Empire, which China now contends is being revived under Takaichi. Chinese officials greeted the assumption of power by the conservative nationalist with skepticism, given her unapologetic views of Japan’s wartime past. They moved into outright hostility after Takaichi’s November 7 remarks suggesting Japan could get involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Straits. Chinese retaliation continues to grow, most recently threatening restrictions on exports of “dual-use” technology.

The official Chinese readout from the visit was explicit in promoting the idea that the two countries should join hands against Japan:

“Both countries, with broad common interests, should stand firmly on the right side of history and make correct strategic choices. Over 80 years ago, China and the ROK made great sacrifices in resisting Japanese militarism and achieved the victory. Today, it is all the more important for the two sides to join hands to defend the victorious outcomes of World War II, and safeguard peace and stability of Northeast Asia.”

Lee was ready to accommodate Xi in one key respect—the reaffirmation of South Korea’s standing policy on Taiwan, telling Xi he “respects” China’s position on “one China.” He made a nod toward their shared history of opposition to Japanese imperialism, symbolized by a visit to Shanghai to mark the anniversary of the birth of Kim Ku, who led the Korean government in exile there.

Otherwise, as foreign policy scholar Moon Chung-in anticipated in an interview with this writer, Lee was “much more prudent on Beijing’s push for collective action against Takaichi’s remarks on history” and tried to balance its strategic cooperative relationship with China, while “retaining its alliance with the US.”

Lee left more empty-handed in his effort to secure Xi’s support in pressing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to return to dialogue and engagement with South Korea. Despite vague words about dialogue, there was no mention of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, much less any reiteration of past statements supporting the “denuclearization” of the peninsula, a formula sought by Seoul.

Can Takaichi Match the Pragmatism of Lee?

The next stop in President Lee’s diplomatic obstacle course is Japan, where he is reportedly heading to what many hope will be a breakthrough meeting with Takaichi, hosted by the currently popular leader in her hometown of Nara, some thirty minutes east of Osaka.

The two leaders had a friendly forty-five-minute meeting on the sidelines of the APEC conference, where Lee went out of his way to defy a widely held view of him as “anti-Japanese.” He embraced a “forward-looking” relationship, building on progress made by the previous conservative Yoon Suk Yeol administration and his Japanese counterparts.

This has led to expectations that the two leaders can forge an unexpected partnership, based in part on shared apprehensions about China and an unspoken need to coordinate a response to the Trump administration.

“The deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific makes it even more necessary for these leaders to collaborate,” wrote Japanese scholar Ayumi Teraoka in Foreign Affairs. “In particular, Washington’s renewed unpredictability and waning engagement in multilateral forums require Japan and South Korea to work together to sustain regional public goods and protect their interests.”

This optimism rests on several untested assumptions—that difficult issues of wartime and colonial history that have bedeviled the relationship can be put aside and Takaichi can bury her well-known conservative nationalist views and mirror the pragmatism of Lee. And it also assumes that the two leaders have a shared view of the regional security situation.

The two-day Nara visit could go smoothly if they steer clear of difficult questions. But there are already signs that this may be a challenge, especially for the Japanese prime minister. She did not hesitate to proclaim that the disputed islands of Dokdo (Takeshima for Japan) are being “illegally occupied.” Takaichi regularly and defiantly visited the controversial Yasukuni Shrine to Japan’s war dead and has left open the possibility that she would go as prime minister.

Lee is committed to establishing a working relationship with Takaichi. “His shuttle diplomacy with Takaichi in Nara on Jan. 13 will go well as long as she does not provoke him on Dokdo or other history issues,” predicts Yonsei University scholar Moon.

But it may not be enough to momentarily avoid sensitive subjects. Real progress remains to be made on resolving these issues, including compensation for forced labor victims and their families from decades ago—an issue that could lead to seizure of Japanese corporate assets. For Korean progressives, simply focusing on the strategic situation is not sufficient.

“They cannot simply avoid historical and territorial issues,” the progressive daily Kyunghyang Shinmun editorialized. “Japan has remained completely indifferent to historical issues. This may be partly due to South Korea’s lack of strong opposition. I hope this summit will mark a turning point in resolving historical issues.”

There is no evidence, however, that Takaichi is interested in doing more than just keeping up the appearance of cooperation. Perhaps more challenging for Lee is that the Japanese leader is clearly locked into a confrontational approach toward China, which has become a key plank of the political coalition she is forming between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and other smaller parties.

Still, President Lee seems poised, for now, to manage the journey from China to Japan. What follows is less clear.

“Seoul’s choreography of summitry with Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing has been masterful,” says former U.S. Ambassador to Korea Kathleen Stephens. “But the real challenges will come when real choices have to be made.”

Japanese Politics 2025

 

2025: The Year of Conservative Resurgence

By Takuya Nishimura

Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point

You can find his blog, J Update here.

