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Monday, August 11, 2025
Japan's Continued War
But what is the alternative
Ishiba Fighting to Stay in Power
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
August 4, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Despite pressure from several lawmakers in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba is resisting demands that he resign. He is trying to take the initiative in the LDP’s internal discussions on responsibility for the party’s defeat in Upper House election in July. He is also discussing legislation with opposition parties in the Diet. The struggle over LDP leadership is likely to continue into the fall.
The LDP convened an unofficial Joint Plenary Meeting (JPM) on July 28. A JPM is a forum for internal party discussions but has no authority to decide on behalf of the party. At the unofficial JPM, the LDP Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama said that, after the party had reviewed its campaign strategy, he would make clear his responsibility for the setback. His statement was widely reported as an intent to step down as secretary general. His resignation would do almost fatal damage to the Ishiba administration.
Moriyama meanwhile out-maneuvered anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP. He agreed to convene an official JPM on August 8, which Ishiba’s opponents in the LDP had requested. These lawmakers had been collecting signatures in support of a JPM, but Moriyama’s decision supersedes this effort. The JPM will be held not at the request of anti-Ishiba members, but at the initiative of Moriyama.
This means that Moriyama can set the agenda for the JPM on August 8. The JPM is the second decision-making body, after the Party Convention. Article 33 of the LDP Constitution states that a JPM deliberates and decides particularly important issues of party management and Diet affairs. Moriyama has set the agenda of the JPM as “review of Upper House election and revitalization of the party,” excising “replacement of LDP leadership” as an agenda item.
The Party Constitution contains no rule for replacing the president at a JPM; instead, it simply says that, in an emergency, the JPM (rather than the Party Convention) can elect a president, when the current president vacates his or her seat. Ishiba has shown no intention to do so. It is unlikely for August 8 JPM to be a meeting for replacing the president.
There is another way to replace Ishiba. Article 6 of LDP Constitution provides that a presidential election will be held at the request of more than half of total party Diet members and a representative from each local branch of the party.
Anti-Ishiba groups have considered invoking Article 6 and garnering support from lawmakers and local branches. However, the provision has not been invoked since it was added to the constitution in 2002, when former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori stepped down during a prolonged struggle in the party. A presidential election based on Article 6 could damage the party significantly.
If Ishiba shows no inclination to step down, it will be hard for LDP members to replace him. “The only way is to explain without escaping,” Ishiba said to reporters after the unofficial JPM on July 28. Ishiba earlier had told opposition leaders in a meeting on July 25 that he would not resign as prime minister.
Ishiba is now devoting himself to policies, expecting that implementation of his agenda will be sufficient cause for others to support him remaining in office. Debates in the Diet on August 4 reflected a consensus that Japan must have a written agreement with the United States to reduce tariffs on Japanese cars. Ishiba made it clear that he was willing to formalize such an agreement in Japan’s national interest.
A summit meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump to confirm the tariff agreement is Ishiba’s fondest wish. The opposition would favor a meeting too, knowing how difficult it would be to arrange. The Anti-Ishiba group in the LDP has a different reason: it would be Ishiba’s last act as prime minister.
Ishiba may also be able to survive by working with opposition parties to find common ground on legislation. The leading coalition, the LDP and Komeito, has agreed with the four major opposition parties -- the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), the Democratic Party for the People (DPP), the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai), and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) – on legislation to abolish the temporary gasoline surtax by the end of the year.
In 1974, the government placed a “temporary” gasoline surtax on top of the ordinary gasoline tax to finance the construction and repair of public roads. More than 50 years on, this temporary measure remains on the books. The opposition parties introduced a bill in the ordinary session of the Diet in June that would have abolished the surtax, but the LDP-Komeito coalition, with a majority in the Upper House, defeated it.
The coalition has now lost that power. LDP and Komeito have joined with the four opposition parties to establish a task group to develop a proposal to eliminate the surtax. With concessions like this from the LDP-Komeito coalition, the opposition parties spared Ishiba from a no-confidence resolution in the extraordinary session in August.
To avoid provoking conservatives in the LDP, Ishiba reportedly walked away from his planned release of a statement on August 15 marking the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II. He has hinted that he may postpone a statement to September or later.
August is ordinarily the time for politicians to return home and pray on August 15 for Japan’s war victims. No rest for the weary this year, however. Both Ishiba and his opponents will use the time to rebuild their strategies to eliminate the other. The struggle will intensify in late August when the LDP wraps up its review of the Upper House election.
Sunday, August 3, 2025
The Russian-North Korean Alliance
The three-day visit earlier this month of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to the North Korean coastal city of Wonsan marked a noticeable intensification of a strategic relationship between the two neighbors. The sheer trappings of the visit—from lavish treatment at newly opened resort to a tête-à-tête aboard North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s yacht—sent that message. And it was accompanied by other symbols of tightening ties, from renewed rail and air flight links to ballyhooed visits of Russian tourists to the resort and the dispatch of North Korean artificial intelligence (AI) researchers to Russia.
