2024: The Making of an Epoch in Japan

An opposition emerges

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
December 16, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point
 
The year 2024 will be remembered as a time of major transition in Japanese politics. An epoch-making event was the ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) loss of its majority in the House of Representatives, which resulted in a hung parliament. It is likely that politics in Japan has entered an era in which the LDP can no longer enjoy unilateral dominance, and no policy decision can be made without the support of other parties.
 
Since December 2012, when it retook leadership of the Diet from the Democratic Party of Japan, the LDP has maintained its leadership with the help of a coalition partner, Komeito. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expanded the political base of the LDP by focusing on the growth-oriented economic policy known as Abenomics. Abe also introduced the tactic of early snap elections before opposition parties are ready for them.
 
After Abe stepped down in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic, the LDP’s decline became apparent. Abenomics proved unable to raise the real wages of workers. Revelations about the Abe faction’s unlawful management of political funds led to a miserable defeat in the general election of the Lower House in October 2024. The assassination of Abe in 2022 and political confusion afterward marked the end of LDP-dominant politics.
 
Kishida tried to leave Abe-politics behind. He relied on his liberal principles and his Kochi-kai faction. He failed, however, to control the conservative colleagues of Abe. Ishiba, an outspoken opponent of Abe, is promoting moderate politics and listening to voices from the opposition parties. This stance became possible from the decline of conservative power in the LDP caused by the slush fund scandal and the party losing its majority in the Lower House.
 
One event that symbolized the coming of a new political era in 2024 was the revision of a budget bill, for the first time since 1996, in the extraordinary session of the Diet in December. The budget bill, coupled with the threat of a non-confidence resolution, is recognized as the most important issue, and the leading parties and the oppositions may be sharply at odds over it. The leading party would not easily accept amendments to a budget bill once it has been submitted to the Diet.
 
In the case of this year’s supplemental budget bill, the opposition leader, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), criticized the bill for including unnecessary spending and lacking sufficient financial support for reconstruction in the Noto Peninsula following last January’s earthquake. The Ishiba Cabinet resubmitted the bill with a reduction in the total budget from 13.9 trillion yen to 12.5 trillion yen.
 
Nevertheless, the CDPJ did not vote for the revised budget bill in the Plenary Session in an effort to establish itself as the principal opposition party. Two other opposition parties, the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) joined with the LDP to pass the bill.
 
The LDP considers the DPP the opposition power most open to its appeals for legislative action. The DPP principal concern is tax policy, including expansion of the tax credit. The LDP and Komeito found support among members of the DPP to raise the threshold for imposing income tax from 1.03 million yen in annual income to 1.78 million yen beginning in FY 2026. Gaining the support of one or more opposition parties for each piece of legislation will become the new mission for the minority government of the LDP and Komeito.
 
Although the LDP managed to maintain its control of the government by replacing Fumio Kishida with Ishiba, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet in the polls has not risen. In the polls of major newspapers in December, the approval rating for the Ishiba Cabinet was 36 percent in Asahi Shimbun, 30 percent in Mainichi Shimbun and 39 percent in Yomiuri Shimbun. These percentages represent a significant decline from October, when the Ishiba administration took power, by ten to sixteen percentage points.
 
On political reform, the LDP has yet to meet the expectations of the Japanese public.    Seventy-three percent of those polled in Asahi and 86 percent in Yomiuri disapproved of Ishiba’s handling of changes to political fundraising and expenditure. Ishiba wants to add greater transparency to the Political Funds Control Act before the end of this year, but he seems to have no viable strategy for accumulating the necessary majority of votes.
 
As to another reform topic, the future of the policy activities fund, the LDP agreed with the CDPJ on abolishing it. Although the LDP wanted to reserve some exceptions of disclosure for spending in diplomatic activities, it finally withdrew its proposal after receiving consistent resistance from the opposition parties.
 
The leading parties and the opposition also reached a deal in which they would conclude on the abolition of political contributions by companies and organizations by March 2025. This means that they could not settle the most controversial issue in political reform by the end of the year.
 
This kind of struggle over legislation will be the order of the day in the Diet for the next year. In the ordinary session of the Diet, expected to be convoked in January, the debate among the parties over the FY 2025 budget will be contentious. It is too early to say whether the Ishiba Cabinet will survive to the election of the Upper House next summer.

Monday Asia Events December 16, 2025

WHERE’S THE WATER: MEKONG DRY SEASON 2025? 12/16, 9:00-10:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson. Speakers: Alan Basist, President, Eyes on Earth; Brian Eyler, Senior Fellow and Director, Southeast Asia Program, Stimson Center; Nguyen Y Nhu, Head of Department of Hydrology and Water Resources, Vietnam National University of Science; Courtney Weatherby, Southeast Asia Deputy Director, Stimson Center (Moderator). 

WHAT DOES THE FALL OF THE ASSAD REGIME MEAN FOR SYRIA AND THE

MIDDLE EAST? 12/16, 11:00-11:45am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Carnegie. Speakers:

Sanam Vakil, Director, Middle East and North Africa Programme, Chatham House; Charles

Lister, Senior Fellow, Director, Syria, Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs, Middle

East Institute. 

POWER PLAYS: US-TURKEY RELATIONS UNDER TRUMP. 12/16, Noon (EST),

VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Quincy. Speakers: Steven Simon, Senior Research Fellow, Quincy; Kadir

Ustin, Executive Director, SETA Foundation; Gönül Tol, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute;

Colonel Rich Outzen, Non-Resident Fellow, Atlantic Council.

MEASURING PRODUCTIVITY IN AN AGE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. 12/16, 2:00-3:00pm (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Hutchins Center, Brookings. Speakers: Marshall Reinsdorf, Economic consultant; Louise Sheiner, Robert S. Kerr Senior Fellow, Economic Studies, Policy Director, Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Brookings; Nicholas Muller, Lester and Judith Lave Professor of Economics, Engineering, and Public Policy, Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University; David Byrne, Principal Economist, Research and Statistics, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Erica Groshen, Senior Economics Advisor, Cornell University School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Research Fellow, Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, former Commissioner, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF COMMERCE DON GRAVES. 12/16, 2:00–2:45pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for New American Security (CNAS). Speakers: Don Graves, Deputy Secretary of Commerce; Emily Kilcrease, Senior Fellow and Director, Energy, Economic and Security Program, CNAS.