December 30, 2025

Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has survived her first Diet session. She was able to enact her economic stimulus plan with the help of her party’s coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP). Despite her naïve and careless statement on a possible “Taiwan contingency,” her cabinet maintains a high approval rating. The current success of her big government and strong national security platform bolsters her conservative agenda. It is possible that 2025 will be remembered as the year when Japan’s conservative nationalists regained political power, driven by populism and global uncertainty.

The big political news of 2025 was Takaichi’s October inauguration. The July Upper House election signaled her forthcoming victory in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) presidential race. In the July election, the ruling LDP and its coalition partner, Komeito, suffered a serious setback when the major opposition parties, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ) and the Japan Innovation Party (JIP), failed to win over voters who had left the LDP. Instead, two more radical groups, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and a new populist party, Sanseito, showed a remarkable surge in the election.

Former prime minister Taro Aso was one of the people who realized how serious the July election defeat was. Although he had reluctantly but openly supported then Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Aso led a behind-the-scenes movement in the LDP to replace Ishiba over the summer. Although Ishiba had no hope of staying in power, having lost both the Lower House election in 2024 and the Upper House election in 2025, LDP lawmakers speculated at the time that someone close to Ishiba, such as Shinjiro Koizumi or Yoshimasa Hayashi, would succeed him.

The LDP lawmakers in Tokyo did not appreciate that LDP local organizations had far more serious reservations about the situation. The local perception was that populist and conservative movements had eroded the political basis of the LDP. The DPP gained votes in the Upper House election on a platform of increasing voters’ take-home pay.  Sanseito campaigned on a different but equally popular policy: stricter measures against foreigners, which appealed to xenophobia among some Japanese. These policies attracted swing voters who were skeptical of the LDP’s leadership.

The July results set the stage for the LDP presidential election in October. Takaichi’s conservative nationalist and populist agenda proved attractive to the local LDP constituencies rocked by the loss of their traditional base. Aso also instructed his faction colleagues to vote for the candidate with the strongest support among the local branches of the party. This proved to be Takaichi.

Although Aso had wanted a more centralist prime minister beholding to him, he accepted her ascendancy. She had long positioned herself among the more extreme and vocal right wingers. Frankly, Aso’s views are not distant from hers, as he shares a belief that a stable administration leans on conservative groups, just like former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did. As deputy prime minister in 2013, he suggested that the LDP in its discussions for constitutional change “should learn from the tactics of the Nazi regime that silently changed the Weimar Constitution” so to avoid protests. Although he retracted the statement, he maintains the need for decisive leadership and backroom decision making outside public scrutiny.

Takaichi’s victory is an epoch-making shift in LDP’s course from liberal centrist to conservative nationalist government. After the death of Abe, the LDP had gradually moved to the liberal side. Abe’s successor, Fumio Kishida, improved Japan’s relationship with the Republic of Korea and imposed heavy punishments on lawmakers with the now-former Abe faction in the kickback fund scandal. The faction was considered quite conversative nationalist.

Kishida’s successor, Shigeru Ishiba, long a political foe of Abe, tried to restore relations with China, which had deteriorated under Abe. Ishiba appealed to Beijing by repeatedly demonstrating his respect for his mentor, former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka who normalized the relations with China in 1972. Ishiba also took a major step toward restoring Japan’s historic war apology by including “remorse” in his address at the 80^th national memorial ceremony for the war dead on August 15, 2025.

Takaichi’s rise to LDP leadership has reversed much of the work of the Kishida and Ishiba administrations. She has unhesitatingly returned Japan to Abe’s political agenda. She supports a revisionist history of the War in the Pacific, believes that Japan has apologized enough for the War, and promotes a prime minister visiting the Yasukuni Shrine to honor some of Japan’s war dead, including hanged war criminals.

This approach took its toll when the LDP lost Komeito as a coalition partner immediately after Takaichi took office as LDP president. Komeito’s leadership had been under pressure from its local branches, which were suffering from a conservative upsurge that included the LDP. Komeito had to choose between its values and Takaichi’s LDP.

Komeito’s departure pushed the LDP further to the right. Takaichi chose to form a coalition with JIP, after failing with the DPP. The LDP and JIP have memorialized a conservative agenda in their coalition agreement. This includes imperial succession in the male line only, amendment of the constitutional provision on the Self-Defense Forces, and the continued official use of maiden names rather than a selective separate surname system.  

Although it was her third bid for the prime ministership, it was obvious that Takaichi was not ready for leadership and too uncritical of Abe’s policies. Believing that Abe’s economic policy had had underwritten his conservative agenda, Takaichi undertook a major fiscal mobilization in the FY2025 supplemental budget and in the draft of the FY2026 main budget to create a “strong economy.” The budgets rely on the issuance of a large amount of government bonds, even though it is increasing tax revenue that drives expenditures in the budget.