As a result of signing a treaty in June 2024, Lavrov told Russian reporters, “we became allies.” But now there is a “deepening of ties…rooted not only in our geographic proximity but also in our alignment on key issues,” not least on the Ukraine war and on countering American presence in the Indo-Pacific. Lavrov spoke about a “brotherhood of arms,” about Russian readiness to defend North Korea and “jointly resist the hegemonic aspirations of extra-regional players.”
While the war with Ukraine served as the catalyst for this “brotherhood,” as the North Koreans stepped up to provide Russia with crucial supplies of men and material at a moment last year when their campaign was faltering, it is by no means the only driver of their growing bilateral cooperation. Their shared mission to resist Western dominance and the mutual economic and political benefits that are forming between these two countries may serve as a cornerstone for a new world order.
Growing Russia-North Korea Cooperation
The massive transfer of North Korean weapons and the deployment of more than 11,000 troops to the Ukraine frontlines is the most visible sign of their alignment. North Korea provided a crucial influx of millions of artillery rounds as well as more than 100 ballistic missiles which have been raining down on Ukrainian cities. It is a two-way street, with sharing of Russian military technology, particularly drones, in return.
Russian oil and food flows freely, effectively nullifying the United Nations (UN) sanctions regime. This is documented in a recent detailed report on “Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia,” issued in late May by the 11-nation Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team.
Less strategic, but increasingly important, is the flow of North Korean workers to Russia, also in violation of UN sanctions. According to an investigative report by the émigré Russian journal “The Insider,” some “thousands of North Koreans are entering Russia, posing as students on ‘practical training,’ but instead coming to labor under slave-like conditions.” In the Russian Far East, “North Koreans are very much back,” at levels not seen since before COVID-19, according to a Russian scholar based in Vladivostok, in an email exchange.[1]
Deeper Than Arms
The illicit transfers are significant but there are other shifts in Russian policy that may be even more consequential.
Russia, once a stalwart protector the nuclear non-proliferation regime, has now nakedly endorsed the legitimacy of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, something even China has balked at doing.
Asked by Russian reporters to comment on what conclusions Pyongyang may have drawn from the US attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, the veteran Russian diplomat gave the nuclear status of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) a blanket approval:
The DPRK leadership drew its conclusions regarding national defence long before the recent US-Israeli strikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is precisely because those conclusions were made in a timely manner that no serious actor contemplates a military strike against the DPRK today. Nevertheless, we are witnessing ongoing military buildup around the Korean Peninsula, driven by the United States in coordination with South Korea and Japan. We caution against the misuse of alliances and partnerships as tools of confrontation, including any efforts to direct them against the DPRK or the Russian Federation.
The technologies applied by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are a result of efforts by North Korean scientists. We respect the DPRK’s actions and understand the reasons why they carry out their nuclear programme.
While the Russians have avoided direct aid to the North Korean nuclear program, they have cleared the way to assistance and technology transfer to assist nominally civilian satellite development and launch efforts. “The provision of technologies and know-how related to the satellite program is not completely prohibited in the eyes of Russia, since the exploration of outer space, from the point of view of Russia, is the legal right of the DPRK,” wrote leading Russia Korea expert Georgy Toloraya following the Lavrov visit.
Perhaps equally important, the Russians have embraced Kim Jong Un’s policy shift toward abandonment of unification as a goal and opposition to any sustained engagement with South Korea.
“Russia has de facto recognized the legitimacy of Kim Jong-un’s concept of the existence of two separate, unfriendly states on the Korean Peninsula and the rejection of the idea of the unification of Korea, under the slogan of which South Korea has been planning to absorb the North for decades,” wrote Toloraya. The relationship with Pyongyang “lays the foundation for building a new Eurasian security system.”
For Russian strategists, North Korea has now acquired a status that is similar to Belarus, its military and political ally in the West. “This is precisely how the Kremlin sees North Korea these days: as an easternmost strategic bulwark of the Russia-led anti-Western security bloc,” says Igor Torbakov, a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Uppsala University in Sweden.
Moscow’s backing only serves to reinforce the hardline coming out of Pyongyang toward the US, particularly their fierce rebuff of new overtures from the progressive Lee Jae Myung administration that has come to power in Seoul.
“No matter how desperately the Lee Jae Myung government may … pretend they do all sorts of righteous things to attract our attention and receive international attention, there can be no change in our state’s understanding of the enemy and they can not turn back the hands of the clock of the history which has radically changed the character of the DPRK-ROK relations,” Kim Yo Jong, the sister of Kim Jong Un, said this week.
Russia Over China
On the surface, the Russian alliance with North Korea exists in parallel, and even reinforces, the long-standing alliance with China. It may even be seen as a tripartite axis in which all three countries share a goal of reducing the American presence and in countering the security cooperation structure of South Korea, Japan and the US.
But analysts have pointed to signs that Beijing is less than happy with the burgeoning Moscow-Pyongyang ties, avoiding direct comment on them and signaling indirectly their less than enthusiastic response.