DOLLARS AND DOMINION: U.S. BANKERS AND THE MAKING OF SUPER POWER. 12/16, 4:00-5:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: author Mary Bridges, Ax:son Johnson Institute for Statecraft and Diplomacy postdoctoral fellow at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies; Harold James, Clause and Lore Kelly Professor in European Studies and Professor of History and International Affairs, Princeton University; Marc Levinson, Economist, Historian, and Journalist.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4eXPWRM

TO GO NUCLEAR, OR NOT: THE KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES AND US NATIONAL SECURITY. 12/16, 7:00-8:15pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Institute for Corean-American Studies (ICAS). Speaker: Vipin Narang, Frank Stanton Professor of Nuclear Security and Political Science, MIT. 

Defending Political Contributions in the Diet

Maybe not a winning strategy

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
December 9, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba spent the first week of December in the Diet defending his proposed policies. The main issue was greater visibility into political fundraising. Although the opposition parties urge the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to prohibit donations from companies and organizations, the LDP remains reluctant to do so. These donations are critical income for the LDP and other parties. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP), which has crucial votes in the House of Representatives, is siding with the leading coalition.
 
Both Houses of the Diet usually hold a question session for party leaders in the Plenary Sittings a few days after a prime minister’s policy speech. The session typically takes three days. Questions in the Lower House are asked on the first day and in the afternoon of the second day. Those in the Upper House are scheduled in the morning of the second day and the whole of the third day. The prime minister and other cabinet ministers may face questions from their own party leaders as well as from the opposition parties. The question session is in the form of one question and one answer without any follow-up.
 
The question session in the Plenary Sittings is followed by detailed discussions of the policies in the Committees for the Budget in both the Lower House and the Upper House. Each budget committee held a one-day meeting for questions by party leaders in this extraordinary session of the Diet. Other policy experts make detailed questions in the following meetings until the supplementary budget pass the committee. The opposition parties focus their attention on the budget committee discussions because they can go deeply into the weeds on the policies of leading parties. The budget committee discussions are not limited to the one-question-and-one-answer restriction.
 
Given his minority government, Ishiba had to protect his administration from broad reforms backed by the opposition parties. In the budget committee session of the House of Representatives, the head of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, proposed a prohibition of political donations from companies and organizations.
 
In response, Ishiba wisely eschewed the dismissive attitude to the opposition parties that Shinzo Abe had adopted. Instead, Ishiba employed a legal argument. Ishiba contended that Article 21 of the Constitution of Japan, which guarantees freedom of expression, did not allow the Diet to prohibit such contributions.
 
“A company expresses its opinion through donation,” Ishiba told Noda. For Ishiba, a donation from a company to a political party, including a purchase of fundraising party tickets, is an act of expression. Freedom of expression is ordinarily guaranteed to protect the people from oppression by the government. Limits on political donations by companies or organizations are, to Ishiba, governmental oppression of business.
 
The opposition also argued that there was an agreement several years ago to prohibit company and organization donations. A former LDP president, Yohei Kono, recalled that his decision in 1994 to review donations from companies and organizations five years later in 1999 was an agreement to end such contributions within five years. Ishiba said the LDP had never made that kind of promise.
 
Ishiba insisted that disclosure of company and organization contributions was preferable to their abolition. Obviously, disclosure in general is important. The debate is not, however, a comparison of disclosure and abolition. The LDP will defer legislative action on contributions to next year, rejecting a request from the opposition parties to conclude work on political reform in the current extraordinary session. 
 
The LDP shared a draft of a revised Political Funds Control Act with the opposition parties. The statute would terminate the policy activity fund, prohibit the distribution of funds from the party to its members unless the use of the funds is disclosed, and establish a third-party organization to monitor political funds.
 
The CDPJ and some opposition parties submitted their own bill to amend the Political Funds Control Act to (among other things) bar company and organization contributions. The DPP did not, however, join in. Instead, the DPP agreed to co-sponsor a reform bill with Komeito, which would not contain a similar amendment. The LDP is supposed to collaborate with Komeito and DPP on their bill, as the LDP did on tax reform.
 
Ishiba continues to promote disclosure requirements in place of a prohibition. He has proposed that the Upper House lawmakers involved in the kickback scandal testify before the political ethics council if they wish to be official candidates in the election next summer. Most of the members were willing to do so. But Ishiba’s proposal would not require full disclosures, nor would it require testimony under oath. 
 
Japanese voters are beginning to understand that Ishiba’s concept of political reform is limited. While he is willing to accept minor limits on political fundraising and expenditures, such as the policy activities fund, he is not courageous enough to support fundamental reforms such as the abolition of contributions from companies and organizations.

Monday Asia Events December 9, 2024

BOOK TALK: ULRIKE SCHAEDE, AUTHOR OF JAPAN RE-EMERGES（シン・日本の経営 悲観バイアスを排す). 12/9, 5:45-8:30pm (JST), 3:45-6:30am (EST). HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. Speakers: Ulrike Schaede, Professor of Japanese Business, University of California San Diego, School of Global Policy and Strategy (GPS). Fee. 

UNLOCKING DEVELOPMENT FINANCE FOR SOLUTIONS TO INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE. 12/9, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Global Development. Speakers Include: Christelle Cazabat, PhD, Head of Programmes, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; Mohamed Amine Hillal, Financing Adviser, Solutions, UN Office of the Special Adviser on Solutions to Internal Displacement. 

REAUTHORIZING THE NATIONAL QUANTUM INITIATIVE. 12/9, Noon-1:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Arthur Herman, Senior fellow and director of the Quantum Alliance Initiative, Hudson Institute; Ryan McKenney, General Counsel of Compliance and Director of Government Relations, Quantinuum; Rima Oueid, Senior Commercialization Executive, US Department of Energy’s Office of Technology Transitions; Allison R. Schwartz, Vice President of Global Government Relations and Public Affairs, D-Wave Quantum Inc. 