Increasing government bonds may be a plan at odds with the Bank of Japan’s (BOJ) monetary policy. The BOJ has been raising the interest rate steadily since July 2024, which reduces the price on government bonds. Increasing bond issuances to support Takaichi’s large-scale spendings would be an increasingly expensive undertaking. Put another way, while the BOJ is shrinking the money supply, Takaichi is expanding government spending. The market has responded to this prospect by hitting Takaichi with a triple low in stocks, bonds and the Japanese yen.

Relations with China have also suffered an unforced error on Takaichi’s part. Apparently disregarding how delicately Kishida and Ishiba had handled China policy, Takaichi decided to raise in public discussions in the Diet the prospect of a “Taiwan contingency” – the notion that Chinese aggression against Taiwan would trigger Japan’s self-defense authority. China reacted furiously, claiming that Takaichi’s comment was a Japanese intervention in a Chinese domestic issue.

It was later revealed that Takaichi had not sought any meaningful staff input. She has argued that her comment did not deviate from the stance of her predecessors. She has refused to retract her comment, leading to increasingly strident statements and actions by China. A recent comment by one of Takaichi’s special policy advisers, Oue Sadamasa, suggesting that Japan should possess nuclear weapons, acerbated the tension.

Nevertheless, the Japanee people still support Takaichi. A poll showed a 65 percent approval rating for the Takaichi Cabinet in November. Fifty percent of the respondents had no concerns about Takaichi’s comment on the Taiwan contingency, while only 25 percent thought it problematic.

The Takaichi administration has quickly gained a measure of stability. The LDP-JIP coalition secured a simple majority in the House of Representatives by adding three lawmakers to their coalition. Although there appears to be no room for error, the LDP has cleared a major hurdle with the JIP. 

Yet, the LDP failed to pass a bill to reduce seats in the Lower House. The JIP had made seat reduction an “absolute condition” for its participation in the coalition. But even with this failure, the JIP has shown no signs of leaving the coalition, apparently finding that continuing cooperation with the LDP is the best way to promote JIP policies.

The opposition parties are so fragmented that they cannot put effective pressure on the Takaichi administration. In fact, the DPP and Komeito voted for Takaichi’s supplemental budget bill because Takaichi included policies in her economic stimulus plan that the two parties supported.

Further, uninterested in cooperating with the CDPJ, the DPP looks willing to join the LDP-JIP coalition. Takaichi has promised to raise the income tax threshold to 1.78 million yen of annual income, an action that the DPP strongly supports. (Households with lower incomes would pay no income tax.) For its part, the CDPJ dropped the option of a no-confidence resolution against the Takaichi Cabinet. Such a proposal has always been the strongest weapon for the opposition parties to protest the government. The CDPJ’s withdrawal of the resolution, five days before the end of the Diet session, indicates the party’s weakness.

While the opposition parties  are trying to find an effective line of attack on the Takaichi administration,  the two-month-old seemingly populist and conservative nationalist government is  shaping up for a long rule

America Steps Back

A National Security Strategy of Retreat 

Leaves Asia to Manage the Consequences  

by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member. First Published December 9, 2025 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.

The Donald Trump administration’s much-awaited National Security Strategy (NSS) landed last week with an audible thud.

The somewhat truncated document is an odd combination of social media-style triumphalism and an effort to lay a strategic veneer on the administration’s often chaotic and contradictory policies. But the document clearly expresses an America-First view of the world, a combination of isolationism and U.S. primacy that places allies and partners near the bottom of the priority list.

Much of the strategy’s attention is on the assault against Europe and the dismissal of both the NATO alliance and European unity in favor of supporting right-wing ethno-nationalism. In homage to the nineteenth century, U.S. control of the Western Hemisphere—in the name of a “Trump corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine—has regional priority.

But in Asia, the NSS offers a strange marriage of two historical moments, both still controversial.

One is the infamous Acheson Line, a reference to the speech delivered by then Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950, drawing a U.S. defense line along the island chain from Alaska through Japan to the Philippines, notably excluding the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. It was a declaration that many believe convinced Stalin to give the green light to Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea, igniting the Korean War.

Trump’s NSS describes a new Acheson Line, the so-called First Island Chain, presented as the first line of defense in the Pacific. Bizarrely, it contains no mention of either North Korea and its nuclear arsenal or even the Korean Peninsula.

This is combined with a revival of President Richard Nixon’s equally infamous Guam Doctrine. Amid the waning days of the Vietnam War, Nixon told reporters during a 1969 tour of Asia that while the region was important to the United States when it came to military defense, “the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will be handled by, and responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves.” One product of this doctrine was the withdrawal of the 7th Infantry Division from South Korea, a decision that shook confidence in the U.S. security commitment.