“Beijing does not want North Korea to start a war or trigger increased US military deployments to the region, even though it may see North Korea as a useful way to distract the US-South Korea-Japan alliance from its focus on the PRC,” a recent report from the Institute for the Study of War concluded. “Moscow has less interest than Beijing in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula and may embolden North Korea to increase its bellicosity.”
Russian analysts counter that their alliance is a force for stability, not a spur to North Korean adventurism.[2] Russian assistance to North Korea’s conventional warfare capability strengthens the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and in the Northeast Asian region, they argue.
But Russian experts also provide support to the idea that there is a rivalry with Beijing at work.
Compared to the security ties with Russia, the long-standing alliance with China, formalized in a 1961 treaty, offers little in terms of security and is a faux alliance, argued Russian scholar Artyom Lukin from the Far Eastern Federal University in Vladivostok.
“China will likely remain Pyongyang’s main economic partner and benefactor, but there is little reason for Beijing to empower Pyongyang with large-scale military assistance,” Lukin wrote in a paper presented on July 17th to a conference at Seoul National University. “For one, Beijing does not want to antagonize Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo by transferring weapons and military-related technology to Pyongyang.”[3]
Lukin suggests that Chinese interest in North Korea as an ally is waning and that they may even abandon it in favor of South Korea.
It’s not inconceivable that Beijing might eventually conclude a Korea unified under Seoul—provided it remains friendly or at least neutral toward China—is preferable to a divided peninsula with its constant risk of major conflict. Pyongyang cannot but suspect that, sooner or later, Beijing will throw the Kims under the bus. Regardless of what is going to happen in the future, the 1961 alliance of China and North Korea has long been hollow.
The Russian scholar, a widely cited expert on geopolitics and the region, as well as US foreign policy, also points to another advantage held by Moscow—the close personal relationship between Kim Jong Un and Russian leader Vladimir Putin. “Kim feels at ease with Putin, even though he shows due respect to the Russian czar,” he told the South Korean conference. “He will never be comfortable with the Chinese emperor.”
North Korean confidence in their Russian ally may have taken a hit from Moscow’s failure to come to the defense of Iran. But North Koreans may also feel this pact is much more substantial and, in any case, their nuclear capability gives them protection that Iran lacked.
Implications of the Russia-North Korea Alliance
What are the implications of the alliance for the future of the Korean peninsula? Does it make North Korea more adventurous, or more confident in its power? Does it create better conditions for Pyongyang to engage in diplomacy with the United States and Seoul? Or the opposite?
Some analysts have argued that the alliance with Russia is essentially transactional, fueled by Moscow’s need for Korean weapons and soldiers to prosecute the war in Ukraine.
“Most immediately, North Korea’s current level of trade with Russia is unlikely to last after hostilities in Ukraine end,” Andrei Lankov, a respected Russian analyst long based in South Korea, wrote in a recent essay in Foreign Affairs. “Indeed, Moscow’s financial flows to Pyongyang could wind down almost overnight. Aside from munitions, there isn’t much of a trade opportunity between the two countries; the two economies are fundamentally incompatible.”
In this view, North Korea, worried about its dependence on China, could then seek ties with the US, even South Korea, responding to overtures from both the Trump administration and the new administration in Seoul.
The deepening of ties and the Russian embrace of Kim Jong Un’s concept of a permanent division of the Peninsula, along with a dramatic reversal of their support for denuclearization, suggest otherwise. For the foreseeable future, Russia has become a backer of a status quo marked by hard lines of division globally, and in Korea. And in its most visionary terms, Russians see this as a cornerstone of their bid to create a viable alternative to the US-led international system.
As Toloraya concluded, “the Russian-North Korean alliance could become a factor in the creation of a new system of security and cooperation in Northeast Asia.”
[2] Artyom Lukin, “The New geopolitics of the Korean Peninsula and Beyond: a view from Russia,” (paper presented at Far Eastern Federal University to the CR Life Foundation Special conference “The Global Context Surrounding the Korean Peninsula and Korea’s Choice for Peace,” Seoul, Republic of Korea, July 17, 2025).
[3] Ibid.
Prime Minister Ishiba Holds On
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 28, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Despite reaching a deal on tariffs with the United States, Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba faces difficulty in maintaining his government. Anti-Ishiba lawmakers in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) are expanding their efforts to remove Ishiba from the leadership. Some newspapers reported that Ishiba has already decided to step down. However, since then, Ishiba has repeated that he would continue to fulfill his responsibilities as prime minister. It is not unusual that the LDP replaces its top leader to represent itself as a “new-born LDP” right after serious defeat in an election.
Ishiba announced to the press that he would stay on as prime minister after the polls closed on July 20 for the upper house elections. On July 23 in Japan, two newspapers, the Mainichi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun, however, reported on the front page of their evening editions with huge headlines that Ishiba would step down soon.