BOOK TALK: WHERE TYRANNY BEGINS: THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, THE FBI, AND THE WAR ON DEMOCRACY. 12/9, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: New America. Speaker: author David Rohde, National Security Editor, NBC News.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3OAKkly

[POSTPONED] PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC: US POLICY IN THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION. 12/9, 1:30-5:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: Yoon Jin-sik, Chairman, Korea International Trade Association; Ambassador Cho Hyundong, Ambassador, Embassy of the Republic of Korea; Michael Beeman, Former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan, Korea and APEC; Park Jongwon, Deputy Minister for Trade, Republic of Korea; Troy Stangarone, Director of the Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy, Deputy Director of the Indo-Pacific Program; Kayla Orta, Senior Associate, Hyundai Motor-Korea Foundation Center for Korean History and Public Policy; Kellee Wicker, Director, Science and Technology Innovation Program; Park Jin, Global Fellow, Former Foreign Minister, Republic of Korea; Yeo Han-koo, Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics and Former Trade Minister, Republic of Korea; Mark Kennedy, Director, Wahba Institute for Strategic Competition; Clete Willems, Partner, International Trade Policy, Akin and former Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economics and Deputy Director of the National Economic Council; Ambassador Choi Seokyoung, Former Korean Ambassador for Economic and Trade Affairs; Melissa K. Griffith, Lecturer in Technology and National Security, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; Mario Masaya, Senior Research Director, US-ASEAN Business Council; Scott Jacobs, Senior Principal for Global Government Affairs, Coupang.

CLIMATE AND THE 2024 ELECTION. 12/11, 6:00-8:00pm (EST). IN PERSON. Sponsor: Columbia Climate School. Speakers: Sheila Foster, leading scholar of environmental and climate justice; Michael Gerrard, Andrew Sabin Professor of Professional Practice, Columbia Law School. 

TRUMP’S SECOND ACT: WHAT IT MEANS FOR ASIA AND PAKISTAN. 12/12, 9:30-10:30am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Asia Society. Speakers: Daniel Russel, Vice President of International Security and Diplomacy, ASPI; Maleeha Lodhi, fmr. Ambassador to the US, Pakistan,. Permanent Representative to US, Pakistan; Kamran Yousaf, Journalist, Host, The Review, Express News. https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/events/trumps-second-act-what-it-means-asia-and-pakistan

THE LAST FOUR YEARS OF CYBER POLICY: A RETROSPECTIVE. 12/9, 1:00-2:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Robert Knake, Principal of Orkestrel; Kiersten Todt, CSIS Non-Resident Senior Associate, President of Wondros; Mark Montgomery, Senior Director, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

BOOK LAUNCH: VIETNAM’S AMERICAN WAR: A NEW HISTORY. 12/9, 4:00-5:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Wilson Center. Speakers: author, Pierre Asselin, Dwight E. Stanford Chair in the History of US Foreign Relations at San Diego State University; Olga Dror, Professor of History, Texas A&M University; Jessica Frazier, Associate Professor in the History and Gender and Women’s Studies Departments, University of Rhode Island.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3OCchcE

Prime Minister Ishiba’s Second Policy Speech

Trying to move forward while standing in place

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
December 2, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba delivered his second policy speech to the Diet at the beginning of an extraordinary session on November 29. Since his first policy speech in October, the LDP’s political fortunes took a sharp turn for the worse, Ishiba now faces a hung parliament. He is careful not to exacerbate the opposition parties’ resentment of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) by listening humbly to the opposition.
 
Ishiba quoted a short-termed predecessor, Tanzan Ishibashi, who had been a prime minister from the LDP for 65 days in 1956 and 1957. “As the basis of national politics, we need to establish a system of regular discussion on the issues to cooperate with each other, disclosing each standpoint and cooperating with each other to catch up with the progress of the world,” said Ishiba, quoting Ishibashi’s speech. Ishiba proposed, as a basic principle of democracy, positive discussion of the policies even in a hung parliament.
 
The opposition parties did not approve of Ishiba’s invocation of Ishibashi, who was a prominent journalist and one of the leaders of the democratic movement in Japan during the Taisho era. The head of Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), Yoshihiko Noda, said “there is a great difference between famous Ishibashi and Ishiba.”
 
Ishiba focused on two reforms in his speech: tax reform and political reform. On taxes, the LDP has acceded to the position of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) to mitigate the “Wall of 1.03 trillion yen.” This “wall” represents obstruction for workers to work as much as they like. 1.03 trillion yen is the threshold of annual income, above which income tax is imposed. Workers stop working to be exempt from income tax, when each of their annual income reaches 1.03 million.
 
The LDP and DPP, with Komeito, have agreed that a higher threshold of annual income should be adopted in this Diet session. In for its concession on the DPP’s policy, the LDP received an assurance from the DPP that its members will vote yes to the supplemental budget of Ishiba Cabinet.
 
Ishiba also promised to introduce a bill to reduce the gasoline tax, another proposal from the DPP. “To wrap up our economic stimulus plan, we have been making utmost efforts to introduce excellent policies beyond the border of parties,” said Ishiba in the speech, even if he did not mention when the reduction would be introduced.
 
He stressed his willingness to listen to the opposition. So far, however, Ishiba has agreed to accept policies only from the DPP; he has had no meaningful policy discussions with other opposition parties.
 
Ishiba’s limited approach has not enamored him to the other opposition parties and invited a backlash on political reform legislation. Ishiba offered three reforms: abolition of the policy activities fund, which does not require disclosure of the purpose for which each party used the fund, establishment of a third-party organization to monitor political funds, and the creation of a public database of political funds reports. “I will sincerely deal with those issues through multi-partisan discussions to restore public confidence to our politics,” Ishiba said.
 
Three opposition parties, CDPJ, the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai), and the Japan Communist Party, rejected Ishiba’s reform package because it did not include  a prohibition on contributions the business sector and organizations to political parties. Although the LDP promised to review company donations in 1993, the issue has languished for decades.
 
The problem is that the LDP now relies on these very donations. According to the political funds report for 2023, released by the Ministry for Internal Affairs and Communications on November 29, the People’s Political Association, which accepts donations for the LDP from companies, received 240 million yen of donations from private companies or business organizations in 2023. The biggest donor was the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, which includes Toyota and Honda. These car exporters will have benefited from LDP policies that are designed to depreciate the Japanese yen.
 
Another piece of bad news for Ishiba and the LDP is that the opposition parties are taking more integrated actions. They are not only consulting with each other on legislation in the Diet, they are considering cooperation in the election of the Upper House next summer.
 
For example, Ishin elected the governor of Osaka, Hirofumi Yoshimura, as the new leader of the party, replacing Nobuyuki Baba who had been reluctant to cooperate with the CDPJ. Yoshimura announced that he would seek further cooperation among the opposition parties to field integrated opposition candidates in prefectural single-seat constituencies in the next Upper House election.
 