The message of this NSS echoes Nixon’s. It demands not only vastly increased defense spending from South Korea and Japan, as well as other partners such as Taiwan and Australia, but also that they assume the roles the United States currently plays in defending regional security, now defined as the First Island Chain. Their own defense gets no mention. As the NSS puts it: “Given President Trump’s insistence on increased burden-sharing from Japan and South Korea, we must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain.”

The NSS makes it clear that the United States will stand aside and ask its allies to take on the task of defending the Pacific and Europe. “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over,” the document pronounces. The United States will now ask “allies to assume primary responsibility for their regions,” while presumably still beholden to the United States’ whims and desires.

As Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated last week, Trump prefers “countries that help themselves…rather than dependencies.” Those that spend more are “model allies”—for now, South Korea is on that list, but Japan is not—but “allies that do not, allies that still fail to do their part for collective defense, will face consequences.” It was not explicitly stated, but the withdrawal of U.S. security guarantees appears to be on the table.

The Retreat from Values and Strategic Competition
The two previous national security strategies, one issued during the first Trump administration and one by the Joe Biden administration, were shaped around the concept of strategic competition with China and Russia. The new document almost completely abandons this driving idea.

Instead, “it prioritizes threats from the Western Hemisphere, European civilizational decline and overregulation, and trade deficits but says nothing about the Russian threat to U.S. interests and views China almost entirely through the lens of economic security,” argued Thomas Wright, a former national security official under the Biden administration.

Evans Revere, a former principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, offered this scathing summary of the NSS.

“This is not so much a national security strategy document as it is a screed telling America’s allies, partners, friends, and adversaries that the United States they once knew is gone. Gone are the priorities, principles, beliefs, and assumptions that underpinned U.S. strategy and diplomacy for most of the past 80 years during both Democratic and Republican administrations. Gone is the belief in a U.S.-centric international economic and security order based on American predominance, power, alliances, and defense commitments. And gone is the belief, once deeply shared across every previous U.S. administration, that America’s destiny was to promote a core set of values, including democracy, freedom, and equity, in cooperation with like-minded allies and partners.”

Media in South Korea and Japan echoed these concerns. “Trump administration formalizes strategy of isolationism based on US interests,” headlined a commentary in the progressive Hankyoreh. The editor of a major Japanese paper told this author that he took the NSS “as another statement of America in retreat” that “reconfirms that the entirety of US national core interest is defined as commercial benefit.”

The editor argued that the Trump administration appears to believe that “authoritarianism can be acceptable in the name of sovereignty, and effective foreign policy is conducted only by strong leadership” or “strongmen” like presidents Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin.

“America’s abandoning of its self-position as a leader of free world is obvious in this NSS,” the Japanese editor opined.

The China Question
Some have taken solace in the fact that while the NSS prioritizes the homeland and the Western Hemisphere, it does give some length to discussing China. There are elements of traditional approaches and policy continuity, particularly an embrace of military deterrence and a reaffirmation of support for the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

But the entire section on China is focused on economic and commercial relations, with the clear suggestion that the two countries can reach a more equitable division of the global economy and presumably the spoils of commerce.

“We will rebalance America’s economic relationship with China, prioritizing reciprocity and fairness to restore American economic independence,” says the NSS. “Trade with China should be balanced and focused on non-sensitive factors.”

“The Trump admin believes in the possibility of a mutually advantageous economic relationship with China,” wrote Michael Sobolik, a senior fellow at conservative Hudson Institute, on December 5.

Trump’s NSS makes no mention of the war against Ukraine or China’s support for Russian aggression, much less China’s military and nuclear buildup. Not only does North Korea drop out of the national security policy, but the entire goal of denuclearization is also gone, perhaps reflecting a growing acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state.

Even though Taiwan occupies a link on the First Island Chain, the focus is almost entirely on preserving its role in the electronics supply chain. “Asia is important because of its growing GDPs, and Taiwan must be defended for semiconductors and sea lanes,” wrote the veteran Japanese newspaper editor.

Two recent developments seem to manifest this view of Asia. One has been Trump’s apparent decision to effectively ignore China’s increasingly aggressive—including military confrontations in the skies—response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s remarks about the potential impact of a crisis over Taiwan on Japan’s security. Indeed, the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal both reported that Trump, after talking to Xi, may have urged Takaichi to back off.

Perhaps more importantly, Trump has cleared the way for a dramatic easing of export controls on the sale of high-powered Nvidia semiconductors to China, effectively putting commerce over security. Ironically, perhaps the NSS also calls for allies like South Korea and Japan to prioritize trade with the United States over China.

“In Europe, we are afraid that Donald Trump’s America may be selling us out to Russia,” wrote former Economist editor Bill Emmott. “In Japan, where I have just been, the fear is of Trump selling them out to China.”