Yomiuri reported that Ishiba had told one of his aides of his coming resignation on the night of July 22, just before the announcement of an agreement on tariffs between Japan and the United States. “Tariff negotiations are about the national interest. I bet on Akazawa (the top negotiator for Japan). I will explain my responsibility for the defeat in Upper House election soon after the tariff negotiations are settled, but I cannot say I’m resigning so far” Ishiba said, according to Yomiuri. The conversation with the aide seems to be the source of the news of Ishiba’s resignation.
The news of a Japan-U.S. tariff deal came in the morning of July 23 Tokyo time. In return for Japan’s pledges to invest $550 billion in the U.S. and to purchase $8 billion of U.S. products, including a 75 percent increase in purchases of U.S. rice, the U.S. reduced the “reciprocal tariff” on Japanese goods from 25 to 15 percent. The Tokyo Stock Market rallied on July 23, welcoming the deal.
On the same day, July 23, Ishiba met with three former prime ministers and LDP heavyweights: Taro Aso, Yoshihide Suga, and Fumio Kishida. Observers believe that Ishiba tried to explain his intention to stay on as the prime minister, but those ex-premiers did not support him.
According to news reports, Aso concluded that, under Ishiba’s leadership, the LDP cannot win an election, considering the defeats in the Lower House election last October and the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in June 2025. Kishida urged Ishiba to make clear whether he was staying or going. Suga insisted that Ishiba make sure that he does not divide the party. After the meeting, Ishiba said that there was no discussion of his possible resignation.
Internal opposition to Ishiba’s prime ministership has spread in the LDP. Some lawmakers formerly affiliated with the Motegi faction, one of the anti-Ishiba powers in the party, started collecting signatures of LDP lawmakers to request a Joint Plenary Meeting of Party Members of Both Houses of the Diet (JPM), an official meeting which can elect new president.
The LDP held an unofficial meeting of Diet members on July 28, rather than call a JPM. Ishiba asked for support to continue his presidency to implement the tariff deal with the U.S. While his appeal seemed to fall on deaf ears, many participants wanted the party to identify who was responsible for the disastrous results of the Upper House election. LDP Secretary General, Hiroshi Moriyama, stated that he would do so after the LDP’s review of the election finishes in August. There still is the possibility to hold a JPM, as there have been many requests to do so.
Anti-Ishiba groups in the LDP have redoubled their efforts to remove Ishiba. Four leaders of the former (now-disbanded) Abe faction -- Koichi Hagiuda, Yasutoshi Nishimura, Hirokazu Matsuno, and Hiroshige Seko – met at a faction reunion on July 23. One of the finalists in the election for president of the LDP last September, Sanae Takaichi, met with Aso and Nishimura to ask for their support.
Some local branches of the party, including the Tochigi Branch led by Toshimitsu Motegi and the Nara Branch, which is the home of Takaichi, submitted requests for the renewal of LDP leadership. After receiving complaints from some local organizations, the LDP Youth Division made the same request.
Reshuffling LDP leadership would not, however, address the policy issues behind the party’s recent losses. For example, the kickback scandal was one of the main reasons for those losses. “Who ruined the LDP?” Ishiba asked his colleagues, insisting on his authority to lead the country. Ishiba seems to think that he has at least three responsibilities in the coming weeks: 1) to conclude all the details in the tariff negotiations with the U.S. and related measures for Japanese business sectors; 2) to deliver his own message on August 15 at the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II; and 3) to lead the Tokyo International Conference on African Development ((TICAD 9) in late August.
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There is a speculation that Ishiba will step down after completing this agenda. The usual process of replacing an unpopular LDP prime minister is a growing demand for his resignation, a request for a presidential election, and the emergence of new leaders to replace the prime minister. If Ishiba steps down this fall, he will be added to the list of ordinary leaders who held a short term.
Once a new LDP president is elected, leaving the prime minister to declare his cabinet’s resignation en masse and both Houses elect new prime minister. If the Houses elect different people, the winner in the Lower House becomes the prime minister. Now, it is uncertain that a LDP candidate will win, given that there is no majority of the leading coalition in both Houses.
However, the opposition to Ishiba has some unusual elements. One is that the driving forces for his replacement are the very ones responsible for losing the election. Most lawmakers in the LDP, and not just the members of the former Abe faction, were reluctant to refuse donations from companies to guarantee the transparency of political fundraising. Another element is the absence of alternative contenders to replace Ishiba. The next leader must have the ability to manage negotiations with opposition parties in the Diet. Ishiba has proven his ability to do so; it is not apparent who else in the LDP could take this on.
On July 25, a large demonstration was held near the prime minister’s official residence to support the continuation of the Ishiba government. Participants shouted “Hang in there, Ishiba!” and “Don't resign!” Although there have been frequent protests against incumbent prime ministers, especially during Shinzo Abe’s administration, it is highly unusual that a crowd would gather to chant in favor of a prime minister retaining his position. Encouraged by these supporters, Ishiba must consider how to define his continuing “responsibility” as prime minister.