A modest piece of good news for Ishiba is that there appears to be no obvious power in the LDP that opposes his leadership – at least so far. But frustration with Ishiba will swell if he fails to raise the public’s approval rating for his cabinet. The Upper House election is fast approaching (by July 27, 2025), and it will present another test of the LDP’s leadership.

Monday Asia Events December 2, 2024

IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRANIAN NUCLEAR BOMB. 12/2, 10:30-11:45am (EST).
VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Heritage Foundation. Speakers: Right Hon. Liz Truss, Former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom; Nile Gardiner, Director, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom and Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow; Robert Peters, Research Fellow, Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense; Andrea Stricker, Deputy Director and Research Fellow, Nonproliferation and Biodefense Program, FDD; Olli Heinonen, Senior Fellow, The Stimson Center. 

"LIQUIDSCAPE" AND THE ART OF CURATING FROM REGIONAL JAPAN. 12/2, 8:00-9:15am (JST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Asia Society Japan. Speaker: Yuka Takahashi, Curator, Arts Maebashi.   

BOOK TALK: THE TROUBLEMAKER: HOW JIMMY LAI BECAME A BILLIONAIRE, HONG KONG’S GREATEST DISSIDENT, AND CHINA’S MOST FEARED CRITIC. 12/2, 11:00am-Noon (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: AEI. Speaker: author Mark L. Clifford, President, Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation. https://www.aei.org/events/the-troublemaker-how-jimmy-lai-became-a-billionaire-hong-kongs-greatest-dissident-and-chinas-most-feared-critic/ PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4ihviyE 

 
NEW PARTY POLITICS OF EAST ASIAN DEMOCRACIES. 12/2, Noon-1:15pm (EST). HYBRID. Sponsors: Weatherhead Center Program on U.S.-Japan Relations; Korea Institute, Harvard University; Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard Kennedy School. Speakers: Joan Cho, Associate Professor of East Asian Studies, Wesleyan University; Aram Hur, Kim Koo Chair in Korean Studies and Assistant Professor of Political Science, The Fletcher School, Tufts University; Koichi Nakano, Visiting Scholar, Program on US-Japan Relations, Harvard University and Professor of Political Science, Sophia University; Daniel Ziblatt, Director, Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies and Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Harvard University. 

ANGELA MERKEL IN CONVERSATION WITH BARACK OBAMA. 12/2, Noon (EST). IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: The Anthem. Speakers: Angela Merkel, former Chancellor of Germany; Barack Obama, former U.S. President. Fee.

THE FUTURE OF US-CHINA RELATIONS AFTER THE ELECTION. 12/2, 3:30-4:30pm (PST) 6:30-7:30pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: UC San Diego School of Global Policy Strategy. Speakers: Susan Shirk, Director Emeritus, 21st Century China Center, UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy; Xinbo Wu, Dean, Institute of International Studies, Director, Center for American Studies, Fudan University; Richard Madsen, Director, Fudan-UC Center on Contemporary China, Professor Emeritus, Sociology, UC San Diego. 

Monday Asia Events November 25, 2024

SUPER ACTIVE AGEING SOCIETY CONFERENCE. 11/25, 9:00am-6:00pm (JST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Nikkei; Novartis; Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking; Relive. Speakers Include Keizo Takemi, Member of the House of Councillors, former Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare of Japan; Juan Pablo Uribe, Global Director for Health, Nutrition, and Population and the Global Financing Facility, World Bank; Hidenori Arai, President, National Center for Geriatrics and Gerontology. 

DIFFICULT DECISIONS: ALLIES’ PERSPECTIVES ON THE U.S.-CHINA RIVALRY. 11/25, 9:00-10:15am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Injoo Sohn, Professor, Seoul National University; Chaesung Chun, Professor, Seoul National University; Victor Cha, CSIS; Bonny Lin, CSIS; Steve Tsang, SOAS. 

BOMBING TO PROVOKE: ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND DRONES AS INSTRUMENTS OF FEAR AND COERCION. 11/25, 11:00-12:15pm (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jaganath Sankaran, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Sarah Kreps, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Bruce Riedel, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy. 

WINNING THE GREAT POWER COMPETITION WITH MATT POTTINGER AND MICHAEL SOBOLIK. 11/25, 11:30am-12:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Matt Pottinger, Chairman of the China Program, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution.; Michael Sobolik, Senior Fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies, American Foreign Policy Council.

A CONVERSATION WITH PEACE CORPS DIRECTOR CAROL SPAHN. 11/25, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: CSIS. Speakers: Carol Spahn, Director, Peace Corps, US; Charles Edel, Senior Adviser and Australia Chair. 

THE AFTERMATH OF TRUMP'S ELECTION FOR TRADE. 11/25, 10:00am (EST), ZOOM. Sponsor: Association of Foreign Press Correspondents, in partnership with the Hinrich Foundation. Speaker: trade expert Keith M. Rockwell, Hinrich Foundation. 

BOMBING TO PROVOKE: ROCKETS, MISSILES, AND DRONES AS INSTRUMENTS OF FEAR AND COERCION. 11/25, 11:00-12:15pm (EST). VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Brookings. Speakers: Jaganath Sankaran, Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Sarah Kreps, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology; Bruce Riedel, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy. 

WINNING THE GREAT POWER COMPETITION WITH MATT POTTINGER AND MICHAEL SOBOLIK. 11/25, 11:30am-12:30pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsors: Foreign Policy Research Institute. Speakers: Matt Pottinger, Chairman of the China Program, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution.; Michael Sobolik, Senior Fellow in Indo-Pacific Studies, American Foreign Policy Council.

FUTURE OF BIODIVERSITY FUNDING: KEY FINANCIAL MECHANISMS FOR 2025. 11/25, 2:30-4:00pm (EST). HYBRID. Sponsor: Atlantic Council. Speakers: TBA. 

Ishiba Bids for Survival through Diplomacy

Missing Manners

Foreign policy for domestic policy

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 18, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba embarked on his first foreign trip since he and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a miserable defeat in October’s Lower House general elections. In Lima, Peru at the November 16-17 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, Ishiba made his utmost effort to establish stable relationships with his counterparts. Success would have boosted his administration. However, the diplomatic complexities of international politics denied him unmitigated success.
 
The summit talk that received the most attention was his first meeting with Chinese President, Xi Jinping. After Ishiba’s meeting last month with the Chinese Premier, Li Qiang, in Vientiane, Laos, the government of Japan has been coordinating a meeting between Ishiba and Xi.
 
