Asia Policy Point
Monday, November 10, 2025
Asia Policy Events, Monday November 10, 2025
THE 21ST KOREA-MIDDLE EAST COOPERATION FORUM: A PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY. 11/10, 10:00am-5:30pm (AST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsors: Middle East Council on Global Affairs (ME Council); Korea Arab Society (KAS); Jeju Peace Institute (JPI). Speakers: Dr. Maryam bint Ali bin Nasser Al-Misnad, Minister of State for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Qatar; Dr. Cho Hyun, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea; Dr. Khalid Al-Jaber, Director, Middle East Council on Global Affairs; Young Hoon Kang, President, Jeju Peace Institute; Ahmed Al-Rumaihi, International Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State of Qatar; Dr. Waleed Siam, Ambassador, Permanent General Mission of Palestine to South Korea and Japan; Woong-Yeob Song, Former Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan; and more.
THE STATE OF TAIWAN: WHAT'S NEXT AFTER THE TRUMP-XI MEETING? 11/10, 9:00-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Bonny Lin, Director, China Power Project, Senior Fellow, Asian Security, CSIS; Dan Blumenthal, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Bonnie Glaser, Managing Director, Indo-Pacific Program, German Marshall Fund; I-Chung Lai, President, Prospect Foundation; Ryo Sahashi, Professor, University of Tokyo.
STRATEGIC ALIGNMENT ON CHINA: EU APPROACHES AND TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION. 11/10, 10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Global China Hub; Europe Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Jörn Fleck, Senior Director, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; The Hon. John Moolenaar, United States Representative (R-MI-02); Zoltán Fehér, Nonresident Fellow, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council; Michael Laha, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Geopolitics, Geoeconomics, and Technology, DGAP; Jacqueline Ramos, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, US Department of State, Valbona Zeneli, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Europe Center, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Melanie Hart, Senior Director, Global China Hub, Atlantic Council.
LITHUANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KĘSTUTIS BUDRYS ON NATO, ENERGY SECURITY, AND EUROPE-CHINA RELATIONS. 11/10, 2:30-3:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Kęstutis Budrys, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lithuania; Marshall Billingslea, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.
Sunday, November 9, 2025
PM Takaichi’s Week of Diplomacy
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
Former editorial writer for the Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
The Golden Age of Alliances
Takaichi prepared for her diplomatic week by focusing on U.S. President Donald Trump’s state visit from October 27 to 29. In her meeting with Trump, Takaichi reminisced about his old friend and her political mentor, former prime minister Shinzo Abe. She gave Trump a golf putter used by Abe and a set of gold-gilded golf balls, acknowledging Trump’s fondness of golf and gold. The two signed a document titled “Toward a NEW GOLDEN AGE,” named after a sentence in Trump’s inaugural address in January: “The golden age of America begins right now.”
In addition to the gift-giving, and without any explicit request from Trump, Takaichi described to him Japan’s initiative to increase its defense spending. Takaichi earlier had announced to the Diet that Japan would reach its defense budget target of two percent of GDP earlier than expected. Japan also will revise three defense documents signed in 2022 to increase its purchases of military equipment from the U.S. On this latter commitment, Takaichi took a page from Abe’s book. In 2018, as Trump was considering higher tariffs on Japanese cars, Abe bought F-35 fighter jets and other military equipment from the U.S.
Both leaders labeled the bilateral tariff agreement in July as a “great deal.” They exchanged a joint factsheet on the anticipated 60 trillion yen of investments in the U.S. by Japanese companies. The factsheet shows only “interest from companies.” One example of a possible investment is the construction of nuclear reactors and small modular reactors by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba. Notwithstanding the lack of firm commitments, the factsheet was a diplomatic card that Trump could play in a summit talk with President Xi Jinping of China after he left Japan.
Helped by Pragmatic Diplomacy
Abe’s legacy was not a resource for Takaichi in her meeting with the President of the Republic of Korea (ROK), Lee Jae Myung, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Gyeongju on October 30. During his time in office, Abe had brought Japan-ROK relations to their lowest level since 1965, when the two countries normalized diplomatic relations. Note that while Abe was in office, a liberal, Moon Jae In, headed the ROK government. Moon was a political mentor of President Lee, just as Abe was of Takaichi.