Monday Asia Policy Events, August 4, 2025
SCHRIEVER SPACEPOWER SERIES: LT GEN DEANNA BURT. 8/4, 10:00-11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Mitchell Institute. Speakers: Jennifer Reeves, Senior Resident Fellow for Spacepower Studies, Spacepower Advantage Center of Excellence, Mitchell Institute; Lt. Gen DeAnna M. Burt, Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations, Cyber, and Nuclear, United States Space Force.
THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE. 8/4, 11:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Foreign Policy LIVE. Speakers: Jared Cohen, President of Global Affairs, Goldman Sachs; Ravi Agrawal, Editor in Chief, Foreign Policy.
ASSESSING NORTH KOREA’S “20×10” REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS. 8/4, 8:00-9:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Stimson Center. Speakers: Rachel Minyoung Lee, Senior Fellow, Korea Program and 38 North, Stimson Center; Martyn Williams, Senior Fellow, Korea Program and 38 North, Stimson Center; Iliana Ragnone, Research Associate, Korea Program and 38 North, Stimson Center; Moderator: Jenny Town, Senior Fellow and Director, Korea Program and 38 North, Stimson Center.
Sunday, July 27, 2025
The No Change Change
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 21, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
Japan’s July 20 Upper House elections resulted in a significant defeat for the coalition government led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The coalition of the LDP and Komeito lost its majority in the Upper House, as it did last October in the Lower House. Although Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba announced that he would stay in his position, his government will be in an extremely unstable condition that could break down in short order.
In the Upper House election, 125 members (including a supplement for one vacancy in Tokyo district) out of all 248 seats were elected. The rest of 123 members do not have an election this year. Among those 125, the LDP saw its seats reduced from 52 before the election to 39 after, while Komeito also lost six seats, from 14 to eight. The coalition secured only 47 seats in the election. The LDP and Komeito hold 75 seats without election this year. Thus, the total sum of their seats in the Upper House is 122, which is short of a simple majority by three seats.
The biggest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan (CDPJ), had no change from its pre-election status. The CDPJ had 22 seats up for election and won 22 seats in the election. The Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin-no Kai) added just two seats, from five to seven. The Democratic Party for the People (DPP) made a significant surge from four seats to 17, while the new populist party, Sanseito, expanded from one seat to 14.
It has been said that the LDP has its supporters, 60 percent of whom always vote for the party in every election. The other 40 percent are indecisive and go back and forth between the LDP and other parties. It is likely that those swing voters, disappointed with the lack of LDP leadership in the Diet, went for the DPP or Sanseito this time; there is speculation that most of these voters were conservatives.
The advance of Sanseito resembles the far-right movements in some European countries. Creating the slogan “The Japanese First,” the party received public support for its xenophobic agenda, such as blocking foreign workers and foreign investments. However, Sanseito is not yet a leading force in the national politics in Japan. Fiery and controversial anti-immigrant speeches of its leader and candidates have isolated the party from the others.
The LDP’s campaign strategy fared poorly. The party promised cash payments for children and low-income families to offset consumer price inflation. However, many voters viewed the handouts as temporary and less effective than lowering the consumption tax rate, a cut promoted by the opposition parties. Additionally, the LDP lost credibility with voters by failing to enact legislation dealing with political donations from companies, to introduce separate surname legislation, and to conclude tariff negotiations with the United States.
The opposition parties also reached a wider range of voters than the LDP did. The DPP’s slogan, “The summer of increasing take-home pay,” had broad appeal, as if the party could give all voters more cash in their pockets by the end of the summer. By contrast, the LDP presented long-term and conceptual policies, such as “1 million yen of additional salary in 2030” or a future target of “1,000 trillion yen of Japan’s GDP.”
The LDP also lagged in social media. At the beginning of the campaign season, immigration was not a major issue. But through advertisements and posts on social networking services, Sanseito turned anti-immigration measures into the top priority for many voters during the final week of the election campaign. The LDP could not reverse the trend, continuing to rely on traditional town meetings and chants of candidates’ names from campaign cars.
Prime Minister Ishiba, as the president of the LDP, declared that he would stay on as premier. “I will take responsibility as the leader of largest party (in the Diet),” Ishiba said in his press conference on July 21. There is no precedent since the establishment of the LDP in 1955 for a leading party or coalition to run the government without a majority in both Houses.
Although the Lower House has decisive power to choose the government, even an Upper House election can have a significant impact, as seen in the collapse of the Ryutaro Hashimoto Cabinet in 1998 and the first Shinzo Abe Cabinet in 2007.
Ishiba has chosen to stay because he believes that he can buck tradition and govern without the traditional majorities. Despite losing a majority of the seats in the Lower House last fall, he saw through the Lower House’s approval of the FY2025 annual budget by the end of March this year. He also headed off submission of a no-confidence resolution against Ishiba Cabinet by the opposition parties. It shows that Ishiba has remarkable political dexterity.