In the October meeting, Ishiba and Li reconfirmed the basic principles of their bilateral relationship, including the Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests and building “constructive and stable Japan-China relations.” Following that shared recognition, Ishiba and Xi reaffirmed the four basic documents that define the relationship between Japan and China: the Joint Communique in 1972, the Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, the Joint Declaration of Building Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peaceful Development in 1998, and Joint Statement in 2008.
 
In the meeting with Xi, Ishiba focused on lifting China’s trade ban against Japanese products, which was a response to Japan’s release of “processed” water from the crippled Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Ishiba requested that China resume discussions over Japan’s beef and rice exports. Ishiba also sought greater cooperation on the green economy, environment and energy conservation, medical care, nursing care and health care.
 
Regarding security, Ishiba expressed Japan’s concern about the situation in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands and the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits. Ishiba also asked that China enhance its safety measures for Japanese residents in China, particularly in light of the murder of a Japanese boy in Shenzhen. Xi assured Ishiba that China would protect the safety of foreigners, including the Japanese.
 
Overall, China was willing to engage in further talks with Japan. As it prepares for a possible trade conflict with the incoming Trump administration, China will benefit from an improved bilateral relationship with Japan. Compared to former hawkish leaders in Japan, Ishiba is an easy person for China to deal with. Ishiba’s political mentor is former prime minister Kakuei Tanaka, a distinguished figure in China’s eyes, who cultivated the bilateral relationship.
 
Ishiba’s determination to revise the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and to organize an Asian version of NATO are goals that China will respect insofar as they serve to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S. Xi urged Ishiba to work with China to establish a global framework of free trade with the idea of expanding the market for Chinese goods in Japan.
 
In contrast to China’s positive response to Japan’s approaches, U.S. President-elect, Donald Trump, has dismissed Ishiba’s request for a meeting in the U.S. after the G20 summit November 18-19 in Brazil.
 
Ishiba has said, even before the U.S. Presidential election, that he would explore an early meeting with the President-elect. It is commonly recognized in Japan that a solid personal relationship with the U.S. President may support the Prime Minister’s political standing in Japan. For a prime minister in minority government, Ishiba needs to establish a stable relationship with the U.S. to maintain his cabinet as long as possible.
 
Ishiba was forced to announce during his visit to Peru for the APEC Leaders’ meeting that he had failed to set up an appointment with Trump. According to Ishiba, many foreign leaders have asked to meet the President-elect. The Trump transition team has explained that Trump will not meet with any foreign leaders before the inauguration next January. A U.S. statute, the Logan Act, prohibits any unauthorized American citizen to negotiate disputes with other countries. Ishiba looks for another opportunity after the inauguration.
 
Ishiba did meet with U.S. President Joe Biden in Lima. Ishiba thanked him for his contributions to the Japan-U.S. alliance. The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the continuation of the network of like-minded countries, including the Republic of Korea.
 
Also in Lima, Ishiba and Biden met with the President of the ROK, Yoon Suk Yeol. At this trilateral summit, the leaders agreed to institutionalize their network. They will establish a Trilateral Coordinating Secretariat to deal with various security issues, including nuclear and missile development in North Korea. With considerable effort, the three leaders may be able to do so before Trump takes office.
 
While Ishiba was meeting with foreign leaders in Lima, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Takeshi Iwaya, visited Kyiv, Ukraine, and met with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Iwaya stressed that Japan will stand by Ukraine and shared serious concerns about the military cooperation between Russia and North Korea. Afraid that Trump may try to distance the U.S. from the network of like-minded countries, Japan is accumulating as many diplomatic accomplishments as possible.
 
The expected retreat of the U.S. under the Trump Administration from the multilateral framework promoting democracy, trade, and human rights, there is a growing argument in Japan that Tokyo should take a leadership role in preserving democratic values, the liberal international order, and free trade. At the APEC summit, Ishiba explicitly condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and emphasized the importance of preserving fairness and transparency in trade and international investment. He also announced Japan’s bid for the APEC chair in 2031.

Monday Asia Events November 18, 2024

FUTURE OF US-JAPAN RELATIONS IN THE AGE OF DIVISION. 11/18, 2:00-4:00pm (JST) MIDNIGHT-2:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Japan Forum on International Relations (N.B. Conservative Nationalist funded by Worldmate). Speakers Include: Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow, AEI; Kazutoshi Suzuki, Professor, Sophia University; Kristi Govella, Associate Professor, Oxford; Saori Tezuka, Associate Professor, Nanzan University. 

COMPLEX SECURITY ENVIRONMENT BY JOHNSTONE AND DENMARK. 11/18, 2:00-3:00pm (JST); Midnight-1:00am (EST). HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan. Speakers: Christopher B. Johnstone, Managing Principal, The Asia Group; Abraham Denmark, Senior Advisor, The Asia Group. 

WILL CHINA’S MOST DYNAMIC COMPANIES KEEP LISTENING OUTSIDE THE MAINLAND? 11/18, 9:00-10:00am (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Peterson Institute (PIIE). Speakers: Guiyang Laura Wu, Associate Professor in Economics, Nanyang Technological University Singapore; Wendy Liu, Managing Director, Global Market Strategy, J.P. Morgan Asia. 

MIDDLE EAST STRATEGY FORUM. 11/18, 9:00am-7:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Institue for Peace & Diplomacy. Speakers: Abdulaziz Sager, Founder and Chair, Gulf Research Center; Shira Efron, Senior Director, Policy Research, Israel Policy Forum; Daniel Mouton, Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative, Atlantic Council; Jon Hoffman, Research Fellow, Defense and Foreign Policy, Cato Institute; Randa Slim, Director, Conflict Resolution & Track II Dialogues, Middle East Institute; Nawaf Bin Mubarak Al-Thani, Former Senior Defense Official and Defense Attaché of the State of Qatar to the United States of America, Canada, and Mexico; H.E. Stephan Klement, European Union Special Envoy for Non-proliferation and Disarmament and Special Adviser on the Iran Nuclear Issue; Annelle Sheline, Research Fellow, Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; Heidi Matthews, Assistant Professor, Osgoode School of Law, York University; Mai El-Sadany, Executive Director, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy; Jeremy Wildeman, Fellow, Human Rights Research & Education Centre, University of Ottawa; Arif Lalani, Former Canadian Ambassador to Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan & the United Arab Emirates; Peggy Mason, Former Canadian Ambassador to the UN for Disarmament; Jon Allen, Former Canadian Ambassador to Israel; Andrew Latham, Senior Washington Fellow, Institute for Peace & Diplomacy; Miloud Chennoufi, Chair, Department of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College.