The stage thus was set for renewed antagonism between the heirs to the Abe and Moon administrations. That drama did not take place, however. Takaichi was lucky enough on three points. First, Lee holds to the principle of “pragmatic diplomacy” and is trying to solidify relations with foreign countries. Second, Takaichi’s predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, had improved bilateral relations with the ROK and then-President Yoon Suk Yeol. Finally, Japan and the ROK need to reinforce their trilateral security framework with the U.S. to counter the growing military alliance of China, Russia, and North Korea.
Takaichi and Lee promised to maintain a “shuttle diplomacy” with frequent visits to each other. In the ROK, Takaichi is widely considered a hawkish leader, who frequently visits the Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are enshrined, and who disagrees with both the Murayama Statement, which is an apology for Japan’s wartime aggression, and the Kono Statement, which admits the Japanese Imperial Armed Force’s role in trafficking women and girls. Avoiding these issues, Takaichi tried to build a personal relationship with Lee, expressing her preferences for Korean seaweed, Korean cosmetics, and Korean TV drama.
An Unusual Exchange on Domestic Issues
Takaichi’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Gyeongju on October 31 did not go as smoothly as the meetings with Trump and Lee. Both leaders met and shook hands without a smile.
Takaichi is one of the lawmakers who are close to Taiwan. She had visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te in April. Lai immediately congratulated Takaichi on her election as president of the Liberal Democratic Party in early October, and her colleagues brought a message from her to Lai in their visit to Taiwan. Takaichi obviously is not a preferable counterpart for Xi.
Xi referred to the Murayama Statement as embodying a spirit of contrition that should be upheld. Takaichi expressed serious concerns over China’s escalation of maritime survey and military activities in the East China Sea, including around the Senkaku Island and in the South China Sea. She also criticized China’s oppression in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It was unusual for the leaders to discuss the domestic issues of their counterparts.
Although Takaichi hoped to make progress on some concerns, such as easing regulations on the import of sea products from Japan and taking greater safety measures for the Japanese in China, Xi did not offer any clear commitment. They at least agreed on maintaining an old bilateral diplomatic principle, a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests,” a term originated in the first Abe administration.
Distance from Center Stage
In her first policy speech to the Diet on October 24, Takaichi invoked the Abe policy of a “Japanese diplomacy that flourishes on the world’s center stage.” The diplomatic week was the premiere of Takaichi’s role on that stage. It is a work in progress, as Takaichi insisted in her press conference at the end of the week that her diplomacy had just begun.
In one instance, on October 26, at the Japan-ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Takaichi prompted collaboration between the Free and Open Asia Pacific (FOIP) and another framework, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The FOIP concept was invented by Abe in 2016. However, Takaichi’s proposed collaboration remains focused on traditional economic cooperation for building infrastructure. ASEAN still faces a choice between Japan and China as the country to cooperate with.
At another meeting, the APEC summit at Gyeongju on October 31, Takaichi proposed active investment to support innovation in artificial intelligence (AI) and digital technology in order to enhance resilience in responding to natural disaster. In her policy speech to the Diet, Takaichi spoke of “investment for crisis management” and promised to make Japan “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” Nevertheless, there is no AI in Japan that is as prevalent in the world as ChatGPT or Copilot. So far, it is unclear how she will have Japan flourish on the world’s stage.
Tuesday, November 4, 2025
All things Gozilla
Zenzilla Garden T-shirt
Japanese American National Musuem
Godzilla: The Official Coloring Book
Japanese American National Musuem
Godzilla Monopoly
Japanese American National Museum
Love from Godzilla
Japanese American National Museum
Sunday, November 2, 2025
Asia Policy Events, Monday November 3, 2025
Prime Minister Takaichi’s First Policy Speech
Ambitions Lacking Details
Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi delivered her first policy speech to the extraordinary Diet session on October 24. She emphasized that her administration would make the Japanese economy and Japan itself stronger. However, it was not at all clear how she would do so or how Japan will fare under her leadership. One thing that was clear was her commitment to follow the policies of the former Shinzo Abe administration, which she greatly admires.