It is unlikely that the opposition parties, from the leftist Japan Communist Party to the far-right Sanseito, can form their own coalition and defeat the Ishiba administration. Another reason for Ishiba’s confidence in his staying power is the absence of any rival in his party so far.
Two days before the Upper House election, Sanae Takaichi, the finalist in the most recent LDP presidential election in 2024, expressed her willingness to run in the next presidential election. However, LDP Secretary General Hiroshi Moriyama has discouraged such moves, saying that it is not the time for a leadership struggle within the LDP. Other contenders in the last presidential election have not challenged Ishiba, nor are they able to do so.
It is likely that Ishiba will enter discussions with opposition parties on a policy-by-policy basis as he has done since losing the Lower House majority. He expects good opportunities to add opposition parties to his coalition and bolster his administration. However, the Ishiba administration will always be vulnerable to the collective efforts of opposition powers as well as to an upsurge of anti-Ishiba sentiment within the LDP.
Monday Asia Policy Events, July 28, 2025
“DISMANTLING MOTHERHOOD” (2024) & “SINGING TOGETHER IN A MUSEUM” (2025): A DOUBLE FEATURE FILM SCREENING AND DISCUSSION WITH THE PROJECT ORGANIZERS. 7/28, 3:00-4:30pm (JST), 2:00-3:30am (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Gender, Sexuality & Identity Research Group, Tokyo College. Speakers: Natsumi Sakamoto, Film Director; Ritsuko Saito, PhD Student, Research Associate, Waseda University.
COLLATERAL DAMAGE? CENTRAL ASIA AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN THE ISRAEL-IRAN CONFLICT. 7/28, 10:00-11:15am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for the National Interest. Speakers: James Durso, Managing Director, Corsair LLC; Roger Kangas, Academic Dean and Professor of Central Asian Studies, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Alouddin Komilov, Head, International Political Development Project, Center for Progressive Reforms; Adjunct Assistant Professor, Webster University (Tashkent, Uzbekistan); Damjan Krnjević Mišković, Professor of Practice and Director of Policy Research, Analysis, and Publications, Institute for Development and Diplomacy, ADA University (Baku, Azerbaijan); Moderator: Andrew Kuchins, Senior Fellow, Center for the National Interest.
DAVID PETRAEUS ON WHAT TAIWAN CAN LEARN FROM UKRAINE’S BATTLEFIELD EXPERIENCE. 7/28, 4:30-5:30pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair, Hudson Institute; General David H. Petraeus (US Army, Ret.), Chairman, KKR Global Institute; Moderator: Jason Hsu, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute.
IDEAS UNCORKED: REIMAGINING STRATEGIC DEPTH. 7/28, 5:00-6:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY, free booze. Sponsor: Hoover Institution. Speaker: Nadia Schadlow, National Security Visiting Fellow, Hoover Institution.
INTRODUCTION TO THE BEAUTY OF JAPANESE SWORDS: ANCIENT TRADITION, LIVING CULTURE, MODERN ART. 7/29, 10:00am (JST), 7/28, 9:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies. Speaker: Paul Martin, Trustee and Researcher, Society for the Promotion of Japanese Sword Culture (NBSK).
Sunday, July 20, 2025
Monday Asia Policy Events, July 21, 2025
INTERNATIONAL TAX COOPERATION AND COMPETITION: A RESET. 7/21, 8:30am-2:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: AEI. Speakers: Peter A. Barnes, Of Counsel, Caplin & Drysdale; Daniel Bunn, President, Tax Foundation; Nathaniel Carden, Partner, International Tax; Tax Controversy and Litigation, Skadden; Ron Estes, US House of Representatives (Kansas); Michael J. Graetz, Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University; Mindy Herzfeld, Professor of Practice, University of Florida; Michael Knoll, Theodore K. Warner Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Adam N. Michel, Director, Tax Policy Studies, Cato Institute; William Morris, Global Tax Policy Leader, PwC US; Michael Plowgian, Principal, KPMG; Kyle Pomerleau, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute; Julie A. Roin, Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Karl Russo, National Economics and Statistics Leader, PwC; Luisa Scarcella, Global Policy Lead, International Chamber of Commerce; Brad Schneider, US House of Representatives (Illinois).
STRENGTHENING CYBER PARTNERSHIPS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 7/21, 9:00-10:00am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for a New American Security. Speakers: Dr. Duyeon Kim, Adjunct Senior Fellow, Indo-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security; Mihoko Matsubara, Chief Cybersecurity Strategist, NTT Corporation; Dr. Teng Wei-Chung, Professor and Chairman, Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology; Dr. Sherwin Ona, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Developmental Studies, De La Salle University; Moderator: Vivek Chilukuri, Senior Fellow and Program Director, Technology and National Security Program, Center for a New American Security.
TOKYO AS A WINDOW FOR GLOBAL JAPAN: A CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR YURIKO KOIKE. 7/21, 11:00am-Noon (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Hudson Institute. Speakers: Yuriko Koike, Governor, Tokyo; Kenneth R. Weinstein, Japan Chair.