ELECTIONS AFTERMATH: EXPLORING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS. 11/18, 9:00am-4:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Keio Center for Strategy, Keio University; Keio Institute of East Asia Studies; Columbia-Harvard China and the Wolrd Program; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Study Center, Columbia University. Speakers: Duy Linh Nguyen Tu, Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor of Professional Practice, Columbia University; Lien-Hang Nguyen, Director, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University; Yuichi Hosoya, Director, Keio Center for Strategy, Keio University; Junya Nishino, Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Politics, Keio University; Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, Global Senior Advisor, McLarty Associates; Scott Snyder, President & CEO, Korea Economic Institute of America; Carol Gluck, George Sansom Professor Emerita of History, Columbia University; Gerald Curtis, Burgess Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Columbia University; Ambassador Derek Mitchell, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Ambassador Masafumi Ishii, Special Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University; Ken Jimbo, Managing Director, International House of Japan; Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University​; Lien-Hang Nguyen, Dorothy Borg Associate Professor of the History of American-East Asian Relations, Columbia University; Ann Marie Murphy, Professor, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University; Andrew J. Nathan, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science, Columbia University; Thomas Christensen, James T. Shotwell Professor of International Relations, Columbia University; Satoru Mori, Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University; Ayumi Teraoka, Postdoctoral Research Scholar and Lecturer, Columbia University; George Miller, Associate Dean, Academic Affairs and Adjunct Professor, Columbia’s Journalism School; Michito Tsuruoka, Associate Professor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University; Stephen Biddle, Professor of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University; Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Maurice R. Greenberg Senior Fellow for China Studies, Council on Foreign Relations; Merit Janow, Professor of Practice in International Economic Law and International Affairs, Columbia University. 

FOURTH ANNUAL CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL LAW & POLICY CONFERENCE. 11/18, 9:45am-5:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal. Speakers Include: Darius Sultani, Doctoral Researcher, Potsdam Institute, Climate Impact Research, Sequencing Carbon Dioxide Removal into the EU ETS; Ingrid Udd Sundvor, Co-Founder, Director, Carbon Balance Initiative; Danny Cullenward, Senior Fellow, Kleinman Center for Energy Policy; Senior Fellow, Institute for Responsible Carbon Removal, American University. 

BOOK TALK: AI SNAKEOIL. 11/18, 10:00am (EST), HYBRID. Sponsor: Elliott School, George Washington University. Speaker: author Sayashi Kapoor, Ph.D candidate, Princeton University and member of Times 100 most influential on AI.  PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/3Cp6Dry

THE RETURN OF DONALD TRUMP AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. 11/18, 10:00am-11:00am (EST),VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Institute for China-America Studies (ICAS). Speakers: Robert Sutter, Professor Practice of International Affairs, Elliot School, George Washington University; Zhuqun Zhu, Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Bucknell University; Nong Hong,, Senior Fellow, National Institue for China Sea Studies; Sourabh Gupta, Senior Fellow & Head, Trade 'n Technology Program, ICAS. 

PULSE CHECK ON TAIWAN'S DEMOCRATIC RESILIENCE. 11/18, 10:30am-2:00pm (EST), HYBRID. Sponsors: Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University (GWU). Speakers: Dr. Chiaoning Su, Associate Professor, Communication, Journalism, Public Relations, Oakland University; Dr. Dennis Lu-Chung Weng, Associate Professor, Political Science, Sam Houston State University; Dr. Austin Horng-En Wang, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Dr. Li-Yin Liu, Associate Professor, Political Science, Tunghai University in Taiwan; June Lin, Senior Program Manager, Asia-Pacific Programs, National Democratic Institute (NDI); Dr. Kharis Templeman, Research Fellow, Hoover Institution. 

AMERICA’S FUTURE IN EAST ASIA. 11/18, Noon-1:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Program on US-Japan Relations at Harvard University. Speakers: Daniel Kritenbrink, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Department of State. 

EVIDENCE BASE FOR POLICY: EXPLORING NEW DATA ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECOLOGICAL THREATS AND CONFLICT. 11/18, 2:00-3:00pm (EST). HYBRID. . Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: David Bonnardeaux, Director, Environment and Energy, Pact; Michael Collins, Executive Director, Institute for Economics & Peace; Jade Cooper, Deputy Director of Americas, Institute for Economics & Peace; Tracy Hart, Lead Environmental Specialist, Environment and Natural Resources Global Practice, World Bank; Andrew Hyde, Director and Senior Fellow, Multilateral Financial Diplomacy, Powering Peace, Stimson Center; Cassandra Schneider, Senior Climate, Environment, and Conflict Program Officer, United States Institute of Peace; Natalie Fiertz, Research Associate, Environmental Security, Stimson Center (Moderator).

BOOK TALK: ON XI JINPING. 11/18, 3:30-5:00pm (EST), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Center for Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific. Speaker: Dr. Kevin Rudd, Ambassador to US, Australia. PURCHASE BOOK: https://amzn.to/4fnHwnt

PENSION FUNDS AND ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS. 11/18, 6:00-7:00pm (EST), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Columbia Business School Center on Japanese Economy and Business. Speakers: Terezie Hesounova Trivell, Director, Private Markets, United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund; Suyi Kim, Ex-Senior Managing Director, Head, Private Equity, CPP Investments. 

The Nightmare Of Trump Returns

Can Asia Manage What Is Coming?

By Daniel Sneider, Lecturer, International Policy at Stanford University, APP Member
First published in The Oriental Economist, November 7,2024
In Japanese

Donald Trump has regained power in the United States, riding a wave of fear and anti-incumbent desire for change. For Americans, it is now the greatest test of its democratic and constitutional order since the Civil War.

But for the rest of the world, it is no less a traumatic moment. The United States is now poised to retreat from its leadership of the postwar liberal order.

What does Trump’s return mean for Asia and for American allies in Japan, South Korea, and the Pacific?

Japanese and Korean leaders may be reassured by soothing words from some American security experts, including would-be advisors to Trump. Nothing will change in the Indo-Pacific under Trump, those experts counsel.