“I will strive to build a robust economy, turning people’s unease and apprehension over their current lives and the future into hope and foster a Japan that is stronger and more prosperous,” Takaichi said. She was adamant that she would restore Japanese diplomacy so that it “flourishes on the world’s center stage” – a term coined by Abe when he advocated for an active role for Japan in the world.
One question remains: What exactly is a strong economy? A “responsible and proactive public finances” is Takaichi’s main concept. She calls for bold governmental spending, which, she says, will raise incomes, transform people’s mindsets regarding consumption, and boost tax revenues without raising tax rates as business earnings increase. She aims to curb the growth of Japan’s outstanding debt so as not to exceed the rate of economic growth and lower Japan’s ratio of outstanding government debt to GDP.
This concept does not differ in any significant way from the “economic virtuous cycle” that former administrations had hoped to achieve. However, neither Abe nor other prime ministers were able to grow real wages. As these administrations poured money into the market by issuing government bonds, wages could not catch up with price hikes. While Takaichi and her allies have great nostalgia for Abenomics, that policy was a remedy for deflation, not for inflation from which the Japanese public is now suffering.
When she talks about responsibility for economic policies, Takaichi must show fiscal resources that will give effect to her policies. She promised in her policy speech that her administration would pass a bill in the current session of the Diet to remove the provisional gasoline tax rate. But she did not propose how she would find the fiscal resources to make up for lost revenue.
Takaichi listed several policies her administration would pursue, including subsidies for the wages of workers in medical services and nursing care facilities, for local communities to support small and mid-size entrepreneurs, and for payments to high schools for school lunches. But she never explained how she would pay for them. It is notable that, during her campaign for the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Takaichi did not rule out issuing government bonds to fund her economic policies.
Takaichi also introduced the concept of “crisis management investment.” She defines it as strategic investments “to address various risks and social issues, including economic security, food security, energy security, health and medical security, and measures to enhance national resilience” with coordination between the private sector and the government. Another goal is to advance Japan as “the world’s best country to develop and use AI.” To implement this economic agenda, she proposed establishing a “Council for Japan’s Growth Strategy.”
LDP governments have long used disaster management to justify expenditures for infrastructure construction. Mirroring the views of her immediate predecessor, Shigeru Ishiba, Takaichi stressed the need to prepare for the Nankai Trough Great Earthquake and to continue reconstruction following the great earthquakes in northeast Japan in 2011 and Noto Peninsula in 2024.
Takaichi’s respect for Abe comes through in her diplomatic policies. A “Free and Open Asia-Pacific (FOAP)” is at the center of her foreign policy. Abe proposed FOAP in 2016 to counter Chinese advances in the region. Takaichi appointed Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MOFA) official, Keiichi Ichikawa, to be the new Secretary General of the National Security Secretariat. Ichikawa originated the idea of FOAP in MOFA.
Takaichi also declared that she would take “front-loaded measures” to increase the defense budget to two percent of GDP within FY2025. Former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida assumed that income tax, corporate tax, and tobacco tax revenues would fund the two percent commitment. Takaichi has yet to adopt that view, and she has not indicated how she would pay for the increase in the defense budget.
As a practical matter, the most important agenda item for the Takaichi administration is how to ensure the survival of her current minority government. Yet, she did not meaningfully address the priority policy of her coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party (JIP) – a reduction in the number of Diet seats. This reduction was the “absolute condition” for the JIP to enter a coalition with the LDP. In her speech, Takaichi did not mention any reduction at all, instead referring to the policy as social security reform. But it is nothing more to her than a topic to “discuss quickly.”
Takaichi also omitted any mention of campaign financing reform, namely the prohibition of donations from companies and organizations. The LDP’s resistance to reform was the greatest reason Komeito left the coalition with the LDP. Indeed, far from pursuing reform, Takaichi appointed lawmakers who had been involved in the kickback fund scandal, to positions in her government and on the LDP board. Her indifference to political reform may engender some criticism.