REPORT ROLLOUT: MESH SENSING FOR AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE. 7/21, 11:00-11:45am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Missile Defense Project, CSIS. Speakers: Tom Karako, Director, Missile Defense Project and Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department, CSIS; Masao Dahlgren, Fellow, Missile Defense Project, CSIS.
POLICY INNOVATION FROM TOKYO TO THE WORLD. 7/21, 3:00-4:30pm, IN PERSON ONLY, 555 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Room 426, Washington, DC. Sponsor: Edwin O. Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins SAIS. Speaker: Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike.
CORONAVIRUS AND NORTH KOREAN HUMAN RIGHTS: REGIME RESPONSES AND FUTURE INSTABILITY SCENARIOS. 7/21, 3:00-4:30pm (EDT), IN PERSON ONLY. Sponsor: Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK). Speakers: Robert Collins, Author, Coronavirus and North Korean Human Rights; Col. David Maxwell, Board Member, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK); Jaewoo Park, Journalist, Radio Free Asia (RFA); Moderator: Greg Scarlatoiu, President & CEO, Committee for Human Rights in North Korea (HRNK).
THE JAPANESE HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS. 7/22, 10:00-11:00am (JST), 7/21, 9:00-10:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Speaker: Michael Cucek, Faculty Advisor for Asian Studies and an Assistant Professor of Asian Studies at Temple University, Japan Campus.
PRESS CONFERENCE: KIM IJUNG, KOREAN RESIDENTS UNION IN JAPAN (MINDAN). 7/22, 11:00am-Noon (JST), 7/21, 10:00-11:00pm (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan. Speakers: Kim Ijung, President, Central Head Office, Korean Residents Union, Japan
Thursday, July 17, 2025
Japan's 2025 Upper House Elections II
By Takuya Nishimura, APP Senior Fellow, Former Editorial Writer for The Hokkaido Shimbun.
The views expressed by the author are his own and are not associated with The Hokkaido Shimbun.
You can find his blog, J Update here.
July 14, 2025. Special to Asia Policy Point
As Japan’s Upper House election campaigns enter their last week, policies toward foreigners in Japan have become prominent. Most parties, whether they are part of the current coalition or not, support the immigration of foreign workers to fill labor shortages.,
However, one small populist party, Sanseito [参政党, lit. 'Political Participation Party'; translated as the Party of Do it Yourself!! in English] appears to have attracted substantial support (largely at the expense of the LDP and Komeito) by arguing that the Japanese should operate the country by themselves and reduce their dependence upon foreign workers. This issue has now taken on considerable importance.
Sanseito was established in 2020 as an alternative to current traditional parties by reaching out to potential supporters via the Internet and social media. In 2022, the party’s leader, Sohei Kamiya, became the first party member to win election to the Upper House. In the Lower House election in 2024, the party garnered three more seats. Sanseito has about 150 seats in local assemblies, including the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, in which the party won three seats in June.
Sanseito has adopted “The Japanese First” as its catch phrase in the Upper House election campaign, much like the terms “America First” or “Make America Great Again” used by U.S. President Donald Trump. The party is clearly right wing. In a July 3 press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Club, Sanseito’s leader, Sohei Kamiya, listed four foreign parties that Sanseito felt closest to: the most conservative part of the Republican Party in the U.S., Alternative for Deutschland in Germany, the National Rally in France, and Reform U.K. in Britain.
Sanseito’s founding principle is anti-globalism. “There is globalism behind the scenes in our current economic stagnation, in which multinational companies collect money through deregulation, accelerating poverty and ruining the middle class,” Kamiya said in a debate of eight party leaders at the Japan National Press Club (JNPC) on July 2.
Sanseito’s party platform for the Upper House election includes regulations that would prohibit excessive entry of foreign workers and the purchase of real property by foreigners. Calling Sanseito by its nickname, the “Party of Do It Yourself,” Kamiya believes that Japan can rebuild without foreign workers by taking advantage of such technologies as artificial intelligence and robotics, even if Japan has a smaller population in the future.
These policies prove a xenophobic aspect of Sanseito. “Japan has no anti-espionage law and no strict punishment for foreigners’ crimes or false advantages (in taxation or welfare),” Kamiya said at the JNPC debate. That statement ignited a controversy on policies for foreigners. As a matter of fact, Japan has Special Secret Protection Act and Economic Security Promotion Act. Crimes by foreigners in 2024 declined by half from 2005. Newspapers published editorials that opposed exclusion of foreigners.
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has supported foreign workers as a solution to labor shortages in Japan. To address complaints about advantages for foreign workers, the LDP proposes to end illegal immigration into Japan. Opposition parties have been critical of the deteriorating situation of foreign workers. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, for example, stresses the need to build “a multi-cultural coexisting society.” The Democratic Party for the People (DPP), however, agrees with Sanseito on a prohibition on foreign ownership of real property.