“U.S. foreign policy in this region is likely to remain constant,” Derek Grossman, a RAND specialist on Asian security and former intelligence official, wrote just before the vote in The Diplomat. Trump may be “a more transactional and unpredictable leader,” but he left alliances in the region intact. No matter what happens, he wrote ahead of the vote, “the China factor will foster the continued development of the U.S. alliance network.”

These views ignore the abundant evidence, mostly in Trump’s own words, of his intention at the end of the first term to abandon much of those alliance commitments.

As his former Defense Secretary Mark Esper and National Security advisor John Bolton documented in their memoirs, he planned to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea, to complete the unfinished bargain with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un which would leave his nuclear forces intact, and to demand massive payments from Japan to pay for the American defense role.

It also brushes past Trump’s repeated intention to impose massive across the board tariffs on foreign goods – not only aimed at China but also at allied nations in Europe and Asia.
More importantly, the idea that foreign policy in Asia can be distinct and separate from what happens elsewhere, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, is an illusion.

As Japan’s own National Security Strategy made clear, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has fundamentally altered the security situation in East Asia. It has created a close military alliance between Russia, China, and North Korea, threatening the stability of the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and all of East Asia.

Trump made it repeatedly clear, as did his running mate J.D. Vance, that he intends to cut off military aid to Ukraine and push it to accept the surrender terms offered by Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

He also threatened to abandon the security commitment to NATO, opening the door for Putin to retake control of parts of the Soviet empire, beginning with the Baltic states and threatening Poland.

“Trump will feel like he has an electoral mandate to do these crazier things,” predicts Michael McFaul, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia and director of Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies.

“If he wins again when it comes to things like NATO or our allies in Asia, he thinks that the American people support him in saying to Putin do whatever the hell you want. I think history shows that when we are strong, the United States of America when we exhibit peace through strength, we have more peaceful outcomes. When we signal weakness, when we try to appease dictators, that's when bad things can happen.”

Trump was constrained from pursuing those goals during his first term, in large part due to the presence of responsible figures from the Republican national security elite and by his own incompetence and unfamiliarity with the levers of power. Those restraints will no longer be present.

“In his first term, he relied on traditional Republicans to fill his foreign policy team, people like (former Secretary of State Mike) Pompeo, (former) Secretary of Defense (James N.) Mattis, (former national security advisors) H.R. McMaster and John Bolton,” McFaul told the Kyiv Independent.

“They most certainly stopped Trump from doing some of the craziest things that he proposed – pulling out of NATO being at the top of that list. What's going to be different this time around is that none of those people are going to be in the Trump administration; he's disparaged all of them.”

What about China? And North Korea?
Despite these concerns, it is assumed Trump will at least continue to see China as the principle adversary of the United States, particularly in the realm of trade and economic policy. For that reason, Japanese policymakers, and to a lesser extent those in South Korea, believe the alliances in Northeast Asia will continue to have value to a Trump administration.

Even if this is true, that does not mean smooth sailing for Tokyo, or for Seoul. It may lead to increased demands on both allies to spend vastly more on defense and to join in export controls and other curbs on trade and investment with China that would cause potentially severe consequences for their economies.

“The Trump administration is going to twist a lot of arms and they better be ready for that,” says Tobias Harris, the founder of Japan Foresight, a respected advisory organization. Trump's advisors have already pushed Japan to greatly increase its defense spending beyond the 2 percent GNP target and to be responsible for its own defense.

The Trump tariff policy may pose an even greater problem, argues Harris:

“If Trump follows through, even partially, on threats to impose off-the-board tariffs on US imports, plus significant imports on US tariffs from China and Mexico, it will have a significant, immediate impact on Japan’s largest manufacturers, prompting them to consider whether to shift manufacturing to the US, back to Japan, or to other markets. Japanese companies may also have to grapple with greater pressure from Washington on technology export controls with China, though as Trump’s vocal opposition to Nippon Steel’s bid for US Steel suggests, they will also have to navigate political and national security considerations if they opt to shift investment into the US in response to the Trump administration’s policies.”

It may be premature, however, to assume that Trump will want to line up Japan and South Korea for a grand confrontation with China. Some analysts suggest that Trump instead may opt for a grand bargain with Xi Jinping, one that could even include abandoning Taiwan.

The President-elect made several comments during the campaign about Taiwan, complaining that their firms have destroyed the U.S. semiconductor industry and questioning whether the U.S. should come to its defense.

“Making China a key target or centerpiece of his second incarnation is unnecessary and possibly unlikely,” a former senior intelligence official and long-time China hand told me.

“There is likely to be little immediate payoff for him or his minions. He will bluster, threaten tariffs, and brag about his relationship with Xi, but probably not come out swinging.”

Trump’s new primary backer, billionaire Tesla owner Elon Musk, has extensive business ties in China, where over half of the company’s global car production takes place at their massive Shanghai factory.

The other target of Trump’s affection may be North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Trump continues to speak about his warm relationship with Kim and lament the missed opportunity to forge a peace deal with him.

That bargain was almost reached at their second summit meeting in Hanoi, but faltered due both to Kim’s overly grand demands and due to opposition from within Trump’s own administration, backed by the intervention from then Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.

There will be no such resistance within the new administration. And Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru does not have any such relationship with Trump, nor is he likely to be able to create one. The most serious obstacle to a deal, one which would seal in North Korea’s nuclear capability and the missile systems that can reach Japan, may come from Kim himself.

Trump may claim Kim is waiting for him with open arms, but the North Koreans have since forged a close military alliance with Russia, marked by the deployment of 12,000 troops to the Ukraine front. An opening to North Korea would likely have to follow a Trump-Putin embrace, and even then Kim is likely to use his new power to ask for a far greater payoff from Trump.

What is more likely, however, is a breakdown in U.S.-South Korean ties, demands to renegotiate defense cost-sharing payments from Korea, and to begin withdrawal of the some 28,500 U.S. forces based there.

“Trump has given no indication he values South Korea as an ally, and quite the contrary, seems set to redefine it either through withdrawal or demanding South Korea take more responsibility for its own defense vis-a-vis North Korea as U.S. forces are reoriented to directly confront China,” Benjamin Engel of Seoul’s Dankook University told NK News.

Whither Japan?
For Japan, the shocking events in the U.S. came just after the ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost its majority in last month’s election, and Prime Minister Ishiba is facing the unusual task of forming a minority government. As a veteran observer of Japan put it to me, “internal political paralysis in Tokyo is limiting the ability of Japan to navigate this new, extremely dangerous situation.”