Monday, October 27, 2025
Japan’s First Woman Prime Minister
Ms. Sanae Takaichi
By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Asia Policy Point
You can find his blog, J Update here.
October 21, 2025
Japan’s Diet elected Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president Ms. Sanae Takaichi the country’s 104th prime minister. Although her success was due to the establishment of a new coalition between the LDP and the conservative nationalist Japan Innovation Party (JIP, 日本維新 の会, Nippon Ishin no Kai; Japan Restoration Association), JIP decided not to send a minister to Takaichi’s Cabinet. JIP will exert its influence indirectly to ensure hawkish policies in the new administration.
Takaichi’s election was not certain after the LDP’s long-time partner Komeito left the leading coalition. The next coalition possibility, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), refrained from forming a coalition with the LDP because even together they could not achieve a simple majority in the Diet. Takaichi then reached out to JIP to form a new coalition. On October 20, after five days of negotiation, the LDP and JIP reached a twelve-point agreement for their coalition.
Komeito’s departure made it easier for the LDP to approach JIP because both parties have closely aligned conservative platforms. Although JIP has previously sought to cooperate formally with the LDP, notably during the Shinzo Abe administration, Komeito blocked JIP from the coalition because of political differences. Komeito kept a liberal position in the coalition. With Komeito’s departure, the LDP was unleashed from Komeito’s rein.
The LDP’s rightward move is embedded in the coalition agreement. Both parties decided to revise the three security documents, approved by the Fumio Kishida administration in 2022, to further increase the defense budget. They plan to allow greater exports of defense equipment by easing export controls in five categories– rescue, transport, warning, surveillance, and sea minesweeping. Takaichi expects to explain the impact of these policies to the U.S. President Donald Trump during his visit to Tokyo later this month.
The LDP and JIP are firm advocates for several constitutional amendments. Both parties plan to submit to the Diet by the end of FY2026 a draft amendment that would add an emergency clause to maintain the legislative branch in a contingency. The parties also will discuss amending the pacifism principle in Article 9. They agreed as well to revise the Imperial House Law to encourage imperial succession only by males in the male line.
During the two parties’ policy talks, JIP abruptly shifted its focus from social security reform and the sub-capital initiative to the reduction of Diet seats. The LDP accepted the idea of a 10 percent reduction in Lower House seats in the current session of the Diet. The opposition parties oppose it, arguing that a reduction in Diet seats must have comprehensive approval of parties with representatives in the Lower House.
As for the sub-capital initiative, which would establish an alternative to Tokyo in case the capital suffers from a major disaster, the LDP and JIP aim to enact it in the ordinary session of the Diet in 2026. There is no time limit on discussions between the two parties on elimination of the consumption tax on food for two years. JIP had earlier demanded that this be part of the Diet’s urgent agenda.
JIP’s most controversial decision was to give the LDP a two-year delay on the enactment of a prohibition on contributions from companies and organizations. The two parties’ agreement states that the Diet will affect the ban only by the end of Takaichi’s term as LDP president in September 2027. It is notable that the coalition agreement between the LDP, the Liberal Party and Komeito in 1999 included a commitment to enact the prohibition in the Diet session of that year. In the event, the LDP did not act on it for 26 years. In fact, any provision in the LDP-JIP agreements is nothing more than a target subject to future discussion.
With these policy agreements in place, the two parties were able to elect Takaichi as prime minister. Takaichi won in the Lower House with 237 votes out of 465, or 51% -- enough to avoid a run-off. The leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, Yoshihiko Noda, came a distant second with 149 votes. The opposition parties could not unite for an alternative candidate. Takaichi also defeated Noda by 125 votes to 46 in a run-off in the Upper House. These votes made Takaichi the first female prime minister of Japan.