Sanseito could be a threat to the LDP. In a poll by Kyodo News in late June, Sanseito took the second position behind the LDP with an 8.1 percent approval rating in proportional districts in the Upper House election. There is a speculation that Sanseito will win ten or more seats.
Sanseito has staked out ultra-conservative positions on other issues unrelated to immigration. The party interprets the Emperor as “sacred and inviolable” in their draft of new constitution of Japan, using the term in pre-war Constitution of the Empire of Japan. Sanseito would also redefine the Self-defense Force as a military force.
It is likely that Sanseito has won over some LDP conservative supporters. Kamiya judges that some disappointed LDP supporters shifted to the DPP, and then they came to Sanseito, frustrated with the liberal DPP.
Given this surge of support for right-wing causes, the LDP is under serious pressure in the prefectural districts. In some traditionally conservative districts, the LDP is in a close race with opposition parties.
Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba had anticipated gains in popular support for the LDP with the conclusion of tariff negotiations with the U.S. before the campaign season opened on July 3. That did not happen. Aggravating the situation was a July 7 letter from Trump threatening a 25 percent tariff rate starting on August 1. “It’s a battle of our national interest. We won’t be taken advantage of,” Ishiba said in a campaign rally on July 9, using unusually aggressive language for a prime minister.
It seems to be the time for the LDP to face the negative aspects of their past policies. Importing foreign labor and prioritizing car manufacturers over other industries have too heavily focused on a “growth-oriented” economy. The LDP put aside some problems caused by these policies such as the impact of labor imports on people’s life or the damage on agriculture from trade deals with the U.S. or other countries. As a result, they made a room for a populist party to step in.
Sunday, July 13, 2025
Monday Asia Policy Events, July 14, 2025
DISINFORMATION & MISINFORMATION: CURRENT HAPPENINGS IN JAPAN, THE U.S. AND BEYOND. 7/14, 6:30-8:00pm (JST), 5:30-7:00am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies, Temple University Japan. Speakers: Matthew Blomberg Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Journalism, Temple University Japan; John W. Cheng Ph.D., Associate Professor, Department of International Communication, Aoyamagaukin University.
CAN A GLOBAL INITIATIVE ON HEALTH TAXES FINANCE DEVELOPMENT? 7/14, 1:30-2:30pm (BST), 8:30-9:30am (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Center for Global Development (CDG). Speakers: Jeremias Paul Jr, Coordinator, Tobacco Control Economics Unit, WHO; N.K. Singh, Former Chairman, Fifteenth Finance Commission of India; Member, Task Force on Fiscal Policy for Health; Moderator: Pete Baker, Deputy Director, Global Health Policy Program and Policy Fellow, CGD.
THE TARIFF DEAL: RECIPROCITY, TRADE BALANCE, AND INDUSTRY. 7/14, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI). Speakers: Wendy Cutler, Vice President and Managing Director of the DC Office, Asia Society Policy Institute; Tami Overby, Partner of Government Relations, DGA-Albright Stonebridge Group; Sarah Ahn, Economic Minister, Embassy of the Republic of Korea; Moderator: Scott Snyder, President and CEO, KEI.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. 7/14, 10:30-11:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Society for International Development, United States Chapter. Speakers: Michael Gubser, Professor of History, James Madison University; Samuel A. Worthington, Author, Prisoners of Hope; Moderator: Anne Simmons-Benton, Co-Head of the U.S. Delegation to the W20 and Principal, Deep Water Point, LLC.
REIMAGINING EU RESEARCH AND INNOVATION POLICY FOR GLOBAL IMPACT. 7/14, 1:00-2:30pm (CET), 7:00-8:30am (EDT), HYBRID. Sponsor: Centre for European Policy Studies. Speakers: Andrea Renda, Director of Research, Centre for European Policy Studies; Stefaan Verhulst, Co-Founder, GovLab and DataTank; Research Professor, New York University; Lisa Goerlitz, Head, Brussels Office and EU Advocacy, Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevoelkerung (DSW); Sylvia Schwaag Serger, President, Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences (IVA); Professor, Lund University; Gunilla Carlsson, Deputy Executive Director, UNAIDS; Former Minister for International Development Cooperation, Sweden; Antoine Mercier, Science and Technology Counsellor, Permanent Representation of France to the EU; Michiel Scheffer, Principal Adviser; President, EIC Board, DG RTD, European Commission; Rosalind Kenny Birch, Second Secretary for Research and Innovation, UK Mission to the EU.
REPORT LAUNCH: RUSSIA’S FUTURE RULERS. 7/14, 2:00pm (EDT), VIRTUAL. Sponsor: Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council. Speakers: Anton Barbashin, Co-founder & Editorial Director, Riddle Russia; Evelyn Farkas, Executive Director, McCain Institute; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, US Department of Defense; Mikhail Zygar, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Moderator: Brian Whitmore, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Eurasia Center, Atlantic Council; Assistant Professor of Practice, University of Texas-Arlington.