Ishiba has promptly congratulated Trump and, as one would expect, expressed hope in the continuation of the postwar security alliance as a foundation of the U.S.-Japan relationship.

But suppose Trump goes deeply down the road of undermining that alliance or even forcing an unwanted confrontation with China. In that case, Japan may be compelled to look for alternatives, including improving ties with Beijing while flattering the newly powerful American autocrat.

“Japanese are not going to end the alliance,” says Japan expert Harris. “But they are going to have to learn how to do things on their own more.”

Japan’s Diet Elects Ishiba, Again

Japan new new government

By Takuya Nishimura, Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun
You can find his blog, J Update here.
November 11, 2024. Special to Asia Policy Point

The 215^th Diet was convoked on November 11. It elected Shigeru Ishiba, President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), as 103rd Prime Minister of Japan without a simple majority in the House of Representatives. Ishiba immediately appointed his new cabinet. But with the loss of seats and the simple majority, Ishiba and the LDP face difficulty in completing any legislative plans through a hung parliament.
 
The 215^th Diet is a “special session” stipulated in the Constitution of Japan. Article 54 of the Constitution requires that the Diet be convoked within 30 days after a general election of the House of Representatives. The cabinet resigns en masse on this convocation per Article 70.
 
Accordingly, all the ministers in the Ishiba Cabinet resigned on the morning of October 11. Each House of the Diet then held an election for prime minister in the afternoon. The House of Councillors elected Ishiba with a simple majority.
 
In the House of Representatives, no candidate obtained a simple majority in the first round. For the first time in 30 years, the House held a run-off between the top two vote-getters, Ishiba and Yoshihiko Noda, the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ). Ishiba won with 221 votes versus 160 for Noda. Eighty-four votes were invalid: these were cast by members of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) for their leaders, who were not eligible for the run-off.
 
Following his afternoon election, Ishiba formed his new cabinet early in the evening.  There were three vacancies to fill. The Minister of Justice and the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries had both lost their seats in the general election for the House of Representatives. The Minister of Land, Infrastructure, Trade and Tourism, Tetsuo Saito, resigned to assume the position of chief representative of Komeito. The other ministers remained in the same positions as in the previous Ishiba cabinet.
 
Again, the Ishiba Cabinet faces real difficulty in attaining any policy goals. The leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito lost almost seventy seats from 290 to 221, less than a half of the 465 seats in the House of Representatives. The opposition parties occupy over half the seats.
 
However, notwithstanding their aggregate numerical dominance, the opposition parties failed to unite behind one candidate for nomination as the new prime minister. If all the opposition lawmakers and some independents had voted for Noda, Noda may have outgained Ishiba and become prime minister. However, the DPP and Ishin refused to vote for him even before the election, because of basic policy differences with the CDPJ. They knew that their action would benefit Ishiba and the LDP.
 
The DPP also has had to deal with its own troubles. On the morning of the election for prime minister, a weekly magazine reported a scandal: the DPP’s leader, Yuichiro Tamaki, had engaged in an extramarital affair with a former bikini model. Tamaki admitted that most of the report was true. Tamaki now teeters on the edge of losing his leadership post.
 
Although Tamaki refused to join the leading coalition, the LDP continues to target the DPP as a partner from time to time on the LDP’s legislative initiatives. Indeed, the LDP has begun talks with the DPP at the policy leader level. The DPP has insisted on raising the annual earnings threshold for the imposition of income tax from 1.03 million yen and on activating “trigger clause” to automatically reduce gasoline tax.
 
Another concern for the LDP is that the structure of the standing committees will work against it. The leading coalition of the LDP and Komeito had occupied 15 chairs out of all 17 standing committees before the general election. But the coalition now has only ten.
 
The CDPJ gained the chair of the Committee on Budget where any kind of issue is up for grabs, including scandals on the management of political funds. The chair has the power to set the agenda, to order the prime minister to answer questions from the opposition committee members, and to terminate debate and take votes.
 
Former CDPJ leaders occupy other important posts. Kenta Izumi can control the Committee on Fundamental National Polices in his capacity as chair. This committee is the forum for opposition party leaders to hurl questions at the prime minister in “Question Time.” Yukio Edano is now the chair of the Commission on the Constitution.  Any progress on the constitutional amendment will be slow, given the CDPJ’s reluctance on the matter.
 
The current special Diet session will end on November 14. After the session, Ishiba plans to go abroad to attend the APEC Summit meeting in Peru and the G20 meeting in Brazil. Then, he hopes to have an opportunity to meet with U.S. President-elect, Donald Trump, in Washington, DC or Florida. Ishiba’s telephone call with Trump after his victory led Ishiba to believe that Trump was a man with whom he could have frank conversations.
 
However, Trump is likely to demand that Japan make further expenditures for its own defense. Japan pledged 43 trillion yen for its defense budget for between FY 2023 and FY 2027 to raise defense expenditures to 2% of Japan’s GDP. If Ishiba tries to increase the budget to meet such a demand, the LDP-Komeito coalition lacks the simple majority in the House of Representatives to approve an increase on its own.
 
Ishiba plans to call an extraordinary session of the Diet after returning, in which he hopes to pass the supplementary budget bill to implement the economic stimulus package. In the ordinary session that begins next January, the Ishiba administration will have to pass an annual budget by the end of March to avoid a government shutdown.
 
Previous cabinets without a simple majority in one of the two Houses had a hard slog to obtain necessary consents from the opposition parties. Ishiba’s Cabinet will be tested in a similar way. If Ishiba fails to gain cooperation from the opposition parties to pass the bills in the Diet, it is likely that the LDP will want to replace Ishiba with someone who they believe can lead the party to win the next general election. Domestic politics and international uncertainty will make Ishiba’s tenure challenging, and maybe short.

Seats of Groups in the House of Representatives
	Last session			Current
LDP	258	290		197		221
Komeito	32			24
CDPJ	99	163		149		232
Ishin	44			38
DPP	7			28
JCP	10			8
Reiwa	3			9
Others	12			12
Total	465
Election of Nominating P.M. in the House of Representatives
First Round					Run-off
Ishiba (LDP)			221		Ishiba		221
Noda (CDPJ)			151		Noda		160
Baba (Ishin)			38		Invalid		84
Tamaki (DPP)			28
Yamamoto (Reiwa)			9
Tamura (JCP)			8
Others			10
Total			465		Total		465