Takaichi started her political career as an independent lawmaker of the House of Representatives in 1993. She participated in establishment of the New Frontier Party in 1994, and joined the LDP in 1996. Affiliation with the Seiwa Policy Group, one of the factions in the LDP, determined her course in politics, which was conservative.
She supported two leaders of Seiwa group who were her mentors: former prime ministers Yoshiro Mori and Shinzo Abe. She supported unpopular prime minister Mori as a “volunteer advisor” in 2000. When Abe ran for LDP president in 2012 against Nobutaka Machimura, who was the head of Seiwa group, Takaichi left the faction to support Abe. Her relationship with Mori and Abe helped her advance politically.
Takaichi is known to have a rivalry with another woman LDP lawmaker, Seiko Noda, whose is relatively liberal. Both won the Lower House election for the first time in 1993. Noda’s first appointment to cabinet minister and first marriage were earlier than Takaichi’s. Abe simultaneously picked Takaichi for LDP policy chief and Noda for chairwoman of LDP General Council to let them compete each other in his second administration starting in 2012. Takaichi appears to have won the competititon.
However, the Japanese people are not very enthusiastic about her premiership. It is true that the main reason behind expectations about Takaichi is that she is a woman – rather than that she has particular political views one way or another. But she was less popular among women than among men in LDP presidential election. She opposes the possibility of a female emperor as well as a separate surname system. She is identified not merely as conservative, but as rightwing.
Her cabinet reflects her political obligations and biases. She appointed Minoru Kihara as Chief Cabinet Secretary, Toshimitsu Motegi as Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Shinjiro Koizumi as Minister of Defense. Yoshimasa Hayashi will be Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications. Takaichi thus included in her cabinet or on the LDP board all the other four candidates in the LDP presidential election.
For Minister of Finance, Takaichi picked Satsuki Katayama as one of the female cabinet members. Ryosei Akazawa, Japan’s top negotiator in tariff negotiations with the U.S. and a close ally of former premier Shigeru Ishiba, remains Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry; he is expected to continue managing trade negotiations with the U.S. These appointments seem to be an attempt to reintegrate the LDP. But appointment of female ministers was limited to two people instead of the expected five.
While it agreed to a firm coalition with the LDP, JIP did not join the Takaichi Cabinet. It is an unusual decision. A junior partner in a leading coalition typically will have at least one member in the cabinet. In its coalition with the LDP, Komeito sent a minister to the cabinet every year since 1999, except during DPJ government between 2009 and 2012. There is one precedent for JIP’s decision: in 1996, the Social Democratic Party and New Party Sakigake left LDP’s Ryutaro Hashimoto Cabinet but maintained a cooperative relationship with the LDP.
The leader of JIP, Hirofumi Yoshimura, indicated that his party did not have enough experience to join the cabinet. But it is likely that the party has reserved a choice to leave the coalition if the LDP fails to live up to the coalition agreement.
Cooperation outside the cabinet is a weaker form of a coalition government than a traditional one. The cabinet attains its policy goals through cabinet decisions. Each decision is made with the unanimous approval of all the ministers. If a minister refuses to sign onto a cabinet decision, the prime minister can force him or her to leave the cabinet.
JIP’s decision to distance itself from the Takaichi cabinet has two aspects. First, JIP will not be responsible for each decision of the Takaichi Cabinet. Second, without a representative in the cabinet, JIP cannot directly use the cabinet decision-making process to turn its policies into law. JIP is not without influence, though; the LDP will be constantly concerned by policy differences that would cause JIP to leave the coalition.
The coalition agreement does not refer to cooperation in elections. The LDP lawmakers from the Osaka area, where JIP has a stronghold, are worried about cooperation with JIP. How the two parties can cooperate in elections in each district may determine the fortune of their coalition.
Sunday, October 26, 2025
The Devil Wears Bitcoin
Even in hell, Bitcoin talks. This modern take on an old Japanese saying still holds true. Cryptocurrency was supposed to do for money what the internet did for information, but it didn’t work out that way. Its virtual existence unleashed real-world chaos — especially in the homeland of its mysterious creator, Satoshi Nakamoto. Tokyo was the centre of the world’s largest bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, until that company collapsed with nearly half a billion dollars’ worth of bitcoin gone missing. It might be the greatest heist in history. If it was a heist.
So what really happened? Here’s the true story of the humble-to-hot commodity, from the former geek website that launched the boom to an inside world of absent-minded CEOs, hucksters, hackers, cybercrooks, drug dealers, corrupt federal agents, evangelical libertarians, and clueless techies. You’ll discover Bitcoin’s connection to the infamous Silk Road, learn why hell has nothing on Japan’s criminal justice system, and get the lowdown on the high cost of betting with the Devil’s dollars. All of this for less than the price of a single bitcoin.
BOOK TOUR UPCOMING 2025
Los Angeles, CA
Palo Alto, CA
November 6: Northern California Japan Society (Palo Alto), 3 pm
Boston, MA
November 8: Japan Society and Boston University with BU’s Center for the Study of Asia 3 pm
Asia Policy Events, Monday October 27, 2025
CARIBBEAN BUILDUP: A RENEWED FOCUS ON COUNTERNARCOTICS AND HEMISPHERIC SECURITY? 10/27, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Americas Program, CSIS. Speakers: Ryan C. Berg, Director, Americas Program, CSIS; Juan Cruz, Senior Adviser (Non-resident), Americas Program and Director, Argentina-U.S. Strategic Forum, CSIS; Mark F. Cancian, Senior Adviser, Defense and Security Department, CSIS.
CHINA–ASEAN AT A CROSSROADS: NAVIGATING REGIONAL FUTURES IN AN ERA OF GREAT POWER COMPETITION. 10/27, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society Policy Institute. Speakers: Gita Wirjawan, Former Minister of Trade, Indonesia, Visiting Scholar, Precourt Institute for Energy, Stanford; Bert Hofman, Non-Resident Honorary Senior Fellow, Center for China Analysis (CCA), Asia Society Policy Institute; Brian Wong, Non-Resident Honorary Fellow, CCA HKU-100 Assistant Professor in Philosophy, University of Hong Kong (HKU); Kevin Zongzhe Li, Affiliated Researcher, CCA.
BARGAINING WITH BEIJING: THE POLITICS OF CHINESE INVESTMENT IN AMERICA. 10/27, 11:30am-12:30pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Johns Hopkins. Speakers: Jeremy Lee Wallace, Political Scientist, A. Doak Barnett Professor of China Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Kate Logan, Director, China Climate Hub and Climate Diplomacy, Asia Society Policy Institute; Ted Fertik, Vice President, Manufacturing and Industrial Policy, Bluegreen Alliance.
JAPAN’S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TRANSFORMED? FINANCIALIZATION AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE. 10/27, Noon-1:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Weatherhead, Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University. Speaker: Hideaki Miyajima, Professor, Faculty of Commerce; Executive Vice President, Waseda University; Moderator: Christina Davis, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics, Department of Government; Director, Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University.
JAPAN’S POLITICAL UPHEAVAL AND ITS IMPACT ON FOREIGN POLICY. 10/27, Noon-2:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Georgetown University. Speakers: Takashi Imai, Washington Bureau Chief, Yomiuri Shimbun; Ken Moriyasu, Washington Correspondent, Nikkei Asia; Sheila A. Smith, John E. Merow Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ROLLERCOASTER. 10/27, 1:30-3:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Harvard University. Speaker: Ariel E. Levite, Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy and Technology and International Affairs, Carnegie.
UNPACKING RECENT SANCTIONS ON RUSSIAN OIL. 10/27, 3:00-4:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University. Speakers: Richard Nephew, Senior Research Scholar, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University SIPA; Daniel Sternoff, Senior Fellow, Head of Corporate Partnership Strategy, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University SIPA; Tatiana Mitrova, Global Fellow, Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University SIPA.
SLOW TECH DRAGON: BALANCED ASSESSMENT OF CHINA'S ECONOMIC TRAJECTORY. 10/27, 5:00-7:00pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute; Jerome A. Chazen Institute for Global Business; China and the World Program, Columbia University. Speaker: Scott Kennedy, Senior Adviser and Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics, CSIS; Moderator: Thomas J. Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations; Director, China and the World Program, Columbia University.
BOOK TALK: BREAKNECK: CHINA'S QUEST TO ENGINEER THE FUTURE. 10/27, 4:00-5:30pm (PDT), 7:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hoover History Lab. Speaker: author, Dan Wang, research fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Jw3SbM
Tuesday, October 21, 2025
Revisionist Japan returns to Asia
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| Takaichi April 2015 |
by Daniel Sneider, lecturer in East Asian studies at Stanford University, non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America, and APP Member
First Published October 17, 2025 on the Peninsula Blog of the Korea Economic Institute.
The upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit was intended to showcase South Korea’s claim to leadership on a range of issues from free trade, digital and artificial intelligence, and democracy. Instead, the Lee Jae Myung administration finds itself beset by shifting geopolitical winds.
A potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, or perhaps a three-way session including North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, will likely overshadow anything else that occurs at APEC. Elsewhere, the unsteady Gaza armistice and a renewed attempt by Trump and Russian leader Vladimir Putin to forge a Ukraine deal continue to dominate headlines.
There is also the imminent shift in leadership in neighboring Japan. Despite efforts to maintain the momentum of improvement in South Korea-Japan relations, embraced by Lee and Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, South Korea faces the prospect of a new Japanese government less inclined to confront historical issues.
Japan’s unstable politics
Japan is experiencing a level of political instability and uncertainty not seen since the early 1990s, when the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered electoral setbacks, splintering defections, and a loss of power.
Following the resignation of Prime Minister Ishiba, the LDP somewhat surprisingly elected hardline conservative Sanae Takaichi to lead the party and form a new government as prime minister.
But Takaichi’s path to power has been anything but smooth. A deep loyalist to the late Shinzo Abe, she is mistrusted within her own party and by most of the opposition. Her victory inspired the Buddhist party Komeito to end its quarter-century coalition with the LDP, citing Takaichi’s apparent alignment with anti-reformers and unrepentant views on Japan’s wartime and colonial history, symbolized by regular visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
The LDP lacks a majority in either house of the legislature, so it had to form an alliance to garner enough seats to form a minority government. Ishiba governed this way for the last several months.
The backlash against Takaichi prompted the main opposition parties – the Constitutional Democratic Party, the Democratic Party For the People and Ishin no Kai, also known as the Japan Innovation Party – to consider forming a government. The three parties combined would have been able to name a prime minister. The Komeito might also have back such a coalition.
That was not to be. Instead, Takaichi and the LDP have lured one of those three, Nippon Ishin no Kai, the most conservative of the opposition parties, into a new coalition. Together, they are just two seats short of a majority in the lower house and five seats short in the upper house.
Takaichi also met separately with Sohei Kamiya, leader of the ultra-right-wing nationalist Sanseito party – which holds a small but significant number of seats – to discuss cooperation. A parliamentary vote is expected to occur on October 21.
A right-wing Japanese government
The prospect of Takaichi as Japan’s next prime minister alarmed observers in South Korea even ahead of the LDP intra-party vote.
“Takaichi is a disaster for Korea,” a former South Korean ambassador to Japan told this writer at that time. Former Ambassador to Japan Shin Kak-soo similarly warned against the “election of a hawkish PM who might derail the restoration process of Korea-Japan relations.”
Some have held out the hope that Takaichi would moderate her views for the sake of pragmatism, emulating the way Abe governed. There have been reports she will name Abe’s foreign minister, Toshimitsu Motegi, to the same post.
She has also been advised to stay away from Yasukuni. Abe was the last sitting prime minister to visit the shrine, twelve years ago.
“I will make a decision on how to pay my respects and pray for peace at an appropriate time and in an appropriate manner,” Takaichi told reporters after winning the LDP vote earlier this month.
But in the LDP race last year, Takaichi made it clear she would visit Yasukuni, which she has done regularly as a cabinet minister. “At an appropriate time, I want to visit properly, calmly and as I usually do,” she said.
In a defiant statement at a symposium in 2022 hosted by the shrine authorities, she declared: “Stopping visits midway or acting half-heartedly only emboldens the other side. No matter how much criticism I face, I will continue calmly and matter-of-factly.”
This is only a small window into Takaichi’s view of Japan’s wartime past and cynicism toward pacifism. In a recent book based on a series of dialogues with right-wing commentator Yoshiko Sakurai, she argued that, “If a nation succumbs to aggression and loses sovereignty, it loses its existence as a nation – language, culture, and territory will be all be taken away.” She also warned that, “Other nations will not come to the aid of a country that lacks the will and courage to defend itself.”
In this spirit, Takaichi is a vocal advocate of assertive patriotism, both in defense policy and historical memory. Japan’s problem, she argues, is not what it did in World War II but that it lost.
“If Japan had won the war, Japan probably wouldn’t be blamed by anyone now, and those who started the war would be heroes,” she said. “When victors judge the vanquished, it creates an enduring misery of defeat and hardship for future generations. Yet I believe it is wrong for Japanese people to apologize endlessly simply for being born Japanese.”
The alliance with Ishin no Kai is likely to be amenable to these views. The party is primarily focused on domestic issues – specifically, the interests of the Kansai region, centered on Osaka, where it is based. But to the extent it has dealt with these questions, the party leans revisionist.
More radical is Sanseito, which takes an extreme nationalist stance and frequently discusses Japan’s war period.
Ishiba’s farewell address
Prime Minister Ishiba has long opposed this wing of the LDP. The triumph of Takaichi and the prospects of a conservative nationalist government clearly concern him. On October 10, Ishiba delivered a lengthy statement on the eightieth anniversary of the end of the war, which contained unmistakable warnings against the shift to the right seen not only in Japan but beyond.
Ishiba wrote that Japan’s defeat had been inevitable. He asked rhetorically, “Why did the leadership of the government and the military plunge headlong into a reckless war that resulted in the loss of so many innocent lives, both at home and abroad, and why were they not able to make decisions to avoid the war?”
The answer, he continued, was a failure of civilians to control the military, erosion of democracy, violent extremism, nationalism and a failure to understand the world outside Japan’s borders.
Ishiba drew lessons from this past for the present, lessons that are clearly aimed at the current shift to the right. “Healthy discourse, including mission-driven journalism is necessary. During the war, the media stirred up public opinion, ultimately leading the nation into a reckless war. We must not fall into excessive commercialism, or tolerate narrow-minded nationalism, discrimination or xenophobia.”
Japan, he cautioned, must learn from history. “What matters most are the courage and integrity to squarely face the past, classical liberalism that values the tolerance of listening humbly to the arguments of others, and a healthy and robust democracy.”
Ishiba’s successor will face a significant challenge in not undermining the progress made in South Korea-Japan relations and in addressing the geopolitical shifts that are unfolding. That same challenge faces President Lee, during and after the APEC gathering.
In the best of circumstances, the South Korean and Japanese leaders will join hands and lean on each other, as their predecessors have done over the last few years, and confront ongoing geopolitical challenges together.
Monday, October 20, 2025
RETHINKING AMERICA’S NORTH KOREA STRATEGY: NEW BOOK
October 28: The Henry L. Stimson Center, Co-sponsored by the Institute for Science and International Security and the National Committee for North Korea, Washington, DC, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), HYBRID
October 30: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School, Harvard University, 10:00 -11:30am (EDT), HYBRID
November 5: Program on Science and International Security, School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, By Invitation
November 7: Center for Korean Research, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY, 1:00-2:30pm (EST), HYBRID
November 18: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), Stanford University, Stanford, CA, Noon-1:15pm (PST), HYBRID
November 19: Commonwealth Club/World Affairs Council, San Francisco, CA, 5:30-6:30pm (PST), HYBRID
December 8: National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, WA, TBA.
Honolulu International Forum, Honolulu, HI, By Invitation















